Free Will and Determinism: is the "focus" exception valid?

[Grames]

I agree that consciousness is finite & active and that mental objects are passive, but it would seem that whatever discretion the brain uses during the “searching” process would fall back into that damned deterministic process; and to the extent, if any, that there is not discretion (random searching) there cannot be free will.

But what I choose to pay attention to or ignore would also be “determined” in the same manner.

How is the existence of this deterministic process applied to a human conceptual level consciousness proven in a way that avoids the logical fallacies of composition and division?

I say it can't be done, you are merely assuming.

[Thumos]

How is the existence of this deterministic process applied to a human conceptual level consciousness proven in a way that avoids the logical fallacies of composition and division?

Decisions made at the conceptual level (which derives its means from the perceptual level) have precedents that are not original to the decision maker, these precedents are direct and determined by the mechanistic laws of the universe. Since the link is direct (if it isn’t, please illuminate the transcendent feature…I have already addressed the ‘choice to ignore determining’ factors at #25) I am not sure why composition and division are applicable, those “fallacies” refer to categorical classifications.

I restate my closing questions at #21

[Marc K.]

I agree that decisions are a function of both biases (I am using the word to mean a tactical level of my ultimate ends) and knowledge (from experiences). Since, ultimately, one does not originate either of those two things it is hard for me to see how a decision to focus can be made with free will.

So you are saying that one does not decide whether to gain knowledge or not? And then the actual gaining of the knowledge just proceeds without any effort from the actor?

but it would seem that whatever discretion the brain uses during the “searching” process would fall back into that damned deterministic process; and to the extent, if any, that there is not discretion (random searching) there cannot be free will.

Here's the problem, your understanding of what free will is. It is not a random process. If you are searching randomly for a demonstration that free will is random, you won't find it.

But what I choose to pay attention to or ignore would also be “determined” in the same manner.

By using the word "choose" here you have already accepted free will. Please restate this sentence without using the word "choose" and then tell me if that new sentence comports with reality as you know it.

[Grames]

Decisions made at the conceptual level (which derives its means from the perceptual level) have precedents that are not original to the decision maker, these precedents are direct and determined by the mechanistic laws of the universe. Since the link is direct (if it isn’t, please illuminate the transcendent feature…I have already addressed the ‘choice to ignore determining’ factors at #25) I am not sure why composition and division are applicable, those “fallacies” refer to categorical classifications.

I restate my closing questions at #21

So, presumably you infer from the entities we see about us to the "mechanistic laws of the universe". Then you demand that a conceptual level consciousness obey those same "mechanistic laws of the universe". On what possible ground is this demand justified? Why should a conceptual level consciousness obey the same "mechanistic laws of the universe"?

[Thumos]

Marc, welcome to the conversation.

So you are saying that one does not decide whether to gain knowledge or not? ...

I am saying that the decision to gain knowledge was determined (not that there wasn’t a decision).

Here's the problem, your understanding of what free will is. It is not a random process.

I agree that it is not random (I qualified the sentence with “if any”…just trying to cover the bases).

By using the word "choose" here you have already accepted free will. Please restate this sentence without using the word "choose" and then tell me if that new sentence comports with reality as you know it.

"What I decide to pay attention to or ignore would also be “determined” in the same manner."

I am not trying to be smug here (the human experience without free will seems very bleak), what I am trying to do is escape what I see as a “catch-22,” which I outlined in the last two paragraphs of my original post. (I believe you were alluding to one leg of the 'catch' here)

[Thumos]

So, presumably you infer from the entities we see about us to the "mechanistic laws of the universe". Then you demand that a conceptual level consciousness obey those same "mechanistic laws of the universe". On what possible ground is this demand justified?

Why do you use the word “demand?” I am “asserting” that people’s decisions are rooted in those laws…to the extent that they ultimately do not originate them.

Why should a conceptual level consciousness obey the same "mechanistic laws of the universe"?

If the conceptual level consciousness is capable of generating output (i.e.: making a decision) then that output is a function, ultimately, of things that are not original to it. (I feel as though I am just reiterating my position, is there a miscommunication here?)

Again, I restate my closing questions at #21

[Grames]

Why do you use the word “demand?” I am “asserting” that people’s decisions are rooted in those laws…to the extent that they ultimately do not originate them.

If the conceptual level consciousness is capable of generating output (i.e.: making a decision) then that output is a function, ultimately, of things that are not original to it. (I feel as though I am just reiterating my position, is there a miscommunication here?)

Again, I restate my closing questions at #21

Demand, assert, whatever. Both terms identify your arbitrary and logically unsupported prejudice.

Yes there is a miscommunication. You fail to answer the questions addressed to you. Its your turn to come up with a responsive answer.

How is the existence of this deterministic process applied to a human conceptual level consciousness proven in a way that avoids the logical fallacies of composition and division? Why should a conceptual level consciousness obey the same "mechanistic laws of the universe"?

[brian0918]

This has been a very interesting read! However, it seems that the discussion is breaking down. I would suggest that in future posts, the respondent reply to each and every individual sentence/paragraph of a post before making new statements of their own.

Thumos, what I see as the problem with your posts (#21 which you continually point to also has this problem) is that you are requesting that people first assume determinism is true, or at least accept it as a possibility, then show it is false. In the same way that one should not accept "God" as a possibility without evidence or rationale, one should also not accept determinism without evidence or rationale.

I can not say for sure without thinking about it more, but it seems like this whole thing may come down to linguistic confusion. What is meant by "determinism"? It does not seem possible to define this word without using the word "determine", which would then require that, for determinism to be true or at least acceptable as a possibility, the causal links and their end result would have to be capable of being determined (by a thinking machine or rational being). As was brought up previously, this is impossible to do. And it is not simply impossible because we don't currently fully understand the laws of physics. No, it is and will always be impossible, due to inherent uncertainties and the nature of chaos (e.g. butterfly effect).

Not only can we not write down a time-dependent equation to describe the universe; even if we could, we would not be able to make infinitely precise measurements for the initial conditions to plug into that equation. Nor too could we even determine the exact time at a given moment that we want to know what will happen; so even if we had an equation (y=xt+c) and we have the initial conditions known exactly (x=1.666..., c=3.333...), we could not know exactly the time t at which we want to know the state of things - the equation becomes completely useless.

Edited July 15, 2008 by brian0918

[DavidOdden]

This has been a very interesting read!

You are entitled to your opinion. I on the other hand do not find it that interesting. Not repugnant, but not enlightening.

However, it seems that the discussion is breaking down.

That is to be expected. The entire topic is grounded in rationalism, which naturally degenreates when faced with an audience interested in fact and existence.

I would suggest that in future posts, the respondent reply to each and every individual sentence/paragraph of a post before making new statements of their own.

Now consider the mathematics of that suggestion. Each sentence generates an average of 4 sentences in response (that is being very conservative). An initial post of 12 sentences thus engenders a reply of about 48 sentences. The reply to that results in about 200 sentences, which then results in 800 sentences; in a few iterations, we've reached maximum entropy.

The solution to that problem is to ignore the non-essentials. Intellectual honesty demands that a person acknowledge when their position has been refuted, but that's not an enforceable rule.

[brian0918]

Thumos,

Going back to your original post, where you make the distinction between a deterministic universe and an indeterministic one. An indeterministic universe is held to be random. However, the idea of "randomness" cannot be divorced from "predictability". In other words, a random process is merely an unpredictable one - one for which a thinking machine or rational being cannot exactly determine the end result.

Likewise, a deterministic universe is one that can be exactly predicted. Such a universe exists only in the realm of mathematical thought.

All processes have a random - ie, unpredictable - component, however that does not mean that at a higher level, when considering a group of billions of particles, their collective motion cannot be predicted to a reasonable certainty within the desired boundaries of consideration.

So what I'm getting at is that these ideas of "random" and "deterministic" are not truly physical phenomena, but the result of a mind attempting to classify observations and interpretations. What you seem to be trying to do is take these ideas, strip them of their context, and apply them directly to physical entities.

Particles do not interact according to the laws of physics. Rather, the laws of physics are the result of thinking machines and rational beings making observations of particles. Likewise, particles do not move randomly or deterministically. Rather, particle motion is determined to be random or predictable by thinking machines and rational beings.

Going back to responsibility, and given the strict contextual boundaries of the terms "random" and "deterministic", it then becomes a matter of asking why it is necessary for a person's action to be exactly predictable by an outside observer (either in advance of the action, or after-the-fact through precise measurement and calculation), in order for that person to be held responsible for that action?

Edited July 15, 2008 by brian0918

[brian0918]

You are entitled to your opinion. I on the other hand do not find it that interesting. Not repugnant, but not enlightening.That is to be expected. The entire topic is grounded in rationalism, which naturally degenreates when faced with an audience interested in fact and existence.

I still succumb to rationalistic tendencies (e.g. when I tried to conclude that the will to survive didn't exist by explaining its evolution, and KendallJ put me in my place), so it was interesting to work my way out of that trap.

Edited July 15, 2008 by brian0918

[Marc K.]

I am saying that the decision to gain knowledge was determined (not that there wasn’t a decision).

And how about gaining knowledge? Is it possible without volition? NO. Another catch-22? No, catch-22's don't exist -- and that whole last post seemed like a catch-22 inside a catch-22.

I'm trying to figure out what question you are asking since this is in the "Questions about Objectivism" forum.

If the question is: is the "focus" exception valid? The answer is: there is no "focus" exception.

If the question is: is your definition of free will correct? The answer is: No.

If the question is: is your description of the "Nature of the Universe" accurate? The answer is: No.

If you have other questions or would like to know why you are wrong, feel free to ask.

To move the thread along, let me ask: Do you accept that you possess free will? If not, why not? Are you having trouble demonstrating it to yourself?

[Thumos]

I would like to state that I am trying to work my way out of this, so please do not get defensive or dismissive (I am not attacking Objectivism, I am trying to understand it…..I have read the whole canon, but this is the one point that always bothered me).

I really do appreciate the replies, but I wish you guys would be a bit more descriptive on where you think my model is flawed. For instance, Grames, I really do not understand how composition/division would apply to the “chain of events” in decision making (I always thought it was more for part vs. whole considerations).

Brian:

“are requesting that people first assume determinism is true, or at least accept it as a possibility, then show it is false” – that is the catch-22 I am talking about. I am trying to understand how either the #21 regression is not valid, or how Free Will can exist within it.

Your last two paragraphs are interesting, but I am not sure why the universe would have to be ‘knowable’ to be deterministic, could you expand on that? For instance, it doesn’t matter that a fish can’t understand the concept of ‘enclosure’, it is still stuck in its bowl (depressing).

Re #35: Particle motion exists independent of man’s classification of it.

David:

I am trying to understand why my (unfortunate/reluctant) position has been refuted. Has the decision making process ever struck you as being deterministic? How were you able to get out of it? (what piece of the puzzle am I missing?)

Marc:

To make sure you (and others) understand what I mean by the ‘focus exception,’ I am referring to OTPAR ch 2 under The Primary Choice as the Choice to Focus or not, a dozen paragraphs in or so:

“Until a man is in focus, his mental machinery is unable to function…The choice to ‘throw the switch’ is thus the root choice, on which all others depend.”

How can a man “choose” to “throw the switch” if his ‘mental machinery was not functioning’ during the decision? If it was functioning and he was not in control of it before he threw the switch, how is he responsible for the ‘choice?’ (same for if the switch was thrown randomly)

My apologies to Dr. Piekoff, I do not mean to belittle the book by focusing the microscope on two sentences.

(Note: I will not be able to reply until Sunday)

[brian0918]

Brian:

“are requesting that people first assume determinism is true, or at least accept it as a possibility, then show it is false” – that is the catch-22 I am talking about. I am trying to understand how either the #21 regression is not valid, or how Free Will can exist within it.

Your last two paragraphs are interesting, but I am not sure why the universe would have to be ‘knowable’ to be deterministic, could you expand on that? For instance, it doesn’t matter that a fish can’t understand the concept of ‘enclosure’, it is still stuck in its bowl (depressing).

Re #35: Particle motion exists independent of man’s classification of it.

Please reply to my statements in turn (at least reply to each paragraph), or I do not believe we will get anywhere. I will not add anymore now as I do not want to go off on any tangents.

Edited July 18, 2008 by brian0918

[Grames]

I would like to state that I am trying to work my way out of this, so please do not get defensive or dismissive (I am not attacking Objectivism, I am trying to understand it…..I have read the whole canon, but this is the one point that always bothered me).

I really do appreciate the replies, but I wish you guys would be a bit more descriptive on where you think my model is flawed. For instance, Grames, I really do not understand how composition/division would apply to the “chain of events” in decision making (I always thought it was more for part vs. whole considerations).

A decision, considered as an event, does not exist as an entity. Only entities exist. Causality in the Objectivist version only applies to entities. It is literally the axiom of Identity (A is A) applied to the actions of entities in a dynamic sense, as opposed to their attributes in a static sense. Thus we do not ever have events causing other events, only entities acting in accordance with their natures, possibly impinging upon other entities.

Now whether you consider the fundamental level of analysis of decision making to be atoms, molecules, or neurons, those units begin in one state and transition to another state. Once the problem has been correctly restated in terms of these units, there is no way to deduce from the deterministic nature of each unit a deterministic nature for the whole person.

We know each unit and the whole person must operate in accordance with causality because causality is an axiomatic metaphysical principle which applies to all entities directly and equally, of any and all levels of complexity, bypassing the problem presented by the distributive fallacies. But causality is more general than determinism. For any given state of a unit and its input, determinism requires a single possible subsequent state. Causality merely requires that starting from a given state an entity must act in accordance with its nature, leaving open the possibility of an entity which selects one alternative of several possible subsequent states. Although bricks, car engines, and computers are deterministic one cannot generalize from inanimate entities to biological entities having a conceptual consciousness. Thus there is no way to logically prove volition is impossible.

None of the above is the same as validating volition, for that a separate appeal to your perception is necessary and sufficient.

Now I guess that what you really want (because I want it also) is a general theory of consciousness and volition, some kind of story to displace the deterministic story which has such large explanatory power over the inanimate world. This story would perhaps be stated in information theoretic terms, specifying minimum requirements for computing power, memory capacity, bandwidth of the senses, and turn upon a holographic theory of brain function. But no such theory yet exists. The ancient greeks proved on a theoretical basis that the world was round and composed of atoms, but thousands of years passed before the globe was circumnavigated and the atom split, finally reducing theory to practice and abstraction to perception. We'll have to wait.

[Thumos]

....one should not accept "God" as a possibility without evidence or rationale, one should also not accept determinism without evidence or rationale.

True, nor should one accept free will without evidence or rationale (which I am questioning/seeking).

#33 – Regarding the Mathematics of Determinability

I do not dispute that there are limits to knowledge, but I don’t understand why having an omniscient agent (or capability) is any more necessary than having a “determiner” (god). Why should either be a pre-requisite of acknowledging that we find ourselves in a universe that has causes & effects and that our decisions take place subject to the same rules?

#35 – Random vs Deterministic Universe

I think there is an important distinction to be made: the decisions made by humans generally involve mental objects that do not behave like sub-atomic particles (unless you are a physicist). In addition, based on my understanding (as discussed at #5 & #7), the actual mechanics of a decision are conducted at an aggregated level of matter whereby the randomness known to exist at the sub-atomic level cancels itself out.

[brian0918]

I do not dispute that there are limits to knowledge, but I don’t understand why having an omniscient agent (or capability) is any more necessary than having a “determiner” (god).

Neither do I understand. But that seems to be what you are suggesting by using terms like "random" and "determinism". I think you need to define these terms exactly without reference to human knowledge. "Random" as I understand it applies to unpredictability, which has no connection to the physical world but is simply an end result of human investigation. I would thus like to see a definition of "determinism" which does not also rely on human understanding or observation.

we find ourselves in a universe that has causes & effects and that our decisions take place subject to the same rules?

I think Grames in post #40 has explained this as clearly as it will get. I would be interested in your response to his statements in that post.

I think there is an important distinction to be made: the decisions made by humans generally involve mental objects that do not behave like sub-atomic particles (unless you are a physicist). In addition, based on my understanding (as discussed at #5 & #7), the actual mechanics of a decision are conducted at an aggregated level of matter whereby the randomness known to exist at the sub-atomic level cancels itself out.

Why does the canceling out of unpredictability (randomness) matter with respect to assigning blame and placing judgment on human actions? Must actions be predictable in order for blame to be assigned? (this question seems nonsensical because your use of the word "random" is also nonsensical in this situation - you are using the word outside of its defined context).

Edited July 20, 2008 by brian0918

[Thumos]

Grames, (RE:#40)

O.K. now I see what you mean. I think this is the most interesting reply so far (and the most grounded in OTPAR terminology which, since I imagine we are all familiar, might aid in communication) perhaps we should narrow the focus of the conversation a bit to #40 (though I’ll gladly continue other strings)…I would be interested to see what some of the other think.

I am going to have to reflect on this for a while, but to get the conversation going I’ll start with the following (my underline):

....But causality is more general than determinism. For any given state of a unit and its input, determinism requires a single possible subsequent state. Causality merely requires that starting from a given state an entity must act in accordance with its nature, leaving open the possibility of an entity which selects one alternative of several possible subsequent states....

How does one go about selecting?

Edited July 20, 2008 by Thumos

[Thumos]

Neither do I understand. But that seems to be what you are suggesting by using terms like "random" and "determinism". I think you need to define these terms exactly without reference to human knowledge....

Oh, it’s just a miscommunication then; by “determined” I mean: result of causality, ‘chain of events,’ etc…having to do more with the nature of the universe (independent of mans ability to perceive it).

Must actions be predictable in order for blame to be assigned?

That is one of the things I am asking - part of the catch-22 I am talking about: If your actions are a causal necessity then “you couldn’t help it,” if there was no causal relationship then “you didn’t cause it.”

Edited July 20, 2008 by Thumos

[Seeker]

Oh, it’s just a miscommunication then; by “determined” I mean: result of causality, ‘chain of events,’ etc…having to do more with the nature of the universe (independent of mans ability to perceive it).

That is one of the things I am asking - part of the catch-22 I am talking about: If your actions are a causal necessity then “you couldn’t help it,” if there was no causal relationship then “you didn’t cause it.”

The answer is: free will does not violate causality but is an instance of it wherein you are the cause, you determine the outcome, and do so by choosing, wherein your choice did not have to be what it was, i.e. it could have been otherwise. Which is to say that it was not wholly necessitated by antecedent conditions, a proposition that you can validate for yourself in the applicable context. And thus: you could help it and you did cause it. No catch-22 here.

[brian0918]

The answer is: free will does not violate causality but is an instance of it wherein you are the cause, you determine the outcome, and do so by choosing, wherein your choice did not have to be what it was, i.e. it could have been otherwise. Which is to say that it was not wholly necessitated by antecedent conditions, a proposition that you can validate for yourself in the applicable context. And thus: you could help it and you did cause it. No catch-22 here.

I think this is a well-written response, although Thumos will obviously respond by saying that if any part of such a decision is not necessitated by antecedent conditions, then it was random and therefore violated causality somehow. But then you simply have to point out that randomness is no more than unpredictability - not a physical entity or event, but an analytical "dead end" for an outside observer. He would then have to show why it is necessary for one person's actions to be entirely predictable by another person in order for those actions to have consequences.

Edited July 21, 2008 by brian0918

[Marc K.]

[...] perhaps we should narrow the focus of the conversation a bit to #40 [...]

How does one go about selecting?

[emphasis added]

The same way you would have us "narrow the focus": volitionally. You see? you are questioning free will while you suggest that we use it: you have stolen the concept. This is another of your "catch-22's" which are really just contradictions which as you know DO NOT EXIST.

This should be expected in any thread that questions the existence of free will and it is why I asked:

To move the thread along, let me ask: Do you accept that you possess free will? If not, why not? Are you having trouble demonstrating it to yourself?

Since free will is axiomatic any effort to deny it presupposes it, which is what you have done here.

So first you should acknowledge that you possess free will and then we can proceed to its validation. There are many little experiments you can perform to demonstrate to yourself that your will is free. You should also understand what "free" means in this case. Dr. Peikoff explains it in the first paragraph of the section in OPAR from which you quoted: "The Primary Choice as the Choice to Focus or Not"; (it has nothing to do with coercion).

Please read some of the other threads on free will and determinism where most of your questions are answered.

[Rounin]

Should/Must I pretend to live in a deterministic universe in which Free Will is possible in order to validate knowledge or have moral responsibility?

I think this is a perfectly rational belief. We can observe that we have the power of volition and of reason, so any meaningful definition of determinism must obviously take that into account. Determinism doesn't negate the existence of volition and reason, rather it adds that the mechanism underlying those mental faculties is subject to the law of causality. I wrote more about this in a previous thread ).

Edited August 10, 2008 by Rounin