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Peikoff versus Determinism: A Critique

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I ran across this article on the 'net and thought it would be valuable to have a critique of it, since it presents a number of objections common to the opponents of Objectivism.

"Piekoff argues in his book Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand that determinism is not the case. I will not present an argument in favor of determinism at this time, but will deconstruct the arguments he presents against it. I will begin on the sixty-seventh page, under the heading "Volition as Axiomatic", because this is the section touted by the index as the validation of free will. It also claimed that there was an argument for it on page 55, but inspection reveals otherwise. Therefore, I begin here.

p. 69 consists essentially of the assertion that, in a deterministic world, epistemology would be useless to man. This is the case, he asserts, because if a person has no choice about what they will think or do, it is irrational to tell them how to guide their thought processes. This argument is fallacious because it assumes that the thought processes of a deterministic thinker would not be changed by interaction with others. There is simply no reason to believe that premise. There is every reason to believe that evolution would equip a deterministic mind with the ability to absorb advice and change the methodologies of its cognition based upon information from other people - "deterministic" does not equal "stupid" or "deaf". Piekoff seems to be under the impression that determinism does not allow for the influence of others to change the course of a life.

On p. 70 he presents... no arguments at all! He asserts that "to ask for... proof is to presuppose the reality of free will", but never bothers to show why. Further down the page, he imperiously declares that volition is "at the foundation of all knowledge." He claims that it is "available to any act of introspection" - this, from a philosophy that claims to prize objectivity above all! (But of course, introspection cannot possibly be jaded by one's preconceptions.) The third full paragraph of this page is essentially nothing more than a series of blind assertions. I'll give you the flavor: "You the reader can percieve... [free will]... simply by observing your own consciousness... you can decide to read attentively and struggle to understand... or you can let your attention wander." At no point in this paragraph does he do anything but continuously assert that free will exists without any evidence. You can see free will, he says, if only you focus just right - and if you don't see it, you're not trying hard enough! For some reason, he sees this as a proof that he is right- we shall see if he decides to actually back this up at any point. His next paragraph is no better: "[Volition] is a philosophic axiom... It is self-evident." Tell that to the consensus of the fields of psychology and neurology, Mr. Piekoff! There are many people who do not believe in free will, therefore it is evident that free will is not self-evident. I contend that this entire page may as well be struck from this book, as it is nothing more than arguments from assertion.

It is on page 71 that we find Piekoff's first -and only- actual argument against determinism. It runs something like this. Man must think in order to know, i.e. he does not have any inborn infallibility. He continues that if man's thought is to be trusted -as it must be since we are men- the mind must have volition to keep its conclusions from ever being predetermined to be wrong. In other words, if you can't avoid coming to wrong conclusions because your brain is controlled by external "puppeteers" (the laws of physics, your biology, etc), you can't trust your brain; ergo, you must believe that these puppeteers don't control your beliefs. First, I'd like to point out that, even if it succeeds, this is simply not an argument for free will. You could use it to argue for the existence of "magic monkey powder" in the brain which altered your beliefs totally at random. Anything so long as they're not predetermined, right? Also, I should point out that the whole argument assumes that you can somehow arrive at your beliefs totally independent of evidence. If your beliefs are determined by the evidence that you personally happen to have run across in your life, what control have you got over them? Finally, I should point out that his conclusion contradicts his premise. He argues in the beginning that we have no inborn infallibility, yet concludes by saying that we do have some faculty that can get us guaranteed true conclusions, just so long as it's used properly.

Page 72 is more or less the same as the above, ergo I stand on what I have written.

In conclusion, I will say that Piekoff's alleged proofs of free will are in fact nothing more than an argument from assertion and a bunch of hand waving, respectively. I have refuted the Objectivist concept of free will. With their base dissolved, the rest of their "integrated" system looks pretty wobbly."

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In conclusion, I will say that Piekoff's alleged proofs of free will are in fact nothing more than an argument from assertion and a bunch of hand waving, respectively. I have refuted the Objectivist concept of free will. With their base dissolved, the rest of their "integrated" system looks pretty wobbly."

I make the motion that since ctrl-y posted the above message against his will, that it be stricken from the record.

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The article was right about one thing: Peikoff did not "prove" free will.

He validated it.

You can't prove free will any more than you can prove that you exist. All you can really do for both free will and existence is "point" to it. I think the word he used was ostensive.

To arrive at the concept of existence, you first point to existents - this chair, that table, etc... and then arrive at the concept of existence - the sum of all existents.

To arrive at the concept of free will, you introspect. Just watch yourself making decisions.

You "point" to existents with your senses. You "point" to free will through introspection.

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I used to argue with myself about the existence of free will; my arguments would go around in circles, until I made the distinction between validating free will (as Peikoff does) and finding a scientific explanation for it.

My internal debate would go something like this: Okay, I can observe myself making decisions. But how do I know this is free will? Maybe this is just a product of *insert scientific explanation here*

A simple answer to this is: Science does not wipe out the phenomenon that it is trying to explain.

When we discovered the mechanism behind vision, it did not "disprove" the fact of vision. If we ever discover the mechanism behind free will, it won't disprove the fact of free will.

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If you're interested in the science behind free will, you might want to see this video of John Searle speaking at Google:

Searle explains two models of the relationship between free will and the brain, and which model he supports. But even Searle's conclusion is tentative; based not on an abundance of evidence to support his model, but rather on contradictions inherent in the other model. Like saying:"There's not too much evidence for this, and for sure there are gaps in our existing knowledge, but there's a lot of evidence that the alternatives are wrong".

I have to say though, I know next to nothing about quantum mechanics - it seems to imply that randomness is inherent in reality itself at least on a micro level. I just don't see how this can be possible.

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p. 69 consists essentially of the assertion that, in a deterministic world, epistemology would be useless to man. This is the case, he asserts, because if a person has no choice about what they will think or do, it is irrational to tell them how to guide their thought processes. This argument is fallacious because it assumes that the thought processes of a deterministic thinker would not be changed by interaction with others.

Smugling free will in by the back door here: If your thoughts are determined, then the fact that they might be changed in the course of blind, determined interactions with other blind, determined humans doesn't make your thoughts any less determined. Billiard balls change direction after colliding with other billiard balls--that doesn't change the fact that their motions are still all determined. Either one's thought processes change in a completely determined manner under the influence of others, in which case Peikoff's argument still fully holds, or else there's something else that does allow one to change one's thought processes (how? blank-out)--in which case, again, Peikoff is correct and there is free will.

There is simply no reason to believe that premise. There is every reason to believe that evolution would equip a deterministic mind with the ability to absorb advice and change the methodologies of its cognition based upon information from other people

No, this is fallacious--if your thought is just like everything else in the universe, fully determined, then there's no way for evolution to introduce something non-deterministic; it's simply impossible, just as evolution couldn't equip a species with the ability to violate the Law of Conservation of Energy. In any case, the concepts of "advice" and "information" assume some degree of free will--the ability to weigh and choose among alternatives in the first case, a selective sorting and integration of data in the other.

- "deterministic" does not equal "stupid" or "deaf".

Only in the sense that "blind" is a better description of a deterministic mind.

Piekoff seems to be under the impression that determinism does not allow for the influence of others to change the course of a life.

First, note the fact that if this argument even addresses Peikoff's argument, then once again free will has been smuggled in the back door here through the word "influence." If influence is used in the sense of a planet deterministically influencing the motion of another one through its gravitation, the resulting motion is still deterministic, as is the thought of the person influenced. If influence is used in the looser sense of the result of a simple interaction that might or might not sway someone's decision, then this means the person influenced has free will--he is able to choose to follow the influence or advice or take cognizance of information or to do otherwise.

The basic error is a stubborn refusal to recognize that determinsim is all or nothing--the mind is just as much a part of the material world as a billiard ball, and if the world is deterministic, then that means that what you think was determined for all time by the conditions at any time in the past, and that fully includes the mind of the determinist. Adding in the influence of other minds is a red herring.

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I make the motion that since ctrl-y posted the above message against his will, that it be stricken from the record.

I suppose that I ought to explain that I intended this statement to be a philosophic joke -- i.e. if the poster or the one writing on the web claims that he doesn't have free will, then he is posting or writing against his will, since he does have free will and denying it won't change that. It's like that statement that someone made (sorry, can't remember who), but it goes something like this: You have free will and you have no choice in the matter.

Or, to put it another way, if you are going to deny that you have free will, like some have who post to oo.net regularly, then please control yourself, because otherwise you are posting without wanting to take responsibility for it. In which case, it ought to be deleted until such time as you do decide that you have free will and are willing to take responsibility for what you post.

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p. 69 consists essentially of the assertion that, in a deterministic world, epistemology would be useless to man. This is the case, he asserts, because if a person has no choice about what they will think or do, it is irrational to tell them how to guide their thought processes. This argument is fallacious because it assumes that the thought processes of a deterministic thinker would not be changed by interaction with others. There is simply no reason to believe that premise.

(emphasis added)

OK, but since I have no choice in whether I believe the premise ... what does it matter if I have a reason to do so or not? Considering the reasons for or against something only makes sense if I have a choice!

A nice example of the inherent self-contradiction of determinism.

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The more I think about it, the more I think that determinism is a type of misintegration. It starts with the premise that all things act according to what impacts on them from outside -- a very narrow view of causation that is sort of a left-over from Aristotle's efficient cause; like billiard balls interacting on a pool table. It then attempts to integrate that with every entity and its every action. And if one does this, then free will must be denied. But, as with other misintegrations, it is a floating abstraction that does not apply to many actions of many entities factually.

The problem is that one cannot account for many actions of entities using this formulation. Even a butterfly's actions cannot be determined by what is impacting on it from the outside, since butterflies can fly against the wind. Some determinists try to compensate for this shortcoming by saying that it is not just external forces but internal forces that must be taken into account. That is, if one had a billiard ball that was spring loaded, and when it was impacted by another billiard ball the spring would unleash its energy, then it would behave differently than a regular billiard ball. This gets a little closer to the Objectivist understanding of causation, that an entity acts according to its nature -- according to what it is; but it attempts to understand even man by a kind of internal spring loaded action. So, even this view becomes a type of misintegration.

The only understanding of causation that accounts for all actions of all entities -- including free will in man -- is the idea that an entity acts according to what it is metaphysically. Man is such that he has free will. He can decide to think and do what he decides to think and do. One's thoughts do not occur due to things impacting on him from the outside and they do not occur from inner springs releasing on the inside. He choses what to think and how to act according to that thinking.

Now, here is an interesting twist. If we were actually living in a fully deterministic universe, whereby even man's mind was controlled by outside factors deterministically, then merely by reading this essay such a mind would begin to behave according to the ideas of this essay -- such a mind would have no choice except to accept the ideas presented here, and he would be pre-determined to accept the idea that he had free will, since he would have no choice in the matter.

In other words, the whole diatribe against Dr. Peikoff's statements regarding free will that began this thread is evidence of free will in the very denial of Dr. Peikoff's stance. A completely deterministic mind would not have the capacity to either approve or reject a statement; it would simply react to the statement and have no capacity to ascertain the truth or falsity of a statement.

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  • 5 weeks later...

Hi,

I agree with Thomas insights on the misintegration on 'determinism'.

Besides the equivocation on 'determinism' I think that there is something similar is happening with 'freedom'. In the objectivism

this is often taken to mean 'the absence of physical coercion'. I take it that the equivalent in the realm of the mind would not be

physical, but mental coercion; being made to think and feel everything you think and feel by and external actor.

There is plenty of evidence to support that the current state of technology doesn't make that possible to any man and I would

also rule out the tentacles of the flying spaghetti monster (or god).

"Volitional" means selected from two or more alternatives that were possible under the circumstances, the difference being

made by the individual's decision, which could have been otherwise.(Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism")

So an act of free will in the objectivist sense simply means a choice by an individual, free from mental coercion, among

alternatives (the very existence of alternatives implies that the choice could have been otherwise).

Opponents of the notion of free will however seem to take freedom to be 'the absence of the need to be a part of reality' or

any equivalent of that formulation that makes it possible for mans mind not to be bound by the laws of nature (and part of it).

Of course that is an unreasonable demand that I suspect is rooted in dismay about having to face the negative consequences

of ones own bad choices (bad in the sense of not giving the effects in reality that the actor intended).

Instead of conceding the invalidity of their demand and accepting the need to adjust ones mind to reality (it can not be the other way around)

they hold on to it and draw the conclusion that reality doesn't allow for freedom (which is true according to their notion of it); man has no free will.

If a man has no free will (now in the objectivist sense of being forced, this is the equivocational reasoning part) than he

can not be held accountable for his actions (the criminal’s actions are beyond his control or ‘but his intentions where good!, but he didn’t mean it!’) and

the corollary is that the notion of 'merit' becomes invalid (you just happen to be so lucky to be caused to excel).

Needless to say that I personally think understanding and accepting the objectivist notion of free will is extremely

important to a persons acceptance or rejection of the whole of the objectivism ethics. If you reject it on the basis of the

efficient cause notion of determinism described by Thomas in combination with a desire to be free from the demand that

reality imposes on your mind to discover the causes that lead to the effects you desire in your life than you will end up a subjectivist.

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