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Rand, Abelard and Universals.

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I've been writing a paper on universals. It's pretty much a defense of conceptualism, since I was given a limited amount of topics to choose from and defending a general conceptualist thesis seemed best. Conceptualism is often seen as a form of soft nominalism, but that's really just because anything that isn't a form of realism (Universals are things that adhere in objects themselves, in Objectivist lingo you'd call it "Intrinsicism") is put in the Nominalist school. To give a somewhat sophomoric description of the school of thought; universals exist in the mind, independent of reality. We create universals from perceived similarities in things.

The most noted conceptualist, who really spelled out the first theory of conceptualism that I know of, was Peter Abelard. We read commentaries on him for class and I decided to look more deeply into his views myself for this paper. Abelard's views are remarkably close to Rand's in many respects. This is quite obvious in his identification that universals are not extended out into reality, but are based on the perception of unity amongst classes of objects. Abelaard thought there was a completely objective process to gain knowledge about universals and that there was a right way and a wrong way to group things as "universals". He espoused a view very close to Rand's theory of measurement omission. We see two objects, like distinctly crafted tables, and we ignore the features of both that are different and form our universal based on their similarities to one another. Clearly this is echoed in Rand, and she deems that which two distinct entities have in common "the conceptual common denominator".

What we have in Abelard, and in Rand, is a rejection of realism and nominalism. We can't class together things either based merely on linguistic trends or on a detached metaphysical view of universals. Universals are neither social myths nor properties that exist in objects without the perception of them.

I decided to do what any rigorous, tenacious scholar hell-bent on finding proof of my thesis that Rand and Abelard can at least be lumped together in a general school of thought on universals: I googled it googling. "Abelard and Rand": The first thing that came up was an article expressing my very opinion of the matter. Really don't know who the author is at all, and it certainly isn't an academic resource. Nevertheless, it's a pretty decent analysis of the two philosophers with only a few things to quibble about.

Rand lumps together conceptualists with the nominalists, implying they are both of the same philosophic strain: subjectivism. Based on the evidence, I'd have to disagree with Rand on that. We can at least say there are glaring similarities between the two schools, especially in regards to Peter Abelard. Perhaps it is because Rand never encountered any writings of Abelard or commentary on him? I certainly haven't found any proof that she did. That's unfortunate. I always find it very satisfying when I have an idea, and someday find out some extremely smart guy came to the same basic conclusion.

So, have any other O'ists run across this before? I'm next to ignorant on Abelard. I hadn't heard his name until this semester in a topics in metaphysics course. I'd love to have someone enlighten me on the situation; am I wrong or right in seeing similarity here?

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The most noted conceptualist, who really spelled out the first theory of conceptualism that I know of, was Peter Abelard. We read commentaries on him for class and I decided to look more deeply into his views myself for this paper. Abelard's views are remarkably close to Rand's in many respects. This is quite obvious in his identification that universals are not extended out into reality, but are based on the perception of unity amongst classes of objects. Abelaard thought there was a completely objective process to gain knowledge about universals and that there was a right way and a wrong way to group things as "universals". He espoused a view very close to Rand's theory of measurement omission. We see two objects, like distinctly crafted tables, and we ignore the features of both that are different and form our universal based on their similarities to one another. Clearly this is echoed in Rand, and she deems that which two distinct entities have in common "the conceptual common denominator".

What we have in Abelard, and in Rand, is a rejection of realism and nominalism. We can't class together things either based merely on linguistic trends or on a detached metaphysical view of universals. Universals are neither social myths nor properties that exist in objects without the perception of them.

I don't know anything about Abelard, sorry, but if you haven't already, I'd recommend reading David Kelley's article, "A Theory of Abstraction," published first in 1984 in Cognition and Brain Theory, if you can get your hands on it. If I'm remembering correctly, he discusses theories of abstraction based on similarities, and distinguishes Rand's theory based on the attention she pays to the importance of differences as well as similarities. Might be a helpful read for your paper.

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Yeah, I posted this as a facebook note and another Objectivist pointed this out to me. There is a clear importance in difference. In fact, if two things were qualitatively identical you probably couldn't say there was a universal or essence there. It's a good point.

I'll post my response from there here as well.

"I guess my point is not so much that she and Abelard are identical, but that Rand could be defined as a conceptualist. I don't see something in the conceptualist approach to universals that ruses out the Objectivist answer. On the contrary, it seems Rand shares much more in common with folks like Abelard (and also with Aquinas and Locke and other early moderns) than she does not share with them. So my general point is more posing the question: why isn't Objectivism a form of conceptualism?

Sascha, I think that is how Rand characterizes conceptualists. And I think there is warrant, in that many people who were of the conceptualist school of thought would detach ideas from reality. Our ideas are representations in our minds, we don't know reality in and of itself. So any concept we form is purely a mental construct from other mental imprints that external reality bestows to us from our senses. However, that ignores what I see as the essence of conceptualism. A conceptualist could come to bad conclusions, based on other epistemological/metaphysical views they already held. However, Objectivists have a direct realist approach to perception, which I think can justify a conceptualist approach as objective, although mind dependent.

Or I could be totally wrong."

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It is my understanding that for Abelard, a universal is a natural kind arrived at by ignoring certain features.

For Rand, a universal is a measurement-omission. And she had a very specific idea about what that entails. We don't acquire universals simply by ignoring certain features. We find what varies quantitatively among units and omit them on the principle that "the omitted measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity".

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Oh, I wasn't trying to say that your thesis is incorrect or that you're overstating the similarities between Rand and Abelard. As I said, I know nothing about him, and I think it sounds like a very interesting subject to explore. From your first post, it looks to me like you have a very reasonable basis of argument that Rand could fall in this school of thought as you've defined it. I was just recommending a resource that I know of that I thought might help you.

Incidentally, I'd be interested to read the paper when you finish with it.

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It is my understanding that for Abelard, a universal is a natural kind arrived at by ignoring certain features.

For Rand, a universal is a measurement-omission. And she had a very specific idea about what that entails. We don't acquire universals simply by ignoring certain features. We find what varies quantitatively among units and omit them on the principle that "the omitted measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity".

Right. I'm reading in some secondary, not-exactly-reputable sources that Abelard thinks something along the lines of Rand with measurement omission, specifically the maxim you quoted. My paper isn't actually due til November. I'll try and see if I can find some better sources for this thesis (It's not the thesis of my paper. My paper is just a defense of conceptualism as being contra both realism and nominalism and being the most plausible general approach to the problem)

Dante,

I don't know the policy of giving out papers. I know there is at least a time limit though. But I'll ask.

Edited by TheEgoist
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