The Prudent Predator argument

[Gary Brenner]

Marc K. wrote:

You have negated your entire argument here.

Not at all. Like the Objectivist, the prudent predator stranded on a desert island would also need ethics. (Ethics is a set of principles for right conduct. It does not necessarily mean respecting the life or possessions of others.)

Edited April 16, 2007 by Gary Brenner

[Gary Brenner]

Marc K. wrote:

This is a joke right? Were you laughing one of those evil laughs when you wrote this?

The only way to properly respond to this level of evasion is to, with sarcasm dripping from my teeth, comment on all of the recent convictions of lions.

My post was not a joke but a way of showing that the use of force is not necessarily contrary to the use of reason.

[Marc K.]

Not at all. Like the Objectivist, the prudent predator stranded on a desert island would also need ethics. (Ethics is a set of principles for right conduct. It does not necessarily mean respecting the life or possessions of others.)

Could the predator (he who lives off the production of others) survive on a desert island?

[Marc K.]

My post was not a joke but a way of showing that the use of force is not necessarily contrary to the use of reason.

So using force against another human being is equal to using force against an animal in your mind? You are an advocate for "animal rights"? Eating a hamburger is equal to murder?

[Gary Brenner]

Marc K. wrote:

So using force against another human being is equal to using force against an animal in your mind? You are an advocate for “animal rights”? Eating a hamburger is equal to murder?

No, the point is, as I’ve shown in this thread, we don’t arrive at a system of rights, a system of Thou Shall Not Aggress Against Others, from the premise that one’s own life is the standard of one’s values. There are just too many circumstances in which self-interest is well served by prudent theft. If you intend to prove that someone is irrational because he has taken money out of another man’s pocket, you must first prove that respecting the possessions of others is essential to thinking rationally. But so far Objectivism has not done that. Therefore, Rand\'s argument provides no better support for human rights than it does for, say, animal rights.

[Moebius]

Could the predator (he who lives off the production of others) survive on a desert island?

Why not? A predator is exactly the same as any other rational being, except that he also has no qualms about taking advantage of someone else if he sees an advantage. Picture two entrepreneurs with the exact same business aptitudes, except one engages in corporate espionage and insider trading, and the other does not.

[Gary Brenner]

Marc K. wrote:

Could the predator (he who lives off the production of others) survive on a desert island?

Let’s first define the limits of the word. Does “predator” apply only to the man who lives entirely by depriving others of their holdings? Or can “predator” also include a man who for the most part trades his labor for a wage but also engages in part-time theft?

Secondly, why not ask if the average non-predator could survive on a desert island? How many members of our modern industrial society know anything about making clothes and shelter directly from natural materials? About finding fresh water? About harvesting edible fruits and herbs? About making weapons to hunt and nets to fish? About making fire for warmth, cooking and light?

[Inspector]

Why not? A predator is exactly the same as any other rational being, except that he also has no qualms about taking advantage of someone else if he sees an advantage.

There is no such thing. Knowledge, and one's premises, are hierarchical. The rejection of the concept of rights rests near the base of one's philosophy and has far-reaching consequences. There is no way that one can hope to be exactly the same as someone who is so radically different at base. Furthermore, even more fundamental is that this rejection requires the acceptance of a Pragmatist's epistemology, which both Gary and Freddy have displayed in spades.

Here is a brief characterization of Pragmatism:

Reason is impotent to know things as they are -- reality is unknowable -- certainty is impossible -- knowledge is mere probability -- truth is that which works -- mind is a superstition -- logic is a social convention -- ethics is a matter of subjective commitment to an arbitrary postulate.

(emphasis mine, to highlight the views that are most prevalent here)

Notice especially Hunterrose's line of questioning: Gary refuses to say that shooting oneself in the head is destructive. He will only state probability, which is no substitute for knowledge. If one shoots oneself and doesn't die, then that "works." (truth is that which works) And note both of their continual insistance that ethics is a matter of subjective commitment to an arbitrary postulate.

[Gary Brenner]

Inspector wrote:

There is no such thing. Knowledge, and one’s premises, are hierarchical. The rejection of the concept of rights rests near the base of one’s philosophy and has far-reaching consequences.

Near the base you say? Just how closely after the premise “A is A” do rights follow? Is it within two or three sentences perhaps? I accept Rand’s epistemology and the foundation of her ethics: that a man’s life is the standard of his values. What I do not accept is the assertion that rights follow from that standard -- closely or otherwise. As I have shown, there are just too many circumstances in which self-interest is better served by taking the possessions of others.

There is no way that one can hope to be exactly the same as someone who is so radically different at base. Furthermore, even more fundamental is that this rejection requires the acceptance of a Pragmatist’s epistemology, which both Gary and Freddy have displayed in spades.

Here is a brief characterization of Pragmatism:

(emphasis mine, to highlight the views that are most prevalent here)

This has nothing to do with me. I reject the idea that “Reason is impotent to know things as they are -- reality is unknowable,” and I have said nothing that remotely resembles that approach.

Notice especially Hunterrose’s line of questioning: Gary refuses to say that shooting oneself in the head is destructive.

That is not what I said at all. I do not deny that a bullet entering one’s skull will cause considerable destruction and most likely death. What I have questioned is that idea that destruction always follows the act of aiming a loaded gun at one’s head and pulling the trigger. Guns have been known to jam, bullets misfire.

He will only state probability, which is no substitute for knowledge.

Am I to understand that you have knowledge that aiming a gun at a man’s head and pulling the trigger will produce destruction 100% of the time? That you have absolute certainty that no gun will ever jam or misfire?

If one shoots oneself and doesn’t die, then that “works.” (truth is that which works)

Straw man. I never made any such statement.

And note both of their continual insistance that ethics is a matter of subjective commitment to an arbitrary postulate.

Straw man. I never made any such statement.

[Groovenstein]

Why not? A predator is exactly the same as any other rational being, except that he also has no qualms about taking advantage of someone else if he sees an advantage. Picture two entrepreneurs with the exact same business aptitudes, except one engages in corporate espionage and insider trading, and the other does not.

How familiar are you with Objectivist principles? I ask because you imply that corporate espionage and insider trading are morally equivalent, whereas to my knowledge Objectivism would not consider them so.

[Marc K.]

The fundamental alternative is existence or non-existence. I have given a test for whether a person is firmly within the realm of existence, [...] my interpretaion of existence or non-existence is the correct one,

Have you read "The Objectivist Ethics" in the Virtue of Selfishness? Because your "interpretation" of what the fundamental alternative is meant to show has absolutely nothing to do with Objectivism. It is clear that you have no idea how the Objectivist ethics is derived.

What conclusions can one draw from your test? Adults exist, babies don't, dogs don't exist and neither do rocks -- not a very good test. More importantly why do you need a test to see if something exists? Do you not trust your own eyes?

With regard to the Objectivist ethics the fundamental alternative is not a test but the answer to the first question one must ask in order to determine whether there is such a thing as an objective code of morality: is there some fact which gives rise to the concept value? I'll give you a hint but the best way to understand the Objectivist ethics (if this is your purpose), is to read it.

Recognizing that the fundamental alternative exists only for a certain class of existents is the first step in a line of reasoning meant to ground the Objectivist ethics in reality, that is, make it objective. The fact that only living things face the fundamental alternative combined with the fact that in order to stay alive living things must act in a certain way -- gives rise to the concept value.

Only living things value. There is no value apart from life. Epistemologically speaking the concept "value" depends upon the concept "life" (this conceptual hierarchy is another good clue as to what's going on in reality).

The other thing you have to remember is that we don't exist as floating abstractions or as a blob of undifferentiated cells. We all exist as something specific. You've had this problem before. A maple tree exists qua maple tree not qua cactus. A salmon exists as a salmon not as a bass. A man must exist as something specific.

What you and Gary Brenner are arguing is that man's life is best served by choosing to live as an animal. To choose to live by force. In this thread you want a man to act like a wolf. Animals deal with each other by force. If man tries to live by force he negates his particular mode of survival, the thing that makes him man, his defining characteristic, his rationality.

The counter argument is

I understand that we are in the debate forum (which is just where we belong) and I might like to debate you, but I would first like to know if this is going to be an honest debate. Will you admit defeat when proven wrong? Do you believe the arguments you are making? Will you admit to mischaracterizing Objectivism, either intentionally or because of ignorance, when it is demonstrated that you don't understand it. Will you propose an objective code of morality and its proof or will you only be arguing against Objectivism? If so, what kinds of arguments are you limited to? Is arbitrary assertion acceptable or must your arguments be based in reality? In your mind is there any way to be certain what is true?

as soon as you consciously choose an suboptimal path to ensure your continued existence, then you are abandoning reason.

Why do you use the word "consciously"? What is meant by "suboptimal path"? Existence as what? If you mean to say "as soon as you choose to act unethically in order to live, you are abandoning reason", then we are in agreement.

Whether pulling the gun is abondoning reason or not depends on what you can rationally expect from it in terms of survival value.

So shooting someone and eating them is reasonable if you're hungry?

[Marc K.]

No, the point is, as I’ve shown in this thread, we don’t arrive at a system of rights, a system of Thou Shall Not Aggress Against Others, from the premise that one’s own life is the standard of one’s values. There are just too many circumstances in which self-interest is well served by prudent theft.

Hold on, let's not change the subject. I gave an example of one man pulling a gun on another to illustrate when reason is abandoned. As a counter example you invoked animal rights. Do you think that animals have rights? If not, why not? What is the essential difference between animals and men?

??????????????????

you must first prove that respecting the possessions of others is essential to thinking rationally. But so far Objectivism has not done that. Therefore, Rand\'s argument provides no better support for human rights than it does for, say, animal rights.

Objectivism will never prove that because it is backward. Respecting the rights of others isn't essential to thinking rationally. Thinking rationally is essential to respecting the rights of others.

Objectivism is organized in a logical fashion with reality and reason being absolute and the base of all knowledge, ethics is the central branch and politics is a derivative branch. All knowledge is arranged in a hierarchy and it can't be violated as you have done here. Principles cannot be derived in reverse.

So you see, you do not understand Ayn Rand's philosophy so I'm not sure how you can say anything definitive about it. Instead of making arguments against that which you do not understand you should really be asking questions and reading some of Ayn Rand's books.

[Gary Brenner]

Marc K. wrote:

Hold on, let’s not change the subject. I gave an example of one man pulling a gun on another to illustrate when reason is abandoned. As a counter example you invoked animal rights. Do you think that animals have rights? If not, why not? What is the essential difference between animals and men?

Pulling a gun on another does not qualify as an example of abandoning reason unless you first prove that reason rules out such behavior. But no such demonstration has been made in this thread. Nor has there been any proof that rights (including the right not to have a gun pulled on you) follow from Rand’s premise that a man’s life is the standard of his values. So your example serves no useful purpose as it assumes a conclusion (the existence of rights) that has not yet been established by logical argument. To make this point, I suggested that killing a hog would also serve as “proof” of the abandonment of reason.

Objectivism will never prove that because it is backward. Respecting the rights of others isn’t essential to thinking rationally. Thinking rationally is essential to respecting the rights of others.

“Respecting the rights of others isn’t essential to thinking rationally,” you say? It follows then that it is possible to think rationally without respecting rights. Therefore, a man who pulls a gun on another has not necessarily abandoned reason.

Objectivism is organized in a logical fashion with reality and reason being absolute and the base of all knowledge, ethics is the central branch and politics is a derivative branch. All knowledge is arranged in a hierarchy and it can’t be violated as you have done here. Principles cannot be derived in reverse.

Your statement that pulling a gun on a man shows the abandonment of reason can either a) be proved or cannot be proved. If it is a) then I will politely await such proof. If it is I will politely ignore the assertion.

So you see, you do not understand Ayn Rand’s philosophy so I\'m not sure how you can say anything definitive about it. Instead of making arguments against that which you do not understand you should really be asking questions and reading some of Ayn Rand’s books.

If I do not understand Ayn Rand’s philosophy and you do, please be so kind as to address her claim that destruction of the looter is the price of looting and provide evidence for it sufficient to overcome the counter-examples that I’ve listed in this thread.

Edited April 17, 2007 by Gary Brenner

[hunterrose]

No, the point is, as I’ve shown in this thread, we don’t arrive at a system of rights, a system of Thou Shall Not Aggress Against Others, from the premise that one’s own life is the standard of one’s values. There are just too many circumstances in which self-interest is well served by prudent theft.

Then is the following a correct interpretation of your metaethics?

You can't arrive at any system of Thou Shall X from the premise that one’s own life is the standard of one's values. There are just too many circumstances in which self-interest is well served by not doing X.

You can't arrive at any system of Thou Shall Not Y from the premise that one’s own life is the standard of one's values. There are just too many circumstances in which self-interest is well served by doing Y.

Rand’s ethics involves a logical gap. It starts with the premise that one’s life is one’s standard of values, and then goes on to prohibit looting without showing that looting is necessarily harmful to the looter’s self-interest.

Your premise is that M is someone's standard of value... and then goes on to prohibit acts that are less likely to obtain M... without showing that said acts are necessarily not going to obtain M? Is this also a "logical gap"?

One should not prohibit the performance of certain acts without first being able to make a logical case that such acts are unlikely to help one attain one’s goals.

Given everything you've said, can you make the non-subjective, non-arbitrary argument that one should prohibit the performance of acts that are unlikely to help one attain one's goals?

Or is Inspector right about your subjective commitments and arbitrary postulates?

[Gary Brenner]

hunterrose wrote:

Then is the following a correct interpretation of your metaethics?

You can’t arrive at any system of Thou Shall X from the premise that one’s own life is the standard of one’s values. There are just too many circumstances in which self-interest is well served by not doing X.

That depends entirely on what X represents. Obviously, if X equals maintaining one’s life, then the above statement is false.

You can’t arrive at any system of Thou Shall Not Y from the premise that one’s own life is the standard of one’s values. There are just too many circumstances in which self-interest is well served by doing Y.

That depends entirely on what Y represents. If Y equals throwing away one’s life, then the above statement is false.

Given everything you’ve said, can you make the non-subjective, non-arbitrary argument that one should prohibit the performance of acts that are unlikely to help one attain one’s goals?

We have already been over this:

Gary Brenner, Post #435:

Moral actions are by definition of greater value in maintaining an ethical standard than actions of moral uncertainty. But that is not to say that that it is necessarily immoral to undertake an action which has an undetermined moral weight. For example, it is moral to further one’s life by taking actions which provide the necessities of survival. Now if I accomplish that task from Monday through Friday, is it immoral to read a trashy book on Saturday and Sunday? The reading of the book adds nothing to the furtherance of my life. It doesn’t make me wiser, healthier, or better equipped to deal with life. It is purely a hedonistic pleasure.

What would be served by revisiting this point?

[hunterrose]

Is the following a correct interpretation of your metaethics?

You can't arrive at any system of Thou Shall X from the premise that one’s own life is the standard of one's values. There are just too many circumstances in which self-interest is well served by not doing X.

If X equals maintaining one’s life, then the above statement is false.

Nope. There are just too many circumstances in which the looter is "well served" by not maintaining his life e.g. if someone (who is more expert at maintaining his life) maintains his life for him. Maybe you were thinking of something else?

We have already been over this...

No, we haven't. Your quote was a statement comparing moral action to actions that are "not necessarily moral and not necessarily immoral." What I'm asking is:

Moral actions are by definition of greater value in maintaining an ethical standard than actions of moral uncertainty...

If we know a given action is more likely to help attain one's goals, how do you make the case that this given action is an ought, given that there are too many circumstances in which self-interest is well served by not doing the action that is likely to help one attain one's goal?

[aequalsa]

Gary,

It strikes me from the content of these posts that you are thinking of ethical principles in reverse. Ethical principles derived with objectivism amount to guides to action. Rules by which you should act to gain or keep values. You should because they are most likely to lead to success.

So if your life is a value, pointing a gun at your head and pulling the trigger is unlikely to be helpful in maintaining that value. The fact that it might jam or only cause brain damage is only something you can know with certainty after the event has occured. Prior to the shooting, the principle don't point guns at your head and pull the trigger is a guide which you derive from reality using reason in an inductive process, which tells you that the probability of that action helping maintain this particular value is not very high. So you choose not to do it. Actual ethical decisions are not made in some rationalistic way whereby you get from the law of identity to slow down when you make a 90 degree turn in a car.

You are looking for particular inductively derived values which are 100% accurate, which is to require an omniscience which humans do not possess.

[exaltron]

Gary,

It strikes me from the content of these posts that you are thinking of ethical principles in reverse. Ethical principles derived with objectivism amount to guides to action. Rules by which you should act to gain or keep values. You should because they are most likely to lead to success.

So if your life is a value, pointing a gun at your head and pulling the trigger is unlikely to be helpful in maintaining that value. The fact that it might jam or only cause brain damage is only something you can know with certainty after the event has occured. Prior to the shooting, the principle don't point guns at your head and pull the trigger is a guide which you derive from reality using reason in an inductive process, which tells you that the probability of that action helping maintain this particular value is not very high. So you choose not to do it. Actual ethical decisions are not made in some rationalistic way whereby you get from the law of identity to slow down when you make a 90 degree turn in a car.

You are looking for particular inductively derived values which are 100% accurate, which is to require an omniscience which humans do not possess.

Thank you!! I (and several others I believe) have asked Gary point blank what it would take to derive an ought, ie, if Rand was unsuccessful, give us an example of a successful derivation of an ought (since I haven't seen him argue that it simply can't be done).

I think this comes down to epistemology: we derive principles from generalizations. We can say that generally speaking, pointing a gun at one's head and pulling the trigger will lead to death.

But according to Gary, unless we can guarantee that every single time from now until eternity, that doing so will lead to certain death, WE'VE FAILED TO DERIVE AN ETHICAL PRINCIPLE!!

Madness I tell you, madness.

[Inspector]

But according to Gary, unless we can guarantee that every single time from now until eternity, that doing so will lead to certain death, WE'VE FAILED TO DERIVE AN ETHICAL PRINCIPLE!!

Just who is looking for a Kantian Categorical Imperative here, anyway?

Really, there are two parts to this; both epistemological (well, one is psycho-epistemological). First, that you can't arrive at principles with pragmatism and probabilities. The second is that looting is psycho-epistemologically destructive. But this requires that emotions and the human mind have identity, which Gary at least has steadfastly denied in favor of pure subjectivism.

[Gary Brenner]

hunterrose wrote:

Nope. There are just too many circumstances in which the looter is “well served” by not maintaining his life e.g. if someone (who is more expert at maintaining his life) maintains his life for him.

If it were true that X may maintain Y’s life as long as X is “more expert at maintaining his life,” then it would apply to the non-looter as well as well as to the looter.

And if it were possible for one to be “more expert at maintaining” another’s life, then the propriety of A running B’s life is a philosophical problem that the Objectivist must grapple with as well. Ayn Rand writes, “Man must choose his actions, values and goals by the standard of that which is proper to man—in order to achieve, maintain, fulfill and enjoy that ultimate value, that end in itself, which is his own life.” (VOS, 27)

But if, as you say, an “expert” can perform this function of achieving, fulfilling and maintaining better than the subject himself, what dissent can the Objectivist offer?

Maybe you were thinking of something else?

Yes, that you still have not explained away all the counter-examples to Rand’s claim that destruction of the looter is the price of looting.

No, we haven’t. Your quote was a statement comparing moral action to actions that are “not necessarily moral and not necessarily immoral.” What I’m asking is:If we know a given action is more likely to help attain one’s goals, how do you make the case that this given action is an ought, given that there are too many circumstances in which self-interest is well served by not doing the action that is likely to help one attain one’s goal?

We don’t make such a case because it is not a “given” that “self-interest is well served by not doing the action that is likely to help one attain one’s goal.”

Edited April 19, 2007 by Gary Brenner

[Gary Brenner]

aequalsa wrote:

Gary,

It strikes me from the content of these posts that you are thinking of ethical principles in reverse. Ethical principles derived with objectivism amount to guides to action. Rules by which you should act to gain or keep values. You should because they are most likely to lead to success.

So if your life is a value, pointing a gun at your head and pulling the trigger is unlikely to be helpful in maintaining that value. The fact that it might jam or only cause brain damage is only something you can know with certainty after the event has occured. Prior to the shooting, the principle don’t point guns at your head and pull the trigger is a guide which you derive from reality using reason in an inductive process, which tells you that the probability of that action helping maintain this particular value is not very high. So you choose not to do it. Actual ethical decisions are not made in some rationalistic way whereby you get from the law of identity to slow down when you make a 90 degree turn in a car.

You are looking for particular inductively derived values which are 100% accurate, which is to require an omniscience which humans do not possess.

1. I never argued that pointing a gun at my head and pulling the trigger is likely to be helpful in maintaining my values. The entire diversion about pointing a loaded gun at one’s head was introduced by hunterrose in a silly attempt to draw a parallel between looting and suicide. I have already demonstrated the irrelevance of that comparison. However, it seems that there is still some remaining dispute over whether death/destruction is a certainty or a high probability when one points the barrel at one’s brain and pulls the trigger. But that discussion is not germane to the issue spelled out in the title of this thread.

2. You say “ethical decisions are not made in some rationalistic way.” That may be true when it comes to setting basic ethical values. But that is not to say that weighing possible risks and benefits has no place in determining day-to-day actions. If a prudent predator after careful study determines that he can take his neighbor’s gold coins with only a very slight chance of being caught, then his analysis is no different in kind from that of the risk-taking stock broker or real estate speculator.

3. I am not looking for “inductively derived values.” I accept the premise that an organism’s life is the standard of its values, and I never suggested that such a premise is derived inductively.

[Gary Brenner]

exaltron wrote:

I think this comes down to epistemology: we derive principles from generalizations. We can say that generally speaking, pointing a gun at one’s head and pulling the trigger will lead to death.

No one on this thread has said otherwise.

But according to Gary, unless we can guarantee that every single time from now until eternity, that doing so will lead to certain death, WE\'VE FAILED TO DERIVE AN ETHICAL PRINCIPLE!!

I never made any such statement. Let’s deal with what I’ve actually said, not with straw men. First of all, as I explained to aequalsa in the post above, I accept Rand’s basic ethical principle that an organism’s life is the standard of its values. I’ve been consistent on this point throughout the thread.

The debate is over what comes after Rand’s premise: whether Rand’s statement that the price of looting is the destruction of the looter is true or false. Since Rand does not say “most of the time,” I have assumed (as have some Objectivists here) that she means in every case.

Yet, as I have shown, a great many looters do not pay the price of destruction. In fact, with regard to the class of state-protected looters (tax collectors), it practically never happens.

So I ask, what is the point of comparing prudent looting (as in state-sponsored theft of taxpayers) to shooting a gun at oneself, when in the case of the latter destruction is an extremely likely outcome whereas in the case of the former destruction hardly ever follows as a direct consequence?

If one values one’s life and wishes to preserve it, one does not put one’s head in the likely path of a speeding bullet. Yet one can hold the same premise and, without contradiction, engage in safe forms of theft.

[Gary Brenner]

Inspector wrote:

Just who is looking for a Kantian Categorical Imperative here, anyway?

Really, there are two parts to this; both epistemological (well, one is psycho-epistemological). First, that you can’t arrive at principles with pragmatism and probabilities. The second is that looting is psycho-epistemologically destructive. But this requires that emotions and the human mind have identity, which Gary at least has steadfastly denied in favor of pure subjectivism.

Fine. Let’s avoid subjectivism altogether. Where is the objective, scientific proof that looting is psycho-epistemologically destructive? I want data confirming that looters have a higher rate of psycho-epistemological damage than non-looters.

[softwareNerd]

It is not always easy to project long-term consequences. In many older style economies, a large proportion of businessmen accept some weak version of the prudent-predator theory, trying to milk short term profit out of deals, with little perspective on the benefits of building reputation. If one looks at India and China, this ethical lesson is not an easy one for the locals to learn when their businesses are opened up to competition. However, after some trial and error, some get the practicality of non-predation and those are the companies that do the best in business.

Edited April 19, 2007 by softwareNerd

[Inspector]

Fine. Let’s avoid subjectivism altogether. Where is the objective, scientific proof that looting is psycho-epistemologically destructive? I want data confirming that looters have a higher rate of psycho-epistemological damage than non-looters.

It is not proved statistically using "data" as you put it. It is proved by knowing the source of self-esteem, which Objectivism does.

Here is an excerpt on the subject of looting and self-esteem. Examine if you will...

...the case of a man who believes that "only suckers work" and seeks a shortcut to wealth by becoming a bank robber, then spends his life in and out of jails, devoting his brief snatches of freedom to the excruciating work of devising ingenious schemes for his next bank robbery.

The explanation lies in the fact that the mental contexts required to produce wealth or to stage a robbery are different, and so are the mental processes involved. The production of wealth requires the personal responsibility of dealing with reality; robbery requires only the outwitting of a few guards or policemen. The formulation of philosophical ideas requires the personal responsibility of observing, judging and integrating the facts of reality on an enormous scale; the faking of ideas requires only the outwitting of careless, frightened or ignorant men. Both the bank robber and the "idiot-philosopher' are psychological parasites. The basic cause in both cases is the same: a mental development arrested by a concrete-bound quest for the unearned. The basic motivation is the same: an overwhelming terror of reality and the desire to escape it.

Man's need of self-esteem is the hater's nemesis. Self-esteem is reliance on one's power to think. It cannot be replaced by one's power to deceive. The self-confidence of a scientist and the self-confidence of a con man are not interchangeable states, and do not come from the same psychological universe. The success of a man who deals with reality augments his self-confidence. The success of a con man augments his panic.

The intellectual con man has only one defense against panic: the momentary relief he finds by succeeding at further and further frauds. To preserve his illusion of superiority becomes his overriding obsession. Superiority—in what? He does not know. He does not function conceptually. He judges people, events and actions "instinctively," i.e., not by what they are, but by what they make him feel. Putting something over on people makes him feel superior—he has long since forgotten (and has never fully known) why.

He has developed a special kind of "instinct" for appraising people: he can "smell" the presence of weaknesses in people, of pretentiousness, uncertainty, self-doubt and fear—particularly fear (not fear of him, but of their common enemy: reality). Such <tnl_155> people make him feel like "a big shot," and his act is successful among them. But when he meets the better type of man, he goes to pieces: what he feels is terror. It is by means of his own terror that he recognizes authentic self-confidence.

The man of authentic self-confidence is the man who relies on the judgment of his own mind. Such a man is not malleable; he may be mistaken, he may be fooled in a given instance, but he is inflexible in regard to the absolutism of reality, i.e., in seeking and demanding truth. The manipulator feels impotent and in mortal danger; his terror of the man is not personal, but metaphysical: he feels stripped of his means of survival.

Remember, as I said, the extent that someone must declare war on reality and on all other men. Unless you think that it is practical to live by clubbing random people over the head, then "prudent" predation must mean fraud. It must mean concealing one's crimes. Such a man's life becomes a quest to eternally conceal the facts of reality (the fact of his crimes, not only that he committed them, but that he is even capable of doing so) from the whole of humanity. Reality and its facts become one's enemy.

Here is some more on that point:

I had been taking an ethics course in college and was thoroughly confused about the virtue of honesty. I was not tempted to be dishonest myself, but I did not see how to prove the evil of lying. (I speak throughout of lying in order to gain some value from others, as against lying to defend oneself from criminals, which is perfectly moral.) ... I had no idea, so I went to Ayn Rand.

She started her answer by asking me to invent the most plausible lie I could think of. I don't remember the details any longer, but I know that I did proceed to concoct a pretty good con-man scheme for bilking investors out of large sums of money. Ayn Rand then analyzed the example patiently, for thirty or forty minutes, showing me on my own material how one lie would lead necessarily to another, how I would be forced into contradictory lies, how I would gradually become trapped in my own escalating deceptions, and why, therefore, sooner or later, in one form or another, my con-man scheme would have to backfire and lead to the loss of the very things I was seeking to gain by it...

The point now, however, lies in what happened next. My immediate reaction to her reply was to amend my initial scheme in order to remove the particular weaknesses she had found in it. So I made up a second con-man scheme, and again she analyzed it patiently, showing that it would lead to the same disastrous results even though most of the details were now different. Whereupon, in all innocence, I started to invent a third scheme (I was only 18). But Ayn Rand by this time was fed up. "Can't you think in principle?" she asked me.

Let me condense into a few paragraphs what she then explained to me at length. "The essence of a con-man's lie," she began, "of any such lie, no matter what the details, is the attempt to gain a value by faking certain facts of reality."

She went on: "Now can't you grasp the logical consequences of that kind of policy ? Since all facts of reality are interrelated, faking one of them leads the person to fake others; ultimately, he is committed to an all-out war against reality as such. But this is the kind of war no one can win. If life in reality is a man's purpose, how can he expect to achieve it while struggling at the same time to escape and defeat reality?"

And she concluded: "The con-man's lies are wrong on principle. To state the principle positively: honesty is a long-range requirement of human self-preservation and is, therefore, a moral obligation."

And if you think that war on reality is somehow compatible with reason, consider one more fact:

Friendship becomes completely impossible to such a man. Friendship is the sharing and recognition of one's values. But a predator sees other men as prey. A man who shared his deepest values would be a fellow predator, and thus a constant threat to his life. He could not be friends with such a man. He also could not be friends with a producer, for he thinks producers to be suckers. Furthermore, any man of reason is a threat to him, as they may discover any of his frauds (or his biggest fraud - the concealment of his true nature). He would have to shun men of reason in favor of fools. Forget about romance; any woman smart enough for him to respect would be smart enough to find him out - or smart enough to plan his murder and escape with the insurance money. He would be genuinely, permanently alone.

People think that a liar gains a victory over his victim. What I've learned is that a lie is an act of self-abdication, because one surrenders one's reality to the person to whom one lies, making that person one's master, condemning oneself from then on to faking the sort of reality that person's view requires to be faked. And if one gains the immediate purpose of the lie—the price one pays is the destruction of that which the gain was intended to serve. The man who lies to the world, is the world's slave from then on.

I found a whole lot more than that, too. For instance, many pages of Chapter 8 of OPAR is devoted to this topic. Here is a brief excerpt:

Theoretical discussion cannot tell us which falsehoods an individual will spread, how many, how skillfully he will do it, or how rapidly the lies will escalate. Philosophy can tell us only this much: reality is a unity; to depart from it at a single point, therefore, is to depart from it in principle and thus to play with a lighted fuse. The bomb may not go off. The liar may blank out the power of his nemesis: that which is, and may get away with any given scheme; he may win the battle. But if such are the battles he is fighting, he has to lose the war...

The liar is a parasite not on people as such, but on people who are deludable—people qua ignorant, blind, gullible. What such people believe and expect—what they expect falsely, thanks to him—this is the power he must deal with and pander to. The liar thinks he has turned others into his puppets, but his course makes him their pawn. It makes him a dependent of the lowest kind: a dependent not merely on the consciousness of others, which is bad enough, but on their unconsciousness. Such a man, in Ayn Rand's words, is a fool—"a fool whose source of values is the fools he succeeds in fooling ...."

A similar analysis applies to every moral virtue and value. Is the liar a man of integrity? His method of action consists in eschewing moral principles and trying to get away with the fraud of the moment. Is he productive? His policy is to live not by his own creative work, but by bilking others of the fruits of theirs. Is he just? His goal is to obtain the unearned. Is he self-confident? Not if the term means confidence in one's ability to deal with reality. Is he happy? Not if happiness presupposes moral character (see chapter 9). Can he be proud? Only in a depraved sense: proud of his ability to delude others, to break the laws of human life, to cheat on reality and escape the consequences—which, however, he does not succeed in doing.

Virtue, as Socrates held, is one; to cheat on any of its aspects is to cheat on all. The dishonest man is not only dishonest; in Ayn Rand's view, he betrays every moral requirement of human life and thereby systematically courts failure, pain, destruction. This is true by the nature of dishonesty, by the nature of the principle it involves—even if, like Gyges in Plato's myth, the liar is never found out and amasses a fortune. It is true because the fundamental avenger of his life of lies is not the victims or the police, but that which one cannot escape: reality itself.

There is more where that came from. Much more. As I looked, I found that everything I was going to say had been said already. At this point, not only are we getting off of the topic of self-esteem, but also stretching the limits of quotation. I mean, at some point, I will have re-published copyrighted material, here!

I just have to stop and will say that the Objectivist argument on this subject is much larger, and much more complex than Gary has implied. So much so that it is safe to declare that he is simply so ignorant of Objectivism that he isn't qualified to critique the philosophy.

Now of course Gary is still overlooking the most important part of Objectivism - the part too long to even attempt to put up here - epistemology. It's a subject that dwarfs the above, but is absolutely critical to understanding the above. I guarantee that Gary will not be satisfied, since he still does not understand principles, and how to think in them.

The moral of this story is that when Inspector tells you that the subject is long and you go go read the book instead of trying to understand it on a forum...

listen.