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  2. Along a similar vein is "Alone in Berlin" While not a dramatic a film, the parallel of sand in a machine is intriguing. His notes weren't going to change the course of the war, or the country. What seems inverted is Otto thought that he is introducing the sand into the machinery of the state. Conversely, it is the ideas that put America in process that is akin to the oil or lubrication conducive to fine running machine. The Hitlers, and statist and other authoritarians take the machines being held together by chicken-wire and bubble gum, and contaminate the lubricant beyond what any filters that may be in place can effectively screen out. This is not a recommendation to see the film, just a few thoughts generated after having watched it recently.
  3. I didn't realize that I was preventing people from seeing all the interesting topics that you've created recently.
  4. Yesterday
  5. I mean have you been on Yaron's Facebook group for his podcast? Just try it out for a day. The amount of anti-immigration, race realism, and ethnostate stuff on there is an example of what you're talking about. Same with the broader libertarian community from what I've seen online. Mises Institute has self-identified white nationalists writing for them, Hans Hoppe off the deep end now talking about creating feudal societies for white people. The fact that it so easily mutated points to a certain existing pathology that was there all along on the right wing. Guess I'll have to stop posting here if this Mr Swig stuff is just going to clog up the board.
  6. You said it's an option... I mean, you didn't say that, but the only way we can get a tribe of white people, an actual legitimate tribe, is to grant them some right to form their own separate country or nation within our country. Since there is no historic "white nation", the only way you can get a tribe is through secession. Talking about secession is a completely separate discussion. And you know, that basically happened. That was the Civil War. The bigots lost. I think the important point in this discussion is that a Bigot Town doesn't make sense. If it were so bigoted that the local government passed laws like forced segregation (they certainly would believe that this is legitimate), it would be operating illegally.
  7. 2046, I’ll hold off remarking on pragmatism until we get to Dewey and Lewis. Concerning the classical ontologists, “they regarded the laws of logic as themselves matters of fact (i.e. ontological in character, not ‘mere’ matters of fact)” (Peikoff 1964, 13). The classical philosophers basing logic in ontology (such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Leibniz) would want to have PNC both as an ontological fact of the world and as a norm, a consciously followed constraint, for ascertaining any fact, whether itself or other facts, whether facts empirical or mathematical. With the variations in ontology between various theories basing logic in ontology are variations in what is ontological form. I think it is always what philosophers say about the ontology of form that is key to their ontology of PNC and their account of how PNC is also a norm. Below is Peikoff’s representation of Aristotle’s ontology at work in a syllogistic inference. I should like to mention that this text is my personal favorite in Peikoff’s dissertation. Also, I’d like to mention that, as Jonathan Lear showed from Prior Analytics, the certitude of the validity of the syllogism below, and the other first-figure ones, is the base certitude of validity by which Aristotle, using some self-evident logical conversions, certified validity of the syllogisms of the other figures. Lastly, in their lectures and writings concerted with Rand; Branden and Peikoff point to contradictions that occur if one denies the conclusion of this syllogism below while affirming its premises. It is a good assignment for the future to work out the moments of Aristotelian form in rendering those contradictions. Under Aristotle’s account, we learn the truth of PNC by observing instances of it and performing an intuitive induction to it (also called an abstractive induction). PNC has to be a law prior to the operation of thought in order to be discovered by such observation and abstraction. The normativity of PNC in Aristotle’s account is from the purpose of thought, which is the comprehension of existence. To serve as guide to that purpose in the way PNC serves, PNC must, in Aristotle’s view, be a first principle in existence. We must not think a thing has and has not a certain character at the same time because, as Joseph puts it, “we see that a thing cannot have and not have at once the same character; and the so-called necessity of thought is really the apprehension of a necessity in the being of things’” (Peikoff 1964, 162). I’ll be looking at Dewey’s expansive notion of logic in turn when we come to it in this series. Looking also at Lewis and at Peikoff’s extractions from both of them. I don’t expect to take up Wittgenstein, and Peikoff also did not. But I thought I’d mention just now a book from Penelope Maddy The Logical Must – Wittgenstein on Logic (2014).
  8. The Pamunkey Indian Tribe was federally acknowledged in 2016, so this tribal nation process is an ongoing concern for Native Americans. I doubt Congress would pass similar laws for tribal Europeans who settled in America and now want their own nation, but maybe.
  9. I suspect the tracking "system" used by the shipping company did not provide the option for a secretary to choose a "no earlier than" date, but did have the option to enter a "no later than date", so instead of the machine being the tool... the opposite occurred.
  10. Reminds me of an anecdote I heard but can't verify, which was disbelieved by one person I shared it with. A researcher needed some radioactive materials. If delivered too soon they would decay to uselessness before they could be used, so the researcher specified no earlier than a certain date. A secretary changed that to no later than the specified date. They arrived right away, making them useless. The disbelieving person was a secretary who said no secretary would make such a change without asking the person who put in the request.
  11. WE know that your statement is not true because it is an explicit contradiction. However, those purporting to BE Objectivists and who accept fascist/tribal ideas, might not understand how that statement is in fact self-contradictory. Do not be disheartened.
  12. We ought to repeal all anti-discrimination laws (those which affect the "private sector," at least) -- and sure, we could have a "Bigot Town" insofar as most of the people who live in a particular community are bigots. But there could be nothing particular about that Bigot Town instituted in law; anyone living there who wished to deal in a non-discriminatory fashion could do so, including selling their property to (for instance) non-whites, or marrying non-whites, or hiring/serving non-whites, etc. Without those sorts of legal barriers to action, I don't know how long a Bigot Town could exist as such, especially given the modern economy, ease of transportation and communication and so forth. Could such a system be more effectively arranged through a complex series of contractual or licensing/leasing agreements? Perhaps. But if it could, to the extent that it could, I expect it would be an utter disaster. And the people who would participate in such a thing would not long be able to sustain themselves or a community (let alone exercise political power in any rational fashion). Such a community would also be ruthlessly ostracized by the rest of society -- and rightly so. Tribal nations within the US are a very particular historical artifact and not something to be emulated for the sake of supporting white nationalist fantasy (or black nationalist fantasy, for that matter, or any other). We aren't giving neo-nazis special permission to run casinos, either. The current creep of fascism/tribalism into even the Objectivist community is... well, probably to be expected, given everything, but still disheartening.
  13. Not out of nowhere. SL pulled the second sentence out of context and tried to apply it to a non-tribal nation situation. I pointed this out and he accused me of trolling. No, a tribal nation is still under the protection of the United States, and Congress has authority over them. I am not in favor of letting bigots, in this case white nationalists, secede from the United States.
  14. While I agree with Van Horn that there is no "intrinsically good action" -- which obviously includes "being early" -- I find the implicit suggestion interesting that this company looked upon being early as a kindness or a favor. I think it's far more likely (as it dovetails with my own experience) that the company/driver did not care much at all about Van Horn's schedule or request, and that the driver was simply operating at his own convenience. And I am not as confident as Van Horn is, that a late delivery would have automatically triggered either a warning or an apology. I've experienced late deliveries, and early deliveries, and delayed deliveries, and missing deliveries... but I don't know that I've ever had a service (let alone a driver) volunteer an apology. It may be that in a more rational culture, businesses would interact in a certain way with their clients and customers... but in the here and now, I find that many of them are as irrational and unpleasant to deal with as the worst elements of the culture as it stands. Being in business does not appear to convey any particular virtue.
  15. Some time after we moved to Florida, the moment the kids were waiting for had come: Their new bunk beds arrived! Even "manual labor" requires thinking and good communication. (Image by Clker-Free-Vector-Images, via Pixabay, license.)Unfortunately for me, they arrived an hour early on a Saturday morning, while I was driving home from the pub after watching an Arsenal game live from England. Annoyingly, I found myself having to pull over to take or make phone calls with (a) my wife, (b) the delivery driver, and (c) the (useless!) dispatcher. I had chosen the delivery time window in the belief that I could get home in plenty of time to clear out my daughter's old bed before the delivery, so her bunk bed could be assembled. Since the bed was still there and it was against company policy to remove it for us, I ended up telling the driver to leave the boxes for her bed in our hallway: I'd put it together myself. Aside from the waste of an hour, that turned out fine, but I was very annoyed by the assumption -- wrong, but not too unreasonable, I'll grant -- that earlier is better. But the fact is, I chose the time window I did for a reason and I planned the rest of my morning around it. Yes, probably ninety percent of the time, a customer (myself included) would appreciate getting a delivery out of the way early, but earlier is not necessarily better. Should anyone involved in scheduling engagements with customers happen by, I would ask that they keep in mind that the timing of an appointment happens within two contexts: that of the business and that of the customer. I am sure I would have gotten an apology for a late delivery, but I did not receive one for the early one. Worse, I wasn't even given the courtesy of a warning, much less a choice in the matter, regarding the timing of this delivery -- which was so far out of an already-generous window. There no such thing as an intrinsically good action, including being early, as this example shows. The standard of virtue absolutely depends on context. Here, the standard would have been: Does this fit in with what the customer has been told to expect? The inconvenience was not all on my end, although perhaps the deliverymen failed to realize it: One of my morning errands was to withdraw cash for tipping. The delivery was over by the time I made it home. -- CAV Link to Original
  16. Comments like this make it sound like you are trolling. First you were talking about a town of bigots. Sure, you can talk about what that would mean theoretically. But then out of nowhere you talk about tribes? It makes no sense. Are you talking about a group of people trying to secede?
  17. Wouldn't it be better to say that PNC is a rule we want to follow if we are recognizing facts about the world, or that the PNC is a methodological rule that recognizes something about the nature of facts in the world, rather than saying the PNC is a fact of the world? A pragmatic or Wittgensteinian viewpoint would want to say that logic is reality. I'm not sure a classical logical ontologist would want to go that route.
  18. Last week
  19. I'm not interested in talking to people who think I'm trolling them. Thanks for critiquing my post, though.
  20. Trolling... is the technique of trying to get a rise out of someone by not having an open and intellectually honest discourse. The Native American system ... of which I am not an expert, likely has a great many contextual issues which are significantly distinct from those that would be raised by any supposed "white tribe" nation... historical contexts, prior government and social organization, various treaties agreed to and sometimes broken, the issue of war and conquest, reparations etc. etc. I specifically did not want to call you out on those specific differences because it was unnecessary and seemed mean spirited... In any case we can discuss Objectivist principles of government anytime you wish. I seriously wouldn't worry about that happening any time soon. The Regressives on the Left are still a greater threat than white nationalism of the Degenerates of the Alt-Right. I do agree with you that anti-discrimination laws should be repealed as all laws which violate individual rights should be repealed.
  21. You were replying to my comment about a Native American-like tribal nation for whites. I suggest you review the thread before calling me ridiculous names.
  22. You say Bigot Town would have irrational, immoral people in local government, which would be a threat to individual rights. I'm saying, okay, now apply that logic to real cities and states which have irrational, immoral people in government. By your logic, isn't America already a "system of anarchy"? Bigot Town would still be subject to State and Federal laws. So obviously we would first need to repeal all anti-discrimination laws for Bigot Town to work as an actual US city. And I doubt that will happen any time soon. I also doubt we'll see a bigoted version of Mulligan's Valley, because the bigots will want to govern themselves to some significant extent. More likely we would see a tribal nation, once the white nationalists cluster together in a specific region of the country and negotiate a peace with the federal government. That, of course, assumes that they don't win. I would prefer that we repeal the anti-discrimination laws, because I think it's the most obviously moral course, and by restoring the rights of bigots in general, we will undercut some of the anti-government rhetoric of the more militant bigots.
  23. Now you're just trolling ...my answers are based on general Objectivist principles and specifically with respect to your OP. We have not thus far, discussed anything with respect to current frameworks put in place by the American government with respect to Native Americans, nor have I any desire to, sufficed to say, if the frameworks violate individual rights they are improper. It's really very simple, Objectivism is very specific about politics and the proper role of government. Are you arguing that well known Objectivist political principles are incorrect? If so I'd be happy to engage in a discussion, although I would not likely agree with you. If not, we're all fine and dandy.
  24. You're arguing against a system that America already has with the existing tribal nations. The tribes can kick you off their land if they want. They are a nation within a nation, and they have limited self-government.
  25. Where have I said anything about "our government"? Please be specific. As for facts indisputable to any Objectivist... there is no need to bother debating those. This is likely a contradiction in terms at worst redundant at best... if they exercise improper use of so-called police power... they are not properly speaking "policing" themselves or anyone... if they are employing some of themselves to exercise proper policing powers to protect rights... then some among their number would simply BE the police (proper). Assuming they do not properly police themselves or anyone, as soon as a third generation descendant of the white tribal nation tried to open up a Café catering to persons other than "white" persons, or tried to rent his property (assuming he has the right to own it) to people other than so called "white" persons, then his rights would be violated if he were prevented from doing so by the so-called police and any so-called laws enforcing such things as, say, State enforced segregation. The issue, as Rand clearly saw, is very simple.
  26. PNC Ground Shifts to the Side of the Subject – Conventionalism I Peikoff addressed logical conventionalism in a sense broad enough to include the various approaches to logical truth within what he took to be the most influential movements of Anglo-American philosophy in the twentieth century to the time of his dissertation (1964, 165n). Those would be pragmatism, logical empiricism, and the analytic movement. For exemplification of philosophies upholding conventionalism in fundamental character of logical truths, Peikoff delves into Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938); C. I. Lewis’ Mind and the World Order (1929) and An Analysis of Knowledge and Evaluation (1946); A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic (1946 [1936]); and E. Nagel’s Logic without Metaphysics (1956). There had been an analogue of conventionalism in logical and mathematical principles within a minority of earlier thinkers who, wanting to guard doctrine of the omnipotence of God and taking the truth and necessity of formal principles to emanate from divine selection of them, endowed formal principles with an ultimate arbitrariness. Those principles would be perfectly unchanging, however, as far as human thought is concerned. Anyway, such an ultimate situation was from a brew of theology with an extra-heavy dose of vacuum imagination. The conventionalisms Peikoff addressed took shape and took hold in part and in some sense due to inadequacies of the various forms of logical ontologism that had been on offer (186–87, 210–11, 235–36, 239). The rejection of those logical ontologisms was reasonable, as Peikoff illustrated, even if we consider them only from within the discipline of classical philosophy from Plato to Kant. The conventionalist replacements for logical ontologism were presaged by (i) nominalist strands in epistemology,* and (ii) substantial additions to logic itself and to geometry in the latter part of the nineteenth century. To those two in the vista of Peikoff 1964, I should add (iii) the spectacular empirical success—from Maxwell to Einstein (GR) and Schrodinger (wave QM) / Heisenberg (matrix QM)—won by casting physical relations in terms of portions of modern analytic mathematics. In my own assessment, it is (ii) and (iii), against the background of (i) and inadequacy of old-time logical ontologism that are the main and sufficient preparations for the crop of conventionalist characterizations of logical truth by logical empiricists to mid-twentieth century. “My concern has not, of course, been to maintain a primarily causal thesis; it has not been my intention to argue, for instance, that Cudworth’s difficulties with God or Locke’s problems with Aristotle’s forms were the causal factors centrally responsible for the dominance in our century of the conventionalist approach to logical truth. Such a thesis would hardly be tenable; the creation of non-Euclidean geometries, to cite just one example, was undoubtedly more influential in this connection than the sort of difficulties I have discussed. . . . My concern has been rather, by considering a few aspects of the question, to suggest that, as a matter of fact, the seeds of conventionalism were implicitly present in the formulations of the classical logical ontologists, and that there was a logic to this presence.” (Peikoff 1964, 240) Peikoff took Kant to be “the philosopher most responsible for the demise of logical ontologism in the history of philosophy” (165). In a roundabout way, I concur. The demise of ontological essences, Platonic forms, and Aristotelian forms and formal causes had transpired before Kant, as far as the modern stream of philosophy was concerned. In that fall was also the fall of logical ontologism. Kant’s weight on the demise was through his own imposing, positive system of theoretical philosophy replacing Aristotle’s (and replacing modern systems such as the system of Leibniz). Kant weight on that demise and Kant shadows on the future saliently include: His success in bringing to much attention a philosophical division of sense and understanding and of the synthetic and the analytic (not what we mean by synthetic/analytic in geometry); his subject-rooted theory of how geometry is possible; his replacement of Aristotle’s categories as in the world with categories as belonging to human understanding in its approach to sensory experience of the world; lastly and most profoundly, in my estimation, his particular replacement of Aristotelian ontological form with subject-side form.** “Although many—but not all—classic philosophers subscribed to the necessary-contingent or rational-empirical dichotomies in their classification of propositions, this was not for them the equivalent of the logical-factual dichotomy; to this latter the vast majority did not subscribe, nor could they have, since they regarded the laws of logic as themselves matters of fact (i.e., ontological in character, not ‘mere’ matters of fact).” (13) The philosophers Peikoff examines in their conventionality of logical principles do not regard these salutary principles as arbitrarily selected, although, as with Kant, their basis is not some fact(s) holding independently of human existence and consciousness. Peikoff quotes logical empiricist Ayer denying that analytic propositions “provide any information about any matter of fact. In other words, they are entirely devoid of factual content” (Ayer 79; Peikoff 170). Ayer does not follow Kant’s proposal that analytic patterns are from invariant organization of the human mind. Rather, granted various linguistic conventions, “the laws of logic which flow from them are necessary and incontestable truths” (Peikoff 174).*** From what we have seen of Kant in previous segments of this essay, he would take conditioning truth and necessity of logical principles such as PNC on any conventional structure of language as inadequate to deliver the necessity logical truths possess. Any indebtedness of logic to structure of language cannot be indebtedness to anything conventional in language, because conventionality is contingency, not absolute necessity, not the necessity Kant attached to the a priori. Ayer and Kant agree that logical truths are a priori and analytic. An example of an analytic statement from Ayer is: “Either some ants are parasitic or none are” (79). “Either some are or none are” is so no matter what facts of the world it is being applied to. And no observation in experience could refute this logical truth. On that much Kant and Ayer could agree. Kant famously did not think that analytic truths are the only sort of a priori truths. The other sort of a priori truths, he called synthetic. He took the analytic and the synthetic to exhaust the sorts of a priori truth. The exemplar of synthetic a priori truths was geometry of Euclidean space, the only structure of physical space known until Einstein’s general relativity (1916). That space (spatial slices of the four-dimensional [semi-] Riemannian spacetime manifold of variable curvature) is not intuitive in the ready-to-hand way that Euclidean space is intuitive (in carpentry or, differently, in Euclid), thus not congenial to Kant’s conception of space as pure form of outer, sensory intuition (in Kant’s technical sense of intuition). Logical empiricism arose in an intellectual scene in which Kant’s exemplar of synthetic a priori truth lay in shambles. Moreover, by that time, David Hilbert had staked pure geometry as purely abstract and independent of any physical application or sensory experience. Hans Reichenbach in 1920 correctly observed that Kant had held a priori truth to be not only necessary and unrevisable, but constitutive of the concept of the object as object of knowledge. That last character of the a priori was not toppled by Einstein’s revolution. At least it was not toppled in the obvious way that universality and unrevisability were toppled with respect to physical Euclidean geometry. At first Reichenbach thought such constitutive principles were at hand in modern application of mathematics to physics, but he soon became persuaded that those principles of application were neither true nor false. They were simplicity- and tractability-based conventions. By the 1920’s, the last toeholds of Kant’s intuitive, synthetic a priori in geometry and in geometry’s physical exemplification had been dissolved by Reichenbach, Schlick, and Carnap.**** (To be continued.) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * In the installment “Aristotle II”, I conveyed Peikoff 1964 on inadequacies of nominalism in provisioning a theory of logic. See also Paul Forster’s Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism (2011, 24–28, 38). ** On transformation of Aristotle’s matter-form distinction from Leibniz to Kant, see Marco Sgarbi’s Kant and Aristotle – Epistemology, Logic, and Method (2016, 79–94). *** Cf. Herder c.1767 and 1772 in Michael Forster’s Johann Gottfried von Herder – Philosophical Writings (2002, 48, 100). **** Michael Friedman’s “The Evolution of the A Priori in Logical Empiricism” in The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism, Richardson and Uebel, editors (2007, 95–108).
  27. You mean like the government institutions we have now? You talk like our government doesn't violate rights on a routine basis.
  28. Nah, it would have to be a bigoted version of Mulligan's Valley, but without the secrecy. It would be a private town. Bigots in the town, or visitors, would still have all their rights, and if there was a problem, law enforcement would have emergency access, or warranted access as needed. The other option is to recognize a white tribal nation, like we do with Native Americans. Then they would police themselves, unless there was a federal concern.
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