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  1. No. Because, consent cannot be given for the unknown or bad faith, those fall outside of what has been consented to and that is fraud. If consent is given for particular action the trade is voluntary and does not constitute initiation of force. No. Submission to tax is not voluntary because it is made under threat of force (threat of incarceration or theft) i.e. if you do continue not to pay taxes you eventually will go to jail or your property forcibly taken. Force is well defined. A worker may feel "compelled" to trade certain actions in exchange for a colleague not "telling on you" but this is not physical force (including fraud) or the threat thereof. Although force is force regardless of how the parties "parse" it conceptually, force objectively requires some element of the non-voluntary, so the mental content of the parties cannot be wholly ignored. People fight in rings for sport, the distinguishing factor for the "first punch" being sport, is the consent of the "receiver" of an action which otherwise would be a crime. People are fallible, and conceptually may be oblivious to the their own rights, their own lack of consent or even the threat of force. An oppressive government bureaucrat and his hapless victim of a citizen may both be oblivious to the implicit threat of "treason to the state" always hanging over a relationship that "feels" like glorious service to the state, through performance of an action, in the name of duty. Force here is omnipresent whether or not the citizen has chosen to recognize they are NOT free to choose or act otherwise, instead zealously holding onto the evasion, the self-delusion, that they don't "want to be free to choose". The fact IS, although man has free will, IF you choose otherwise you will be arrested, incarcerated, possibly killed. The insanity in such societies does not negate the objective presence of force, which would immediately prevent free action, should anyone awake from the insanity and attempt to deviate. Rand has covered this very well throughout her writings. The AR lexicon does a good job here: http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/physical_force.html Hope this helps.
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  2. Rand differentiates between the metaphysical and the man-made (Philosophy: Who Needs It, chapter 3.) Metaphysical facts are not expressible by the concept of justice (fair, unfair, right, wrong, etc.), they just are. Justice comes from appraising the chosen aspects of other people in relation to you. Excessive wealth can't come from anti-life activities, because, at the root, wealth can only come from virtuous action (production.) If you mean having a person with wealth that did not earn it, i.e. that acquired it by looting, in short, that did not merit it, then the law should do something about that, but then that would rule out the inheritance tax. Rand (PWNI, pp. 140-141) criticizes meritocracy on the grounds that it is a self-contradictory concept. To "merit" something is a matter of justice, and "-ocracy" refers to rulers, then "meritocracy" seeks to create a "tyranny of justice," thus collapsing into conceptual incoherency, and blanking out the different between might and right that justice seeks to create. As far as this author's idea of a meritocracy, it is problematic to say the least. From an economic standpoint, "what alone can improve [material] conditions is more and better production. And this can only be brought about by increased saving and capital accumulation" (Mises, Planning for Freedom, pp. 92-93.) The inheritance tax is particularly damaging to capital accumulation. The prospect of an inheritance tax destroys the incentive and the power to save and build up accumulations of capital. Rothbard calls inheritance taxes "perhaps the most devastating example of a pure tax on capital" (Rothbard, Power and Market, p.1185.) It's impact will be devastating because of the far-reaching nature of the argument. The argument conceives "that everyone should line up at the same starting line," but regardless of where we start off, within a few generations every piece of property must pass to heirs, and continue in such a manner indefinitely. Thus we can see that the difficulty with this argument is that it proves far too much than perhaps it wanted to. For which one of us would earn anything like our present real income or enjoy anything near our present standard of living were it not for inherited benefits that we derive from the actions of our predecessors (in accumulation capital stock)? Specifically, the modern standard of living resulting from the accumulation of capital goods is an inheritance from all the net savings of our ancestors. If the argument wants to be consistent, then we will have to remove all these "unfair advantages." Without them, we would, regardless of the quality of our own moral character, be living in a primitive jungle. If everyone were prevented from passing on accumulated wealth to the next generation, the result would be drastic impoverishment and mass starvation of the majority of the human race, a decidedly anti-life conclusion, would result. So if the grounds are pro-life, then this argument fails. Simply stating "but this is the logical, rational, enlightened thing to do" is of no avail. The author states that the living do not experience the inheritance tax because the person who is being taxed is dead. But the dead are not the ones that own the property, the heir is the living owner who is taxed. Such a tax necessarily violates property rights, which contradicts the stated desire of not taking the unearned from anyone. The meritocrat might reply that the heir didn't earn it because he didn't produce it himself, but technological production is not the only way to earn wealth. Exchange also is one way to earn wealth, and the heir acquired the property in question through the objective link of contractual exchange. Whatever he did, even if just being in the right place at the right time, caused him to earn the property in the eyes of the previous owner passing it on to the later owner. The socialist government (or society at large, or whoever is claiming the right to tax it) has established no link whatsoever with the property, has done nothing to it, so it's difficult to see why a contractually designated owner, the heir, who has an objective link to the property (earned it via contractual exchange from a previous to a later owner) should be denied ownership in favor of a non-producer, non-contractor who has no link whatsoever with the property, if the grounds specified is "he who earned it." Thus the meritocracy argument for inheritance taxation fails on its own grounds. Branden (in Rand, ed., Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pp.96-99) recognizes that there is a contradiction in the contention that only those who produce wealth should control it, and the inheritance tax. For if we recognized the right of those who originally produce the wealth as the legitimate right, then this also implies the right to give it away to an heir through gift. Therefore, the alleged worthiness or unworthiness of the heir is logically irrelevant. That section is particularly instructive, because Branden also explains how inheritance does not contribute to economic instability, that one's place on the unhampered market has to continually be earned, and how the inheritance tax tends to aid the second and third generation welfare statists by keeping out rivals, thus hampering the natural market "circulation of elites."
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  3. I'm glad you noticed. Yes, it is an absolute statement -- I use them whenever I can as I find that they make communication and principled discussion much easier. Rights are absolute. I'm not sure why you would call it "out of context" though. I'm sure you know the context for a discussion of rights but in case someone forgot I named the context: moral and legal. As you have acknowledged Rights are a bridge between morality and politics. Rights pertain only to action (another absolute). Rights sanction the moral actions one must take to survive and thrive and they also delimit the actions others may take with respect to you; they may not initiate force against you. As long as someone acknowledges Rights (implicitly or explicitly) and acts accordingly, then they possess and retain their Rights. When someone decides not to live by these principles and initiates force against you, then they have repudiated the concept and must be considered as outside the boundaries of Rights. They have forfeited their Rights and so they have none that I must respect. This reading conforms much better to the quotes you provided by both Ayn Rand and Tara Smith: "If they demand the violation of the rights of others, they negate and forfeit their own." -- AR from Racism "An individual's rights are always held on the condition that the rightholder respect other's rights, thus throughout, I am leaving aside person who forfeit their rights by violating the rights of others. As long as a person truly possesses rights, however, he is entitled to have them respected..." -- Tara Smith (cited previously) In both you see that persons can "forfeit their rights". And as Tara Smith notes, if a person "possesses rights [then ...] he is entitled to have them respected". So I really can't see how you think these quotes support your position. Also, I find it a little disingenuous that you disagree with what Tara Smith has to say on the subject and then try to use her quotes to support your position. You should just say you disagree and leave it at that instead of trying to manipulate what she says, as you acknowledge doing here: "Little practical difference" is still a difference -- the difference is obvious and is not what she meant, and I think you know that. Rights are moral principles which means they are absolutes within a moral context. So Rights are conditional upon your respect for them, as you acknowledge here in your response to me: But then you contradict yourself not two paragraphs later: I don't have this problem. I say that Rights are absolute (read inalienable) and contextual (read conditional). I say you should never violate anyone's Rights and the criminal is not a problem for me to deal with under this principle. Since he has already violated the principle I know that he has explicitly repudiated it and therefore I won't be violating his Rights when I treat him like the animal that he confesses to be. I take him at his word (or actions) and treat him according to the principles he holds. You, on the other hand, say that rights are inalienable (absolute) and unconditional (non-contextual). So actually I think it is you who are dealing in out of context absolutes. When the slave and the slave-master come to you and ask which one of us is right, you are forced to say "well you both have rights and you do not forfeit them no matter what you do".
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  4. Something like this?
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  5. There have been comments regarding the propriety of Professor Norsen's strong wording and the fact that he includes not just a judgment of the merits of the theory, but a judgment of the author. I have no position on the scientific merits of either side, but I do have a position on the propriety of passing moral judgment when someone betrays fundamental intellectual principles. In a scientific debate one ought to challenge the argument and not just the author; and the argument has been challenged. An author can be chastised but forgiven for not rigorously thinking through their assumptions, evidence and logic, but there are basic standards of intellectual integrity which must be met in scholarly research. Betrayal of those standards demands moral condemnation, especially when such betrayal threatens something of great value, namely the credibility of Objectivism in the academic context. Crackpot ideas aren't just quaint, they -- and their promulgaters -- are deserving of moral condemnation, because at best they depend on evasion, if not deliberate and knowing dishonesty. An author must take responsibility for their words, especially when they are published as a book (the fact that the book was not published by a reputable scientific publishing house does not relieve the author of his responsibilities). The words do not just magically appear on the page, the author must knowingly put them there. The act of putting particular words on the page says something about the author himself. In academic scientific writing, it is typically not necessary to express moral outrage at errors in a book since, thanks to the process of peer review, egregious errors have been caught and what remains is the realization that such-and-such assumption may not be well supported, a or particular method of reasoning does not actually produce what it is thought to produce. But we are dealing here with unvetted samizdat, the dissemination of arguments which would not, according to the review, have survived the rigors of critical scrutiny. Read through Professor Norsen's comments again and ask "Does TEW meet at least the minimum standards for publishing in theoretical physics". My understanding of what he is saying is that the book is well below that threshold, that TEW betrays basic intellectual standards. That is the context where condemnation of the author along with condemnation of the author's words is warranted. Ifat, would you please provide your expert first-hand judgment of altonhare's comments. Alternatively, will you please find someone who is a credible research scientist in theoretical physics to defend his statements here? Because physics is a science which I don't know, I must rely on the judgments of others who know the science. Yes, you must trust that the reviewer is himself credible -- you must judge the judge. Then if the judge is found credible, you should not evade the conclusion that he reaches simply because you yourself did not reach that conclusion. Doing that is the subjective approach to science. I seriously doubt that you refuse to believe any experimental results in neuroscience until you have personally replicated the experiment. Trust is essential to scientific progress, which is why a betrayal of trust is such a serious matter.
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  6. You can decide to donate the goods to him--but then of course you have to pay for them in his stead.
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  7. AshRyan

    Isn't inheritance theft?

    You're saying that a person who inherits money can't have self-esteem based on what he then goes on to do with it, since he wouldn't have been able to accomplish the same things without it (which I think is arguable, depending on what you mean by accomplishing the same things). But anyone born in an industrial, Western society is already starting out way ahead and can then go on to accomplish things they otherwise wouldn't have been able to if they were born in Iran, or during the Dark Ages, or whatever. It makes absolutely no sense to say that one's self-esteem is invalid if they didn't start from an absolute null point. Nobody starts at an absolute null point. So the issue of how much extra one might inherit, as such, is morally irrelevant. This is just progress. In the case of the thief, however, it's just parasitism. There's a huge difference.
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  8. Jefferson

    Isn't inheritance theft?

    I will answer as best I can. Correct me if I'm wrong. The difference between starting a business with inherited money and stolen money is that inheriting money involves a person freely giving the money to you while stealing money involves violating rights. Theft is wrong because it violates rights, not because it will damage your happiness in the future. It is wrong to violate rights because it is destructive to human life. Productive achievement is a life-supporting action, an enterprise started with stolen money will be tarnished because it was started with a life-destroying action. You can maintain your self-esteem when using inherited money to start a business. You are still self-reliant because without you the money would be useless. I praise the the man who makes good use of his inheritance because of the value he creates. I condemn the man who steals because this is an immoral action though I may recognise that he has created value with the stolen money. One needs to separate the way the money was obtained and the use to which it was put. Inheriting=neutral Stealing=evil Producing=good Squandering=evil
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  9. As sNerd said Rand never said nor implied “Meritocracy” but I also remember a quote where she once remarked that such a thing was discounted immediately due to “the last 5 letters in the name”.
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