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A new work: "Popcorn"

For completeness' sake, I'm going to go ahead and review Binswanger's essay and respond to it here: Granted that "freedom of entry and residency" are absolutely different from citizenship/voting rights or other means of participation in governance. Agreed, though to the point of contention I would say that a procedure by which immigration takes place does not amount to a barrier against it. Absolutely, and also agreed to Binswanger's arguments re: seeking employment, buying homes, etc., and against immigration quotas. Indeed. And it is depressing to note that I've witnessed many Objectivists on this very site make a version of this argument. Right. And speaking to the point of departure I'm anticipating, the fact of that jurisdiction requires a certain procedure at the border... Precisely. Criminals do not carry signs announcing the fact, but the government can sometimes ferret it out by contacting those other governmental bodies that have the requisite information: for instance, the Mexican government may be aware that a certain car is stolen. Whether such a stop/gathering of information is "violating the rights of the innocent immigrant" in those cases where no car is stolen is precisely the question at issue. Here's the rub. There may well be evidence that a given man is a criminal, or even actively on the run from law enforcement, but accounting to a transfer of jurisdiction, that evidence may not be immediately available (as it would otherwise be when a man goes from New York to Connecticut). When Binswanger writes that a man does not have to satisfy "the government," it elides the fact that there are two distinct governments involved. A criminal ought not have a "home base" by crossing the border, where he is thereafter safe, and must commit fresh crimes before he can bear investigating. He remains responsible for the crimes he has already committed. But law enforcement in this new jurisdiction, if it is to hold him responsible for the crimes he has committed in the other, must be able to access that sort of information. And it cannot do so instantaneously with respect to everyone who might cross the border, nor would it even know to do so if it does not know who crosses the border at all. Binswanger argues against an "indiscriminate subjection of everyone to a screening process," but a border screening process is not indiscriminate: it is alone for those who cross the border, and accounting to the fact that law enforcement agencies in different jurisdictions have different information. So when someone enters the new jurisdiction, there must be an opportunity to gain access to that information, so that criminals can be stopped and law-biding citizens can pass without further delay. Without Binswanger available to defend himself, I don't want to expand on this too much, but I do wonder why these are exceptions, "of course." War and an epidemic presumably constitute exceptions in his mind because they are dangerous, creating "emergency conditions" (which is often a kind of magic totem for some Objectivists); yet a criminal, too, can be dangerous and threaten life, liberty and property. Indeed, that's what it is to be criminal. But let it pass... Once we have eliminated those aspects of immigration policy that seek to prevent access on the basis of collectivist notions like racism, economic protectionism, etc., I do not believe that rights-respecting people would experience the remaining inspection required at the border as harassment, but rather as the protection of their own rights. This is often true, and has been true for a long time, here and elsewhere, yet it might still be possible to want people to be able to immigrate freely... and bar criminals, terrorists and plague-carriers, for the very same fundamental reason: the protection of individual rights.

When government manages property or something like property, then regardless of the rights and wrongs of that underlying situation, it should do so in a way that respects rights as much as possible, including the right to freedom of movement.

Neither do I, because there is no such thing as public property, so public property can't be owned by anyone. You can't own what isn't real (we can pretend it's real). Doesn't mean the land is not necessarily property. Group ownership is not equivalent to public property. Doesn't really matter, because the government doesn't own the land even as a group of individuals. Individuals or groups of individuals. Not "the public".

That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be granted. (George Mason et al., Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776.) Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws. (John Adams, Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 1780.) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (US Constitution, Amendment 4, 1789.) In 1765, the King's Messenger Nathan Carrington, along with others, pursuant to a warrant issued by George Montagu-Dunk, 2nd Earl of Halifax forcibly entered the home of one John Entick. The warrant authorized them "to make strict and diligent search for ... the author, or one concerned in the writing of several weekly very seditious papers entitled, 'The Monitor or British Freeholder, No 257, 357, 358, 360, 373, 376, 378, and 380.'" They seized printed charts, pamphlets and other materials. Entick filed suit in Entick v Carrington, argued before the Court of King's Bench in 1765. Charles Pratt, 1st Earl Camden ruled that both the search and the seizure were unlawful, as the warrant authorized the seizure of all of Entick's papers, not just the criminal ones, and as the warrant lacked probable cause to even justify the search: "By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my licence, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing; which is proved by every declaration in trespass, where the defendant is called upon to answer for bruising the grass and even treading upon the soil. If he admits the fact, he is bound to show by way of justification, that some positive law has empowered or excused him" (Camden 1765.) Entick vs Carrington established the English common law principle against general search warrants and of requiring some positive action (probable cause) requirement before subjecting an individual to a warrant. Camden's judgment became the basis for the Virginia and Massachusetts Declarations and later the 4th item on the Bill of Rights. Among self-styled Objectivists and Randians, the ones that are not biased against immigrants and who support some kind of free immigration (Brook and Binswanger come to mind), they often express desire for some kind of screening and inspection at the border. This is problematic because it seems like a general warrant. It also seems like there was no probable cause that could have triggered the inspection. If you submit someone to an inspection without those requirements being met, it seems like you're violating their rights. Why is that? Well if it's "initiation" of physical force that qualifies as violating rights, the people you're searching generally and without probably cause haven't even been accused of doing anything wrong at all. They haven't met any evidentiary standard. You're just searching them because they're foreigners and might possibly have done something. It seems like you're the one initiating physical force on them. Indeed, if you're interested in what might normally be the traveling of private persons going about their business, and just wish to apply the normal right of liberty, property, security in one's person, papers, and effects, it seems like you don't have a basis to search immigrants. Normal here means to assume there's no unusual circumstances going on. People cross and transfer multiple jurisdictions all the time, every day. And yet this is normally not grounds for a search or inspection. If there actually are grounds, then a warrant can be executed by the legal system. But no pre-crime searches are normally allowed if I'm traveling from, say, California to Nevada, or Bronx to Brooklyn. It seems like normally there is no special problem of "transfer of jurisdiction." I'm just in one jurisdiction one second, then in another the next. If you say, well what if they're evading Mexican justice, well what if I'm evading Bronx justice by traveling to Brooklyn? Can we subject me to a "what if" search warrant? It seems not. It seems "what if" search warrants are a terrible idea. In real life, the matter is resolved by a judge in one jurisdiction being presented with a writ or warrant from another jurisdiction. Then the legal system proceeds as normally. No "what if" warrants are permitted.

(Caveat: I haven't read Binswanger's essay.) I think there's reason for border patrol/checkpoint/a controlled point-of-entry, and that this does not interfere with what we might call the "right of travel," but which is really just a specific application of the normal liberty/property/right-to-life stuff. Such a checkpoint represents a broad transfer of legal jurisdiction, and I believe that the proper administration of law and justice requires an opportunity for ensuring that -- you know -- someone leaving Mexico to come to the United States isn't fleeing Mexican justice, etc., because all else being equal, American authorities aren't going to be on the lookout for people who've committed crimes in Mexico (and will not have the requisite information on them). Thus, such a border checkpoint provides at least an opportunity for that information to be transferred/collected by the appropriate bodies, when relevant. It's mostly a procedural matter, then, but procedure matters. The comparison that I've used before is this: part and parcel to our rights, vis a vis the administration of justice, we have the right to a "fair and speedy trial." Fair enough. We can't simply throw people into prison indefinitely without establishing that they've committed whatever crime, and without having received an appropriate sentence; the lack of a fair and speedy trial, then, is an abrogation of liberty/individual right. But that fair and speedy trial must actually be executed, in reality, and we need real world procedures to achieve this. Someone arrested, however he might have the right to a "speedy" trial, cannot expect an immediate trial. Some actual judge must be found to hear the case, evidence must be collected, etc., etc., and this may amount to some delay, in reason, even if every actor is doing his level best to provide that speedy trial. Even an innocent man may have to spend some time in prison to accommodate the provenance of justice on his behalf. And so it is with crossing a border (whether international or, say, between states): an individual has every right to do this, yet there may be some kind of delay at a crossing reflecting the real procedural change between one legal jurisdiction and another -- to ensure, again, that the person involved isn't a wanted criminal, or a known terrorist, or etc. Edited to add: It may go without saying, but just in case... The appropriate procedural delay I discuss above has nearly nothing to do with modern or historical immigration policy, which is usually a mish-mash of xenophobia, economic protectionism and various other assorted collectivist ideas. If the border checkpoint were delimited to what I've briefly outlined, it would look far, far different than our own border today. That said, I think it's important to at least acknowledge that there's a role for such a checkpoint, if only because bad faith debaters seem to enjoy suggesting apocalyptic scenarios where actual invading armies stroll across an unguarded border, because we don't believe we have the right to stop them. But no, we're within our rights to stop invading armies and wanted criminals, just as we could stop them on our own, domestic streets. A rational border policy then is really just an inspection service meant to identify and respond to such threats as they enter our jurisdiction.