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human_murda

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human_murda last won the day on March 28

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  1. human_murda

    Veganism under Objectivism

    And need is a sanction to violate others' rights?
  2. human_murda

    Just Shut Up and Think

    A polynomial fit, as used here, is a method for interpolation. It cannot be used to predict numbers outside the data range. For that, you need to know beforehand what "law" the numbers are following.
  3. human_murda

    A theory of "theory"

    If you close your eyes, you stop seeing the sun. Your lack of comprehension is absurd. Is retrocausality a theory of causality?
  4. human_murda

    Socially competitive subtleties

    I heard that when a lion takes over a pride, it kills the cubs of the previous leader. You could try it sometime. Very Alpha 👌. The behaviour of tribals and animals are, of course, quite exemplary.
  5. human_murda

    A theory of "theory"

    Oh, it definitely does. It simply doesn't observe locality.
  6. human_murda

    A theory of "theory"

    Anyway, the original statement of Newton's second law is: This describes the effect after the cause (impulse).
  7. human_murda

    A theory of "theory"

    All derivatives (including acceleration) are defined around an infinitesimally small interval around a particular value in the function domain. Not only that, you need a concept of ordering. In the case of time derivatives, you need time ordering (before and after). Without it, you'll get the wrong sign of acceleration. For example, without the correct time ordering (which keeps track of the changes brought about by forces), you'll get an acceleration vector that is in the opposite direction of force (which is physically untrue). You definitely need a concept of before and after in the case of a derivative. Otherwise, the law wouldn't work. These things are implicit in the workings of calculus. (To say that acceleration is instantaneous is true. To say that it involves no concept of before and after is context dropping. Such concepts are implicit in the meaning of instantaneous).
  8. human_murda

    A theory of "theory"

    Force produces a change in the state of motion of the object (the change in the state of motion occurs after the force is applied). Acceleration is a measure of that change across time. Just because the numerical values of acceleration and force are simultaneously defined (and can be mathematically obtained from each other) doesn't mean one doesn't cause the other.
  9. human_murda

    A theory of "theory"

    Isn't (net) force the cause and acceleration the effect?
  10. human_murda

    Race Realism

    You just listed 3 continents. They're not racial groups by any standard. Why aren't you considering European and Asian as the same? If it's based on the difficulty of traveling, why aren't you considering India and China as separate? After all, the tallest mountain range in the world separates the two and I don't think many have traversed it. Also the Asian category would be the biggest genetic dump ever. Are you considering Northern Asians, North-eastern Asians, South-eastern Asians, South Asians, Central Asians and West Asians as all the same overarching racial group? I'm also assuming you're dumping Australians and Americans into the Asian group? What about the Jarawa/Sentinelese people of India? Are they Asian? What about the Siddis of India? Are they Asian? Also, the reason I asked about Dravidians is that at various points in time, they have been classified as Negroid, Mongoloid, Australoid and Caucasoid (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_definitions_of_races_in_India). Do you believe in this 'oid' classification? The only "racial" category that you have suggested that remotely makes any sense is European. But of course, Europe is much smaller (it's about the same size as USA) than Asia (and maybe Australia and North and South America) which you seem to have dumped into one category: Asian. Also, I personally don't think that racial classification is impossible. I think it should be possible and would have some connection to geographical origins (just not the one you suggested). Also, since homo sapiens are one species and can interbreed (and evolve), I don't think racial categories should be fixed for all time. If there are large enough numbers of "mixed race" people of a similar kind, they should be considered a separate race.
  11. human_murda

    Race Realism

    @Sameak I'm from South India. What do you think my race is? What race are Dravidians/Malayalis? I'm curious to know.
  12. human_murda

    Universals

    Actually, an accurate comparison is between length and colour. An object can possess length (has the capacity to be measured using a metre scale or its equivalent) or colour (has the capacity to be measured using color perception). Once you have determined the similarity and established the universal, you can state more specific things: you can say that the object is long or short, or that it is red or green. Here, you're talking about a range of measurements. However, just as objects don't need to be identically long (for "that object is long" to be a valid statement), red objects don't need to be identically red (they can be any shade of red. Shades of red exist [shades of red are still more precise range of values but still not identical, although they may become indistinguishable at some point]).
  13. human_murda

    Universals

    If your question is how anyone can say that an entity/attribute belongs to a specific category if the criteria for belonging doesn't exist "out there", I'd say your question is wrong. The implicit assumption in your question is that similarity doesn't exist "out there" but only in your perception (and hence if classification is on the basis of similarity, not something identical which exists in objects, that is meaningless). This is wrong. Similarity has both a metaphysical and epistemological meaning. If you ask what makes things similar, in reality, that has a scientific meaning that is enough to justify your ability to state facts about them. For example, consider the universal attribute of length. What criteria exists "out there" that qualifies objects with different lengths to be said to possess the same attribute (length)? The capacity to be measured against a metre scale (or its equivalent). What makes objects possess the universal, length? The capacity to be measured against a metre scale (or its equivalent). This is what makes the objects similar. Similarity is a metaphysical fact. However, at the end of the day, the identities of these objects are only similar, not necessarily identical. You can say that objects are similar (as a metaphysical fact) without them possessing a single identical characteristic. In the realm of identifying colors of an object, the yardstick that you use is your perception. An object is measured by your perception and you check whether the colours are similar in the scale of your perception. Just because the yardstick that you use is your perception does not make it primarily epistemological (as you seem to think). It is as valid as a metre scale and just as scientific and metaphysical. This is the metaphysical validity of similarity: the capacity to be measured against a standard. It doesn't matter if the yardstick is a metre scale or your perception. Your perception exists "out there" as much as a metre scale and isn't any less valid as a yardstick for linear measurements (and surely not just epistemological). The key is to reduce an attribute so that you can speak of it in degrees (linear measurements). The yardsticks may not be mixed. There is no dichotomy between the validity of yardsticks of perception and the ones used for scientific measurements (the latter maybe more precise). The capacity to be measured against a standard is an invariant fact. It is the metaphysical fact used to judge similarity. Color perception and metre scales are two different standards that may be used. Your criticism that one cannot state facts about universals if they do not exist out there qua universals is invalid. There are so many other considerations about the validity of Universals as Rand defined it, but would take too long to post. The only important bits are: if identical abstract universals did exist out there, that makes the problem of universals trivial. In my opinion, a good statement of the problem of universals is: "if things in reality aren't identical, how can they be considered to belong to the same category" (for eg, people may be considered to belong to the same race even if they do not possess a single identical gene that other races do not have). Also it is an absurd claim to suggest that things in reality are pre-classified for the sake of humans (which is what universals existing inside objects would amount to). Humans can classify objects without that classification already existing out there in nature. The classification would still be valid and still capture a metaphysical fact about the object. Universals qua universals don't exist. Universals exist as instances (but not inside objects). Similarity is a metaphysical fact (which is just as valid metaphysically (as a fact "out there" about the object) even if you simply use perception).
  14. human_murda

    Universals

    Evidence for the correct meaning of 'universal' already exists in the English language (or any spoken language). The universal length refers to the length of a specific object. The universal 'man' refers to a specific man. Consider the differences in meaning of the sentences 'man died' and 'the man died'. The former comes across as an invariant fact applicable to all men (and may be true for particular men). In the latter, the universal has been instantiated (which is necessary because individual men have specific measurements. When you're referring to specific men, you cannot continue talking as though any measurement is possible [or as though the individual has no specific measurements]. You have to instantiate the universal: the universal does not refer to an abstract universal that exists in specific objects). Similarly, when talking about specific entities, you speak about 'the length' instead of just 'length' (similar is the case for any concept or attribute). Just as AR said, the universal (such as "manness") does not exist "inside" an object/aspect. That's not the way universals are used in language. Universals do not refer to universals that exist "inside" an object. Universals refer to specific instances. If it's a concept, it refers to the whole of an object, not some part that resides within it. If the universal is an attribute, it refers to all aspects of the attribute as it exists. You talk in terms of universals ("man is evil") is you want to omit particular measurements (and are talking about invariant facts). You instantiate the universal ("the man died"), if you want to talk about someone in particular. The comparison isn't equivalent: because the universal exists as a specific instance (just, not as a universal).
  15. human_murda

    Universals

    I agree with Eiuol (if the following is his claim:) that universals as such don't exist but represent invariant facts about reality (and in this sense, they exist) and exist as the specific entity or aspect you're referring to. This is the sense with which AR used the term universals: So, for example, length of an object exists. But length, as a universal, does not exist out there in reality. It is absurd to think that universals (obtained by a method of measurement omission), as such, exist out there in reality. That would mean, for example, that there exists an object without any specific lengths (which is absurd). Every object which exists has a specific, concrete length. No object exists with a "universal length" (a length without any specific measurements: that is an epistemological device). Similarly, as in the above AR quote, a variable (a universal) can stand for 5 or 5,000,000. But the variableness does not exist in 5 (since 5 is a particular measurement, it is not a quantity without any specific measurements: a universal). This is not to say that universals don't exist: length of an object exists. However, as universals (as an entity with no specific measurements), they don't exist. Universals exist: as instances (specific entities, their aspects, etc). In English, articles are used to instantiate universals ('an apple', 'the length'). Universals are used to refer to concrete things in reality. Universals do not refer to universals that exist in reality. They exist: as the thing or aspect you are referring to. They do not exist: as a universal (as an object with no specific measurement). Universals refer to things, not to universals (they are epistemological: they are something in your mind which refers to something in reality. One part exists in your head. The other part exists in reality. The part that exists in your head [universal qua universal] doesn't exist "out there". Saying that something is epistemological doesn't exclude the existence of something in reality [the existence of something in reality is necessary]. However, universals do not refer to universals. They refer to things). They also capture certain invariant facts about what you're referring to. @intrinsicist: you are equating universal with identity. The fact that universals do not exist (qua universals) in reality does not mean things don't have identity.
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