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  1. Universals

    Evidence for the correct meaning of 'universal' already exists in the English language (or any spoken language). The universal length refers to the length of a specific object. The universal 'man' refers to a specific man. Consider the differences in meaning of the sentences 'man died' and 'the man died'. The former comes across as an invariant fact applicable to all men (and may be true for particular men). In the latter, the universal has been instantiated (which is necessary because individual men have specific measurements. When you're referring to specific men, you cannot continue talking as though any measurement is possible [or as though the individual has no specific measurements]. You have to instantiate the universal: the universal does not refer to an abstract universal that exists in specific objects). Similarly, when talking about specific entities, you speak about 'the length' instead of just 'length' (similar is the case for any concept or attribute). Just as AR said, the universal (such as "manness") does not exist "inside" an object/aspect. That's not the way universals are used in language. Universals do not refer to universals that exist "inside" an object. Universals refer to specific instances. If it's a concept, it refers to the whole of an object, not some part that resides within it. If the universal is an attribute, it refers to all aspects of the attribute as it exists. You talk in terms of universals ("man is evil") is you want to omit particular measurements (and are talking about invariant facts). You instantiate the universal ("the man died"), if you want to talk about someone in particular. The comparison isn't equivalent: because the universal exists as a specific instance (just, not as a universal).
  2. Universals

    I agree with Eiuol (if the following is his claim:) that universals as such don't exist but represent invariant facts about reality (and in this sense, they exist) and exist as the specific entity or aspect you're referring to. This is the sense with which AR used the term universals: So, for example, length of an object exists. But length, as a universal, does not exist out there in reality. It is absurd to think that universals (obtained by a method of measurement omission), as such, exist out there in reality. That would mean, for example, that there exists an object without any specific lengths (which is absurd). Every object which exists has a specific, concrete length. No object exists with a "universal length" (a length without any specific measurements: that is an epistemological device). Similarly, as in the above AR quote, a variable (a universal) can stand for 5 or 5,000,000. But the variableness does not exist in 5 (since 5 is a particular measurement, it is not a quantity without any specific measurements: a universal). This is not to say that universals don't exist: length of an object exists. However, as universals (as an entity with no specific measurements), they don't exist. Universals exist: as instances (specific entities, their aspects, etc). In English, articles are used to instantiate universals ('an apple', 'the length'). Universals are used to refer to concrete things in reality. Universals do not refer to universals that exist in reality. They exist: as the thing or aspect you are referring to. They do not exist: as a universal (as an object with no specific measurement). Universals refer to things, not to universals (they are epistemological: they are something in your mind which refers to something in reality. One part exists in your head. The other part exists in reality. The part that exists in your head [universal qua universal] doesn't exist "out there". Saying that something is epistemological doesn't exclude the existence of something in reality [the existence of something in reality is necessary]. However, universals do not refer to universals. They refer to things). They also capture certain invariant facts about what you're referring to. @intrinsicist: you are equating universal with identity. The fact that universals do not exist (qua universals) in reality does not mean things don't have identity.
  3. The Royal Family of Nominalism

    Neither. Such statements are normative. Gender and sex identify metaphysical characteristics but ideas like "a rational woman cannot want to be President" are different. For example, it is incorrect to say that "human beings are selfish". It would be correct to say that "humans should be selfish". In a similar way, it is incorrect to say that "girls play with dolls". It would be correct to say that "girls should play with dolls". I'm not sure what word I would use to denote such normative characteristics. Perhaps, "feminine" and "masculine" would be good terms. In popular usage, "feminine" may denote some characteristic that is "becoming of a woman" (woman qua woman). It is normative. For reference, Cambridge Dictionary defines "feminine" as "having characteristics that are traditionally thought to be typical of or suitable for a woman". The "suitable for a woman" part is normative. Of course, other dictionaries define things differently, stressing qualities traditionally associated with women, but that definition may be derivative (derived from the traditional standards of society). These 2 words come the closest. I think this is also the way AR used the words 'feminine' and 'masculine'. In this sense, these two words do not identify characteristics that humans universally possess. They refer to virtues (in the same way that "selfishness" refers to a virtue everyone need not possess). They refer to characteristics that one must possess. Femininity and masculinity are treated as virtues in popular usage (validating their usage as normative concepts. By comparison, gender isn't treated as a virtue. It is a metaphysical concept). However, the dictionary definitions aren't very good. So new definitions: male = male animal; female = female animal; man = male human; woman = female human (of a certain age); feminine = characteristics that are becoming of a woman; masculine = characteristics that are becoming of a man. Male/female are sexes. Man/woman are genders. Feminine/masculine are virtues. Sometimes, the term "manliness" is also used to denote the corresponding virtue. Virtues aren't arbitrary. (Again, disclaimer: English isn't my first language. I don't even know what a subjunctive is. I can only talk about the simple, obvious meanings of these terms)
  4. The Royal Family of Nominalism

    Gender as the term <straw man> non-binariesTM* </straw man> use is definitely an anti-concept though. *straw man
  5. The Royal Family of Nominalism

    This is just the way children learn. The child first learned about gender roles, then learned to identify herself based on these roles and then learned about gender. This is an inverted way of learning things. This is just the chronological order in which a child learns the concept gender. That does not mean that gender does not refer to the biological sex of a human being. That is the essential that implies all secondary sexual characteristics (of humans) and gave rise to the concept of gender roles (valid or not). Just because a child first learns of the (possibly invalid) concept of gender roles, then learns to self-identify against that standard and then ultimately learns the concept gender doesn't change the meaning of the word gender. This is pretty much the way you learn all concepts. For example: a child may first learn about the appearance of certain races or may have learned to associate certain behaviours with certain races before he learned about lineage and ancestry. That does not mean that lineage and ancestry are not what the term 'race' refers to. Appearances and behaviours were the way children learned to identify races initially. This is the way a child chronologically learns these things. The child will eventually learn that lineage and ancestry are the basis of the concept of race. This does not invalidate the concept of race. This is how children learn things. They learn using appearances and other people's opinions. How you came across a concept should be irrelevant to you (people's opinions on how to identify an entity doesn't change that entity). In another example, a child may learn to identify people of different sexual orientations by observing their mannerisms and speech. He may not know about sexual attraction. Eventually, he may learn about the concept of sexual attraction. This does not invalidate the concept of sexual orientation. Sexual orientation does exist. How you came across a concept should be irrelevant to you (unless you think meanings are determined by social consensus). Stereotypes and misconceptions exist about pretty much every entity on the planet, from Quantum Fields to race and gender. You may come across these stereotypes and misconceptions (and learn to identify things in real life based on stereotypes and misconceptions) before you actually learn how to identify the concepts correctly. Unless the thing itself doesn't actually exist (which it does in the case of gender, race, etc), your goal should be to correctly identify them. Stereotypes, gender roles and misconceptions serve as faulty definitions used to identify a concept. Gender roles serve as a faulty (and very detailed) definition to identify gender. Don't confuse the two (gender does not refer to gender roles. Gender roles are not "associated" with gender). Stereotypes and gender roles are faulty definitions (and many people strongly conform to these faulty definitions in order to have an "identity") used to identify a legitimate concept. They don't and cannot invalidate concepts (of race, gender, etc). If anything, get rid of these faulty definitions (and attempts to create your own "identity" around them). These faulty definitions are destroying the legitimate concept of gender, race, etc. What's more, even more faulty definitions and "identities" are popping up. If gender roles are incorrect ways to identify your gender, these new definitions are incorrect ways of identifying nothing. For example: if somebody says that "you are not a boy if you can't play tennis", they are effectively using a characteristic to identify somebody as a boy. The concept boy does not refer to and is not "associated with" the "ability to play tennis". The latter is used to define and identify a boy (in a faulty way, of course). Again, as I said before, sex refers to the biological sex of animals. Gender refers to the biological sex of humans. But are valid concepts and definitions. Don't lose these concepts over faulty definitions. (As a note: I would say that your child has a strong sense of gender roles but her concept of gender is very indirect)
  6. The Royal Family of Nominalism

    Never said it was. I don't give much importance to the idea of "male brain" vs. "female brain". And where do they get this intuition from? Do they "just know" something's wrong? Also, where did you get this information that transgenders feel this way? Are there testimonials you can look at? Also, what exactly is it that is wrong? The feeling of wrongness has to be with reference to something. Or are you saying that they "feel" about nothing in particular? If it's about nothing, how could they possibly identify it (or "intuit" it)? If it's about something, then why are you saying that it's only later identified to be stemming from something gender-related? What is the "something" in "something is wrong"? Is it nothing in particular? Also, is this feeling rational? If not, why should anybody else care about it?
  7. The Royal Family of Nominalism

    I was talking in terms of hypotheticals. Nobody is claiming anything about neuroscience. The only unsupported assertions are yours, about what people do or don't know. Instead of your twitch responses, try thinking for five seconds.
  8. The Royal Family of Nominalism

    I'm not talking about feelings. I'm talking about identifications (percepts, concepts, etc). Suppose a person of female gender allegedly has a "male brain". Suppose she has never encountered genitalia till the age of 5. At 5, she says she feels like she is male or identifies as male. The question would be: how can she "feel like" a male or identify as male if she has never acquired the concept of male/female through perception/conception mechanism. Where does her identification (state of consciousness) come from. Assume she has never learned about male/female in real life (her parents hid that information, perhaps to let her choose). However, because of her "male brain", she identifies herself as male. What is the mechanism/source of her identification? How can she identify something she never encountered in real life?
  9. The Royal Family of Nominalism

    Nobody in the entire world has ever said that male/female identifying brains are inherited? Sure... Didn't say it was.
  10. The Royal Family of Nominalism

    I am obviously attacking that idea as a strawman. I'm not saying that's the only idea they have. I'm saying that if somebody has that idea, it's wrong. I'm attacking the idea as compared against reality. I was very careful to avoid associating ideas with people because I knew somebody would accuse me of "strawmanning". This was why I avoided mentioning the term "social constructionists", but I forgot to leave out the term "evo psych". I am very sorry if I offended any scientists. I won't make that mistake again. I'm deeply sorry.
  11. The Law of Identity

    How is that an argument by assertion? Can you explain?
  12. The Law of Identity

    I think transgenders attempt to fit reality (their physical characteristics, mainly how they appear to other people) to an error in cognition (error in identifying who they themselves are).
  13. The Royal Family of Nominalism

    I completely agree with this. They usually provide two (mutually contradictory) justifications for why nobody can contradict them: 1) From evolutionary psychology: the idea that this "feeling" (actually: identification) of who they are is obtained through genes or some means other than perception. Such inheritance can be random, is not derived from reality and may eventually be discovered to be in conflict with physical reality. They may claim that they are physically a man but their brain comes with the identification that they are a woman. Since the identification is obtained through means other than perception and "cannot be helped", they claim that these identifications (of themselves as male or female) are as valid as a person whose genetic consciousness is "cis" (people who get a transmitted consciousness which identifies their biological sex correctly but don't have a choice in their identification either, since that part of the consciousness [which identifies their own biological sex] is transmitted genetically and is not derived from perception). 2) The idea that gender has nothing to do with biological sex and is a social convention. Under this paradigm, gender is a man-made concept. Hence, it is arbitrary. Hence, they're all equally valid. The concepts are considered to be derived from reality but in a loose sense: through social agreement. What is considered is "normal" or correct is also part of this agreement and has no basis in reality and must be fought. The latter argument can also be applied to all concepts: all concepts are man-made (true) and hence, arbitrary (false) but are given meaning and made "real" by society (false). Both justifications cut off consciousness (identification) from reality (one says identifications are hereditary; other says they are arbitrary.) and they contradict each other. There are still more (less important) arguments. Definitions: sex and gender are two different concepts but your sex determines your gender. Some heuristic definitions can be given: sex: biological sex of all animals gender: biological sex of humans male sex: male & animal female sex: female & animal male gender = male & human female gender = female & human man = male & human & 18+ boy = male & human & 18- woman = female & human & 18+ girl = female & human & 18- For example, a cow is female but not a woman. A bull is male but not a man. This is the only distinction between sex and gender. Humans can be referred to by their sex as well as gender. Your biological sex and the fact that you are human (and hence your gender) are determined by your physiology and is not an arbitrary choice open to debate. Note: saying something like "that female offered me candy" is a bit dehumanizing so the latter is more preferred [gender contains the implication that you are human]. But both are correct. This doesn't mean that gender has any additional special non-physiological attributes. Gender is preferred over sex (when referring to people) for the same reason that "those gay men are playing in the field" is preferred over "those gays are playing in the field". The only thing gender adds to sex (and "gay men" adds to "gays") is personhood (the fact that you are human). The addition (of personhood) makes sure that you are not reduced to your biological sex or sexual orientation while somebody else is referring to your biological sex or sexual orientation. It is a respectful way of addressing people (but it is not a title or indication of social status as some "constructionists" would want you to believe). There is no mystical undefinable element. Gender is a respectful way of referring to a person's biological sex by including the fact that they are human. The same thing happens with "gay men" or "gay person" as opposed to just "gays". Both sex and gender refer to biological sex but for different classes of species. Sometimes the word "man" refers to all humans emphasizing the personhood and getting rid of the biological sex. This is more evidence that what the words man/woman add to the table is the concept of being human, not some BS social convention. Also, English isn't my first language, but this is how I understand these words (male, female, man, boy, woman, girl). It seems extremely simple to me. But pretty much all native speakers seem to have some problems with this. I don't understand what their objections are to this (I have heard some say that since gender roles are made-up and different throughout the world [eg: marumakkathayam in Kerala], the concept of gender is false. That's faulty logic. Gender and gender roles are two separate concepts. The validity of gender roles has no implications for the validity of the concept of gender). To summarize: gender is a different concept from sex (which is broader) but if you are human, your sex determines your gender.
  14. How Nazis Recruit Normie Conservatives For Meme Wars

    The problem is that these particular men exist within these groups. So your arguments do apply to particular men. You're just not identifying them. There is no such explicit dichotomy. Every statement about the group is derived from individuals and every statement about an individual implies something about a group. A group doesn't have a higher, separate existence. You wouldn't be able to say that '99% of the people in this group are colour-blind, but I'm saying nothing about individual men'; by that statement, you would be saying something about individual men, but you're leaving them unidentified (i.e., you don't know which particular men fall under the 1% and which particular men fall under 99%. However, just because you don't know who they specifically are doesn't mean that you're not referring to them. You're still referring to particular, unidentified men). If you say "capitalists are evil", you're not talking about any particular men (say Amit or Dhruv). But these particular men exist. Statistics isn't exempt from this. You are claiming that you would never judge any particular individual you encounter in real life because you don't know which part of the curve they fall on. But you're still making an important claim: that a lot of specific, particular, unidentified men have a tendency to have a low IQ, because of their race. 'Specific' and 'unidentified' aren't two mutually exclusive categories. They are related by the theory of measurement omission (that is the way statistics works too, since they are an abstraction): "Bear firmly in mind that the term “measurements omitted” does not mean, in this context, that measurements are regarded as non-existent; it means that measurements exist, but are not specified. That measurements must exist is an essential part of the process. The principle is: the relevant measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity". In summary: you are referring to particular individual men. You are just not identifying who these particular individuals are. Just because you don't know them personally or are not identifying them individually doesn't mean you're not making claims about particular, individual (unidentified) men. Without reference to any particular men, what you would have is a floating abstraction. Statistics isn't a floating abstraction. Also, at times, your "arguments" boil down to this: since we know that humans differ in their inessential characteristics (some have dyslexia; others don't), isn't it possible that humans differ in their essential characteristics (capacity of reason) as well? You are evading what a difference in such an essential characteristic would imply: they are not human. You're not saying that some humans differ in their essential characteristics by degree. You're making a categorical distinction ("unable to understand capitalism"). This is like saying that: we know chairs differ in their inessential characteristics (differences in color for example); isn't it possible that they differ in their essential characteristics as well (isn't it possible that some of them aren't made to be sat on)? This is nonsensical. Regarding success, you are also ascribing innate guilt to some groups of people: because your ancestors haven't achieved something in the past, you're never going to achieve something in the future. This isn't how humans work. Humans don't necessarily inherit the concrete methods of functioning of their ancestors.