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merjet

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merjet last won the day on August 5 2018

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About merjet

  • Rank
    Junior Member

Previous Fields

  • Country
    United States
  • State (US/Canadian)
    Ohio
  • Relationship status
    Married
  • Copyright
    Copyrighted
  • Biography/Intro
    I have several articles published in Objectivity and the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies.
  • School or University
    University of Illinois
  • Occupation
    actuary (retired)

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  1. I hadn't heard the recent audio interview when I posted yesterday. I just finished listening. Most of their conversation is about postmodernism, like the earlier video one. Reminiscing: I still have my copy of Explaining Postmodernism. I bought it July 5, 2004. Stephen Hicks signed it with a note the day I bought it. He encouraged me to write a review. I did, and it became my first on Amazon. It is the third oldest review of EP on Amazon, dated July 21, 2004.
  2. The distinction I have in mind is different, but not incompatible with that. Physical necessity is about physical things. Logical necessity is broader, and includes the sort of necessity one can grasp in, say, higher mathematics. For example, this consequence is logically implied by this theorem. For example, this function is differentiable, therefore continuous. The reverse may be true, too, but not always.
  3. Jordan Peterson interviewed Objectivist philosopher Stephen Hicks almost two years ago. In March he did so again. Links: video of first interview audio of second interview They are long, about 1.5 hours each.
  4. Thank you for that, Stephen, especially for the distinction between logical necessity and physical necessity. Also, I liked your comments about John Locke. I have began a series on my blog about inference and necessity. Here is the first: Blanshard on Implication and Necessity #1. More to come.
  5. Fannie and Freddie trying to make another housing bubble? Another bubble and collapse
  6. It won't answer the title question, but to somebody enough interested in modus ponens I recommend Bland Blanshard's The Nature of Thought, Vol 2, the chapter Formalism and Necessity. The Feb 1963 The Objectivist Newsletter included a favorable book review of Blanshard's Reason and Analysis by N. Branden. That book also addresses modus ponens ("p implies q"), but not as much.
  7. ProPublica and "prefilled filing" ProPublica Targets TurboTax Again
  8. Two Logics #1 Two Logics #2 ProPublica Targets Free File Tax Preparers ProPublica Targets TurboTax TurboTax, Forbes, ProPublica
  9. The Entrepreneurial State #1 The Entrepreneurial State #2 The Entrepreneurial State #3
  10. The Innovators #2 The Innovators #3 The Innovators #4
  11. Sort of. I believe that ‘putting the cart before the horse’ – like the one Amazon reviewer of Two Logics wrote – is a better description than ‘stolen’. I received a copy of Two Logics via inter-library loan and read some it. Mostly Two Logics is a critique of what Veatch calls the relating-logic of analytic philosophy and a contrast to what-logic, which was mostly originated by Aristotle. Veatch says the following about relating-logic and the fallacy of inverted intentionality. To recur to our own well-known illustration, suppose that our concept “planet” involved among its various notes that of moving in a particular circular orbit. As [C.I.] Lewis would see it, that this particular note should be contained in our concept of planet would be entirely of our doing, it being up to us to define our concepts in any way we choose, packing into them only those notes that we ourselves might decide we wanted them to contain, and leaving out those that we did not want” (106-7). It "is nonetheless an inevitable consequence of that rigid dichotomy between analytic and synthetic, or between language rules and statements of fact, in terms of which a relating-logic must operate. … [W]hat this dichotomy means is that all necessary connections are confined exclusively to the sphere of the linguistic and the logical: they represent only our human devices for relating and connecting things, and not any real connections or relations in things themselves” (113). “However, this still does not obviate the confusion, or even the fallacy – although it may be a more subtle fallacy that that of a confusion of use and mention. Indeed, we propose to call it the fallacy of inverted intentionality, thus availing ourselves – though for our own purposes – of the Scholastic distinction between first and second intentions. For the interesting thing about this distinction is that it serves to [point up what would seem to be an obvious and inescapable order of priority in regard to what we might call the various levels or orders of meaning or of intention” (119). “Moreover, so far as the distinction between first and second intentions is concerned, we may say that when we make statements about red and green, they are of first intention; and when we make statements about how the terms “red” and “green” are to be used, they are of second intention … Now we will go further and say that there is clearly an order of priority involved here. It is only because of the sorts of things that words like “red” and “green,” or logical devices like inference tickets, etc., are used to mean or signify, that we are justified in laying down the various logical and linguistic rules for the use of such terms” (120). The first Objectivist literature on the stolen concept is an article with that title by N. Branden in The Objectivist Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 1, Jan. 1963. He wrote: “Man’s concepts are derived from and depend on earlier, more basic concepts which serve as their genetic roots. For example, the concept “parent” is presupposed by the concept “orphan”; if one had grasped the former, one could not arrive at the latter, nor could the latter be meaningful.” So in my view Branden described the error as contradicting or ignoring the genetic concept more so than stealing it. I may or may not read more of Veatch’s book. There are two things I believe important that Veatch’s book does not address. One is the term logic developed by Fred Sommers after Veatch’s book was published. This was the subject of The Logic of Natural Language (1984). It was further explained in An Invitation to Formal Reasoning: The Logic of Terms. Sommers’ logic handles relations and multiple categories quite well. Another is that Veatch does not address Boolean logic or Boolean algebra, originated before Veatch was born. Boolean algebra was very important to the development of computers.
  12. The Innovators #1 Bernie Sanders lies about Amazon income taxes Bernie Sanders' Medicare for All Bernie Sanders' Medicare for All #2
  13. CBS News on Canada's climate change IRS pinches middle and lower income self-employed Bird eggs
  14. Sorry. I can't answer that, since I haven't read Veatch's book. I have ordered it via inter-library loan.
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