Sort of. I believe that ‘putting the cart before the horse’ – like the one Amazon reviewer of Two Logics wrote – is a better description than ‘stolen’.
I received a copy of Two Logics via inter-library loan and read some it.
Mostly Two Logics is a critique of what Veatch calls the relating-logic of analytic philosophy and a contrast to what-logic, which was mostly originated by Aristotle. Veatch says the following about relating-logic and the fallacy of inverted intentionality.
To recur to our own well-known illustration, suppose that our concept “planet” involved among its various notes that of moving in a particular circular orbit. As [C.I.] Lewis would see it, that this particular note should be contained in our concept of planet would be entirely of our doing, it being up to us to define our concepts in any way we choose, packing into them only those notes that we ourselves might decide we wanted them to contain, and leaving out those that we did not want” (106-7).
It "is nonetheless an inevitable consequence of that rigid dichotomy between analytic and synthetic, or between language rules and statements of fact, in terms of which a relating-logic must operate. … [W]hat this dichotomy means is that all necessary connections are confined exclusively to the sphere of the linguistic and the logical: they represent only our human devices for relating and connecting things, and not any real connections or relations in things themselves” (113).
“However, this still does not obviate the confusion, or even the fallacy – although it may be a more subtle fallacy that that of a confusion of use and mention. Indeed, we propose to call it the fallacy of inverted intentionality, thus availing ourselves – though for our own purposes – of the Scholastic distinction between first and second intentions. For the interesting thing about this distinction is that it serves to [point up what would seem to be an obvious and inescapable order of priority in regard to what we might call the various levels or orders of meaning or of intention” (119).
“Moreover, so far as the distinction between first and second intentions is concerned, we may say that when we make statements about red and green, they are of first intention; and when we make statements about how the terms “red” and “green” are to be used, they are of second intention … Now we will go further and say that there is clearly an order of priority involved here. It is only because of the sorts of things that words like “red” and “green,” or logical devices like inference tickets, etc., are used to mean or signify, that we are justified in laying down the various logical and linguistic rules for the use of such terms” (120).
The first Objectivist literature on the stolen concept is an article with that title by N. Branden in The Objectivist Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 1, Jan. 1963. He wrote: “Man’s concepts are derived from and depend on earlier, more basic concepts which serve as their genetic roots. For example, the concept “parent” is presupposed by the concept “orphan”; if one had grasped the former, one could not arrive at the latter, nor could the latter be meaningful.”
So in my view Branden described the error as contradicting or ignoring the genetic concept more so than stealing it.
I may or may not read more of Veatch’s book. There are two things I believe important that Veatch’s book does not address. One is the term logic developed by Fred Sommers after Veatch’s book was published. This was the subject of The Logic of Natural Language (1984). It was further explained in An Invitation to Formal Reasoning: The Logic of Terms. Sommers’ logic handles relations and multiple categories quite well.
Another is that Veatch does not address Boolean logic or Boolean algebra, originated before Veatch was born. Boolean algebra was very important to the development of computers.