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Severinian

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  1. Like
    Severinian reacted to Ninth Doctor in Heirs to dictatorships   
    Try looking into the history of the 18th century monarchs who were influenced by the Enlightenment.  Joseph II of Austria is a prime example.  With the stroke of a pen he freed the serfs and gave Jews equal rights.  There was a backlash, and he ended up writing his own epitaph: Here lies Joseph II, who failed in all he undertook.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_II,_Holy_Roman_Emperor
  2. Like
    Severinian reacted to Repairman in Heirs to dictatorships   
    There's a great deal of truth to this. Being born into a dictatorship poses a bit of conundrum for everyone under its influence, from the highest to the lowest. Generally, dictatorships lack the institutions of justice and liberty of which we in Western nations take for granted. Corruption is often the norm, institutionalized from the highest to the lowest. Vendettas are common. Machiavellian politics would likely result in usurpers overthrowing any leader appearing weak and sympathetic to liberal reforms. Stability is the primary objective for any nation with a history of violent factional or tribal conflict.
    What to do if one were an enlightened man born to rule such a nation? If it were me, I would do everything possible to secure my own preservation. A loyal ally among the security forces, one willing to accept the ideological changes, would be absolutely necessary. And it wouldn't hurt to have a backup plan for living in exile.
    2. As an sort of philosopher-king, I would need to do a great deal of philosophizing in the language of both the higher and lower economic classes. Routine public addresses would be more effective than one three hour long "I am John Galt" speech, public addresses that relate to conditions specific to the nation. I would also need to allow the freedom for public rebuttal.
    3. I would begin with a drastic reform of stripping the oligarchs of their monopolistic powers to privatization. I would need to know just how backward this hypothetical nation is in order to know how to proceed. Perhaps the nation has industrial capability, maybe better than any other nation. If so, it would be easier to liberalize institutions. If it were a nation of primitive savages, the process of allowing market forces to "do their magic" would be hindered by the fact that there would be very little wealth to take to market. Privatization brings enemies from all levels. Many Brits from the coal miners union have never forgiven Margret Thatcher.
    4. The most difficult task of transitioning from absolute rule to rule of law is to institutionalize reason, purpose, and self-esteem. It would take generations of educational reform to reverse the effects of a church or state monopolized school system, and it would be made clear that that school system would not be public forever. On this point, there will be the old and unreconstructed who will always tell their children and grandchildren how much better it was under the old regime. I wouldn't expect my "revolution" to be successful beyond my life, but if my works and words survive me in the memories of others, it could be the genesis of something to come. I might be "air-brushed" out of my nation's history books, but I would die satisfied knowing I tried.
  3. Like
    Severinian reacted to SpookyKitty in Heirs to dictatorships   
    He would be assassinated or overthrown immediately for this. Dictators never rule alone. There's always a powerful oligarchy lurking in the background.
  4. Like
    Severinian reacted to DonAthos in The value of preventing others' suffering   
    I agree that animals have no rights and no inherent moral status. Also that an animal's suffering is not of equal worth to a human's suffering. But that does not mean that, in the treatment of animals, "the only issue is economic viability."
    You yourself make the case here:
    It should change your answer. If you like animals in general and enjoy treating them well, then your enjoyment of treating them well is another issue to take into account when deciding on how you're going to treat them. Not simply how much money you'll make based on your treatment of them.
  5. Like
    Severinian reacted to Reidy in The value of preventing others' suffering   
    The thinking here seems to be that money is the only rational motivator and that a rational actor would consider this and nothing else. This looks like a good case where this would not be true. Being kind to animals is also a motive.
    The question would rarely come up anyway; gratuitously painful slaughtering methods would probably not be economically prudent. On the other hand, people hold snails to starve in order to empty out their digestive tracts. The Japanese (I've read) appreciate sashimi from fish butchered live at the table; feeling the reflexive death twitches on the tongue is part of the experience.
  6. Like
    Severinian reacted to Nicky in Is consciousness only possible in biological organisms?   
    Consciousness is a functionality biological mechanisms possess. So, your question boils down to: is it possible to recreate that functionality in a different mechanism?
    And yes, sure. Why wouldn't it be. Of course, the brain is the most complex thing in nature, and we're still struggling with much simpler kinds of functionality found in living things, so it's going to take a lot of effort. But it's a finite amount of complexity, that will take a finite amount of effort to understand and re-create.
  7. Like
    Severinian reacted to dream_weaver in Are all powerlusters nihilists?   
    From Rand's notes:
    [Toohey] is the great Nihilist of the spirit.
    Toohey understands human greatness and the motive-power of human greatness better than any other man in the story. Roark is great, but too unself-conscious to analyze or understand it—for a long time. Keating and Wynand seek greatness blindly. Toohey knows its roots.
    One other passage I found that comes across as relevant to myself is from OPAR Pg. 170
    Of all the variants of emotionalism, nihilism is the ugliest.
    Working off your title question accordingly:
    All power-lusters are emotionalists.
    Some emotionalists are nihilists.
     
  8. Like
    Severinian reacted to Spong in Immortality, would you take it?   
    What is the purpose of ignoring the distinction between indefinitely long life and literal indestructibility? The actual issue raised by this thread, and the only one relevant to human life in reality is the potential for achieving, through technology, indefinitely long lifespans. That is simply not an issue with any resemblance to Ayn Rand's indestructible robot.

    I find it completely astounding that some individuals seem to have conluded that if the alternative between life and death is the ultimate basis of human values, then the actual failure to meet that standard, the actual occurance of the complete annhilation of all your values is somehow necessary to make them values in the first place. That is spectacularly fallacious.

    The point of an ultimate end is to achieve it. The fact that the potential to fail to bring about that end is what necessitates a code of values to guide your actions does not mean that you therefore should fail at your acheiving that end. It means precisely the opposite--you should always acheive it.
    If the highest moral purpose of your actions is to ensure the continued existence of a life proper to a rational being, then how, at some arbitrary number of years in the future, will it suddenly become desirable to extinguish that life?

    A good general rule is that when you start sounding like Leon Kass you should check your premises. "Finitude" (i.e. a short lifespan) is not a value.

    And the idea that you'd "get tired" or bored and simply give up after a few centuries is one of the most apathetic, unambitious, passionless, unimaginative statements of pathological ennui that I can conceive of. It represents a seriously impoverished view of the future that is possible if a rational philosophy takes hold, of the values that one could potentially pursue and create given a radically advanced state of science, and of the phenomenal extent of the human potential. More often than not, simply to make the claim is indicative of a lackluster sense of life and an inert mind.
    It's often been said that in the scenario of longer lifespans, only boring people will get bored...
    For the record, I certainly don't think that anyone who ever makes this claim is boring, etc., but I do think they haven't thought the matter through or considered its nihilistic implications.

    These attitudes have life or death consequences for all of us, because their prevelance in the general population contributes to the widespread indifference or outright hostility toward the incredible promise of aging research. But whether such research will go ahead with sufficient funding, and whether it will escape being stifled, through the force of the state, by its many ideological enemies has real bearing on whether we will see any practical benefit from it in our own lifetimes.
  9. Like
    Severinian reacted to dream_weaver in "Time marches on"   
    Actually, he makes the inquiry about the owner's weakness toward the end of the first day on the new job, rather than at the interview. The twisting of the dial is changing the radio station, is analogous with the change in the staff at the new newspaper,
    From Notes While Writing, The Journals of Ayn Rand
    Toohey proceeds successfully on his chosen course of destroying all those whose lives touch his. He fails only with three human beings: Roark, Dominique, and Wynand. Roark is the great, consuming hatred of his life, the symbol of all that he must destroy. He is helpless before Roark; he cannot touch Roark spiritually—and he knows it. So he marshals every social weapon he controls—to break Roark's career. And Toohey holds a great power over society, carefully built up through the years. But he fails. He cannot prevent Roark's ultimate triumph. In regard to Dominique, Toohey is one of the few who understand her real nature. He goads her on to self-destruction. He helps to bring about her marriage to Wynand—a marriage he hoped would destroy them both. He has a special interest in Wynand: he works slowly, through many years, to obtain editorial control of the Wynand papers, on which he is employed as a special columnist-commentator. He understands Wynand. He knows that Wynand's bitter cynicism is only a mask for the kind of spirit Toohey dreads; he knows that Wynand is not basically corrupt. He hopes to achieve that corruption through Dominique, whom he considers to be the worst possible influence that Wynand could encounter. He fails in his calculations. At the end of the story, he loses that particular battle by losing his position with the Wynand papers. But another great newspaper signs him up at once. Toohey, like time, marches on.
     
  10. Like
    Severinian got a reaction from Harrison Danneskjold in Some people welcome oblivion   
    When talking about the issue of life extension, it shocks me that a lot of people who don't believe in life after death don't really fear dying, and even say that they wouldn't want to use a cure for aging if it was possible, because they want oblivion at some point. Put aside the point that a non-senescing person could still commit suicide, how can some people possibly welcome oblivion? Imagine never existing anymore, ever, that is horrible! 

    I don't understand these people, and they can't really explain why to me. The only possible explanation I can think of is that there's some fundamental pain, fear, guilt or sorrow that is constantly bothering them deep down, which is so strong that they would actually prefer to not exist than to bear it. Maybe they see joy as a mere relief from this fundamental pain, and at some point, they run out of "distractions from pain", and therefore, they would prefer oblivion, like Schopenhauer. Isn't this the only explanation? If one welcomes oblivion, the alternative must be worse? What can be worse than experiencing nothing? Experiencing something painful. 

    As an aside, when, in Atlas Shrugged, Rand writes about people who hate existence. I guess she's talking about these people? Maybe some nihilist nutjobs even think they're doing people a favor by killing them, if they believe that everyone else must have the same painful experience of life, and that oblivion is best for everyone. She said that most Americans are incapable to fully grasp the nature of these people's psychology, because of a different sense of life.

    Thoughts? 
  11. Like
    Severinian got a reaction from splitprimary in Some people welcome oblivion   
    I don't think it's irrational to be motivated by fear. Fear, if it's based on something rational, is telling you something important, for example that you might die if you don't do anything about it. Schopenhauer was motivated by pain only, but I'd say a truly rational person is both motivated by fear/pain/etc and also the good things in life. 

    The attitude of the people I'm talking about seems to be of the latter, "I don't care, it's gonna happen anyway, my death won't make that much of a difference, I don't mind the idea of oblivion", etc. That sounds very Schopenhauerish to me. 
  12. Like
    Severinian got a reaction from splitprimary in Some people welcome oblivion   
    I highly disagree that an immortal person would have no need of values, and I think that quote is taken out of context. Survival is not the ultimate goal, happiness is. If you were immortal, you could still enjoy new places, new art, revisit/reconsume old places and art, enjoy life's physical pleasures that you never get tired of, etc, you would never have to be "tormented by boredom".
  13. Like
    Severinian reacted to StrictlyLogical in Some people welcome oblivion   
    I agree.
     
    Emotions are not guides to action.  They are however based on held premises, and to the degree your thoughts, concepts, values etc. are rational, integrated, and consistent, so too your emotions will parallel what rationally makes sense.  As an early warning system, or as first impressions, your emotions are useful, but action should always result from sound judgment.  When fear emerges in the appropriate context, its motivation can assist the action taken ... adrenaline is useful for some flight or fight contexts and can be used in the carrying out of a rational response.
     
     
    I see on this website a certain degree of confusion and inconsistency surrounding the concept "death" in view of Objectivist principles.
     
    Without getting into it, a few things to think about:
     
    1.  Fear is an appropriate response to a person with correct premises which can assist to motivate a person to avoid disvalues, or avoid losing a value.
     
    2.  Fear of "the experience of death" is irrational insofar as "the experience of death" is an invalid concept, nothing can experience anything when dead
     
    3.  Focusing on the pain of death, on a sensational/perceptual level experience, as the important aspect to consider, is antithetical to the Objectivist position regarding a man's character and "soul" (metaphor) which is on a higher level than the mere perceptual or on the level of sense experience. Emotions of fully developed people do not revolve around sensations, pain, pleasure, etc. alone.
     
    4.  Life is the ultimate value, it makes all other values possible.  The desire to live is a conscious choice, and life itself is also what makes all choice possible.
     
    5.  Continued existence, life, requires action, requires judicious voluntary use of the mind, and insofar as man has free will and is fallible, a man's life can be extended or shortened to the degree he consciously protects and nourishes it or fails to do so.
     
    6.  Fear, of loosing life, the ultimate value (now... or now.... or NOW... or a minute too early, or a day too early, or a decade too early...) is a valid emotional response, insofar as maintaining this ultimate value, life requires continual action, in the face of the fundamental alternative, to be or not to be.  It must of course be contextual and absent any particular apprehension of its shortening resulting from action, it should not arise.
     
     
    Fear of life ending earlier than what otherwise  IS possible, IS not the same as fear of the inescapable eventuality of death, NOR is it the same as fear of the experience of death.  The latter two are in their way invalid emotions, whereas the foremost IS valid, and in fact completely in accord with LIFE being the ultimate value which makes all other values possible.
  14. Like
    Severinian reacted to Plasmatic in Some people welcome oblivion   
    In other words, you are wanting to restrict your question to the psychology of those capable of value and increasing value but still wanting oblivion?
  15. Like
    Severinian reacted to softwareNerd in Some people welcome oblivion   
    One minor point. I suppose you might be using the term "fear" broadly (i.e. to mean "negative about"), but I cannot remember ever being really fearful of dying except in dangerous contexts [e.g. on some high ledge with a chance I could fall]. When you die you die: there's nothing there to be afraid of, because there's nothing there.

    Another minor point: not dying is different from not aging. If someone tells me they have a way of not dying, and it involves being on life-support, or even severely incapacitated, it wouldn't interest me, and I assume most people feel that way.

    As for the psychology of people who say they wish to die some day and don't want to live forever, I think its hard to judge if that's all you have to go on. The idea of not dying is so radical that it is unreal. Perhaps you can probe for reasons in a round-about way: e.g. "if you could take the 10 beast years of your life and live 10 extra years of that type, would you want to do so"? 
  16. Like
    Severinian reacted to StrictlyLogical in Some people welcome oblivion   
    These people exist.  They are deeply damaged.
  17. Like
    Severinian got a reaction from softwareNerd in The value of relationships   
    "It'd be moral to leave the Matrix, not for the sake of some abstract devotion to "reality" or "real people" or anything else that's based on the idea of a perfect illusion (which is the Kantian skew), but to avoid living your life at the mercy of whatever happens outside."

    What if this "Morpheus guy" could convince you that the machine was far more safe from destruction/tampering than you would be in the real world if you went outside into the real world? Maybe you could even leave the virtual world and see it for yourself, that the machine was perfectly hidden and secure, but everywhere where there were people, the risk of murder or other horrible things was high. If you then had the choice whether or not to go back, would it still be best to live in reality, even though it was more unsafe? 

    It seems to me that in order to have a meaningful relationship, the subject of your love must be both conscious and "beautiful" to you. You would always feel a tiny bit of a fundamental loneliness with a "robot" even if it seemed 100% human. On the other hand, you don't love anyone just because of the fact that they're conscious. You don't love a mosquito, and you won't care that much if it turns out that they suffer greatly because it's hard for us to sympathize and empathize with an insect's suffering ("The Bambi effect"). Likewise, if your girlfriend was turned into an insect permanently, you wouldn't love her that much anymore, even if it would be her qualia in the insect. (I know the example is bizarre, but just bear with it)

     
  18. Like
    Severinian got a reaction from Harrison Danneskjold in Nietzscheism + reason   
    Playing a sort of devil's advocate here - Would it be fair to say that Objectivism's morality is like the morality of Nietzsche, but with an emphasis on reason and long-term thinking?

    Nietzsche held that a person should do whatever he pleases, even if it hurts others, even if it means seeking power.

    Objectivism holds that we should use and seek power over other species, that it's moral to eat meat and wear make-up (for the sake of enjoyment) even though animals have to suffer and die for this. It holds that in a war, innocents can be killed as collateral damage.

    In other words, the one thing that differs Objectivism from Nietzscheism is that Objectivism also says "Pause before you act and think about what really benefits you. If you try to control other human beings in everyday life, you are depriving yourself of the incentive to be a producer and trader, you are also depriving yourself of the benefits  and wealth you can get from leaving them alone and trading with them. Also, they might end up seeking revenge on you if you can't control them anymore, and so forth." 

    Agree? 
  19. Like
    Severinian reacted to softwareNerd in A question on the realism   
    Rand does not use "realism" to mean true to life, and objects to too true a portrayal. On the other hand, she does not write fantasy. Her actors aren't wizard or super-heroes. Instead, we see her actors making the best hamburger in the world, or making the best buildings: pretty real-world grounded pursuits. However, she often does not seek to be taken literally, and sometimes expects her reader to look through the author's eyes to judge a character, rather than judging them as they would if they met them in real life. 
     
    Anthem is her only book that could be considered a wee bit fantastic, but I think she would still call it "realism" in the way she used the concept. The style more like exaggerated legend rather than proper fantasy. In Atlas, she lets her actors spread a few symbolic and slightly fantastic rumors about John Galt. 
     
    On the "saint" in Anthem, I'm not sure if Rand was thinking of Saint Lawrence (patron saints of cooks) who said cheerfully "I'm done on this side; turn me over now!" If not, her tale is in the same spirit.
  20. Like
    Severinian reacted to Eiuol in Nietzscheism + reason   
    That's a fair statement. But your reasoning isn't quite right.

    "Nietzsche held that a person should do whatever he pleases, even if it hurts others, even if it means seeking power."

    He didn't. He believed it was probably -better- to be that way than to be an entirely selfless person, but he explicitly believed the greatest and most admirable people wouldn't hurt others, on grounds that it is too much concern about other people, that it's a weakness of someone to hurt others. He didn't think one should do whatever one pleases, but he didn't believe in morality per se. Instead, he went for ranking ideas and beliefs, often based on passions, aesthetics, and a strong will to power. Power as in power to control one's life. I can look later today for a passage where he speaks unfavorably of power over others.

    You're right, though, about emphasis on reason and long-term thinking. That's unique to Objectivism compared to Nietzsche. At best, he thought reason was of limited use and isn't a critical factor for becoming happy or fulfilled.
  21. Like
    Severinian reacted to StrictlyLogical in The value of relationships   
    There is beauty.  Beauty in reality, and beauty in art.  If you are familiar with Rand's views on esthetics you will understand that art has a purpose and a value to man, and what that purpose is.
     
     
    Irrationality as such, which is something completely distinguishable from art, fiction, and imagination, is not beautiful.  There is a world of difference between celebrating life by engaging in imagination, fiction, contemplating a flower or a seascape etc. and abandoning life by choosing to live in a drugged stupor, an induced euphoria, or a blind ignorant false existence.  Beauty lifts one up, helps man to affirm values in life and reality. It is something man uses to affirm and help him embrace his love of life... not something to replace it or tempt him away from it into a living death. 
     
     
    If you ask whether or not a robot, having the same ability to provide advice, listen to your problems, give you comfort, food, and or a place to crash as a person would be a value in those respects, I would have to answer yes.  BUT the value of the robot, for a rational person, is exactly because of WHAT they are, not what they "appear" to be.  Insofar as a person can give you business contacts or help you fix your fence you can have a "robot" acquaintance who in those limited exact ways can be just as good as a person.
     
    A rational person however cannot escape the reality that a robot with no actual consciousness, no actual feeling or empathy, cannot "feel" what you feel when you speak to them about losing a dog, or a card game or your set of keys.  It may be a subtle issue, but only evasion would permit you to value the robot in these respects the same as you would value a person (assuming you value conversation which involves speaking of shared experiences and having an empathic connection).  Of course a robot could imitate such a thing, but you would always know it was fake.  The same goes for admiration among peers, self esteem from mutual respect, pride and a great number of things we get from other real people which cannot be found in actuality from a non-conscious simulation.
     
    Now, of course, IF someday nonbiological systems were truly empathic and truly conscious etc, then the reality of THAT must be taken into account.
     
    I think the final answer to your friend is A is A.  If he actually values reality above fiction, actually values people more than unconscious automatons, THEN that is his answer.  Of course if the converse holds... I suppose that would be his answer.    
  22. Like
    Severinian got a reaction from softwareNerd in The value of relationships   
    I recently spoke to a hedonist who challenged the traditional Objectivist view by this example:

    Imagine that you meet a person like Morpheus from the movie The Matrix. He explains to you that you are actually living in a virtual reality machine, and that all other people in this world, just like the world itself, are merely part of the software. Just like non-human characters in video games, we can't expect people in this world to be conscious at all, they just seem to be, and act like they are.

    Naturally, you think he's joking, but he performs all sorts of "miracles" to prove to you that he is indeed from the outside, and that this is a computer simulation. The rational judgment at this point is to believe him, since he can seemingly defy natural laws.
     
    Now, he offers you a choice. You can actually return to the real world if you like, or you can stay in the simulation. Your life in the real world is not too good, you live in a dictatorship, and if you exit the machine, your life expectancy and chances of achieving happiness in the real world are smaller than in this one. But of course, you would meet "real people".

    Is it rational to go to the real world? Most people would say yes, because there's a huge happiness in knowing that you experience life with someone else. But what premises have led to that emotional response? (You know this is the Objectivist view on emotions) Is it actually rational to care whether your connection with others is genuine, as long as they react in the same way? If so, why? On a meta-ethical/meta-psychological level.

    As you can probably guess, the hedonist said that the rational choice would be to stay.
     
    I know many Objectivists don't like surreal examples about morality, but I think it's important, because it lets you focus solely on the issue in question.
  23. Like
    Severinian reacted to Eamon Arasbard in Innocents dying, ethics   
    I would like to clarify one point here -- yes, it is true that murdering an innocent person would make you feel horrible, and this would be the immediately percievable reason not to do it. However, this does not establish why it is rational to feel empathy -- ignoring this point means assuming that psychopaths are more rational than the general population.
     
    The reason why empathy is rational is because human cooperation is metaphysically necessary for survival, and this means recognizing and respecting the inherent humanity of others. In the scenario you described, you would be violating the conditions under which humans can be guaranteed peaceful coexistence, and this would be a breach of social ethics for this reason. It is also worth noting that this situation would be extremely unlikely to occur, but if it were, then you could be the one whose kidneys had to be stolen next time, so you would be lending moral sanction to your own murder. If the universe worked that way, then everyone would basically be screwed anyway, so moral principles wouldn't carry much weight.
     
    In our universe, you would always have a chance of someone finding out what you would have done, and would have to take action to prevent that from ever happening. You and your partner would have to spend the rest of your lives in fear of being caught, and this would affect your ability to live your lives the way you would want to. (And if you were the types of people who COULD live your lives that way, then you would have to prevent others from finding out, which would take considerable effort, and prevent you from engaging in positive pursuits because you would be living in fear of reprisal from those around you -- or other people would find out, and take the necessary actions to force to pay the consequences.)
     
    As for how this relates to war, my position is that we are endangering our own survival by sanctioning the murder of civilians in other countries. I might accept the premise that it is better to die than to live under a dictatorship, but someone who is a Muslim might also believe that someone is better off dead than not knowing Allah. So if one accepts the argument that we're justified in killing innocents in Muslim fundamentalist countries because they're living under a dictatorship, then a Muslim could just as easily claim that the terrorists who attacked America on 9/11 were justified because their victims were not benefitting from Allah's good graces.
     
    We would of course be right that being free is a necessary condition for living well, while Islamists are wrong in thinking that following Islam is necessary. But the fact that our position is correct does not grant the right to initiate force.
     
    The one counterargument which I do agree with is that it's better for victims of an Islamist regime to die than for residents of a free country to be enslaved. However, this only applies if there is a danger of losing a war which can be averted by military actions which will result in collateral damage.
  24. Like
    Severinian reacted to Harrison Danneskjold in Animals' intelligence   
    No; they almost certainly can tell that we experience qualia. They know that we have first-person experiences, too; they just don't ask themselves what ours are like.
  25. Like
    Severinian reacted to dream_weaver in Free will and intelligence   
    The ITOE immortal robot was used to examine values. (OO.search on immortal robot)
     
    In Harry Binswanger's book, How We Know, he briefly outlines conscious thought as it relates to computers, in a paragraph on page 40 cited here.
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