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Ilya Startsev

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Ilya Startsev last won the day on January 5 2015

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About Ilya Startsev

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  • Birthday 04/05/86

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    thanks to Rand, struggling with the biggest problem in my life: Immanuel Kant
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    the ones I most like/admire: AS, ITOE, DIM, EoS
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    Oryol State University
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  1. Toward new epistemology

    Besides adding "or the constant noise or ringing happening in the background" to this passage, I'd also like to stress that this sensation of light or "light-show" as A. D. Smith calls it in his The Problem of Perception, is internal, rather than external, also implying that seeing darkness is a type of sensation rather than nothing. Additionally I would like to also differentiate between sensations of which we are unaware and sensations of which we are aware but not conscious: We may be not aware of these thoughts, such as when we close our eyes we may be unaware of all the internal photons that are continuously sensed in our eyes, or the constant noise or ringing happening in the background. On the other hand, we may be aware but not conscious of some sensations, such as when we sit we may be aware but not conscious of the chair and our body pushing against each other, or while living in a big city we may get used to noise, thus being aware but not conscious of it.
  2. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Since the above quotes may be difficult to understand, I will interpret them in order to explain why I consider this a failure on Smith's part. In the quote Merleau-Ponty meant that a thing that caused no sensations cannot exist, and Reid meant that a thing that caused no sensations can exist. To be fair Merleua-Ponty should be considered a realist and Reid an idealist, the opposite of Smith's evaluations of them. On a related note, Smith believes that insects (and presumably other animals, except humans) don't feel sensations. This is absurd.
  3. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    A. D. Smith's biggest failure that I've noticed so far is that he thinks of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as an idealist based on this quote: And then states that Thomas Reid is a realist and quotes him thus:
  4. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    An explanation of the cause of an illusion, from my point of view, is that a contrast causes sense data integrated into perception to disintegrate or break apart, dividing them into ones that remain unaffected because of their closeness to some features of perception and those that have changed through the contrast.
  5. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    There are too many good points in that book, so I cannot share all of them, but here are two salient ones that at least relate, through criticism, to naive realism, which is how Oism is usually portrayed by its opponents: The idea here that the author is trying to communicate is that illusory sensation is a replacement of real sensation characterized by its conflict with perception itself, although it is contained in it because it affects perception, even though our brains modify the input as well. In other words, the difference is that integration of all sense data is not achieved when perception is "infected" (author's word) by illusion. Rather, what you get is the same as in popular illusions: there is a mix of sense data that correspond to "normal" (another author's word) perception and ones that do not, regardless of whether they are modified by our subjects or not.
  6. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    I've just started reading this excellent, excellent book, so I am already very impressed, thank you very much for the recommendation! The only issue I have so far is with his first passage on Kant: There are two issues actually. First, from the quote, he seems to think that Kant somehow defended Newton's conception of objective space in KrV, which is false, as you've shown in your article. The second issue is that there is not little but no perception in Kant's latest edition of KrV, as I've shown previously.
  7. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Perhaps this is an even better demarcation of the term energy: Material energy Kinetic energy Potential energy Real energy Vacuum energy Binding energy Ideal energy Dark matter Dark energy
  8. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    As another side note: What has been historically known as kinetic and potential energy (since Leibniz, iirc) is the same as matter and not the only energy known today. Hence I prefer to associate kinetic and potential energies with matter (as is done by physicists today), but associate the real energy (that isn't matter) with vacuum, binding, and dark energies. This way I think is more logical and better comprehended, since real energy isn't what we use for fuel (that's material particles like electrons) but the very form of nature, that which moves nature like its inner fire and keeps it together as well. Also this distinction between matter (kinetic and potential energy) and energy (vacuum, binding, and dark) supports the crucial distinction of man-made and natural that seems to have been erased in our highly technical and materialistic society. I guess another way to distinguish the energies is by calling them material (kinetic and potential) and real (vacuum, binding, dark). Therefore my use of the term "potential" is more fundamental than what's called "potential" energy that should be called material one.
  9. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    I must qualify this statement: I connect it to my heuristic of electromagnetic fields. The issue here is that it is counterintuitive and hard to understand that, for example, H2O has less energy than the sum of energies of the individual atoms, and hence a question arises concerning the source of this "new" energy that supposedly "holds" these atoms together. Intuitively we know that something is gained by the atoms of hydrogen and oxygen when they form the molecule of water. What's really happening is that their atomic energy decreases is lower because of the stability of the molecular bond in which they've gotten themselves involved. Hence even though they lose use less energy, they actually gain stability from the bond. The strength of the bond is what keeps them together, not "energy" per se. However, it is easier to associate energy with stability than otherwise, so what these atoms gain is something they didn't have before, that is -- the molecular form.
  10. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Well, the primary unquantifiable form is the form of the immediate reality in which something exists. For example, our form or reality is our environment, where you exist at the moment or can exist. It can be a room, including what you see out of the window or a car with the surroundings as far as you can see on the horizontal plane. If one ignores this form, then one necessarily doesn't follow a distinction between objects and their individual forms. A form of an object is not just its shape, outline, or surface, but it's the kind of energy that holds all of its matter together. To me forms of objects are represented by electromagnetic fields, but in philosophy this is merely a heuristic in order to understand where essences come from. In quantum physics, since we rejected the idea of a medium in which light travels (i.e. ether), we started thinking of particles such as photons as independent of context, and this thinking precipitated in the quantum/cosmic split. However, we all know that humans don't exist in a quantum reality nor in the cosmic one (idealists think otherwise, of course). Instead only quantum particles exist in the quantum reality. Matter and Energy equivalence makes physicists think that matter is its own context and thus its own form, but this is not the case. Quantum electrodynamics and interpretations of quantum theory such as the De Broglie–Bohm provide evidence and theorization of the energetic context of quantum particles, namely the vacuum energy that is not reducible to kinetic or potential energies but rather structures them (i.e. forms them). Vacuum energy is also called potential photons, as we know though the Casimir effect, which describes how photons actualize from this potential field. So this is what I mean that reality is the potential and every physical object comes from (or is actualized in our minds) this potency. This, of course, goes against the mainstream picture propagated by philosophers like Kant and physicists like Bohr that everything starts from matter and ends up in it too.
  11. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    What's worse is that Rand parallels Kant in the mathematization of philosophy, which necessarily removes the reality of forms that cannot be quantified. And yet reality is not merely objects that it contains. Reality is also the form, the context. I find that most people fail to grasp this, namely the fact that reality is more complex than reason itself. Reality is the potential, not necessarily the mentally actual.
  12. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    I am starting to sense this too while reading Kant's pre-critical works, and particularly his mathematico-linguistic side shines through. While Aristotle's project was to connect the philosophy of the ontologically real to the language of the essentially and mentally actual, Kant's project, as can be seen from his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (1763), was to connect the language of philosophy to the mathematics of the real. Hence Kant's logic allowed coexistence of opposites that he saw as non-contraries, such as -1 and +1 with 0 as a real possibility, and hence he switched the context, supporting the idea that Aristotle's logic was analytical and, having nothing to do with reality, meaningless. Meaning for Kant was only in what's real, and what's real for him is mathematically quantifiable, matter rather than form. Aristotle, of course, shunned mathematics, as it wasn't in his primary interests. So this is the way the moderns were able to supersede Aristotle.
  13. Transcending Objectivism and Kantianism

    For those new to this thread, I am discussing relevant epistemological terminology in greater detail in my other thread on the forum, Toward new epistemology.
  14. Transcending Objectivism and Kantianism

    So what we need to connect is the two lines going back and forth: 1) subjectivity beneath objectivity, and 2) subjectivity that can be objective. The first is the effect of our concepts, including implicit ones, such as (meta)categories, upon our percepts in our minds. And the second is how we view our concepts in relation to what we perceive. Concerning the first, here is a passage from David Kelley: Concerning the second I don't think there is a problem in either Randism or Kantianism. Both accept the evidence of the senses as important.
  15. Transcending Objectivism and Kantianism

    I guess my stance would be to connect reason to both objectivity and subjectivity. My previous project to connect Randism to Marxism failed because egoism and altruism cannot be connected. But this new project to connect Randism to Kantianism could succeed because, if you follow my own delineation of these philosophies (which I think is more fair than the chart by the Objectivist Standard because I don't mix altruism and egoism anymore, such as you can see in their third, yellow column, especially row 4 in contrast to the rest and the mixture in row 7), the only thing left to connect is reason to subjectivity from an objective standpoint. The idea that Objectivists seem to ignore is that indeed there is subjectivity hiding beneath the objectivity, but the overwhelming focus on the word "objective" leads to thinking that being subjective can also be objective, and this is actually the Kantian stance.