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Ilya Startsev

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Ilya Startsev last won the day on January 5 2015

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About Ilya Startsev

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    Advanced Member
  • Birthday 04/05/86

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    Male

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    Russia
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    Not Specified
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    Single
  • Real Name
    Ilya
  • Copyright
    Public Domain
  • Biography/Intro
    thanks to Rand, struggling with the biggest problem in my life: Immanuel Kant
  • Experience with Objectivism
    the ones I most like/admire: AS, ITOE, DIM, EoS
  • School or University
    Oryol State University
  • Occupation
    student

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  1. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Perhaps. It doesn't deny the point that it wasn't Kant's fault. Besides, you really can't change history, no matter how much you'd try.
  2. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Similarly, concerning Kant from the same book:
  3. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    I found something quite illuminating from the book that Boydstun recommended, The Sociology of Philosophies. On page 527 there is this chart of most if not all pre-Kantian philosophers in classical Europe. It answers on my question concerning the relationship of Berkeley and Hume. The connecting link is Maclauren (Edinburgh math chair). I have no idea who it was, but it's shown that he attacked Berkeley, so Hume is connected to the attacker on Berkeley, not Berkeley himself. Hence you can see how inappropriately he called himself an "idealist" "following" Berkeley.
  4. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Perhaps, but I am not in a syncretic mood. Susskind doesn't deny that the Planck units (particularly of space and time) are the most fundamental in our universe, and he uses them as such natural blocks to explain black holes. However, adding something else besides them or making something else more fundamental seems like an unjustified reification. Like graviton.
  5. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

  6. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    To make my point short, I have to say that each of us has one brain, not two or three. And each brain does one and only one thing: it thinks. It thinks in whatever form: whether of understanding, judging, or whatever. Each of these ways of thinking doesn't justify having different brains or different subparts of brains that answer to these functions. I believe that neurological evidence shows that our brain employs more complex nonlinear phenomena than if it had separate functions à la Kant.
  7. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Just to confuse everything a thousandfold, I refer to Kant's early use of Verstand in his "Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime":
  8. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    And then there is this which makes everything a lot more confusing:
  9. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    This all goes back to what 'mind' is for Kant. If 'reason' for him is Vernunft, then 'mind/reason' is Verstand. The two are equivalent semantically but not so philosophically unless you can think of the entire mind within a single thought.
  10. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Another distracting projection by Kelley (ibid.) now concerning Kant's philosophy: I think he is confusing Kant with Fichte here. Pamfil Yurkevich in his "Mind from the teachings of Plato and experience from the teachings of Kant" shows that Kant never specified or identified consciousness, in contrast to Plato, for example.
  11. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Without having read Locke properly, it's hard to answer on some of these attacks, but they continue bugging me. For example, while reading Kelley's Evidence of the Senses, I came upon this passage: Locke has a form of metaphysical empiricism (I am taking this term from Oizerman's Metaphilosophy). I don't see anything inherently unstable in his philosophy. Now, if Kelley agrees with the criticisms of Locke like Roecklein does of Parmenides, it doesn't mean that those criticisms actually applied to these philosophers. They could very much be straw men or, even better, red herrings. A good criticism always reveals the essence of a philosophy, but I don't see these projections by Kelley and Roecklein as anything other than what they are. Explain how form and substance are different from the bulk of size, shape, solidity, and other primary qualities? Aren't form and substance basically a simplified quintessence of these qualities? Of course as a mere distinction they differ but not as what referents they signify. I've remembered that Unity is the first a priori category belonging to Quality, along with Plurality and Totality. So how can you necessarily have such a 'unity' at all times? Seems like it's doing a double work that is unjustified (not that anything is justified in Kant).
  12. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Yes, or maybe it's that Roecklein and I don't agree upon anything. In that case I would love to debate the issues with him directly.
  13. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Is he serious? After such thinking I must conclude that Roecklein is either an idiot or an atomist himself.
  14. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    Tell me this is not intuitive (contra Kant):
  15. The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

    I fail to grasp that, and Kant's explanations are of no help. I guess I need to read more of his critics. I surely wouldn't call Locke a pure empiricist, but an atomist? That's a very strange claim, so I will have to read the article to understand the argument. Is Roecklein sure that he was not reading Kant? Locke's categories are intuitive and perceptible, like those in Aristotle. Similarly, Roecklein wouldn't claim that Aristotle reduced objects to 'bundles of qualities', right?
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