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Ilya Startsev

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Ilya Startsev last won the day on September 11

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About Ilya Startsev

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  • Birthday 04/05/1986

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    philosophy & videogames

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    thanks to Rand, philosophizing as a hobby
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    the ones I most like/admire: AS, ITOE, DIM, EoS
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    Veda School
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  1. Ilya Startsev

    Transcending Objectivism and Kantianism

    Thinking back on Peikoff's careful note on application of categories, there is an opinion of quite an opposite thinker, namely Alfred Korzybski, that can be used to justify the metaepistemological nature of the DIM categories:
  2. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    On page 409 (halfway through the book), Korzybski states a millionth time: So his entire book most probably consists of such repetitions without any justifications.
  3. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    I'm starting to think otherwise due to this quote, in which he removes Kant from the category of 'philosopher' to which Aristotle belongs: And because he attributes noumena to Aristotelian analytics:
  4. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    To elaborate and analyze one of the previous quotes, I want to note that in Korzybski's own words, the problem with the mentally ill is that they "identify the symbol with actualities" (p. 196, his italics), which he has done on the previous page when he "necessitated" the '1 = 1' formula to mean the following external (in Korzybski's words "outside of his skin") elements: "different nervous systems which produce and use these symbols"; "the surfaces" and "different parts of the paper"; "the distribution of ink"; other materials or material conditions. So what happens is the equivocation between symbolic language made as a tool for comprehending reality outside and the empirical data from reality outside to which our language refers. Without the link of reference, which Korzybski ignores in his definition of identity ('absolute sameness in all respects'), he projects his own disorienting confusion on the readers and Aristotle, whose works he never bothered to read. Although Korzybski states some truths in his work (e.g., "[A]n enormous amount of knowledge may be found in a mature occasional perusal of a good grammar or dictionary, the neglect of which acts as a psycho-logical blockage to the understanding" - p. 763), he doesn't usually follow his own advice.
  5. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    Here is a quote by Korzybski that I think supports my evaluation of him as a mentally ill individual: And then, to make this absolutely clear, he adds:
  6. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    I agree that there is no significant difference between 'unknowable connection to reality' and 'no connection', but I disagree with your definition of idealism. To the contrary, look at Plato. The only true reality, according to him, is the reality of ideal forms only through which our mind can grasp physical and illusory reality outside, [which in itself is] not true reality. Hegel and Emerson were idealists in pretty much the same sense, in that mind is the connection between physical and true (or metaphysical) realities. Representationalism, on the other hand, is a very vague term, to which we can append Descartes, Locke, and Kant, philosophers of significant differences, in fact, differences so significant that we can fairly judge these men to belong to three different categories. The notions of constructs is essential to another vague term: constructivism, which is popular in academia, or at least it was popular at the end of the 20th century. What you describe sounds more like social constructivism, which attributes even to science as an institute such purely subjective and arbitrary constructs. And this is surely neither Kant's, not Korzybski's positions. Hence your arguments to equate Representationalism with Idealism don't work, except in the case with Descartes, but only because the main 'thing' for him that constructs everything, including the mind (or the brain), is God.
  7. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    Yes, that's Korzybski's non-aristotelianism, ážš. But Rand also never discussed him.
  8. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    I start thinking that Korzybski was insane but escaped hospitalization by lucky chance. First he calls Aristotle a 'genius' and then he writes this: So far the claim that Aristotle is 'the extrovert' is unsupported and the claim that he, Rand, I, and everyone on this forum think feebly is in logical error. He also so many pages into the book has yet to cite Aristotle at least once or at least analyze sufficiently any of Aristotle's ideas. Rand, in comparison, did a much better job with Kant than Korzybski can boast of doing with Aristotle. We have no details on Aristotle from Korzybski, only calling names. I will keep you posted if I find anything.
  9. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    Well, actually he does say that Aristotle's system is more comprehensive than those that followed during the two thousand years. On page xli (one of his prefaces), he includes this figure in which A (aristotelian system) contains "a more limited and less general system such as 'christianity' (C), within which is, for instance, the leibnitzian system (L), and within which there are individual, personal systems (P)."
  10. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    Korzybski doesn't use the term 'anti-Aristotelian' and doesn't consider himself to be opposed to Aristotle's main mission, which he thought was to make a system to explain science and set its goals. Korzybski only does it for the 20th century's science. He claims that his non-Aristotelian system is the first of its kind, as previous attempts (he doesn't yet mention which ones) weren't as comprehensive and complete as his own.
  11. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    Therein, tjohnson wrote: I think that's harmless. Here is some context by Korzybski: I mean, Aristotle's subject-predicate logic is also all structure and forms. Besides it's ontological. How is it that he thinks it doesn't correspond to facts? In the second paragraph it seems he reduces reality to a sort of kantian inversion: noumenon is the unspeakable and phenomenon is the sensation (like light rays). And in the first he reduces aristotelianism to linguistics a la language games and empty scholasticism. Does then Korzybski misrepresent Aristotle?
  12. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    The link of the 'early responses' leads to a pro-GS blog post, which makes an impression that Science and Sanity received mostly positive reviews and the few negative reviews it had, including the one by Hook, were misrepresentations of Korzybski's work and misunderstandings of his system for a philosophical one, as if it isn't. In this respect I would go with Albert Ellis and say that all such cognitive creations, like the system of Korzybski, are inherently philosophical (even on the unconscious level).
  13. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    That's the complexity issue that Rand didn't understand, thus she called it a bunch of names. It was Kant's style that was cumbersome, but, just so you know, so was the style of Copernicus, yet Rand had no issue with him. The part about 'self-evident' is also arguable. I agree that some of Kant's arguments come from common sense, especially his arguments for ethics in the Metaphysic of morals, and P. F. Strawson would agree concerning circularity in Kant's logic. I would also argue that Kant didn't come up with many original ideas but merely mutated old ones (like Aristotle's categories, to which he added other ones but placed them in a vacuum, removing the subject-predicate context), yet all of these Kant's faults are contained in the writing of a very complex and comprehensive manner on all topics, but once grasped he becomes boring (at least for me). From personal experience, there was a critic on this and other forums named Bill Harris, and his vendetta against Objectivism started when he was 15 years old (supposedly) when he first read Rand calling Kant a 'witch-doctor'. He is an academician and from an academic family. He claimed that Rand isn't interesting to academia because she doesn't follow academic rules, such as referring to first and second sources exhaustively and not using logical errors like ad-hominem attacks. That's from philosophical departments' view. From a literary point of view, again anecdotal, I had spoken to a professor of literature at NIU, and in his class on American literature of the 20th century he rejected my proposal of studying Atlas Shrugged because he attributed to it an utter lack of literary value. And some other professors agree that AS is too cold (concerning style) and uninteresting (concerning content). I, of course, disagree with them all, but maybe that's idiosyncratic, as I'm interested in female Russian philosophers, as I'm Russian myself, and, contrary to what Rand says about Russian culture, I feel a sort of cultural bond with her nonetheless.
  14. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    I don't know, I was hoping to discuss Korzybski while I'm still reading him. Frankly, I think him the 20th century Kant but more on the commonsensical side in the context of today's sociocultural nihilistic and postmodernistic, non-identity perspectives. He was coming on that wave against which Rand battled.
  15. Ilya Startsev

    Korzybski vs. Rand

    And that's Rand's problem. Yes, Kant avoided definitions in his pre-critical period especially because he wanted to make his philosophy end with the best possible definitions, that is to form definitions by the end of the discussion or make them clear by then at least, hoping that readers would be able to figure them out in context during the process, like in mathematics. He opposed traditional, scholastic metaphysics that started with definitions before the discussion. In his critical period, however, Kant used a lot more definitions and even started many of his works with them, as he thought it would be easier for readers, and besides by then he wanted to avoid confusion. For Rand, Kant's works are not only complex (that was an understatement earlier on my part), but incomprehensible because he deals with the mental processes required as conditions for knowledge. He explores the inner world as it has to be for us to have any knowledge at all, and be human at that. Kant's logic on the surface is Aristotelian, but really he was more concerned with mathematical thinking, as he applied all his thinking externally -- outside in with his theory of knowledge (erkenntnistheorie) with the faculty of understanding as primary; inside out with his ethics, or practical theory, with mind as the primary faculty; and outside in and inside out together with his mechanics and teleology with his aesthetics and the faculty of judgment. Kant thus answers on these questions: What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope? What is man? - in his anthropology (a primary question for Korzybski, I should note) Korzybski makes greater focus on illogic than Kant since Kant was under the influence of the sociocultural conditions of the time which favored strict logic as applied in science before logic became mathematized and completely removed from its scholastic treatments. I am not hereby trying to defend Kant's rationality or even his philosophy as a whole, but merely trying to make it clear that Rand really didn't have any sufficient reason to reject Kant on the basis of her arguments.