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Ilya Startsev

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  1. First, I believe the author of Corruption is a man, not a woman. I think the problem of universals is an epistemological issue, so I agree with Ryan. Rand had something similar in its place, calling it entities (as Eiuol mentioned), but entities, to me, is so abstract a term that it can only be used to merely differentiate some terms from other terms with similar meanings, and that's not a very substantial addition to epistemology. The reason existence also doesn't solve the problem of universals is that existence is singular and universals is plural, which is a more important distinctions than 'entities.' Aristotle was directed toward existence and yet he set up the problem of universals by his essentialist philosophy. Since many non-mystic philosophers fail to understand essences (as conceptual things in themselves we hold in our consciousness), they continue to claim that there is the problem of universals. Of course, if you reject Aristotle's essences and Kantian categories, you have a problem with universals. Oh, there is someone else you need to fear on this - the academically accepted Thomas Reid, who differentiated sensation and perception, and yet conflated the latter with conception, calling it illusionary (he didn't believe centaurs were ideas). Reid, who called himself a 'direct realist' and who refuted, in Schopenhauer's words, Locke, was praised by Kant before being completely annihilated by him (of course, thus making him into such an important academic figure of 'direct realism' in the history of philosophy). Hence we need to fear those people like Reid who sacrifice their entire life, from their own naivete, for a straw-man, so future disintegrators could say they 'disproved' direct realism. In this regard, Reid is the same as Rousseau, another idiot whom disintegrators praise before placing all the influence on fascism on him. Insanity, yes, and also chaos, but this is known as progress in philosophy, didn't you know? This may be problematic still if you allow others like Thomas Reid to interpret that because there is a conflation of concepts and percepts in some points of the conceptual continuum then perception must be epistemologically purified into sensation (a darling of Kantians and positivists like Wittgenstein). Hence Rand is rejected by academia as not important.
  2. The scientists-on-Mars illustration is also incorrect because it reduces the categories to experience when they are also conditions for scientific knowledge, which is based on experience. Building on the discussions of this thread, I would like to give three arguments to clarify further my points: Randians and Kantians are unable to understand each other's positions while their levels span the following: Transcendent reality: noumenon Phenomena, sense data Transcendental ideas of Kant Transcendental reality of Rand Positions of their philosophies complement each other in the following way: Noumenon is missing in Rand Phenomenon is included in both Concepts condition phenomena (internalism) Transcendental reality is missing in Kant (externalism) The combination of their positions becomes a condition for a new philosophy like this: Nonexistence, from which matter differentiates Material particles Internal concepts External Existence as a metaconcept, which pre-conceptually conditions internal concepts An important provision of studying these arguments is to remain neutral toward both philosophies.
  3. Thereby, we can delineate three kinds of egoism: Randian egoism: rational and objective Nietzschean egoism: irrational and subjective Kantian egoism: rational and subjective It is important to note that while the first two egoisms differentiate collectivism vs. individualism and are individualistic, Kantian egoism doesn't make this distinction. Thus, in contrast to Rand and Nietzsche, Kantianists don't consider collectivist vs. individualist distinction meaningful, and anything that opposes these two sides is not considered a philosophical question, but rather a triviality for not true philosophers. The reason for this is that 'collectivism' has no meaning for Kantians because society just as a collective is a mental construct that has nothing to do with the nature of an individual.
  4. This is 4b from OP. I am starting to rethink it. The two problems with it that I see are my use of terms altruism and will as applied to Kantianism. The altruism part is false, so Rand was wrong about it in Kant. Aristotle was more altruistic than Kant both in his politics and ethics. In Aristotle, society was the direction for all political and ethical individuals, so congruence with others was important. In Kant, on the other hand, the idea of will is a reduced version of Rousseau's, but it is not the same as Rousseau's general or social will. Instead, in Kant it is a selfish kind of will that projects itself on all egos, thus equalizing egos as per Kant's understanding of the nature of man. Perhaps Rousseau had done more to inspire Nazism than Kant. Kant, however, is closer associated with the politics and ethics of European Union. In Rousseau society must force others (even violently) to make them free. In Kant, society is a mental construct - it doesn't really exist other than in an a priori category of Community. In Kant, only independently existing and similarly egoistical individuals exist as ends in themselves, and they only follow their practical and theoretical categorical laws, none from outside themselves. So, the new 4b should be this:
  5. Yes, and the points I am trying to make is that integration is not automatic, regardless of what concepts who made or what concepts Rand misintegrated, and that you conflate universe and existence whenever you conflate object with context, even while thinking of the universe as an object afterwards, thus referring to an actually existing object (universe) incorrectly. Actually, perhaps universe should be thought as only a context, Cosmos of L14. I don't know what I was thinking earlier by going along with all this universe-as-object deal. This also explains the quandary MS had with the boundaries of the universe. He was right: as a context, universe (I better call this Cosmos, as that's how I integrated the concept)... so Cosmos has no strict boundaries like objects do. To say it has strictly delineated boundaries, which of course you don't, is to ignore the kind of objects within Cosmos that indeed have those boundaries, like The Great Attractor, for example. On the other hand, there are also two problems with your integration of the concept universe: first, you ignore the string theory integration of physics, which is purely evidence-based (in contrast to other theories, like Lisi's 'exceptionally simple' one and inflation), and second, because of the Direction of your consciousness, you cannot integrate the concept universe properly, that is, from the bottom-up, and especially also because it's a context and not an object. Any top-down view on the universe is automatically misintegrative, and a reduction of it is disintegrative. These two problems do not allow you to understand the universe as anything other than a context [maybe?], even though you apply your perceptual ontology on its level. So I recommend you first to integrate a concept that is related to 'context.' Thinking some more on this, the whole discussion of universe as object or as context really is a waste of time because it all depends on the kind of knowledge we have of it, and we have too little to say with absolute accuracy what that kind of 'supercomposition' is other than in vague conceptual terms. A photon, which is a point of spacetime of absolute velocity. But it's obviously a special object, as it is a quantum, which cannot be destroyed. Speed of light, by the way, is known as the speed of causality throughout the universe because on the most fundamental level all events happen, and also caused, with this speed. I know this doesn't address the discussion, but still: I hate whenever someone conflates Kantian and Platonic absolutes. It drives me nuts, a little bit. It's like conflating mind (L7) and metacosmos (L15). The difference of scale is too extreme for a normal being to process it properly. It's like starting from rest and jumping to lightspeed. I like this translation. Yet it only applies from within the fields of ontology and epistemology, but not metaphysics. But then you may call everything I wrote bullshit. By that, I would say you have stretched your category 'bullshit' beyond subjective and understandable boundaries.
  6. I was aware of that. Indeed so, but you may not understand that. After all, non-mystics conflate soul and mind, emotion and thought, and thus contradict themselves. Contradiction, however, only exists in mind-centeredness. It can never exist in the soul, which is why the only non-contradictory way of gaining information from reality, from things-in-themselves, is through the soul, thus all realists are also mystics. I haven't found a single realist who wasn't also a mystic, and I have 63 of them already categorized. The understanding that genuine integrators are realists/mystics (that's the nature of integration) is my breakthrough, going far beyond Peikoff's DIM rationalizations of one and many.
  7. Jung is more serious than Freud. Besides, I love Jung exactly because he was a mystic. Mystics have heart and soul, non-mystics don't.
  8. Actually, I've read everything I wrote after reading the entire thread, so it all reflects my views as accurately as possible. Happiness is not an entity? How would you define a noun then? Collective unconsciousness is not my 'pet theory.' It's a famous psychological understanding started by Carl Jung. You don't know about it?
  9. The first part is unclear. Why call immediately perceived objects a more conceptually heavy term 'entity'? By the way, in Russian linguistics nouns are defined as entities. (Rand might have gotten it from there.) Sounds like space is only within and not around the objects as well. If relation is only an aspect, then this is not different from Kantian category 'relation.' The meaning of 'everything' employed here is 'every thing.' You are using the idea of reduction here as it is used against idealists. Rather, reduction is applied from greater to smaller, not in reverse. It's not a reduction to thought but an ontological reduction from whole to its part(s). Non sequitur. It's like using reduction and then saying the greater object doesn't exist. Besides, while you've mentioned studying molecules by using a microscope, you forgot the use of telescopes to study the greater object in more detail. Oh-oh, welcome Kant. And then you are just equating metaphysics with epistemology. And that's your L8 breaking through. Sounds like you are projecting L8 (your 'perceptual ontology') higher up, unable to understand how planets can be objects without massive creatures floating in vacuum trying to perceive them. By the way, World would be the ultimate context for mat8, like for Schopenhauer. There is nothing beyond it for you, not even the universe. Rather, World is the universe for all materialists. Of course, these kinds of discussions only show how ontology is epistemologized by human consciousness based on its type. If an abstraction or mental object is a thought, then indeed they are physical because they are within the brain and nervous tissues. A thought, by the way, can be conscious or unconscious. We have thoughts when we sleep, for example, and call them dreams, which we sometimes remember and sometimes not. Applying N's criticism of "I", you can see how thoughts can be not in one's awareness like the brain is not in our awareness. Yes, for those who are not integrators. From my point of view, this is also untrue. While, metaphysically speaking, ontological reality can be viewed as an illusion, it doesn't follow that we shouldn't concern ourselves with it. Rather, we are unable not to not concern ourselves with it in each of our own ways. Besides, for integrators like me, metaphysics leads to analyzing, clarifying, and specifying the ontology, not trying to move away from it into some imaginary metaphysical realm, like Brahman. Yes, to rise to the greater you must grasp the lesser. Yes, this is interesting because it not only shows how our consciousness is structured metaphysically but also the reason we cannot understand each other. That's a vast overgeneralization. Just because we don't give much thought to objects we consider to understand, it doesn't mean we don't know them. We do because we perceive them. The thinking processes can be so automatized that they don't reach our awareness. We simply accept apples and bananas without being conscious of what they are in themselves. On the other hand you give a very good descriptions of Buddhist beliefs, but you fail to understand that any of their applications or comparisons do not describe reality for everyone. Not all solutions are 'parasitic,' but only the false two choices from Buddhism or Hinduism that you seem to know so well, limiting yourself only to them. Besides, I don't like the notion of 'parasitic' here, since it's offensive and dismissive of other views. Nice try at red herring. You review mat8 options and come up with your own mat8 option, defined by you. I've started this comment with explaining that your conception of entity is unclear in terms of its relation to objects and that it is overconceptualized. The overconceptualization may help you erase some boundaries in order to compare this to maya/Brahman options, but really you are simply unable to reach beyond the limits of maya/Brahman as they are conceived by a mat8 consciousness (or it's also a reduction from some idealists' quibbles with mat8 illusionists). ??? -- [after reading to the end, I finally understand what you wrote here and that this reflects my own understanding of objects. Good point.] That's also a hefty claim. You have yet to show an ontological model in which these objects are shown to be composed from something else. Yes, why not? Because it's a claim that's easy to 'decompose,' thinking that composition is ongoing, when in fact it may not be so. Humankind may 'decompose' itself through a nuclear holocaust, for example. Its 'decomposition,' however, depends on disintegrators. You then say that it's not infinite, but how about showing that you value compositions above all else? Not a chance. So why can't they end at two or more objects? There is surely more than one object we can perceive in reality. Are you trying to show that objects are infinitely distant from each other in order to grasp at the universe? The issue is that you are still staying on L8, being stuck on it perceptually. I disagree with this materialist-emergentist claim because it reduces consciousness to an appearance or an aspect. Our bodies are alive because they are organic. They are not corpses that decompose into inorganic molecular compounds, such as dried out skeletons. You don't have to go that far. A society is a supercomposition. So is race. None are fictional. That's a high jump. You need to understand the lesser before you rise to the greater. Yeah, if they collide. But even then the 'impact' with other stars would be trivial. After all, they are not billiard balls but relatively stable systems. Why don't you consider solar systems further as supercompositions before you go to the universe? Actually this seems to contradict the proper 'system' understanding and even your emergentist 'test'. If a system has no unique attributes other than its objects, then it's not a system but merely a collection of independent objects. This is very interesting. Indeed this is true of Limits of L17. You must have gotten this idea by accident, however, probably referring it to Nonexistence below L1 as you see universe as merely a collection of particles without a unique attribute other than its composing objects. Basically, you are confusing scales as most materialists do. Not true. String-theorists' omniverse is more complete because it contains all possible sets of physical laws. String-theory interpretation of quantum mechanics is currently one of the most advanced and accurate interpretations there are. This theory subsumes all experimental evidence, unlike many other theories, which are surely less complete. Oh, so if scientific evidence doesn't match your idea of the universe then the theories that use this evidence are incomplete? You have no idea of what a universe is. As I said earlier, start with the lesser before you rise to the greater. If you cannot grasp the lesser, you will never rise to the greater. So, what are the ends of the universe like? This is actually quite an important question because the surface of the universe, as also a surface of a black whole, contains holographic information about what's inside. This is supported by not only string theory but also holofractographic universe theory. I disagree. The structuring of knowledge comes from pre/metaconcepts, not particular concepts themselves. Rather, what happens with an addition of one significant conceptual fact is a growth of knowledge, not the entire (re)organization of it. I strongly disagree here. A plenum has no specific boundary like the universe does. Instead, plenum is metacosmos, a greater contextual whole. This term specifically relates to dark energy, as used and coined (in this context) by Nassim Haramein. It surely isn't because that contextualizes universe, thus making it metaphysical. And it's not, also in Rand. That's false, even coming from your own words. Continuous 'substance' is not an object. Rather, you confused object-context when you first wrote universe-as-plenum. And in such handwaving metaphysics, no statement can be true. It's merely your imagination. And no rationalizations can get you out of this because your premise is false. You cannot make premises true by other premises or by conclusions, Eiuol. Put in other words, your concept of universe contradicts Rand's distinction between universe and existence, a distinction which is crucial in idealism because it shows their Position to be metacosmic, out of reach of any materialist. You've invented this 'closeness' through your imagination, a straw-man of actual theory. Thus, just as you've done with Brahman, you've seemingly dismissed something you don't understand, namely a metacosmic level of ontology, a supercomposition, allowing an analysis of universe from above rather than from below, like you are doing. Yes, so that would be defining it as context, which is metaphysical, yet false because physical things cannot be metaphysical. New Buddha: In TOC of How we know there are two things that interest me: logical hierarchy and Bottom-up vs. Top-down Theories. Also interesting sections are Naïve Realism: consciousness as reproduction and The Failure of Realism. Know anything about these? Maybe I should read it, but I don't have time! It's funny how he talks about 'Kantian reversal' in the overview in 'some' history. It's something I would've started the book with. I've already categorized Binswanger as a Descartean idealist (based on Hsieh's Survey of Objectivist Commentary on Philosophy of Mind), so his secondary-positional convergence with Kant at the end looks legit, all his commentaries and criticisms of Kant notwithstanding. Nonetheless, Binswanger's ideas are surely more interesting to me because he won't confuse universe with existence. I cannot agree more. This is on the spot. Space(time) is the condition of perception. And with this I cannot disagree more. Spacetime is physical, not metaphysical. Perhaps Binswanger idealizes the realistic Direction of Einstein, who idealized light, not spacetime, thus keeping the latter physical. Oh, this is Kantian bull. If you don't, you might as well take it as sensation. Binswanger equivocates like Rand by believing in one thing but saying completely the other. I say: to not evaluate the content of perception is to reject ontology by replacing it with epistemology. Yeah, except 'rainfall' is closer to sensation than perception. That's what happens when you reject ontology: your thought lacks clarity, and anything based on it stops being objective. The rest are his rationalizations of his hybrid idealism. That's another reason I don't want to read his book. Oh, and that's existence, right? (The only way it could be in my metaphysics: Existence as (meta) Space, but this doesn't ignore physical spacetime. Instead it structures it.) I would differentiate your imaginary idea from Binswanger's, though. At least he looks from the metacosmic plane (L15). I like Peikoff's definitions of integration (connection, unity/one, whole/combination, system, necessity) in DIM better (ch. 1, sec. 2). He explains it more broadly than you do. Surely, a Kantian one (L7). I rather agree with Binswanger's and New Buddha's take on this issue. A bowl of applies indeed is perceived, rather than merely sensed, as you've identified it. Except I don't follow how something is metaphysically given here. Rather, it is physically given, since apples and the bowl are physical, and so are all the senses that reach us from them. In a way a good point, but trivial, in this context, I think. Oh, yes, welcome Stefan Molyneux and his 'forests do not exist, but trees do' argument! And you said he was a 'moron,' Eiuol? You seem to confirm the opposite interpretation now. A bowl of applies exists just as a forest exists, both in their own rights of being physical objects (not metaphysical or metaphysically given or some other mumbo-jumbo). We aren't talking about unicorns here, unless you've imagined a bowl of applies on a table where there is no bowl of applies and it's all in your head. Maybe you want to eat some applies? (j/k) To be exact, applies are objects of organic tissues L6 and bowl of inorganic molecules L3 (if it's mass manufactured and has no personal value) or L8 (if it's custom made, and thus prized for its artistic features, say china). Hence there are two levels represented of a bowl of applies while we perceive both, but their compositions are different. The point that this ontological elaboration makes is that we can indeed perceive anything physical, even subatomic particles, but with help of computers or other instruments - yet the latter doesn't make things more confusing or complex to the point that one claims that particles don't exist or that bowls of applies don't. Anything physical can be perceived, sensed, and conceived (on every individual level, every object and every context). My ontology proves this. That you are unable to perceive a bowl of applies is a limitation of your consciousness but not necessarily everyone else's. Imagination of a mat8 who cannot exceed the limits of his consciousness to be someone else. It's okay, Eiuol. No one can. MisterSwig is partially wrong and partially right. The composition part seems to be accurate in terms of trying to grasp the whole (the universe), which Eiuol is unable to do without fallacies at this state. The part of unbounded universe is wrong, though, since anything physical is bounded. Now, this fact is metaphysically given! Yes, but your causality is situational, context-, not object-, dependent. You don't even think that a bowl of applies is immediately perceivable! (Who would perceive it other than a human, though?) Makes no sense. First you talk about objects from different 'ends' of the universe being related spatially, and now you say that the universe is the boundary and cannot be defined accurately. Like I've implied before, you've imagined a self-contradictory universe that doesn't exist other than in your head. Haha, excellent reduction of idealists! Except, MisterSwig, you fail to differentiate physical universe (L14) from metacosmic idea(l)s (L15). And because you fail at this, you are asking to be defined as an materialist. Poor family feud you got here. SL, MisterSwig, and Eiuol - all having the same kind of consciousness but arguing over trivialities, mere ideas! Gentlemen, let me tell you a metaphysically given truth: every person is unique with their own unique ideas. Hence no idea is better than any other because it's only an idea! My goodness... What's the point of meaningless conflicts? To be the devil's advocate I'll help you with the headache and answer on your questions, numbering them for easier reading. The universe is bound by causality the same way every entity or object is bound. In that regard, universe is not so different: it's an existent, an identity. The question of whether the universe caused its own causality or something else did is interesting, but if you consider that there are two directions to take it at, then this makes answering the question simpler: the bottom-up direction (which I prefer) claims that objects and contexts compose the universe, but the universe thus has a unique attribute (which Eiuol ignores and possibly rejects), namely that it is different from objects and contexts that compose it because it is greater than them. The top-down direction is the general idealists' direction (whether atheist or theist - doesn't matter) that the universe is metaphysically (read: metacosmically) necessitated to be what it is and to have what it does (also causally). If you look top-down, then yes, because it's metaphysically necessitated. If you look bottom-up, then no, as absolute nothing preceded it, thus preceding quanta and later formations that came about from the vacuum, forming the universe as we see it now. Causality could be differentiated into metaphysical and physical. However, the bottom-up approach can also be viewed metaphysically, namely that all differentiations of matter, energy, and force resulted from Nonexistence. These physical entities then became the physical foundation of causality while the universe was growing long ago and now has stabilized into the universe we see in the past (like cosmic background radiation) and the future (all the light from the stars far away). Hence the point is that what we know as the universe is not the singularity but the past and the future universe. The singularity, on the other hand, is the unreachable present moment of the universe, which is like Nonexistence. This metaphysical singularity must be differentiated from the universe-as-singularity, but many scientists don't do that, like those who developed and support inflation theory, which is a kind of modern era preformism on universal scale - an imaginary particle-as-the-universe. Unknown present moment of the universe and the known past-and-future one must be differentiated in order to not confuse scales. As a side-note: although I compare present-moment singularity with Nonexistence and claim it is unknown rather than unknowable, I have to add that the present moment itself is Nonexistence and it is unknowable, but the singularity can be known through the bottom-up approach. Once the puzzle of dark energy is cracked, then we'll know what it's like to be a singularity in a non-idealist sense. Oooh, but they are so similar, as you can see from what I wrote above. Yes, as also per my differentiation of present and past-future universe. Nonexistence is (metaphysical) Time, which isn't really a physical time, but rather it exists in physical time, yet can never be reached, known, or comprehended, since it is actually eternal. Oh, yes, so you are agreeing with Eiuol's non-existing bowl of applies and Molyneux's non-existing forest. Join the fray, I was right about you after all! Just because you are not conscious of the social processes doesn't mean they don't exist. Collective unconscious is a real thing, Eiuol, and also the fact that everything that surrounds you and clothes you is conditioned on international relationships of societies (such as businesses, factories, committees, etc.), and not mere individuals who cut the deals. Besides, there would be a society of these individuals, if it's international and, particularly, government trade. Oh, that's my favorite question as of late! Of course she was, but only to the extent of her convergence with Kant. I don't understand what the fuss is all about. It's merely words we assign to mean things. Whether an object is what we perceive or it's a noun (which we also perceive when we read) as an entity, so what? MS ignores the differences between physical and metaphysical on the greater scales and rejects the metaphysical, and yet he can quibble about the differences of Randian categories of objects and entity to no end. In my system, I call objects things we can sense, perceive, and conceive that are thus related to consciousness and also metaphysics. Thus, to me there is no difference between object and entity. They are both nouns we use for same exact things. For example, a human body is an object, but if it's an alien body it's an entity. But a body is a body, right? Maybe if we stop differentiating objects and entities we can get other, more important things straight. This would be a more accurate way of representing things than Eiuol follows. I like the point of 'sub-,' as it allows understanding that there are ontological levels of different scales: below, immediate, and above. Very interesting. I knew there was something fuzzy in Eiuol's discussion of the universe. I agree because there isn't really a difference between objects and entities which you at the same time wish to believe. Proves my point exactly. I like 'object' better though. It sounds more... concrete. "Entity" is like a children's word before they learned to differentiate objects in their awareness. Objects as mental constructs is harder to pinpoint, though, because they exist on the sub-level in relation to our immediate perception. Tissues of nervous system are concrete objects but thoughts would be more contextual, as bioelectromagnetic impulses). Overall, I have to say that Eiuol seems to be on the right track in developing an ontology. Nice work! By using your own terms, MS, to clarify what Eiuol was developing, consider direct or immediate perception being on a particular level of composition, while subcompositions and supercompositions are perceptual but in a compositionally different way from the immediate level upon which someone's consciousness is positioned. Eiuol is completely right in presuming that consciousness is level-dependent and there are different types of consciousness based on their levels. This is confirmed by much evidence, starting with Peikoff's DIM as represented in my Diagram. You can perceive a tissue, an organ, a body, a society. All of these are on different levels of perception. In fact, levels is what differentiates these percepts. No, because information is not coming directly into your brain from the environment. Instead, it's processed by an instrument (which organizes raw sense data) and then enters your brain. This shows perception in this instance not to be direct, but assisted, thus indirect, as Eiuol correctly identified. The idea that MS can't grasp is that concepts also exist on different levels. We conceive of molecules and applies, and what differentiates these concepts is their levels in the hierarchy. However, we also can perceive them, albeit differently. In the first case, concepts are closer related to sensation, and in the second case concepts are closer related to perception. Hence in molecules (L3), the mix of sensation-perception-conception leans more toward sensation, whereas in apple (L6) -- more toward perception, although you can argue that apples are merely somewhere between strict sensation and strict perception, since direct perception for me is L9. Then this is a true ontological object (I use the exact same term and definition). Nice job, Eiuol! You seem to start differentiating ontology and epistemology as you should. MS doesn't get it yet. Wonderful, wonderful. Do you see what the Model is now? Do you see how wonderful it is? Your point also stresses that the singular vs. multiple distinction doesn't really matter. Quantity is not ontological per se. A very interesting speculation concerning possible parallel universes beyond the veil of Nonexistence. Yes, he is not ready yet, but he is trying his best.
  10. So what we find from discussion is that metaconceptual is pre-conceptual, that is, fundamental.
  11. Because you called existence a concept, therefore a thought. But you are right, it's pre-conceptual in a way, and not explicit but implicit. Basically what I wrote to you.
  12. No. Read what you wrote. Existence as the concept is implicit in all concepts. How can you think of all concepts? A thought of all concepts is not explicit or particular in any way. It's like taking all the concepts in your brain, or even your brain, and everything beyond your brain that you made a concept of and... guess what happens next. Concerning her thought in the lexicon quote, it's not very accurate. She made blunders when she rationalized her philosophy on children (we saw this explained by Binswanger in Perception). Rather, Rand only guessed how implicit concepts work, as she defined the thing in the first place. Her definition of this sort, by the way, is very similar to what Kant called an analytic a priori, like bachelor being a single man. This means it's inaccurate. The reason it's inaccurate, I think, is that Rand didn't have an ontology. Without an ontology a thought cannot be as sharp or as accurate as it can be. Ontology is the lesser you must grasp before rising to the greater. If the concept of existence only existed in one's head, then this would not be different from Kantian epistemology. But existence is not an epistemological concept. The point of all this is that Rand wasn't perfect. Her flaws are exactly those I've repeatedly pointed to on these pages. No, it's you with SL who are reducing all metaphysics to being in your head, in a Nietzschean manner. Metametaphysics that I present here is seemingly beyond the grasp of materialists. But why? That's the pity because you surely know what nonexistence is, as that's your primary goal. It's in the Direction of your very consciousness. If X isn't metaphysical, then concept of X may or may not be metaphysical, if my logic is right. The metaphysical 'concept', if you like to call it that, will not be the same as any other concept because it is a concept of all concepts. It's a metaconcept, an implicit, not an explicit one. This is too easy to take as dogma and mix with epistemology in the brain, which is what Rand had done in her division of existence and nonexistence. To me, if Existence is a metaconcept, then Nonexistence is also a metaconcept, since they are related. Bah, I will need to study him as well. Thanks for the tip to you, and also to KyaryPamyu. However, I am not a Buddhist, nor am I interested in their way of thinking, especially if it's in Gautama's tradition. I hate Zen Buddhism too. Also, reading this part: Perhaps this is a reduction to Nonexistence in the style of Gautama. Unless, if Nagarjuana is not mat8, he means that Nonexistence is in all existents. Then that would be right, since Nonexistence and Existence form a continuum, out of which all ontology and its relationships differentiate. On the other hand, I know Buddhists do not believe in dualism and hence mix everything in the single nihilistic concept. I do not mix things like that. I am an integrator because I strictly delineate concepts, metaconcepts, ideas, categories, metacategories, you name it, before I can put them together in a single whole.
  13. A very relevant quote I've come across while reading John Amos Comenius (translated by me from Russian, not original): It may be useful for pedagogical purposes, especially for mat8 like Eiuol and StrinctlyLogical.
  14. How can a thought not be a thought? You contradict yourself by contradicting me, SL. By the way, Rand called existence an implicit concept. edit: your comment is a psychological projection, as you obviously unable to conceive of existence as it is, you must reduce it to a mere thought. You aren't an idealist, SL.
  15. Putting our differences of understanding epistemology aside, Eiuol, a concept is a thought, which obviously exists in our brains. However, Existence is not a thought. If it were, it would have existed in our brains.