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Akilah

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Everything posted by Akilah

  1. Akilah

    Health & Evasion.

    Now, it is true - when objectively assessed - that health is a value - and that, physical beauty is thus a manifestation of health; i.e, there exists no physical beauty apart from health; that gross error would be a stolen concept. And so, when observing the common intellectuals of objectivism (I am an objectivist) such as Brook, Peikoff, Ghate, Binswanger, and perhaps Rand herself - there appears to be a complete absence of this consideration (an objective value); one can merely glimpse at the physical disposition of these men (and Rand) and observe their *seeming* carelessness about health (and consequent, beauty). Is this just some gross evasion shared among them - or, are they simply unaware?
  2. Akilah

    Health & Evasion.

    No, the problem is within treating 'genetic' disease as self-evident (the immutable given) - i.e, unfortunate, distasteful events which Man cannot reverse with the use of his mind; that is, not thinking, limited to the concrete and specific. There is a cause of disease, just as there is a cause of a man's choice to eat junk food or refuse to study philosophy. It likens to the common view of life and ageing (or senescence) - the unstated and uninvestigated premise (unthinking) that ageing is the given, immutable, unchangeable fact of life; "Man is doomed to age, wither, acquire cancer, and succumb to his genetic defects of which we call ageing, its just what it is". Instead of investigating the cause of senescence to which a man then may grant himself a state of biological non-senescence, non-aging, infinite youth (and if it is, in fact, genetic, the next step is then to particularize in the cause even further; "what genes, or what methylation processes cause this".., etc. Or more commonly, the notion that an individuals intelligence is 'genetic' hence immutable (why? blank out) - this same argument is then thus applied to the overweight and obese, "Its just the way it is, my hormones, my inexplicable desires and emotions, those damn thyroids, my genetics, I cant help it". Again, it is treating the concrete and specific as the self-evident and the given. But, again, morality is absolute, only contextually; so, I would say that, to the extent that one knows a certain action or blemish is in opposition to his beauty (or any other value, as judged after the complex process of assessing all of ones objective values in their respective hierarchy) and continues to pursue that action (say, eating doughnuts, candy, not studying philosophy or going to the gym) constitutes and overt evasion. In the case of an ugly nose - I would ask, "why is it ugly?". As, the beauty of a nose is defined contextually on a persons face (another persons nose is unlikely to be beautiful on me); is it ugly because I have gained too much fat on my face? Or is it ugly because of a genetic defect of which I have identified which results in the size of my nose being far out of proportion in regards to the size of my face? And so on. If one knows the former (and is trying to know) and continues to over-eat, then he is evading. I just find It peculiar to observe a host of intellectuals and not one of them seem concerned with health and beauty - perhaps they are, and I just don't know. That is all.
  3. Akilah

    Health & Evasion.

    "There's no mention of baseball either. Doesn't mean they don't care about it, it just means it's not relevant, beyond the painfully obvious: a rationally selfish person should take care of their health". Thanks, that clears it up.
  4. Akilah

    Health & Evasion.

    I am pretty there is some rational explanation for their lack of interest in health -I've read OPAR about 3 times now and cannot recall any discussions on physical health. It just seems there is a disregard for physical health and beauty among popular objectivists. And, lack of health is an evasion (to the extent that one knows, and is trying to know) - with the exception of certain genetic-dependent diseases. My primary concern is if I am thinking about health incorrectly - I see it as one of the highest values (up there with reason, purpose, and self-esteem) - thus the reason for popular objectivists lack of concern with the matter (or perhaps I just don't know). It reminds me of those ivory tower intellectuals who regard their abstractions as far more important than any application of those abstractions (which Peikoff devotes a whole section to in OPAR) and thus disregard their health and beauty. It parallels the man who eloquently speaks of great plans and endeavors to supreme virtue; but, then never accomplishes his tasks - there exists a kind of disconnect. Well, no - beauty and health are measured in degrees; someone with sickle-celled anemia resulting in yellow eyes and so on is not as beautiful.., etc.
  5. Akilah

    Health & Evasion.

    Yes, and yes. Someone who is not healthy cannot be beautiful (a contradiction in terms) - I use 'health' as defined by, the proper biological (physical) functioning of man; thus, human beauty as, the proper physical appearance of man. Beauty being a subset of aesthetics; i.e, a depiction of man in his proper metaphysical state (which is thus genetically dependent upon his proper biological functioning). To set beauty against health - or the reverse - is a logical error (an error in judgement; which could have serious anti-life consequences); as, there is no proper physical appearance of man if he has no proper biological functioning. This error can be seen in common hip-hop-rap female artists (think Minaj) who inject themselves with all kinds of synthetics and plastics at which a large portion of men then judge that as "beauty" - which it is not; its a perversion in judgement. Beauty is objective. I agree with Aristotle's definition of beauty (symmetry, definiteness, and proportion) as those are the precise characteristics which indicate proper biological health - forming a kind of harmony between the two. I must stress however, that, there is a distinction between beauty as applied to living systems as opposed to nonliving physical concretes; as, the standard of biological beauty is the proper functioning of that living system. Whereas with physical concretes, this cannot be so. (To say, as applied to a random sample, "she is beautiful" while she is obese, living with atherosclerosis, and has a disfigured face, perhaps, from a car accident is to err in judgement).
  6. Akilah

    What are the basic emotions?

    Ayn Rand in her book the Objectivist ethics--while not explicating the reason for this truth--claims that the basic emotions are joy and suffering from which all others are derivatives; but, perhaps this is merely a result from my past Stoic philosophy before my conversion to Objectivism, however, are not the basic emotions desire and aversion? I.e, joy, being the result of the successful state of life is then necessarily the result of the satisfaction of desire, and the aversion of that which is bad. Desire being the logical correlate of volitional thought--i.e, value judgments. E.g, the desire for food is not some innate biological instinct, but the result of value-judgments; the frustration of that desire is what results in a host of other negative emotions, and if prolonged long enough, results in suffering.
  7. Akilah

    What are the basic emotions?

    I suppose I was conflating concepts and emotion--i.e, any kind of particular emotion being a concept, hence, having units which constitute that state of consciousness. My error lies in thinking that, the concept of emotion is the emotion itself--which is untrue. So, you think that emotions (each and every particular) exist as primaries?
  8. Akilah

    What are the basic emotions?

    Oh, I see; so, instead of 'basic' I am trying to find the 'primary' emotions if they exist--surely they must?
  9. Akilah

    What are the basic emotions?

    I.e, you cannot expand the concept of joy and suffering to then obtain hatred and love? What I grasp from joy and suffering being "basic" is that they are the primary emotions; meaning, no other kinds of emotions precede them. And so, all other emotions are 'narrowed' abstractions from those primaries which serve as their basis.
  10. Akilah

    What are the basic emotions?

    I think there exists a difference between hunger and the sensations of hunger; i.e, 'hunger' is the concept of recognizing that food is necessary at that moment (hence, the desire of it) as concluded from the evidence of the senses (the feeling of an empty stomach). Hunger is not built in--the sensations preceding it are. Sorry, my mistake; she describes the basic emotions in Atlas shrugged.
  11. Akilah

    What are the basic emotions?

    Is that not what basic means?
  12. The good is that which promotes life as per individual qua man; and the reverse applies--however then, what is the 'right' or 'wrong'? Is it that which is correctly identified as good or bad? Meaning that the differential between that which is right and good lies in the 'right' being the factual evaluation of a certain object (action, material good.., etc) as 'good'? I.e, "You are wrong about this matter, eating cake is not good for health" and so on.
  13. Very simply, the three cardinal values are reason, purpose, and self-esteem. Which I presume are ranked in that order as well. My question is, how does one integrate his own values with the three cardinal values and remain consistent? Exempli gratia, 'health', or 'wealth' and so on.
  14. Akilah

    Choice - or not.

    Given that a choice is a concept before an action, that is, it is the predicate of action. But, what is a choice? I have worked out that, a choice is merely the result of judgment of what, amongst alternatives, is right or wrong. The necessary result, is that, it is fundamental to human nature that he can only act on what he has judged right or wrong. Making the choice between the slice of pizza and ribeye steak is to say, "is the pizza right or is the steak right and the pizza wrong?"; Man cannot act out of morality - it is his nature to be morally perfect. Let me stress this, action is the result of judgment amongst alternatives; that is, choice, which is merely that precise judgment of those alternatives as right or wrong. Man cannot act outside of this judgment - it is the kind of identity he is, his nature. To choose, is to judge, and to act, is to choose. To act impulsively is to judge whims as right and planned action as wrong (choosing) and so on. Necessarily, then, what is fundamentally wrong cannot possess any rationale as to why it is 'right' - that is, if an action is wrong, then there exists no contexts, no circumstances, no rationales as to why it is right for that specific context. Exempli gratia, if one has proclaimed that eating healthy foods is right and eating unhealthy foods is wrong, then, there exists no rationale to justify eating unhealthy foods (that is to say, a reason for why, granted a specific context, it is right to eat unhealthy food) - I am tempted to say, that, it is a stolen concept to answer otherwise, in that, when an object is fundamentally wrong, there cannot exist any pretexts for which it is right because it is already wrong. The resulting, and rather exciting, conclusion is that mans nature is to be morally perfect; that is, he cannot act outside his judgments - so much for "man isn't perfect"; it is his job to be perfect. *Note: I am looking for objections from my fellow objectivists, am I wrong? I want to know the truth*.
  15. The way Rand and Peikoff use it in their books is extremely vague; how can one practically use his faculty of reason? And what relations does the faculty have in terms of emotions? The epistemology of objectivism states that man first senses, then he perceives, at which he then gains concepts. Perceptions are merely collections of sensations - that is, all existents are different, it is the stage where a conscious being "identifies". From this, a unit of measure can be obtained from the perceptions to which that unit becomes a concrete concept which man decides to express in symbols. Where is 'reason' in this process? How can I consciously use 'reason' over emotion, and why does emotion conflict with 'reason'?
  16. Akilah

    What is 'reason'?

    So, can we definitively say that, using the faculty of 'reason' is reduced to asking 'why' and 'how'?
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