In regards to self-causality in Metaphysics and Epistemology Posted Thursday at 03:17 AM · Edited Thursday at 03:18 AM by Akilah · Report reply Now, I want to first make definition of that concept "cause"; for it seems to me that qua verb, a cause is the act of a thing creating another thing; e.g., when men say, "a dog barks" he means that the dog is creating bark(s). And so, cause qua noun identifies a thing that is the creator of another, as it is; and so, e.g., the dog is the cause of a bark (the dog creates barks)--and philosophy is the cause of history; i.e., it is only be means of philosophy that history exists, for philosophy creates history. And here, creation is the act of putting a thing into existence. And so, in regards to those things that are--what seems to me to be a peculiarity--self-caused, these are things which create themselves by no other means than themselves; however, I want to make clear here that I do not mean final causality in the Aristotelian conception of it; i.e., these here derive from my own original thinking on the matter. For in regards to the universe, a man may say, "the universe has a cause"; however, in the sense by which men seem to mean "cause" modernly would amount an extension of deterministic cause (i.e., that all things are the effects of other things; that all things are caused by previous things) as by whatever inclination they have in them, they conflate the concepts of determinism and causality with each other--they think determinism is causality and that causality necessitates determinism and so it goes. And so, when a man says, "the universe has a cause" their mind immediately hastens without doubt to conclude some other thing outside the universe as the cause of the universe; and in this lies the illumination in regards to the actual nature of determinism; for determinism is the rejection of but a single kind or species of cause; i.e., the rejection of self-causality. When we investigate the three modernly popular conceptions or positions on free will, we see that they all share this common premise of deterministic causality; i.e., both the determinist, compatibilist, and the libertarian accept without suspicion the deterministic premise of causality (that all things are effects of, or caused by previous things; for them, this is what it means to be a cause, and what causality is). But it is this premise of which I precisely call into question: are all things really caused by previous, other things? Or is there a class of things which need not to be caused by previous things? And therefore, in regards to the universe, the consistent determinist would then need to point to some mystic, supernatural entity which caused the universe (determinism leads us directly into mysticism, not on account of choice, but necessarily despite the determinists position that he is scientifically inclined, it couldn't be more untrue). However, my primary question would be in regards to the kinds of things that would be self-caused (i.e., what kinds of things are self-caused?); I can imagine that the most rudimentary constituents of matter (of particles or whatever they are) would necessarily be self-caused as they cannot be analyzed further. And finally, in regards to free will, it seems that (just by means of observation) that the act of making a choice itself devoid of any content of that choice is self-caused--i.e., it is indeed caused (just as everything else is), but it exists by means of itself.