organon1973

Can you tell me whether Aristotle provided a formal definition of 'syllogism' in his work, and if so, what it is? Thank you; happy holidays.

Is it possible the conceive four dimensions, in four dimensions? I do not think it is. Our conceptualization of the universe must be accurate, of course, though. Is the universe in fact finite and 'unbounded', or rather -- bounded, not by a hard shell at some point, but by its own magnitude? Could the big bang have been local? E.g., a collapse over a certain number of light years, though not the whole thing? Also: is negative time (i.e., movement backward in time) as nonsensical an idea as negative length (i.e., having a pencil with a length less than zero, which is of course impossible)? I think it is. Does 'time travel' (the idea of movement backward in time) derive from mathematical non-objectivity? The separation of math from existence? The idea that a negative can exist, in greater degree than a corollary positive, ever? Which of course cannot happen; if Jane has six trees, she can give away no more than six trees. I define time as: the dimension in which entities act. I do not yet understand calculus, though I understand the principle of how to derive the area under a curve; rectangles of ever narrowing width, describing the area under a curve; as the width of these rectangles approaches zero, approaches that 'limit', the area approaches complete accuracy. The 'area' of an area: 2 dimensions: area 3 dimensions: volume 4 dimensions (as in our universe): space All over the place here. I am reading Einstein's own book on Relativity (though it's been a while since I picked it up -- stuff lately). I look forward to learning more of those who frequent this particular forum. I like to learn, and understand things. Be well. - John

(Need to improve your board username there, friend. Not a jab there.) Rationality is his nature, not a trait of character. The traits of character derive from whether he chooses to live in accordance with his nature (which is/was impossible, in the absence of the grounding in rational philosophy (philosophy, the primary science; psychology, the second science, these two, foundational to securing rational consciousness in the world, in existence) provided by Aristotle and by Rand).

Good question. Qualities as relate to the manner of managing his consciousness, the method(s) by which he governs his mind, I would argue. Disagree. "The sum of a man's qualities in a moral context" does not in any way exclude that these qualities will be of a negative nature.

No, it is not. It is trait of character -- a sum total, if you wish, expressed in a man's identity, in relation to both consciousness, as well as to existence (the form more traditionally grasped, manifesting in behavioral calm, 'ease', if you would -- a man can be cognitively confident as well, though, given an explicit grasp of rational philosophy and of the nature of rational thought, I think). Character traits are not actions, or virtues (which are actions in a moral context). They are primary aspects of a man's identity, and are immediately grasped. And, disagreeing with what Rand said here, pride is not a virtue -- it is a "psycho-emotional" state (an emotional state, deriving from psychological causes) that proceeds from the grasp that one is good, in whatever context (the broad moral context of which self-esteem is an index, the source of the greatest pride, given one is indeed good (self-esteem, the personal grasp of one's own goodness)). Guilt is the contrary -- the psycho-emotional state that results from the grasp that one is evil, in whatever context (and should one, as that astonishing mind born in 1905 once wrote, ever come to an unavoidable precipice of the realization that he is irredeemably evil, he has two options before him, and no others: insanity or suicide).

Excellent work by Peikoff here. I would define character more briefly as: the sum of a man's qualities in a moral context. Not a fundamental trait of character, but a man's most fundamental choice, which fundamentally informs the nature of his character. I really like this board. There are minds here.

"Confidence is a recognition of ability..." This is not the case; the recognition of ability relates to justice.

To the degree a man (by his nature, a rational being) is rational, it will manifest in confidence; to the degree he is not so, it will manifest in insecurity.

I would like to know your thoughts, if any, on the following. Be well, and Merry Christmas. -- The fundamental character traits of a rational being are Confidence and Insecurity. Why? Because these — and only these — fundamentally relate to the relationship of a consciousness that is self-aware to its values. (Realize also that anxiety is the psycho-emotional corollary of insecurity — thus we see in practice: generalized anxiety disorder.) [(from Rational Psychology (work in progress)].

Things you must give up when you enter the priesthood: sex, money, and your frontal lobe. (Is there a humor thread anywhere on the forum?)

This is a blog entry of mine on this from 7/1/2009: "Everything happens for a reason." There is no “plan” in the universe — no goal-directed, integrated, over-arching map, designed by a supreme consciousness, that integrates everything that occurs, has occurred, or will occur into a meaningful, intended unity. Men are beings of free will – there is no necessity in relation to what they will they think, or what they will do — a man’s thoughts, his actions, his identity are self-determined. Unlike the course of a rock moving in space, subject only to fixed and predictable forces of nature, what men do is not set in advance — it is a matter of their own choice. But everything that does occur, occurs according to the fixed principles of that which is. When a drunk driver strikes another vehicle, there is no “reason” for it, no ultimate plan according to which the injury of the innocent lives of others makes sense. But it does “make sense” in that: the individual chose to drink; his faculties were therefore impaired; and, lost in a self-caused stupor, he crossed the divider. So while there is no governing plan, no map designed by a supreme consciousness, that is behind everything that occurs — everything that occurs does indeed make sense – i.e., can be integrated, can be understood.

One knows an induced proposition is true by virtue of either the concept itself, or a wider group (the genus, family, order, class, phylum, kingdom) to which it belongs, itself a concept. That truth is grasped by relating the given property to the _nature_ of that which is identified and integrated by the concept. And there you go.

I would say that Step 1 involves a 'self-referential' induction, relating to the nature of life -- while Step 2 involves a 'relational' induction, the property coming from a genus (in this case life, itself a concept) to which men belong. Once we identify a concept (in this case, life) as having a given quality by virtue of what it is (i.e., to that which is identified and integrated in the process of forming the concept -- in this case, that life is a conditional state, and that it can end, given the necessary values are not achieved and/or maintained), we can then (through a forward application -- a sort of deduction, though applying to concepts rather than particulars) apply that quality to all valid subdivisions within that concept (cells, insects, dogs, dolphins, birds, men, etc.), and finally to all particular instances of all of those concepts. How do we know all men are mortal? 1. All living things are mortal. (This relates to the nature of life, to that which is identified and integrated in forming the concept.) 2. Men are living things. Therefore: Men are mortal. We can then proceed with deduction in the more common sense -- the application of a quality of a given concept, to all particular units of that concept. 1. Men are mortal (from the above argument). 2. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal. I would argue all inductive truths come from one of two sources: either (1) the nature of the concept itself ('self-referential' or what I call 'simple' induction in the piece); or (2) a genus of the concept ('relational' induction), that genus itself a concept and its nature informing the quality for all valid conceptual subdivisions within that genus. And that there are these alternatives, and no others.

I would like to offer the following definition of psychology, and to learn your thoughts or objections (if any) in relation to it: Psychology is the science that studies health and disease in the context of a consciousness that directs its own operation.

Hi sN, I think this relates to the nature of concept-formation, specifically that which is observed and integrated when forming the concept of 'life' -- a conditional state of self-generated, self-sustaining action (that requires the achievement and/or maintenance of certain values for its continuation).

Here is another: "We were just discussing a most interesting subject," said the earnest matron. "Dr. Pritchett was just telling us that nothing is anything." "He should, undoubtedly, know more than anyone else about that," Francisco answered gravely.

One knows an induced proposition is true (e.g., "All men are mortal") by reference to either: the concept's differentia, or a genus of the concept, which informs the quality for the narrower group (and a concept retains all of the qualities all of the valid genuses to which it belongs). This is described in the article. All of a concept's qualities are "metaphysically intrinsic" to it (I have corrected this in the article; it was incorrect as originally stated). Some qualities, though, proceed from the particular nature of a concept's units, from its differentia, and some proceed from the nature of a genus to which the concept belongs, that informs the quality for the narrower group. The former I designate as 'simple' induction; the latter as 'relational' induction. Both are valid methods of induction. There it is in brief. :-) Thank you for the links; I will review them.

Faith is belief in the absence of evidence. But it is an objective fact, a fact of reality, that knowledge arrived at by rational method is true, given the premises are true (this follows from the nature of things). If all physicists are men, and all men are beings of volitional consciousness, then all physicists are beings of volitional consciousness. This is a conclusion of which one can be certain, and faith forms no part whatever of that certainty.

I posted a lengthy essay to my blog recently on the problem of induction; I would prefer that you view it, and submit comments, there, as I will incorporate the answers to rational objections and questions into its structure. I thank you in advance for the time you invest in reviewing it. Be well. http://anactivemind.johnrearden.com/?p=133 - John