amagi

The only possibility is that the deterministic neurons are physically organized in some way such that they compose a system--the output of which is nondeterministic. The component cells are deterministic but the system as a whole is nondeterministic--this is an emergent property. Rather than speculate on how, technically, this is possible, I'll just point out that this is not a feature of only my view of consciousness. It is also an absolutely necessary feature of the view I'm arguing against--the view, advocated by some on this forum, that volitional thought has no physical basis, occurs prior to any action in the brain, and moves the brain's atoms around by an undiscovered law of physics. Those holding this view do so precisely in an attempt to solve or avoid this problem of the deterministic nature of cells, but as I've suggested, their proposed solution requires them to assume exactly the idea they set out to deny. Specifically, they want to explain how a volitional consciousness could be supported by or based on a brain composed of entirely deterministic matter--so they claim that thought, or at least volitional mental acts in particular, have no physical basis in the brain. Somehow the mind, while requiring the brain as a sort of prerequisite to exist, can bypass the brain and carry out certain thought processes with no dependence on any physical action--no change in the brain or in physical reality at all. This independent mental process then acts somehow on the brain to move around the atoms of the brain's cells. This loophole in the causal closure of physical reality, then, is the source of free will. I reject this as arbitrary and logically unsound. But even assuming for the moment it were true--what must also be true for this to be the case? How did the mind aquire the ability to function independently from the brain? Since those holding this view must still recognize the overwhelmingly conclusive scientific facts showing that the brain gives rise to the mind--they are left with the following problem--the existence of the mind, and all of its innate attributes and capabilities, including intelligence and the capacity for free will, came about because in a developing human organism, certain (deterministic) cells arranged themselves into some physical organization that eventually formed the brain. In other words, deterministic cells in some physical arrangement formed a system, the result of which was not deterministic. A deterministic brain somehow produced a nondeterministic, volitional consciousness. So, the proponents of this view implicitly grant that the actions of deterministic cells can give rise to nondeterministic results (an emergent property). When it comes to volitional thought specifically, however, they are unable to apply this principle. If they did apply it, they would see that a physical, neural basis for volitional thought is not a negation of free will, and it does not attempt to reduce consciousness to matter. It is simply the only logical explanation consistent with scientific knowledge for the question of how the human mind can carry out thought at all. Biological determinism--the attempt to deny the existence of free will or to reduce consiousness to matter--is, of course, pervasive in our culture, particularly in academia, and it is vitally necessary to reject and oppose such ideas. However, rationalistically asserting that thought has no basis in the brain, or, equivalently, that volitional thought must occur before any change in the brain, is not consistent with Objectivism. In answer to the question of the cause of a volitional act: There is one cause--the voltional thought, which must have a correlating physical process in the brain (by which the thought can affect further changes in the brain). That process as a whole is nondeterministic--because as I've shown, a system of deterministic cells can produce a nondeterministic result.

Well, I suppose you'd have to read Ayn Rand to see if she gave any sense to the words "man is an indivisible entity." I'm claiming something more specific about the brain, but it follows from her meaning in conjunction with current knowledge of the brain. If you accept the premise of my argument--that thought must have some underlying physical process in the brain to account for it's existence, function, and ability to effect changes in the brain--than the "supervenience" problem can be seen more clearly. Is it the thought causing a change in the brain, or is it the physical expression of the thought causing a change? Either way you answer, the cause is ultimately the same. The brain process that must underlie thought is the reason that further brain activity can be affected by thought--but that "brain process" cannot be severed from the thought itself. It cannot be viewed as an independent and distinct causal force because it is an integral part of the whole thought process. The form of the brain process is determined by the content of the thought, and vice versa. Without the brain process there is no logical way thought could occur at all, and it is the brain process that directly interacts with the rest of the brain's matter. But that brain process is only the mechanism by which conscious thought occurs--as such if you claim that the brain process is causing an event then it necessarily follows that the conscious thought is causing the event as well. To talk about whether the brain process or instead the thought is the causal factor is to assume that one can exist without the other, and it is an implicit acceptance of dualism. "Dual aspect monism" or "nonreductive materialism" are terms conventionally used to describe roughly the view I'm advocating. I don't necessarily agree with or accept either of those terms. To claim that "everything is physical" but consciousness is nevertheless not reducible to matter is a misuse of language, even if you're trying to describe approximately the view I hold. I agree with Leonard Peikoff when he says in OPAR, p.35: I am certainly not claiming that my view of the brain is part of Objectivism, but I do beleive that it is entirely in agreement with Objectivist principles. I'll address the question of whether the neural basis of thought is deterministic in a future post.

This problem has been described as the "supervenience argument," and it is generally taken to be a major obstacle to the view that volitional mental acts, while having causal efficacy on the brain, are nonetheless in existence themselves only because of corresponding brain processes. However, this problem only arises if one accepts the view of dualism--the view that the mental is metaphysically severed from and outside of the rest of reality. Ayn Rand rejected this view: From The Journals of Ayn Rand The existence of consciousness is a primary, and it cannot be reduced to matter. However, neither can it be "split" from matter--from the body--except "for purposes of discussion" (i.e. epistemelogically) and "not in actual fact" (i.e. not metaphysically). In accordance both with Rand's view and with scientific knowledge of the neural basis of consciousness, a mental state and its corresponding brain process should be seen as two aspects of the same event, the same integrated phenomenon. Therefore, the singular cause of a particular act of volition is that one phenomenon, which has both a neural basis and the element of conscious awareness. As for the question of how a collection of deterministic cells could give rise to a volitional consciousness--this is properly a question that only science can fully answer. All that can be said is that they do in fact do exactly that. Those objecting to the idea that abstract, volitional thought could have any basis in a brain composed of those deterministic cells declare instead that consciousness somehow operates independently of that brain (at least when it comes to volition) and then, through some hitherto undiscovered law of physics, moves the brain's atoms around--deflecting them from their otherwise deterministic course. However, it is readily apparent that this attempt to escape the deterministic nature of cells, quite apart from being anti-scientific, fails utterly at that escape, for this reason--it is those very same deterministic cells that are still creating the nondeterministic consciousness in the first place, regardless of whether the volitional thoughts are expressed in the brain or not. How is it that a fully deterministic brain could give rise to a process that transcends its own deterministic nature? It should be obvious that as long as one accepts that the brain gives rise to the mind it is, in this context, almost trivial whether volitional thought is expressed in the brain or whether instead that thought occurs by a mysterious process in some dualistic realm independent of the brain--the problem of deterministic brain cells remains firmly in place. The solution to this apparent problem is, fundamentally, to accept that volition is an emergent property of deterministic cells just as consciousness is an emergent property of non-conscious cells. This is no threat to free will. As Leonard Peikoff writes in OPAR, p.35 We know that volitional consciousness is ultimately a product of the deterministic cells of the human brain. The way to reconcile this fact with the existence of free will is not by rationalistically inventing arbitrary laws of physics or by accepting a mystical form of dualism. It is rather through scientific investigation informed by a proper, Objectivist view of consciousness.

The above reply is bizarre in light of the fact that the theory I proposed involves a directly observable physical brain mechanism corresponding to conscious thought processes. The whole point of my argument is that there must be physical process in the brain allowing any particular thought to occur at all. The alternate theory, which I reject, is that thought can occur with no action by the brain to account for it, and that this thought can then affect a subsequent change in the brain by some unexplainable means. It is supremely obvious that it is this theory that is not open to scientific investigation. If there is no physical process allowing for the existence of volitional thought then there is no scientific method by which the relationship of the brain to the volitional actions of the mind can be discovered. All that could be observed is a spontaneous change in the movement of the brain's matter with no discernable cause--a sudden departure from the usual laws of physics and the function of cells. It is this view that "dismisses the hard questions" of how thought does in fact direct changes in the brain. The only logical solution to this problem is that the thought itself--all thought--must have a biological basis in the brain allowing it to interact with physical reality. Thought is not reducible to biology, but it is inextricably paired with it. Furthermore, as I clearly stated already, the fact that individual neurons are deterministic is in agreement with my theory. Their deterministic nature does not preclude them from providing the physical mechanism allowing the mind to carry out abstract thought any more than the fact that individual neurons are not conscious prevents them from giving rise to human consciousness.

Yes, it does seem to be a contradiction. However, it is also accurate. The seeming contradition is only superficial. The alternative, advocated by some on this forum and described somewhat in this thread, is that the brain has no function beyond that of a deterministic machine--a piece of matter with actions every bit as mechanistic and determined-in-advance as a muscle. In this view, consciousness, while somehow needing the brain to exist, nevertheless is capable of action that is not necessitated by any prior or concurrent action of the brain (which would make it deterministic) and that such mental action intervenes in the mechanics of the brain to change the physical action of brain matter. It is obvious that this position requires the idea that consciousness is capable of actions not connected to or expressed by any physical action of the brain. The actual process and content of certain volitional conscious thought therefore must occur with no physical basis in reality. Otherwise they would be mere products of the brain-machine and free will would not exist; clearly this is false. Put simply, this is the view that a whole process of conscious thought can spontaneously occur in the mind prior to any action by the brain whatsoever (i.e., unconnected to any change in reality outside of the mind)--only affecting any change in the brain after the mental process has completed. This position is very different from merely the true concept that consciousness is not reducible to the brain. Instead, this is a denial of the necessarily true idea that all mental content and action, even the nondeterministic actions of volitional human thought, must be expressed in the brain in some fashion in order to exist at all. This is "necessarily true" by all that we know about the relationship of the brain to the mind. Thought occurs only because some mechanism in the brain accounts for it, despite the fact that the conscious human mind directs and controls this thought. How any conscious act could exist and occur with no physical brain mechanism to allow it or account for it has never been explained by those who hold the false view I've described, despite the fact that this is the crux of their entire argument. It is quite clear that human consciousness can intervene in an otherwise deterministic physical world--this is free will. However, it cannot be the case that consciousness occurs in some metaphysical vacuum with no mechanism or process to account for the existence and content of its thoughts, which then intervene in the detached and deterministic brain. Instead, it must be that the actions of the brain are physical expressions of this conscious process of volition as it occurs. Despite it's propenents' unwillingness to admit as much explicitly, the above view holds that certain thought processes occur with total independence from the brain and then impinge on the brain's matter by some arbitrary, ineffable means. This is the logically untenable viewpoint. The reason it is logically permissible for deterministic brain matter to give rise to nondeterministic thought processes is the same reason that non-conscious brain cells can give rise to human consciousness. Brain cells are fully deterministic, biological machines--yet because of them consciousness exists, and that consciousness is certainly nondeterministic in humans. The phrase "emergent property" is not ideal but it suffices to describe the principle involved. How this is possible is a question for science.

And of course the "fair and balanced" comment was almost certainly a not-so-subtle stab at Fox News. The "best-selling novelist" bit might have any number of meanings, but I'd bet they had Michael Crichton in mind. And if that were true, would it be a stretch if I were to speculate that the editorial's author was displaying a bit of psychological projection--that perhaps in mounting his attack on the religionists, some dark, unexamined recess of his conscience drove him to lash out in defense of his own faith against an author that dares to name environmentalist mythology as the religion that it is? Well, it's a nice theory isn't it.

True, and this is some consolation to someone who has already had children with a religious spouse before discovering a rational philosophy. However, if anyone still entering into such a relationship were to use this as a justification for allowing a child to be raised in the church then they would be, in almost every conceivable context, despicable and evil. For anyone who takes ideas and reason seriously, this would be an enormous betrayal, not to mention a hideous example of child abuse. Also remember that even though some independent individuals reject their childhood indoctrination entirely, they are the (probably very rare) exceptions. It's true that most people will emerge from even a serious church upbringing as the sort of casual Christians that are the norm today--that is, they won't take religion seriously. But it's also true that the vast majority will still consider themselves nominally religious. And even if they don't, it's likely that they still will have absorbed countless, deadly false premises on every level of philosophy, and they will be burdened with a mountain of unresolved contradictions even if they become implicitly rational individuals. With at least one rational parent it certainly might be easier to avoid that fate, but that parent would be competing against an institution whose entire purpose is arguably to systematically destroy a child's rational faculty.

Wow, I've never heard that line before...... Well at least he's consistent. He certainly compromised when it came to his film. This explains the movie perfectly in fact. The film's basically good and heroic message was corrupted by several irrationalist ideas. That the director is roughly familiar with Objectivism but failed to grasp it fully makes sense. I take it as another sign that Objectivism is spreading. This movie failed to reach its potential, both cinematically and philosophically, but I still enjoyed it a great deal.

It's been too long since I watched this film to comment on it. I will say that I have seen most or all of Miyazaki's films and on the whole they are easily the most artistically valuable anime I've found. His explicit philosophy, however, has clear environmentalist leanings. Several of his films are meant to be ecological morality fables about the conflict between man and nature. This should not prevent people from seeing these films however, as they are artistically wonderful, both from a cinematic standpoint and in terms of animation. The one truly bad film in this regard is Pom Poko. Miyazaki did not direct this one, but his Studio Ghibli did produce it and I'm guessing he was probably involved in some way. It's about a group of magical racoon-like creatures that wage war on the humans who are destroying their habitat. If I recall correctly, the racoons slaughter innocent people amidst a lighthearted comic atmosphere. It was disgusting. Be assured that this is the exception. The films directed by Miyazaki are mostly either delightful, benevolent children's movies or epic action/adventure films.

Having just ended a three-year relationship with the daughter of a pastor, I feel that I understand Moose's situation very well. Virtually everything he has said to describe his girlfriend applies exactly to this girl. She is also a Christian of the apathetic variety. She goes to church only because her parents expect it, and she has very little serious interest in philosophy, politics, or any other intellectual endeavor. For a long time we very rarely discussed her ideas, and not for my lack of trying. Whenever I attempted to discuss such things with her she became closed-off and defensive. She was afraid of the conflict of a disagreement, and she had little in the way of argument, rational or otherwise, to support her beliefs. In three years the only justification she ever provided for her belief in God was, to quote, "I believe it because I want to believe it." Needless to say, I suggested that this is not a rational basis for one's view of existence. She admitted this, but still maintained that she was simply unable to reject her religious views because she could not conceive of any other way. All of this certainly detracted from our relationship. I could never respect her intellectually as an equal for this refusal to think. And yet we were in love. I do believe it is possible to genuinely value someone greatly despite these kinds of intellectual differences. I also believe that whatever we had was greatly diminished by such differences. It may have been love, but it was never enough to base a lifetime or a marriage on. It was primarily for these reasons that we eventually ended it. We had a good relationship, but it would not have worked in the long term. I don't claim that this would be the case for all such relationships, but I do believe that it would always be a very serious obstacle. In my case, despite her refusal to apply her mind to her ideas, this girl is intelligent and relatively driven. Her religious beliefs are abstract formalities to her, and she has an implicitly scientific view of the world in most respects. I valued many qualities of hers on the sense of life level, and we simply had a lot of fun together. Maybe this is enough in some cases. With regard to "teaching" her Objectivism, in the course of our relationship she read The Fountainhead, Atlas Shrugged, and a small amount of the nonfiction. I was also eventually able to engage her in discussion of these ideas to some degree. Although I believe it did cause her to think more deeply than she had, and although she agreed vaguely with some of the political ideas, ultimately it didn't sink in. She simply lacked the desire to use her mind in any serious way. As to Moose's situation, I'm afraid that I must agree that his announced intention to tell his children nothing about religion while accepting his wife's decision to religiously indoctrinate them does suggest that he does not take his own ideas seriously. He says he would insist that she teach them religion "in a manner that is not brainwashing." There is no such manner. Telling a child that religious ideas are true is brainwashing by definition. It is the deliberate destruction of a child's rational faculty. One of the reasons I broke up with the aforementioned girl is that, despite being religious in only the most superficial sense, she wanted to send her future children to church. I would never even consider accepting such an atrocity. To an Objectivist, that prospect is sickening, as someone else suggested. I do not believe that it is inherently immoral to raise children with a religious person, but it does require a very clear agreement on the religious parent's part to not teach the child religious ideas as truth in any way. To accept any other compromise or concession--to allow even a little bit of religious upbringing--is monstrous. You do not teach that "there is no god" as simply an alternative dogma, but you do teach that reason is the only source of knowledge. It is not possible for one parent to do this while the other teaches irrationalism. To be charitable, perhaps Moose understands some of this, but it is not clear from his statements.

It is relevant here to note that some of the individuals responsible for the "research" described in the above article have been guests on the "Coast to Coast" program. For those who are unfamiliar with the show, it is a popular nationwide US radio show that deals with, among other things, aliens, bigfoot, ghosts, psychics, the occult, prophesy, vampires, angels and demons, alternate dimensions, consiousness expansion, government conspiracies, alternative medicine, and whatever other mystical insanity you can think of. The hosts of the show, formerly Art Bell and now George Noory, believe in or pretend to believe in virtually all of this nonsense, and their guests, with few exceptions, are raving lunatics. I listened to the program on the "Global Consiousness Project," and all I can say is that their "future-predicting" machine is such pathetically transparent quackery that it's almost astonishing any of them were ever employed by an academic institution at all, let alone by Princeton. Sadly, knowing modern academia, it is in fact not astonishing at all. In fact many of the "Coast to Coast" guests have advanced degrees or have held academic positions.

I agree. I have some knowledge of the transhumanist movement and of similar futurist groups, and some of their views, especially those on the so-called singularity, are pure mysticism. An example is the view that humans will be able to "upload" their consciousness into digital computers within a matter of decades. As someone else suggested, these views are no different than religious eschatology. This is unfortunate, because despite their inclusion of a number of such irrational ideas, these groups do attract individuals who are genuine enthusiasts of legitimate scientific eventualities. Moreover, many of the ideas advocated by such groups, like the World Transhumanist Association and the Extropy Institute, are profoundly good ideas that are very seldom advocated in mainstream society. They support the radical enhancement of human life through technologies such as genetic engineering, nanotechnology, cybernetic implants, etc. Very much like the libertarians, however, these groups stand for some positive concrete goals while denying and opposing the rational philosophy that must underlie them. And just as with the libertarians, the result is that transhumanism includes many bizarrely irrational absurdities alongside some out-of-context good ideas. In fact the transhumanist movement, particularly the Extropian faction, contains many libertarians. The World Transhumanist Association seems to include far more leftists and socialists, though it contains libertarians as well. As to the singularity, as conceived by many futurist groups it is arbitrary, mystical nonsense, but it is nevertheless based very roughly on a sound idea. This is the fact that the rate of scientific advancement is continually accelerating. It is conceivable that the rate of advancement will, at some point in the coming century or two, become so rapid that the human condition will be impoved profoundly in a relatively short period of time. This conception is, however, vastly different from the idea that mankind will ascend to virtual godhood through technology within 30 years.

I'd like to know what the truth is concerning the issue of Thomas Edison's alleged theft of French director Georges Melies' short film, Le Voyage Dans La Lune. I've heard it said that Edison bribed someone to obtain a copy of the film and then distributed it widely for profit. The first I'd heard of this story was from the HBO miniseries From the Earth to the Moon. It can also be found on several internet sites. Can anyone comment on the truth or context of this claim?

Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind is one of the worst movies I've seen. The main characters are neurotic anti-heroes who have no reason to be in their disfunctional relationship. The movie is naturalism crossed with surrealism. Spoilers follow: All the characters I can remember are morally depraved, like the medical assistants who smoke pot and dance on the bed where a patient lies undergoing complicated brain surgery, the philandering doctor who has an affair with his assistant, wipes her memory and then tries to have an affair with her again, or the guy who tries to date another girl with a wiped memory by theft and by assuming the identity of her ex-boyfriend. Every one of the several romantic relationships in this movie is portrayed as being miserable, hostile, and riddled with betrayal. The ending of the movie is terrible--the girl says to the guy, essentially, "I'm going to get bored with you and our relationship is going to be as screwed up as before." The guy accepts this as natural and takes her back after she left him and deliberately erased all memory of him. The clear message of this movie is that relationships are inherently disappointing, painful, and unfulfilling, but that somehow love is good anyway and it's great that these two people got together even though they are of no value to each other. Whatever mildly interesting exploration of psychology and memory this movie attempts is drowned in its revolting sense of life. None of this is surprising coming from the screenwriter responsible for the naturalist depravity-wallow Adaptation.

You never started. You made an personal accusation in a public forum which you have now declared needs no justification whatsoever, no evidence to support it at all, not even a pretense at an explanation on your part of any kind. You never gave any such justification and clearly you never will. So I agree--this is a waste of time.