DonAthos

Thanks for the patience, y'all. Work is clearing up a bit (if temporarily ). *** If IP is not actually a right, then trying to determine a "proper" length of issue for a patent is problematic. Or rather, the best length of issue will always be the shortest, because if IP is not actually a right then it is actually a violation of rights. I think that practically we've seen, in this thread and many others, how problematic it is to assess these situations. Where are the objective guidelines? Need we wait for Solomon to tell us how long is too long, how long is long enough? And it's not just the length of a patent term that is... "fuzzy." Is it? How is it meant to work at all? Man A invents the chair, as such. Man B builds the second instance... but it's slightly taller. Is that sufficient to make it "different enough" to be of his own mental labor, and not an appropriation of Man A's? Or it's blue, not beige. Or a different grain of wood. Or it's three legged and not four (maybe Man B thus owns "stools" in perpetuity)? Man A and Man B, he of the "slightly different chair," both show up at the marketplace to hawk their work. They see one-another's offerings and are incensed (because in this IP-friendly universe, Man B's creation of value detracts from Man A's: it's a zero-sum game). Man A moves to destroy Man B's chair (we can be in the frontier, or in an otherwise lawless place; it is up to Man A to defend "his rights"; i.e. his life). Man B resists, and they fight. Thereafter, we arrive as officers of the law (regional sheriff on assignment?) meant to sort this matter out. Clearly, one of these men has violated the rights of the other... and the other man acted in self-defense. We'll send one of the two to jail. But which? Is there any objectivity to be found here at all, even in theory? (This is over trademark and not patents, but here's an IP story from Yahoo's headlines from today. Either this man is violating Chick-Fil-A's rights, or Chick-Fil-A is violating the man's. How to decide? "Objective criteria"... or coin flip? Can these nebulous rules, supposedly in defense of man's rights, be written down anywhere such that men can understand and apply them?) *** Nicky answered you well and succinctly, and here are a couple of quotes taken from the Ayn Rand Lexicon on the topic of "property rights" which may help to further elucidate the matter: Anyways, if I was charged to argue how and why theft of actual property (even a sock) is destructive of man's life, I believe I could do so. But I cannot do so for my ongoing chair example, and so far I'm not convinced that any such argument exists. My neighbor builds a chair for himself based on having seen mine = a violation of "my rights"? An attack on my life? How so? Is there anything other than arbitrary assertion or circular reasoning ("well, the chair is intellectual property, thus it's necessarily a violation of rights and an attack on your life") to back up the claim that there is any "violation" here at all? I think this is only partly true. This idea that "all property is fundamentally intellectual" is potentially dangerous, if interpreted in the fashion expressed here, I believe. The "creation of an invention" in a person's mind (here: the invention of the chair) is not the same as someone creating a chair with their hands. In the first case, reading it as "opposed" to the second, no chair exists at all; there is no property. Nothing upon which a person may sit. Nothing to gain. Nothing to keep. No value. (I may have a million genius ideas -- and frankly, I think I come up with some good ones at times -- but that is virtually meaningless without setting out and realizing my ideas in actuality.) "How all creation occurs" is a two-fold process, and not one-step as I take the implication of your quote. A man's mind must grasp... and then his hands must create. Both are required. It's strange. I almost sense sort of a mind/body thing going on here... As though some men just blindly copy things "with their hands" -- acting "unthinkingly" -- and therefore usurp the "mental value" created by others. Whereas the creators and innovators do all of the "actual work" in their mental efforts, and the subsequent physical labor (on anyone's part) is just a foregone and negligible conclusion, bringing nothing to the table, so to speak. If that's what's ultimately behind this, it's on the wrong track. It's not better to think of a chair and then not build one, than it is to build one "without thinking about it" (were that even possible). Wealth creation requires thought and action. And the supposed villain of our tale -- the Chair Copier -- is also thinking, and acting, and creating wealth. Just as much as the Chair Innovator. The Chair Copier deserves the fruit of his labor as much as the Chair Innovator does his, and while the Chair Copier's path may in some senses have been "easier" than that of the Chair Innovator (in that innovation may be considered more difficult than understanding another's innovation, all else being equal) -- and while this means that the Chair Copier certainly benefits from the Chair Innovator, and his efforts -- that does not mean that the Chair Innovator owns the product of the Chair Copier's efforts, mental and physical. Seeing my smile as we pass on the street may well benefit your life, but that doesn't mean I own any part of you, or your later successes.

Since it's been bandied a couple of times in the thread, I'll just say: I think any conception of "art" which would "eliminate" architecture, music and dance would be worse than useless. That's like a conception of color that somehow eliminates red, orange, and yellow. If it's a choice between that, or letting abstract paintings into the tent, then there's no real question between them in my mind.

I'm going to have to take a brief hiatus from active participation -- work calls for at least a few days, and I tend to get "caught up" here (though pleasantly so). I'll try to keep tabs, and especially on this topic, because of everything, achieving an adequate understanding of the justification for IP has long been a strong source of personal interest. Before I stop typing, let me state what I want to understand of such a justification: Rights are important to me. If I think back to "earlier times," as partially a way of simplifying matters so that I can better understand them (e.g. my example of "chairs" over "iPhones," though I'd contend that these are principally the same), I can visualize the importance of the rights that I advocate and defend. If I were an early farmer, and someone sought to take my life, liberty, or property from me, there is no question but I would defend myself. I wouldn't need any governmental stamp of approval to feel justified in asserting my rights. If a man looked to cut off my arm, I would fight him; my arm is essential to me (is me) and to my survival. If a man tried to take my crops -- the crops in which I'd invested myself (my wealth; my time; my thought; my sweat; etc.) -- I would fight him. Those crops are essential to me and my survival (not only of themselves, as food, but of the fact that I must be allowed to reap the rewards of my investments and labors). If a man tried to keep me from doing those things that I needed in service to my crops, or hunting game for my family in a "common wood," or otherwise impinge on my liberty, I would fight him -- those activities being essential to me and my survival. I could not allow my arm to be cut off. Or my crops to be taken. Or my liberty impeded. To allow those things is to court death. However, if I built the first chair... and a neighbor came over, and observed my chair, and went home and built one for himself...? I cannot imagine what would drive me to fight my neighbor for so doing. If IP, such as we're discussing, is property in fact -- if this is actually a discussion of human rights -- then we must recognize that my neighbor is violating my rights. He is threatening me and my life by doing so, in as real a manner as cutting off my arm. That is how serious rights are, and why they need to be preserved and protected at all costs; it is not an intellectual game, but a matter of life and death. To violate rights are to initiate the use of force. But if my neighbor builds himself a chair? Even if it is on the basis of seeing my chair? (And thus benefiting from my mental labors?) I do not see that as a matter of life or death. I do not feel called to fight my neighbor on that basis. I do not feel threatened by it. And I would judge my efforts to stop him from building that chair, or to take the chair from him afterwards without his consent, as an initiation of the use of force... on my part. (If I came over to take my neighbor's chair from him -- the chair that he has built -- I would fully expect him to defend himself. And I must say that I'd find him justified. Honestly... wouldn't you?) As to patents, these are the recognition that a government may bestow upon a person and his inventions... but they do not create IP. If IP exists at all as an actual right, then it exists outside of government. The inventor of a chair owns "chairs," whether or not any government recognizes the fact. So the inventor of a chair does not need a patent on chairs to feel violated by any other man who also builds a like chair. And since force is justified in response to its initiation -- because patent law is ultimately backed by the gun -- if I were to build a chair, and my neighbor were to build his own chair afterwards... then I would be justified to take or destroy his chair, threatening physical force against my neighbor should he resist, up to death. (Just as I would threaten physical force to preserve my arm, my crops, my liberty, and all that which are actually a part of my rights.) Right?

Well, the idea that this is an "unauthorized reproduction" is precisely what's at issue. Or moreover, whether anyone has the legitimate "authority" to tell me when I may or may not build a chair. And I both agree and I disagree that "the physical labor of copying is not the source of the object's value." I think that there are two senses here. Well, back up for a moment (I'll get to the "two senses" in a moment). As stated, strictly, I completely agree. Copying things unthinkingly is not the source of an object's value. If I were to copy your chair as a machine might do, for instance. But if I build my chair because I have recognized the value in doing so? If I take the time to learn how your chair was constructed, and why I ought build one of my own? Then I have performed mental labor as well as physical labor. In one sense, you -- as originator of the chair -- are the source of the value of all chairs from now until the end of creation. You thought of it first, and insofar as all other chairs are based on your prototype, they stem directly from your "fountainhead." However. In another sense, you are certainly not the source of all the chairs which follow. Other minds must grasp what you've done, and why you've done it, if they are to follow suit. If a million chairs are built based on your initial design, that does not necessarily mean that you've built a million chairs. The value of that million chairs is not due alone to the originator of the idea. In the same way, when I learn mathematics from my teacher, and then go on to solve problems on my own...? In one way, I could not have done so without my teacher's efforts. And yet? It is not my teacher that is solving the problems that I solve. My mind must grasp the mathematics. My hand must write out the calculations. I am the one solving problems. And when I do so, I am entitled to reap the rewards. I feel the pride that comes from solving those equations, and I am right to do so. A teacher does not own the subsequent efforts of his students. And the originator of an idea does not own the fruits of the labor, both mental and physical, of those who take that idea for themselves, and employ those ideas for their own ends. Agreed (and insofar as you're quoting me, I'll note that I'm not shy of so acknowledging ). But neither do I owe fealty to the whole of humanity that came before me, and certainly we ought not construct a convoluted system of laws and taxes to force me to "pay what I owe" to all of the previous innovators. They do not own my efforts, and nobody does but me, except that I enter into an explicit agreement to trade my labor. Except that "the system in place" itself requires a great investment of time and energy to investigate, and even then, how often does it happen that there is a lawsuit based on the idea that a given work or design is "too similar" to another? Perhaps this is just a matter of "poor implementation"? But I think that we will always have poor implementation if the system is unjust in principle. And so that's the matter that must be sorted. And if Rand's argument as quoted above is sufficient for you, I understand. But it is not yet sufficient for me, for the reasons I've stated. The first man who builds a chair is simply not the creator in fact of the value of all subsequent chairs. He is the first to recognize the value of the chair. The first to put that into practice. He is the innovator. He owns the chairs which he builds. He does not own the idea. He does not own the efforts of those who subsequently also recognize the value of a chair, and subsequently put that into practice. Those are the property of other people.

I'm certainly not going to try to lay out a theory on which colors produce which emotional effects. I mean, if colors do have that function, even in the abstract, then that's a job for the visual artists... and I'm not among them. But can't we observe that there are certain general associations for colors? You've pointed out that some people consider certain colors to be "happy." Bright colors are often held to be "bold"; pastels are seen as "soft." I believe that artists speak of warmth or coldness, and I can imagine that this might be designed to convey certain information, or a particular impact. And as for grey...? Don't we talk about things being "grey" when they're uninteresting, or boring, or muddled/unclear? Isn't red often associated with passion? White with purity? Black with death? I don't know -- I'm speaking out of my bottom again. As for peoples' attachments to certain "abstract paintings," I can't speak to that either. I'm still at the level of just ascertaining what "I like" and what I don't. What I can guarantee (which you can take or leave, at your discretion) is that I'm no nihilist. That's not where I'm coming from at all.

One of the places you and I may continue to differ here is: don't you think that there are certain elements of these abstract works (such as the "slow notes" I'd mentioned earlier) which may be relied upon to produce certain effects (i.e. sadness) in he who partakes of it? In other words, if I was composing music, and I wanted to evoke a certain feeling of sadness in my intended audience, I wouldn't merely throw up any random pattern of notes and hope for the best. I would work to find a musical sequence to achieve that effect. I don't know a lot about music (insert joke here about how I don't seem to know anything), but I have enjoyed the musical scores of John Williams since I was young. In his Superman theme, I believe that he has captured some of Superman's soaring spirit. And in his theme for Schindler's List, I hear much of the melancholy and sadness that I associate with the events of that film. Now... perhaps this is due in part to my pre-existing knowledge of the stories to which those themes are associated? Or perhaps there are other aspects of my consciousness that are in play here? Perhaps. But I think that the Superman score and the Schindler's List score, of themselves, have a certain character. And that it was this character for which John Williams was searching. (And in that he found them, and realized them, he is great at what he does.) *** To follow up on my last post for Thomas, I've been thinking about... childhood trips to the Griffith Observatory in Los Angeles, and their thrilling laserium shows. Typically they would associate music with abstract visual patterns -- multi-colored lights and shapes. Generally the lights and shapes would help to emphasize the... emotional impact of the musical selections, and I would assert that their goal was to do so. If someone in the employ of the Observatory could make intelligent decisions as to which abstract visual patterns better emphasized X musical composition in this regard, then isn't this an argument that such visual patterns can deliver the same kind of artistic experience as music?

I think I understand what you're getting at, and I think that I generally agree. A certain piece of music can be "sad," not simply on account of what I feel when I listen to it, but according to its composition. And I could invent some story or other which corresponds to the emotions that the music elicits (though I don't know that I always do so, when I'm actually listening to some classical composition). But my point of confusion/contention is this: if music operates in this manner, then why cannot abstract images operate in like manner? Just as a section of slow notes in minor key may produce a sad effect (though I do not guarantee that they always will, context depending), couldn't... I don't know, but certain shades of deep blue, via smears of paint in some deliberate manner, be relied upon to produce a like effect?

Lol! Well in that case, I withdraw from the challenge!

All right. I've listened up to 43:19 of the lecture, and I've stopped it there on two accounts: 1) He's going into Bentham's philosophy, which I don't find particularly applicable to my concerns on this matter, and 2) I'm just incredibly antsy from the proceeding presentation. Most of what he says is indisputable (or at least, nothing which I would dispute), but I'm still missing the vital step from "the centrality of man's mind to man's survival" to "therefore, if you build a chair first, you own all subsequent chairs that anyone else builds." I almost feel like I'm watching the Underpants Gnome episode of South Park, but without the comedy. Now maybe it's just me? My personal lack of understanding? I'm open to that. I'm willing to be wrong on this subject, and I'm willing to embrace correction fully, if I can be made to see my error(s). I'm not a Libertarian. I'm not a... er... Benthamite? I'm going to go where reason and reality sit, insofar as I am able, without reservation. So if you have those, lay them on me. But look... In Mossoff's lecture, he spoke about man's mind being the difference between a simple parcel of land, and its potential for being a farm. No questions there. Yet his conclusion is that the "products" of man's mental labor are equally deserving of protection as the products (i.e. material products) of man's physical labor. Well, what then? Are we saying that the first man to turn land into a farm therefore owns "farms," as such? Of course not, right? Absurd, right? Other things Mossoff observed as being products of man's mental labor -- and therefore a testament to the centrality of man's mind to his survival (and ultimately therefore something deserving of legal protection in a Capitalist society) are: clothing. And "division of labor." Ought someone therefore be able to "own" these things? Never mind that the potential claimants are long, long dead, but even in the most theoretical of settings, can this ever be sensible? Look. I think that the inventor of the chair is deserving of the fruits of both his mental and physical labor. The fruits of both happen to coexist in one material value: the chair that he's built. He also owns every subsequent chair that he builds, or contracts to have built through his factories or any other manufacturing arrangement. The things that he builds, the deals that he manages, all of that are his. But the step I'm missing -- the only step that matters for me, with regards to "intellectual property" as such -- is how this entitles him to prevent anyone else from doing something similar. If you build the first chair, then you own that chair that you've built. If I see your chair and I build the second? I own that chair. We cannot discount the centrality of the mental work that you've done, in building your chair, but neither can we discount the fact that you needed to have one built, in actuality, for there to be any "property" at all. In my creation of the second chair, I've also performed mental (yes) and physical (yes) labor. This is how there is a second item of property. That I have done this work, in understanding how your chair was made, and recognizing that it would be good to turn raw material into a value for my own use -- and in that I have performed the manual labor necessary to bring this idea into physical fruition -- that is what makes this chair, mine. You do not own the chair that I've built on account of having built one before me. Do you?

Again, I'll claim that I have taken inspiration and knowledge and other assorted boons from countless others who have come before me. I do not live as a caveman does, and a caveman could never live as I do; I was born into a world of incredible wealth, and I benefit from that pre-existing wealth in ways so numerous I couldn't begin to count them. When someone offers to deal and trade with me directly, of course I respect the terms of that trade (or I don't make it). But to insist that justice requires that I must somehow compensate every source of good or value of which I'm the recipient, even incidentally...? I don't know. That sounds, at the least, unwieldy. Now we can agree that we ought give people "what they deserve," but I consider it begging the question to say that the inventor of the chair (or the iPhone) therefore deserves financial compensation, on their terms, of anyone who wishes to build something alike. Perhaps I reward the originator of the chair with a smile, as I carve my own facsimile. Or with my friendship. Or I don't know. But we're talking about property rights and the initiation of force, and I don't know that I can agree that being the first person to build a chair means that you "own" the efforts of others to do likewise. In fact, that doesn't sound right at all. Well, I understand. The life of a chair patent would have long run out, and maybe that's too broad of an invention to patent, and so on. I understand that if I were to press on any of these details, we could just consign the whole matter to some "special science" of law, where men would somehow be wiser and better able to decide what was, and was not, fitting of a good system of IP. But again, we're talking about the initiation of the use of force and human rights. I think the lines ought to be clear here, because if we're just a shade off on what's "too narrow" or "too broad," then we are necessarily on the side of those who initiate force. These IP discussions always seem so "ad hoc" to me, for lack of a better term. Patents are "property" in ways that suit us, but not "property" in others. They can't be transferred? Why not? Property -- real, actual property -- is transferable. If patents are not, it leads me to suspect that patents are not property at all. If we're serious about these matters, then the man who first invented the chair deserves to reap all of the rewards, period. It was his mind, etc. And if he wants to pass that on to his descendants, why not? I mean, if we're talking about the actual, physical chair that he's constructed, we'd never have this discussion at all. Right? His lease on that chair -- no matter how valuable it might become over time -- would never run out. It would be his family's property forever, unless they ever chose to sell it. So why shouldn't his ownership over "chairs," as such, be equally as eternal? It seems more and more to me that the reason is: because nobody can own the concept of "chairs." And to prevent another person from building a chair -- even if their impetus was that they saw you building the first one, and are therefore benefiting from your mental labors and so forth -- is to initiate the use of force. I hope to investigate the thread you've linked and the discussion Mnrchst referenced as well in the near future.

Oooh, oooh, a challenge! May I play? I do not have any understanding of perspective, so this is just based on "looking for something off." My guess is hidden below:

This hits at part of my (longstanding) confusion with intellectual property. I'm going to take an opposing view to yours to try to further suss this out. Suppose I have the components for an iPhone. I've purchased these components with the money I've earned through my honest employment. I think that you'd agree that these components are my property. And we're agreed that a person cannot own an idea; an idea, in itself, cannot therefore be property, except that it "belongs" to whomever holds it. Given this, why cannot I arrange the components I own in the fashion that I choose, if I decide to act upon the knowledge that I have in constructing an iPhone? Because the instant that I do so, it somehow now becomes Apple's property? How so? They're not the one to have purchased these components, nor did they invest the labor in this specific phone's construction -- I did that. I got the idea from them, but what of that? They never owned the idea to begin with. Because "they did it first"? Why should I care that they did it first? "They are the reason that it exists, not [me]"? To a point that's true (let's grant that iPhones in general would not exist without Apple), but in the case of this specific iPhone that I've built? I am very much the reason that it exists. It was my mind that understood how to construct it (just as I did not invent nuclear physics, but if I understand how to build a bomb based on other peoples' discoveries, and I do so, I am the reason that this bomb exists). It was my wealth that provided for its construction. It was my labor that constructed it in fact. And I am neither contracted to Apple, nor have I entered into any other specific agreement not to make an iPhone. In learning and living I have acquired "inspiration" and knowledge from a myriad of places, and the work of countless, countless others. Why should I take the time to care who devised which devices, and how recently, and where they have originated, before I choose how to invest my rightful time and resources for the furtherance of my own life? Where's the sense in it? Before I build a chair, should I track down the descendants of the first man to ever build one? No. I observe others sitting comfortably; I decide that is a good idea; I build myself a chair. This seems only sensible, and an iPhone is but a sophisticated chair.

This was a good thread to read, though I remain confused... but the discussion on p.2 of misrepresenting a poisonous chemical mirrors a question of my own that I'd raised in the other thread I'd linked to in the other other thread. So, I guess I'll push that point here (in a broader fashion) and see whether it helps... *** I host Thanksgiving dinner. I invite friends and family over. Unbeknownst to all, I have poisoned the turkey, but I assure everyone present that it came out very well and should be great to eat. All of my friends and family subsequently die. Have I used force against them? Based on some of the reasoning and explicit examples I've seen used in this thread, it would seem that I have not. I've merely "lied" to my friends and family, and they chose to believe me. They've paid for their poor choice, but I am not legally responsible for their bad choices. Lying is not illegal, and therefore I have committed no crime. On the other hand, this conclusion strikes me as absolutely absurd. Clearly I have murdered them. Clearly this is poisoning and not just "lying." Clearly this is a crime. Isn't it? Or is murder through such lying -- recognized forever and everywhere as intentional poisoning -- protected by law in a "rational society"?

So, if you gentlemen don't mind, and since we have this painting for reference in our thread, I have a couple of questions regarding it: @Jonathan: what was the process you used to compose this work? Were photographs used at all, or did you work exclusively from life (or was it something else)? Why/how did you select this particular process for this piece? @Avila: what do you find specifically lacking in this painting, which you attribute to Jonathan's use of (or rather, reliance on) photography? What changes do you desire made, and how would those changes make this work better?

Hmm. Well, "dependency" is kind of a scary word, because it suggests that the artist would be limited in his means of expression. But then I take it that you see nothing wrong with an artist choosing to base a work off of a photograph for some select reason? (As opposed to doing so because he isn't skilled otherwise; feels that he has no choice.) Impact? On me? The immediate experience almost certainly. (Although I might do well to hesitate a bit more here, because it occurs to me that there are aspects of an experience that I might not be sensitive to in the situation, that will only become palpable to me upon a... more distanced reflection. I might have a different emotional response. Being in the midst of something might well cause me to be "overstimulated" for lack of a better word, and less able to key in on certain details.) But also here, I'm running into my own lack of experience as an artist. Because it occurs to me that we're not necessarily interested with the impact of a scene on the artist, are we? We're primarily interested in that which the artist can convey through his own art. Or, to follow your provided example: I don't doubt that hearing Mozart's Requiem in a church might not be the greater experience than hearing a recording of it at home... but if your goal was to learn to play that Requiem, would we insist that you listened to it exclusively in a concert setting? Would there be key information lost, for the purpose of your learning to play it, if you chose to study the recording instead? Well, okay. I don't feel the need to argue that point at all. We don't want to turn a tool into a crutch. (Except perhaps literally, when we've fallen down a flight of stairs.) Your charge, then, is that Jonathan not only uses photography, but that he is dependent on it? All right, this sounds like a fruitful avenue of exploration. What are these "certain qualities" that can only be attained thus? I've no dog in the atelier fight (as yet, at least). I'm a believer in a big skill set, so I have nothing against instruction in a wide variety of artistic method. I can't imagine anyone arguing that an artist wouldn't want to have sound training in rendering figures. And insofar as the ateliers help the artist acquire "skills that will help him express his artistic vision, whatever that might be," and insofar as his artistic vision requires rendering figures, I guess we're on the same page here. (Though I'm unsure that every artist in fulfilling his vision, even of portraying ancient literature, will necessarily wish to render his figures in an anatomically faithful way, if that is partly your implication. I don't know.) Again, this seems promising. Since Jonathan has provided some of his work for consideration, and since you've apparently found this "distinctive mark" in his work, can you name exactly what you're seeing such that perhaps I could see it, too? Strictly? I don't know that I can answer based on the information provided. I might have to either play them both myself, or (better) have them play each other. My (cheeky? I don't mean it that way) answer to your question may apply to our topic thus: knowing that one man has painted from real life, while another has painted from a photograph will not help me to judge between the success of their artwork. Of course, if we posit that the second man doesn't also "have it all in his head," I can answer and say the first man. But I'm still allowing that an artist might work from photographs by choice, and not by crutch. (And for what it's worth, we've still not ascertained that Jonathan has worked from photography in the artwork he's provided, and he says that he didn't. And I don't think I have any real grounds to doubt his word.) Is painting from a photographic reference the same thing as "tracing"? And weren't we agreed that a man could look at a photo and do the same sort of "editing" that he might do on location? Welllllll.... In the first place, I think you'd be hard pressed to find anyone around here who would claim that "everything an artist spits is art." So, while I've noticed you use that phrase a few times in this thread, you might give thought to retiring it... Or at least, I certainly have no such belief, so you and I can dispense with that notion while we discuss this together. But I was talking about an artist's choice re: level of detail, and I don't think that's merely a byproduct of a poor/"modernist" artistic education. I think that sometimes artists intentionally do not include certain details, in order to produce certain effects. Or maybe I'm talking out my ass? Quite possible. Am I wrong on this point? If you would claim that Jonathan's work left out detail... detail that his work should incorporate, I must ask what details are missing, and how would their inclusion specifically make his work better? Finally, I know it's been bantered a bit as to whether your work is available online, or where it is, but I have to say that I'm curious. I imagine that you've refrained from sharing as to not give "ammunition" to your critics -- but I can tell you that how I feel about your art won't predispose me to think you right or wrong on anything. So, at long last, are you willing to share? It might be helpful to see what you consider to be the right amount of detail work, and etc., when trying to understand your arguments, and to see those qualities that you've incorporated from working on location that Jonathan (you assert) cannot access, because of his supposed reliance on photography.

I really don't want to engage anyone in the above sort of manner, so I'm a little hesitant to press, but... I also responded to your earlier post, and I wonder if you're interested at all in the questions I'd raised? Perhaps you think my scenario inapplicable? Or perhaps you've decided that I'm also being "deliberately obtuse" or "intellectually dishonest" (though obviously I try not to be either of those things). I don't know. But I remain interested in this topic, and generally unsettled, and since you appear to have a strong and clear opinion on the subject, I'd also be interested in your reply.

If this is really the dispute, then I'm totally unfit to judge what's right and what's wrong, based on my current level of knowledge. But if this were really the dispute, then wouldn't it just be a technical matter that could be answered decisively? I imagine that experts in photography and the technology that goes into cameras know quite well how it stacks up to the eye, by now. I'd also imagine that this would be documented somewhere. In any event, I don't see how it would necessarily make paintings based on sight better than those based on photography, or vice-versa, whichever happens to provide the most information. Is the quality of a painting simply down to its fidelity to a real-life scene? I wouldn't think so. I guess, given the premise that photography routinely limits certain detail/information in a predictable fashion, that a person could begin to see similarities in paintings based on photos (in that they would characteristically lack those same sets of details)... but like most stereotyping, I'd still be careful when judging a given work. I mean, how would you know for certain that detail X being left out of the painting was on account of detail X's not being visible (due to working form a photograph) as opposed to being a conscious choice of representation on the part of the painter, whether working from real life, a photo, or from the imagination? And in the face of the artist saying, "no, I didn't work from a photograph," why would you insist that they did? I don't know.

I'm a little mystified at the discussion of photography. Like usual, I feel the need to preface this with a warning about my lack of specialized knowledge (in that I have none). Maybe I should just make a signature that I basically don't ever know what I'm talking about...? But okay. Is Avila's contention that photography is a lesser visual medium than painting? Or is it that a painter cannot make a good painting based on a photograph? I suspect it is the latter (though the conversation has seemed at times to address the former). If so, how is that? I understand Avila's observation that a camera will simply record what it "sees" as opposed to the filtering that a man's mind may do. Let's take that as granted (while also acknowledging Jonathan's point that a man may add effects to the initial photograph which are indicative of his mind at work). Well, what of that? If we're discussing painting from a photograph, then doesn't the painter still need to... look at the photograph? And at that point, can't he make any artistic determinations he needs as though he were still on site? I guess I don't understand how using a photograph for reference is supposed to be limiting. Avila? Anyone? Bueller?

In the same sense you mean here, what is the "value," say, of a man's baseball card collection. Isn't it the price that people are willing to pay for those baseball cards? That is, doesn't this "value" depend on other peoples' estimations? So when we own baseball cards, insofar as we also "own their value," do we also "own" other peoples' estimations of our baseball cards? I think that if we own property in baseball cards, what I mean is that we own the physical items -- the cards -- which may or may not be a "value" to us (or anyone else). I have the property right to sell or destroy them as I choose, but if I do sell them, I cannot command others to pay the price that I ask, regardless of what I think they're "worth." (We must instead come to a voluntary consensus as to their "value" for the purpose of trading.) Suppose I had a rare baseball card -- high in "value" in the way that you mean -- and some personal rival of mine decided to flood the market with copies of that card, specifically in an effort to injure me. In this way, he is intentionally destroying the "value" of my collection; he is acting in a willful and malicious manner. And surely this could be as damaging to my property's "value" as the example you've provided. Do I have grounds to sue?

This is a topic about which I continue to find myself confused/uncertain. If you're interested in looking at it, not too very long ago I participated in a thread that dealt with this very matter. Perhaps some of that discussion will shed some light on the present one?

I think this is fairly argued. If we look at "respect" as a function (or an application) of justice, then musn't we accord Peikoff the respect deserved for writing OPAR and also simultaneously evaluate his more recent statements regarding the transgendered, or date rape, or etc.? Wouldn't justice necessitate taking all of that together? Not, by way of contrast, and in the name of respect, valuing his positive contributions such that we allow them to cause us to ignore or slight whatever other mistakes he might make. In other words, can't we come to the conclusion that Peikoff is the man who wrote OPAR, and yet sometimes indulges in armchair philosophy (if we accept that wording, which I'm unsure about), and yet is wrong on the subject of rape (as is my position)? If the respect paid to such a person is a little less unvarnished than that which we might give simply to "Rand's intellectual heir," and the author of OPAR, well... isn't our reformed appraisal more fitting to the reality of the situation?

Forgive me, but is the implication here that anyone who reaches different conclusions than you do with respect to homosexuality, or the transgendered, is necessarily therefore not an Objectivist? As far as "the idea of normalcy"... well, what is the idea of normalcy? I'd like to know what we're talking about before I'm for or agin it. You don't mean that "normalcy" is to be desired for its own sake, right? It seems right to fix something that is wrong with you (so long as the "cure" is not worse than the "disease"). But are we initially agreed that to be homosexual is to have something wrong with you? Because I'm not at all certain that there's anything "wrong" with homosexuality. And these standards also stipulate the sex of one's sexual partners? How so? And if one is "improper" in this respect, and violates these standards, what is the specific penalty that one should expect to pay? I don't quite know how to respond to this, except to say that if homosexuality is "traceable to causes dealing with neurology or psychology," which I think sounds likely, then wouldn't heterosexuality be equally traceable to those same kinds of causes? How do you determine what is "normal" here? Statistical analyses? Ought one wish to be like others for the sake of being like others? Or is there a specific argument against homosexuality that does not ultimately boil down to "it isn't normal"? Are you quite certain that "primacy of consciousness" is at issue here? Heh. Well, we're talking about a few things now, it appears. You don't have to respond to anything you don't wish to, but I'm responding to comments you'd already made in the thread, and which I therefore considered "fair game." And I like that topic, too. Come to it, can we discuss the phrase "the world's authority on Objectivism and objectivity" for a moment? What does it mean to be "the world's authority" in this manner? What specific powers does such an authority have, by virtue of being an authority? Who gives the "world's authority" that title? By what power? And for the uninitiated, by what means would they come to either agree or disagree that the "world's authority" was an "authority" in fact? Without trying to respond to the whole essay, this gives me an opportunity to remark on something that has been a bit of an itch. The last sentence reads: I'm aware that Rand used the term "hero worship," and I'm certain that it can be argued for in certain senses: like "a most intense form of respect"...? Perhaps. But truth be told, it makes me uncomfortable. I do not consider myself inclined to worship, as I typically understand the term.

I find this an interesting statement, and it raises questions for me. Let's leave aside the transgendered for the moment, and consider the homosexual. Suppose that homosexuality is found to be due to a certain neurological "configuration" (which you term "problem," but I'd like to stay away from that language just now, as it may be a bit of question begging). Should the homosexual desire a different sexual orientation? If so, on what basis? Would it necessarily be better for them to adjust themselves, rather than live as a homosexual? And it doesn't necessarily have to be a neurological explanation for me to still be interested in this question. Whatever homosexuality's root, I take it for granted that it must have some root. And if we suppose that we may one day have the technology (possibly including a better developed science of psychology) to "address" homosexuality, I still wonder whether there's any good cause to do so. Why should a homosexual want to not be homosexual?

So... I want to keep engaged in this discussion, because aspects of it interest me. At the same time, I don't have much specific knowledge regarding the transgendered (or hardly any at all), nor do I want to get bogged down by (as Crow suggests) a purely "medical discussion." So here's a question which I hope may have some sort of analogous application to our discussion: Suppose that a person is born genetically predestined to be short, but they "feel tall," by which I mean that if they were to envision their persona made manifest -- their ideal physical form -- it would be as a tall person. Suppose also that medical research had devised a drug that, should they take this drug, they would overcome their genetic predisposition and attain the height that they would prefer to be. Would we have any good (general) argument to make against taking this drug? Would taking it represent a "metaphysical assault on reality"?

Just to be clear about this, the charge of "no respect" is related, not to DH's disagreements with Peikoff, per se, but to her manner of expressing them. That is to say, it would not be deemed a lack of respect to publicly argue against Peikoff's stated position, so long as one did so "in a respectful manner." Right? (Or does a proper show of respect entail reserving disagreements to private and personal communications? Or further to not voicing them at all?)