DonAthos

I'm glad you brought this up. In calling for civility, I'm not arguing against "passion." You don't know me in real life -- you have nothing to go on for this except my word -- but I'm a passionate guy. Even when I haven't lost my temper, when I'm talking about anything I care about, I get animated. I admire "heat" in that sense. And strong opinions? Absolutely. But there's still a way of talking to people that I consider, not just "polite," but as I've explained important to valuable conversation. And where passion is concerned, I believe that we are capable of focusing and using that passion when choosing how we respond to a given situation. For instance, imagine that right now I believe that you are wrong on this topic that we're currently discussing. Imagine that I feel this strongly, passionately, that I'm "heated" on the subject. I still am master of how I choose to express my disagreement. (And how much more so, given that I'm typing this, and have the power to craft my response?) It's not that I would disagree with you any less, or be prevented from expressing my disagreement to you clearly, should I opt for "civility." Note these differences in possible phrasing: 1) You're wrong about this, and here are the reasons why: 2) This is a ridiculous notion. You should know why already, but if I have to spell it out for you: 3) You're ridiculous. I shouldn't even bother trying to explain since it's so obvious -- you're being intentionally obtuse. But in case anyone reading this isn't completely dense, they can consider that: This is all I'm really talking about. This is a choice that we make, and I think that #1 is the right one for this forum. #1 isn't exactly bending itself over backwards to be nice and circumspect. It's direct -- blunt, even, and I'm not proposing it as the one and only "guide to civilized style," but I'd still take it head and shoulders over #2 and #3. And yet I believe that I see #'s 2 and 3, or their spiritual cousins if not verbatim, time and again, derailing potentially productive conversations and scaring away who knows how many would-be contributors of value. If I thought that the only way to maintain a healthy passion for ideas, and for one's own presumed correctness, was to impugn one's interlocutors, then I guess I'd back down here and just decide that discussion, as such, wasn't for me. These catty and sophomoric exchanges aren't just problematic for sincere philosophical discourse, but I find them actively unpleasant. I'm too earnest and care too much about these topics to tolerate being disrespected for my contributions by people I'll never know in real life, and when I allow myself to get drawn in, I suffer for it and find that I've made my life worse. So if playing in the mud were the price of admission, I'd just bow out now and let the pigs have at it. But I don't believe it is the only way. I don't think we lose anything of actual value by acting in a dignified manner. Not passion certainly. Not our conviction. Not our clarity and directness. And rather I think (and believe I have argued) that we stand to gain.

It has happened a few times where I've felt motivated to bring up the issue of "civility" in threads in which I've participated here. Enough so that I think it warrants its own, separate discussion. Let me set the table a bit for what I want to talk about. When I look through threads I'm occasionally taken aback by the kind of "discussions" that some here participate in. They are hostile and filled with invective and scorn. Do I mean to implicate everyone? By no means. Nor am I making any claim about a certain percentage who participate in that manner, whether "some," "many" or "most" or anything like that. All that I'm saying is that it happens often enough that I'm no longer surprised to see it. If this hostility isn't quite "characteristic," it's certainly a noticeable feature of the community. A predictable feature. And if this were most places on the Internet, I guess I'd let it go and spare everyone a pointless lecture on my own ruffled sense of propriety. I fully expect the comments on a YouTube vid to be heinous, for instance, and don't think I could get through to the myriad snarky 14 year olds there via such an appeal. But given the nature of this community -- people who care about ideas and take them seriously; people similarly committed to reason and standards of integrity and honesty -- I expect something different. Something better. It's enough to make me wonder whether some people believe (perhaps implicitly) that there is some tie between being "honest" and intelligent, and being cruel or cutting. That's certainly nothing new to me, if so; I've lived long enough to recognize that sometimes the intelligent feel that their ability gives them license to be scornful, especially to those they consider (often incorrectly) to be their inferiors. Or maybe some take meaning from reports of Ayn Rand's testy demeanor and anger? Maybe they think that there's something inherently virtuous in being mean? But here is why I believe that "civility" is important, and especially given the context of the kinds of discussions that I presume we wish to pursue. Discussions don't generally take place between machines, but men. As a man, I strive to be logical, to be reasonable, and to use my mind as best I can to arrive at truth, to make good choices, and to live my life well. Discussions are both enjoyable and profitable for me in that they serve those ends. When I "philosophize" in a social setting (here meaning: discuss, debate, argue), I like the give-and-take and am thankful for those who challenge me. Why "thankful"? Because their challenges can often provoke me to new insights, both into their positions and into my own. And what is more, as a man I am prone to error and to mistake. This is not an argument for any subtle kind of skepticism, but a recognition that the process of arriving at truth is neither automatic, nor necessarily "easy." Through the process of argument, sometimes I am led to recognizing that I have been/am wrong, and to correction. This is, in fact, precisely what happened to me when I read Rand; I was persuaded that I had been wrong on a number of topics, and was overjoyed at the discovery. However. As a man, I am also an emotional creature. Not to disparage emotion, which I think plays important roles in my life, but I know from experience that when I am in the throes of a strong emotion, my ability to reason clearly is sometimes impacted. When I fight with my family, with my wife, I sometimes say things that I recognize I do not mean or otherwise believe, upon later reflection. What's worse, I have a short temper -- a flaw that has long been with me, and which I continually seek to correct through being aware of my own emotional state, and tempering my passionate drive for immediate response against those who arouse my anger. There have been times even here, and despite my apparent righteousness on this subject, when I have lost my temper. And I have regretted it every time. What we seek to do through conversation, and the rewards that are possible through these discussions, is wholly threatened when we allow ourselves to get angry, to lash out. Am I speaking just of my own personal experiences? Perhaps, but I do not believe so. Incivility -- "being a jerk" -- is a provocation to another person's anger; an invitation to "lose it." And that is no boon for rational discussion of any kind. To the contrary, it does nothing but put men "on their guard," and make it less likely that they will give all arguments the cool and reflective analysis that reasoned thought and discussion so often demands. So. What I'm asking is that we try to maintain a certain level of politeness in our discussions. That we hold others -- and most importantly ourselves -- to the highest possible standard. This is not a call for false kindness or that we should all "like" one another or anything of the sort. Feel free to hate me, hate each other, I don't really care about that. Nor would I ask that we refrain from stark and frank discussion of ideas: it is not uncivil in this context to say that a certain position is unequivocally wrong, or to clearly demonstrate why. But if we want to discuss any topic of import, we ought to treat that topic with the respect it deserves. (If it is an unimportant topic, why discuss it at all?) And because we are men engaged in this discussion, and not machines, we should strive to be equally respectful of and polite to one another in order to facilitate the kinds of discussion necessary to make the entire endeavor fruitful. If instead we just want the emotional satisfaction of railing against perceived "enemies," and allowing our bile to flow unimpeded, there are a million other forums on the Internet seemingly tailored for just that very thing. I would rather we make this place unlike all of those others, and as a valuable by-product demonstrate to the world what it looks like when men and women of intelligence, reason, and goodwill come together to discuss those matters upon which they might (howsoever temporarily) disagree.

I understand and accept that we disagree. I've long been convinced that trying to argue to unanimity is a fool's game. Fortunately for us, Peikoff's podcasts are available for anyone who wants to decide for themselves what he meant, and if I otherwise come up with any better way of explaining my position, I'll give it a go.

I don't really know how often that happens. I don't think that's what Peikoff is talking about either. But if we can imagine any scenario where a woman changes her mind -- decides against intercourse once it's already begun -- and I don't think that's necessarily a "lifeboat" type of situation... I think that Peikoff has asserted that it's not rape for the man to continue. I think he doesn't believe such a thing to be rape at all. I think he's said this clearly. I think he's moved the line from when the woman shows up at the man's hotel room at night to "genital connection," because of the furor his comments initially received. I think he is just as wrong now as he was then. I think the idea that he was speaking in a strictly "legal" context is completely wrong.

It "should not be 'rape,' a legal term"? So even if it *were* provable in a court of law that the woman had demanded the man stop, and the man disregarded her (Ninth Doctor supposes a videocamera in his next post), there would be no "crime" here according to the "legal" standard you think Peikoff is proposing?

Ah, I see. We might be talking at cross-purposes with the term "ad hominem." Let me explain what I mean. The issue under consideration is Peikoff's podcasts and his statements (or perhaps misstatements) on rape. When Ninth Doctor advocates a certain interpretation of Peikoff's statements, I think that it's appropriate to respond (should one choose to respond) to say that he's right or wrong on the merits of his argument, and the facts we have access to. What I think is inappropriate (with respect to this kind of discussion generally) is to say -- as I believe you do -- that Ninth Doctor is not the kind of person who should be listened to, and that therefore his argument is faulty. This is "ad hominem"; not personal attacks or insults, per se, but a shift in the focus of discussion away from the arguments towards those who are making them. Drawing conclusions about the strength (or lack thereof) of a person's argument based upon the merits (or lack thereof) of the person advancing that argument. Or in other words, now we're talking about whether Ninth Doctor is a sincere guy or not, or whether he intends his signature as an insult, or what his general opinion of Leonard Peikoff is, and etc., but Ninth Doctor's character is not the issue at hand. An evaluation of his character does nothing to establish whether Ninth Doctor is right or wrong in the arguments he makes, or help us to understand Peikoff's podcasts any better. I'll take you at your word. As to how I could think myself implicated, Ninth Doctor and myself have proposed very similar interpretations of Peikoff's message in this thread. If anything, I think he's been too lenient in his "sympathetic reading" of posts 253 and 256. And while I sincerely hope that I avoid "sneering," I don't know whether I always succeed in conveying my intended tone. Nor do I know when I might be "pontificating" apart from merely arguing. If the meaning there is something like "coming across like a preachy ass," I'm afraid that it probably does describe me from time to time. That's a fair point. I came in partway too, and didn't really like what I saw. Perhaps that's just the nature of Internet discussion? I don't know what to say in response except that I have a vision of how I believe things could be, and how I think they ought to be. And while there will always be a certain element who seek to derail meaningful discussion and drag the level of discourse down, those who desire better shouldn't let their own contributions be defined by that lowest element. Well... therein lies our division. I did. I agree that everything must be interpreted according to the widest possible context, but I disagree that Peikoff maintaining (on the one hand) that a woman "has a moral right to change her mind" necessarily means that he thinks that a man must take her at her word if, in the midst of coitus, she starts telling him that she wants him to stop. I think he's allowing for the man to decide that she has already given "consent" for him to continue in the sexual act; that the "rational line" has been crossed. (He may judge her protestations as "not valid" in the face of her initially having allowed "genital connection" to have occurred.) I have no interest in taking people out of context. Nor am I any "detractor" from anyone, so far as I know. My only interest through all of this is arriving at the truth of things. And what I relay to you, through these posts, is the truth as best as I can recognize it. And should I be convinced through any agent, whether your arguments, or a further clarification from Peikoff, or etc., that I've been wrong on my interpretation of his statements, I promise that I'll say so with no fear of loss of ego or etc. I've never been afraid to be wrong in the past, or to admit my errors, and I won't start that now. But for now? I think that Peikoff is advocating a species of rape, for the reasons I've already provided.

Y'all know by now that I don't know much about art, but it ought to be said somewhere here that this is some striking and beautiful work, Jonathan. I had no idea.

Marc K's post and Trebor's subsequent replies disappeared from the thread for a time, so I withheld my response. Now that they've reappeared, here is what I was going to say in reply: I don't know, but... I am often tempted to bring "civility" up. I think that it is an important consideration generally, and that the nature of fruitful discussion (especially the kinds of philosophical discourse I believe we aspire to) is somewhat fragile. It's not always easy for me; I have a temper, and have had one for a very long time. I continue to err and lose my temper from time to time, despite my efforts, and I almost always regret it when that happens. You and I, and Trebor and I, have managed to engage in civil discussions in the past despite (possibly ongoing) disagreements, and I hope that can continue in the future. Here and now, however, you've seemingly cast aside the substance of Ninth Doctor's critique on the basis of who he is as a person. That is the very essence of "ad hominem" reasoning. Furthermore, it's possible that you have sought to tarnish me in the same attack, by referencing (but not naming) "another pontiff." (Though it's also possible you mean John Link, or someone else; I've certainly never called upon anyone to "recant" their previous positions.) In any event, this is not what we want our discussions to look like. Is it? I respect that you may personally dislike Ninth Doctor. There are certainly members here for whom I am more or less fond. But I'd hope that you and I would want those who dislike us to concentrate their efforts on arguing (or agreeing) with our arguments and reasoning, and not simply rejecting what we say on the basis of who we are. And I think we owe the other members here the very same consideration. I completely disagree with this interpretation. Here is the portion which Ninth Doctor transcribed again: Peikoff initially is wondering what a woman "[has] to say 'no' to in order to 'make it rape'." Is it a French kiss against her will, if she'd already agreed to kiss? Is it a man touching a woman's breast against her wishes though she's willingly taken off her shirt? Peikoff's stance is that these are acceptable actions on the man's part, given that the woman may just be "shy at the moment," intuiting that "she wants something else." In any case it's not "a monstrous evil" to ignore the "N-O" that comes out of "the woman's mouth." Arguing that a man must take a woman at her word in these scenarios is "positively ridiculous." Does it sound like Peikoff is here discussing the legal feasibility of "objectively proving her case" of rape in a court of law? It does not. (Note again his use of "monstrous evil"; he's not just speaking of whether something is provable in a courtroom, but of its general moral significance. Its nature as "rape" or "not rape.") He is instead arguing for times and places where a man is within reason to ignore a woman's apparent lack of consent for sexual actions. He continues "I mean," so in this second paragraph we're expanding on/continuing the thoughts developed in the first. The "rational line" (between "rape" and "not rape") is "genital connection." He says that if a woman says "no, I don't want this I've changed my mind" (which incidentally shows that he's considered the case of a woman changing her mind; i.e. she does not want this sex any more) that this is not "valid." That it must not necessarily "be respected," depending on context. ("Be respected" by whom? By the court system? No. By the man with whom she is having sex.) So yeah, I disagree that this has anything to do with a specifically legal context. He's arguing that there are times when a woman may say "no," and that "no" doesn't have to "be respected." Where her attempt to withdraw consent is not "valid." He is consistent with his original podcast in arguing that there is a point at which a woman has consented to sex and may not thereafter withdraw that consent. He has moved that point from showing up at the man's hotel room at night to "genital connection."

I believe that "Objectivism" is a philosophy, and that an "Objectivist" is someone who adheres to that philosophy. What does it mean to "adhere" to a philosophy? Specifically in this case, I believe that it means to explicitly accept those ideas which Ayn Rand identified as being fundamental to Objectivism (e.g. "rational self-interest" in Ethics, etc.) and to attempt to hold those concepts with "total consistency" -- to "understand, to define, to prove and to apply them." A person on this path of mental integration and resulting action, whether just beginning or 30 years on, is an Objectivist in my book.

I'm not interested in "barbs and indirect attacks with an ad hominem flavoring," so if you see me doing that, let me know and I'll apologize. I don't know if that's my one and only "take away point" exactly -- Peikoff said a lot of things in that 15 minutes, after all -- but I also think he said that. (Or, to be more precise, I don't think he'd consider it "rape" once the woman has initially consented to penile penetration, even if she subsequently changes her mind.) And since this was the very issue I'd hoped to have clarified by his "clarification," I guess you're right in that it does kinda overshadow the entire podcast for me. I'd said earlier in this thread that this "controversy" gets at important questions like "what is the nature of consent"? I'm not sure I could yet tell you precisely what Peikoff's answer to that question is, given what he's had to say on this topic, but I suspect that I disagree with him. And I do think that he's advocating things that I would call rape. Things that are rape. You think I'm wrong to draw any such conclusion, and would prefer me to dismiss what he says ("appears to say") as mere semantical error or misspeaking? Why? Because he's been correct on other matters and/or is otherwise a good person? Does it follow that therefore Peikoff couldn't possibly mean the things he's saying currently? Ah well, okay. Perhaps that was meant specifically for the Doc, or perhaps that's a general curse against those who do Peikoff the disservice of taking him at his word. Regardless, if you ultimately decide that it is worth your effort to "explain" all of this to me, I'll be here.

I hope all is well for Thomas and his family. Since he's removing himself from this conversation, however, I'd like to take up a more active role personally, because I find these topics interesting and wish to see them developed and examined further. As sort of an upfront caveat, I know next-to-nothing about Kant, nor do I have any plans on reading him in the near future. Isn't this attributing far too much power to Kant? It seems to cast him almost into the role of Satan, or Pandora at least, though I'm fairly certain that "the irrational" was loosed upon society far before Kant drew breath. Again, "next-to-nothing," but I'm pretty certain that Kant has been dead for a while. So as for Kant "making it possible" for Bush to call Islam a "religion of peace"...? Isn't Bush responsible for what he, himself, says/does? And if we're talking about Kant laying some sort of philosophical foundation or whatnot, 1) aren't there others who predate Kant who laid foundations which made Kant's work "possible," if we're accepting this "sins of the father" rationale? 2) Isn't Bush personally responsible for the philosophy that he accepts? By attributing all future horrors to Kant, while they actually relied on scores of other people for implementation, in reality, aren't we implicitly removing the agency of all of these myriad actors from our calculations? To coin a (pompous, unearned, and quite possibly incorrect) phrase, this seems almost like a "philosophical determinism" to me. While the philosophy we accept governs our subsequent actions, we have the power to accept or reject philosophy, and alone in our individual capacities. So if we do something dumb in the here and now (in a philosophical sense), that is not Kant's fault. It is the fault of those of us who do that dumb thing. And to attribute our present day woes to Kant, who died in... fact checking... 1804? Seems misguided at least. I recognize the difference between "identifiable likenesses" and, say, a Jackson Pollock. But as these conversations have progressed (taking all of our aesthetic interactions together), I've wondered more and more about the idea of "re-creating reality." As I look at an image of the Mona Lisa on my computer screen, I don't know that reality has been re-created, exactly. Women tend not to be so small. Or segmented (most women that I've known have had legs, for instance). And they are usually three-dimensional. And alive. And etc. It has occurred to me that even the Mona Lisa presents certain aspects of reality (in this case, various aspects of the image of a woman) which have been... well... abstracted, for our consideration. If other, more "modern" artists have chosen to abstract different aspects of reality for similar consideration, such as line, shape, and color, do I have any good reason for dismissing that out of hand? If "concretizations that artists produce can belong to the class existents rather than entities," as explained above, then doesn't that allow for "line, shape, and color" as the subject of artistic consideration?

I've only listened to this podcast once, but taken with the partial transcriptions provided here, I'm willing to take a stab at what I think has happened. I believe that initially (in the previous podcast) Peikoff meant to say (as I think it sounded) that a woman can "give consent" to sex in a manner like showing up to a hotel room at night, and past that point she cannot "withdraw" that consent; that the man is free to have sex with her regardless of what she then says. But he was met with a lot of, uh... feedback, proposing circumstances under which a woman might show up at a hotel room (for sex)... but then... change her mind. Like she sees whips and chains on the wall. (Or perhaps is disappointed at the lack of whips and chains.) So he's correcting himself. He has moved the "point of no return" line. Now, it's not showing up at the hotel room, but genital contact. From Ninth Doctor's transcription (with one minor edit, in bold): All right. So am I wrong in taking his meaning? Because I take it that, if I have penetrated a woman, then "that is the point at which" she can no longer "say 'no'"; that her attempts to communicate a change of mind to me are not "valid." And I'm free to continue on with the intercourse. Am I misconstruing this? Or is this what Peikoff is saying?

I've wanted to ask for a while, so I guess I'll just go ahead: Is it really a point of contention for anyone whether an object of "utility" can also have artistic value? If The Fountainhead does not serve to demonstrate that architecture is an artistic discipline, then I'm not quite sure how I'd argue it further... But what of furniture? Or clothing? Or the decorations on pottery that serve as some of our earliest examples of extant "art"?

Thomas? (Or anyone game, actually.) As I'd said previously, I've been trying to keep up with this thread, and one thing that I'd really like to see happen is for someone to take the apparent contradiction in Rand's Esthetics that Jonathan has highlighted, head on. He's raised it a time or two before elsewhere, I believe, and... I dunno, but I'd really like to see someone address it clearly. I believe that the contention is... that Rand's definition of "art" as typically applied to "abstract art," leading to abstract art's dismissal, similarly (and of logical necessity) excludes such disciplines as architecture and music. (We only subsequently salvage architecture and music through special pleading.) And since we know that architecture and music are certainly "art," then there must be either some flaw in Rand's definition of art, or in our application of it. Perhaps the conclusion is: abstract art is as much art as music is. Is this the gist of the argument?

Ahh. If that's the case, then I'm not certain how much Kantian sublimity (is it really meant to be capitalized?) is truly in Rand's works, though I'm open to arguments. Going back to the definition that Jonathan proffered: "The Sublime is the aesthetic experience of feeling the pleasure of exhilaration or exaltation through something which stimulates a sense of fear through its horror and/or immensity of magnitude." I'd take it then that, say Galt or Roark (to take two of Rand's most readily identifiable heroes) are meant to have experienced this "sense of fear" through, at least, a contemplation on the "horror and/or immensity of magnitude" of the obstacles against which they struggled. But, for instance, when Roark was asked by Toohey what Roark thought of him, Roark answered that he didn't think of Toohey. And I believe him. So, yeah... I'd buy an argument that a reader of Rand's fiction might experience the sublime as we're discussing it; after all, the reader certainly is forced to consider the scale of the evils against which the heroes struggle (even if we ultimately decide that this evil is actually toothless). But I'm not convinced that the characters spend any time worrying about the power of their opposition, or thereby experience the requisite fear/terror.

I've been trying to follow along with the discussion, and Jonathan (or whomever) can correct me if I'm wrong, but... I believe that this "Kantian sublimity" is meant to be an effect produced in the reader of a given work (in this case, let's say Atlas Shrugged)... not something which, in itself, motivates the characters.

Achieving and maintaining pregnancy can involve significant planning and effort. Being pregnant -- from what I understand -- can be difficult. People chart their biological status, take classes, pre-natal vitamins, endure screenings, read books, deal with workplace complications, risk miscarriage, suffer physical change and trial, and so on. It's not a light thing to be lightly undertaken, but the rewards can be great. While the above covers a bit more ground than simply "being" pregnant, taken together I can understand why someone might find reasonable pride in their pregnancy. If, by way of contrast, we're imagining a pregnant woman as simply a bump on a log, who lays there as changes occur to her... then I guess there's no pride in that? But I've never known any pregnant women of whom that would be an apt description, nor would I associate with them generally. I guess that I'm saying that to "be pregnant" well in modern society is a heap of work, and if a woman sets herself to do that work properly, then absolutely there's reason to be proud of her efforts and accomplishments.

I appreciate it, but will only reply to say that I'll let the topic go for now out of deference to the Doc's wishes. Bluecherry and I have followed up in private messages, and should anyone else care to contact me similarly, I'd be happy to continue the discussion. Otherwise I guess it's a waiting game until Peikoff deigns to set the record straight.

Check this out (emphasis added): Are we reading this together? Here, in this very thread, we have the above member saying that it "could be okay" for "a man" to "force himself on a woman." Right? I'm not making this up, am I? The words are <pointing at my computer screen> right there. What would make it "okay"? Well... the woman "could be one of those types that wants to be taken and wants to offer resistance, and the man may have identified this in her." Now... where have I heard that sort of argumentation before (and recently)? In fact, where have I heard this exact argument, repeated several times? Wait, stop, I'll tell you. In the thread about the rape scene in The Fountainhead. "One of those types" = Dominique. "The man may have identified" = Roark. So... perhaps you'll No True Scotsman Amaroq out of being someone "who [knows] much of anything about Objectivism"...? But I'll venture a guess and say that Amaroq is quite conversant with Objectivism. So, on that basis alone, I must disagree with you that you've "never yet come across anybody who knew much of anything about Objectivism and actually thought it was ever wise or even permissible to treat a real person how Roark treated Dominique in that one scene." Because I think you've come across that in this very thread. And come to it, why shouldn't I endeavor to be like Roark -- he, the perfect man? Because he does "the impossible"? What specifically is it that Roark does that is impossible? Hold down a resisting woman, believing that he knows what is best for her? Because that sounds firmly in the realm of the possible to me. (Actually, it sounds like the details of the Kobe Bryant case brought up... in this very thread. Maybe Peikoff knew exactly what he was talking about?) Just want to quickly comment on this, because I loves me logical fallacies... (and those who think I'm wrong about basically everything can take that as meaning I love to commit them, if they desire! ) The quoted segment would only be question begging if I were using it as the basis of an argument meant to prove that the scene in The Fountainhead were rape. But I'm not. I've made that argument separately, and it exists in the thread devoted to it. Here, I'm proceeding on the basis that I am correct to label it rape (which I am), and expressing my reaction to this latest controversy, which is: it does not surprise me (and shouldn't surprise you). Instead, it is a consistent application of bad thinking that people have engaged in, in order to turn a fictional scene of clear rape into "not rape" for other purposes.

I never said that fiction = reality. But fiction does bear a relationship to reality. In the case of The Fountainhead, I've often heard it said that Roark is meant to be an example of human perfection, or the ideal man, or some such. And of course we're often invited to weigh the morality of fictional events. Fiction is meant to be... applicable to our lives, isn't it? We're supposed to draw lessons. We're supposed to be changed. And if that isn't true generally, then isn't it specifically true when it comes to Rand's novels? Where The Fountainhead is even-more-specifically concerned, I'm not 100% sure about where it comes from originally, but the quote from Rand which we've bandied about -- where she described the rape scene as "rape by engraved invitation" -- I'd grabbed from an ARI study guide for The Fountainhead... for students. Here's the entire question: So here, would-be Objectivists (keeping in mind that the outreach to schools, essay contest, etc., are all part of a proselytizing effort) are being asked to examine a scene of rape... and come to the conclusion that it is not. (The subheading for this study guide section is "Understanding the Plot." This is nearly, but not-quite, base-level stuff. Basic understandings. "Look at this clear rape that is described by the character involved as rape, but decide that it isn't." I'm nearly to the point of describing this as an invitation to "doublethink." And actually, I guess I just did.) Is it truly surprising that some Objectivists would do so, then take as one of their lessons that there are certain times when it would appropriate for a man to treat a woman as Roark treated Dominique? When it would be appropriate for a man to try to behave as Roark, the perfect man, did? Is it truly surprising that some Objectivists would import their defenses for what Roark did -- and why it "isn't rape" -- to other scenarios, some of which might take place in real life? (What The Fountainhead as fiction allows is for Roark to rape Dominique and things to "work out": Dominique enjoys it, and even falls in love with Roark. We understand that this is the very rape that Dominique needed. As I made clear several times in that other thread, this is not some unique twist to The Fountainhead. It is a standard trope... of rape erotica.) Well... again, I'm just not surprised, that's all. I consider this to be completely understandable and even expected, given the defenses I've seen for that Fountainhead scene. You say that The Fountainhead is fiction and not real life? I agree. But when Objectivists have to construct bizarre mental mechanisms in order to pronouce what clearly is rape "not rape" (because they've received from on high that it is not rape; just ask the author), that's bound to have deleterious consequences elsewhere. The gymnastics in this very thread to make Peikoff's meaning other than what he seems clearly to mean, I now find utterly and sadly familiar. It's part of that rubber meeting the road, or the whirlwind reaped from our sown wind, or the fruit borne of that tree, or whatever metaphor you'd prefer which says that allowing intellectual dishonesty, even in a matter so apparently small as wrangling over the meaning of a fictional scene in a novel, has bigger and more fearful consequences later on down the line.

So, I've lost my free time for the last forever and haven't been able to drop by and invest any serious time here lately. Tonight was suffering from insomnia and decided to, you know, just look around a bit... and of course this is the damned thread I stumble into. I know it's been disavowed by "both sides" that this has anything to do with the rape scene in The Fountainhead -- and I hate to be "the rape guy" -- but you know what? It seems pretty clear to me that these issues are related. Or maybe Objectivism, a philosophy of reason and non-initiation of force, just keeps on getting "accidentally" paired with rape... somehow? But no. That doesn't track. It seems to me that Objectivism (at least as it's often popularly presented) is ambivalent on this subject matter. In the thread devoted to rape in The Fountainhead, I laid out my nascent ideas on the source of that ambivalence, but here I'll just say that these comments from Peikoff do not surprise me in the least. In fact, I'd be surprised if Peikoff fundamentally felt any other way (and to be sure, it'll be interesting to see his planned statements). But whether Peikoff ultimately does or does not support the apparent meaning of his statements, several others have seemingly expressed very similar views re: Dominique and Roark in the aforementioned thread; that Dominique had given an implied consent ("engraved invitation") and her later actions could not serve to change that. When she later considered (and called) the action "rape," she was just "confused." So yeah. The "romantic realism" line... the "authorial fiat" line... they're all (ultimately faulty) arguments that detract from the main point, which is that Roark was free and clear to do as he felt regardless of what Dominique said/did during the scene. Peikoff's latest comments seem part, parcel, and utterly consistent with what I'd already gathered from discussing The Fountainhead and reflecting on peoples' voiced positions. Though they would never call it "rape" (and presumably do not allow themselves to understand it as such), some Objectivists clearly endorse behaviors and actions which add up to rape in fact, when enacted in the real world. This is more than just Peikoff said something dumb, and more important. This is an issue that speaks to questions of "what does it mean to consent?" and "if someone is 'evasive', can I force them to do what 'they really want'?" and "can a person willingly suspend their rights?"

If homosexuality were a choice, even then how would it be immoral? Anyways, I don't know if this matters to anyone or not, but when I worked at ARI there were at least two openly homosexual employees there. Great guys both.

Hmm... I suppose my answer is less about helping people discover Objectivism "on the web," and more about helping people discover it overall, but I figure... That Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead (as well as VoS, ItOE, and many other initials) have already been written; there exists projects to get these works into adult hands, and student hands. There exists education in logic, and new scholarly work to engage modern intellectuals. What I think is needed is still more art to help change the culture, and possibly art that engages younger minds. So, two ideas occur, both in the guise of writing contests: 1) Screenplays. 2) Early-child to young-adult fiction. I don't know that I would want to spend my million dollars in one year; that kind of money could fund an annual writing contest (or two) for a long time with a decent prize (or tier of prizes). Or, they could fund one such contest with a provocatively large potential winning for publicity's sake, or for later promotion for the winning entry (or to publish the fiction/produce a low budget version of the winning film?). If I were also administering the contest, here is what I would look for: I would want to encourage people to produce children's fiction and/or screenplays which express distinctively Objectivist themes. The winning entries would hopefully be high-caliber, able to compete in their respective marketplaces. It is through these entries-turned-products that I would hope to have reached "the culture," and also through the artists who would have been further exposed to Objectivism en route to producing their submissions, and who will create more throughout their lifetimes. So yeah. That's my idea.

As usual, there is a lot that I could respond to -- a lot I'd like to say, for love of my own "voice" if nothing else... But what strikes me about the recent replies is how very close I think we are to a central resolution (more or less). So I'll cut this short to highlight what's important. If it is the case (bolded, underlined, and italicized to draw attention to the fact that it may not be the case, as I believe we've already agreed*) that Rand's use of "trash" was that by some objective standard (presumably by Objectivist Esthetics, which to an Objectivist would represent "the objective standard") Parrish's artwork "[is] not good art," then I believe that Jonathan is correct: We** should be able to examine Parrish's artwork for ourselves, apply the relevant philosophy, and determine whether Rand was right or wrong. After all, by an objective standard Parrish's artwork is either good art or it is not. *In other scenarios, where Rand's use of "trash" may simply have signified her personal distaste apart from an objective standard (which is not to revisit the controversy of personal preference, but just to refer to the distinction we've recognized between "I like this" and "this is good"), or where she may have been using this language to make another point as Jonathan has suggested/identified in his latest response to me, this is not necessarily the case. Without knowing definitively one way or another which scenario we're dealing with, I still consider Rand's claim essentially arbitrary, and cannot claim to know that she was either right or wrong overall. **By "we" I do not mean "me" at this present time and place. In recognizing that where Rand claims "bad" and Jonathan claims "good" by appealing to the same standard, it should be possible to judge between them, I'm not simultaneously pronouncing myself fit to do so. At present, taking Rand in this sense -- that Parrish's artwork is "not good" -- I must declare myself an agnostic between them, except to say that I lean towards Jonathan due to what I've already explained in how I react to the art when I view it; it does not look like "trash" to me. I am, however, saying that if I studied and applied myself to answering this question, I believe that I ultimately could answer with confidence and either say that Rand was right regarding Parrish, or wrong. And again, and importantly, this is only true if we agree that Rand was saying that Parrish's art is not good, per an objective standard. Or at the least, and whatever Rand's views may or may not have been, it should be possible for me to ultimately come to a conclusion with respect to Parrish's artwork as against an objective standard for art. It's either treasure or trash (or somewhere between), but not both.

So, I don't mean this as an argument one way or the other -- this is just speculation on my part (though not entirely without reason)... but... I've always wondered about "the happy fool." Any kind of profound ignorance or error has to be challenged by the circumstances of the world, I feel, and probably with regularity. So I wonder how deep the happiness of the happy fool really runs. I wonder how much of their smile is genuine. When you say that "[r]eal happiness can never be achieved long-term when it is based on something that doesn't jive with actual reality," I agree. But even in a short-term sense (though I may be too lenient on myself here, as I'd happily shift these goalposts), I wonder what kind of happiness can be purchased by being out of sync with reality. Reality, being reality, entails harsh consequences for those who don't pay proper attention. And I expect that there has to be a psychological toll according to what's required to deny/evade/ignore, or whatever a person has to do, to keep himself unaware of the truth of things. How that toll manifests might not always be straightforward, and thus hard to account for in every instance, yet I do believe that there's a price to be paid somewheres. On the topic of whether being an Objectivist necessarily means being happy -- or whether a sad Objectivist is an argument against Objectivism... Having a canvas, paints, brushes, and whatever-other-tools that a master painter would have, will not guarantee that you can paint a masterpiece. However, it would be extraordinarily difficult to paint a masterpiece without them. I look at philosophy as a tool, and I regard Objectivism as the best tool for the "job" of being happy, which is kind of like a life-long, personal masterpiece. But having the best tool for the job is not synonymous with having finished the job. And anyways, unlike an artist's masterpiece "happiness" is not a state that can be achieved and then a person goes on to other things... nor does "being a happy person" mean living completely free from pain or sadness. Happiness, I think, is an emotional appraisal of our general status in the world -- and the world being what it is, our status can change. If you find me the day after the world wide zombie plague carries off my loved ones, I'm apt to be sad about it, whether I'm fresh from a reading of Atlas Shrugged or not. But even then, I would find my greatest strength in my ability to deal with that challenge or any other challenge that life throws at me. And I believe that my "ability to deal" rests in my capabilities to reason, to commit myself to the best actions on that basis, and etc. So even in those moments when I am at my lowest, I would be "happy" in the sense that I am prepared to fight against those circumstances which otherwise would keep me down, and I reckon that I have a fair shot at success.