dondigitalia

That's supposed to be joyful?! My sisters both said it hurts.

Aside from the complete arbitrariness of positing an existent for which you have no empirical evidence, have you ever considered the contradiction inherent in the unkowable? "I can't know anything about this existent, except I know that it is unkowable, but if it has the characteristic of unkowability, then it exists, which is something else that I know about it, except I have no means of knowing it." Therein lies the problem of the supernatural. I'm not willing to say that any non-material being is necessarily a violation of identity, since there are other non-material existents which are perfectily knowable (concepts of consciousness). It is the supernatural, not the non-material that violates the law of identity. The supernatural is, by definition, that which we cannot know, i.e. that which has no knowable identity, i.e. that which has no identity. The supernatural is not equivalent to the non-material; it's just that most of the non-material things people try to talk about are supernatural fantasy.

She does use them as synonyms, but synonyms don't usually have the exact same meaning. Universe refers to the 3-dimensional physical universe we live in, whereas existence could refer to any hypothetical universe. Since this physical universe is the only one which exists, it's generally ok to use the terms interchangeably in most contexts, but the concept "existence" does not necessarily mean anything physical. It could be said that "universe" is a scientific concept, but "existence" is a metaphysical one. Either that or you'd have a frozen abstraction.

What do you mean by "spiritual being/dimension"? Can you define them using genus and differentia? I would consider myself a spiritual being, since I have a mind, but I suspect that isn't what you mean. I will say that if something is such that it cannot be studied scientifically, then it is a violation of identity. This does not mean things which we don't currently have the means to study, but things for which no study is possible, on any level. I don't know that PoE specifically does, but from what would he have created it? Moreover, what is god? What are his essential characteristics? How can we observe or know him? "Metaphysically given" refers to the non-man-made only because we know of no non-human volition in the universe. If some volitional alien race were discovered, I don't think it would be entirely proper to call it the Metaphysical vs. the Man-Made, but rather the Metaphysical vs. the Volitionally Made. Does that answer your question? I refuse to discuss it in terms of a God, however, because to do so is meaningless. By what means would this hypothetical spirit be acting on matter? Infinite means: greater than any quanitity, which means: no specific quantity, which means: a quantity without identity.

It is a vast amount of information as compared to no information, but not when compared to other metaphysical systems, such as Plato, Hegel, or the Christians, who, in addition to (at least implicitly) accepting the axioms of Objectivism, posited all kinds of other useless crap to go along with it. Yes, and that's the reason the two branches are usually taken together--it's really difficult to draw a clear line between the two, at times. Most of those implications are epistemological, though. It's only a very small portion that is metaphysics. I think Ayn Rand said once that Philosophy is 90% epistemology.

I'd say it's 50/50. EDIT- I don't mean to say that that specific point is about 50/50. But that kind of thinking is. It could be any number of things, depending on the person. ********** Incidentally, a friend of mine who is a physiologist has explained to me that the amount of alcohol one can consume before any faculties are impaired is highly dependent on genetics. Some racial groups have different general levels of tolerance than others. She has told me that Asians tend to have a lower level of tolerance, whereas caucasians can typically handle more. Those are only very general rules, though. I think it's rather silly to put out a blanket statement like "drinking alcohol is immoral," when there are many, many people out there who can drink one or two (or maybe even more!) drinks without impairing their rational faculty. Frankly, I could care less about knowing if somebody else is acting immorally with their alcohol consumption. If somebody wants to impair their rational faculty, that's their deal, but far be it from me to tell them exactly at what point such impairment occurs. For myself, I'm off to the UCB O'ist Club meeting. And after that, as always, we're all going out for a beer.

Even the referents of the verb "to exist" include those of the past and future, regardless of the grammatical tense of the verb. That is the open-ended nature of concepts. If we say "existed" the referents still include those things of the present and future, viewed from the perspective that they will have, at some point, ceased to exist. The reason its so crucial to draw a distinction between the axiomatic concept "existence" and the non-axiomatic concept "state of being" is because one subsumes all the characteristics of all existents, whereas the other subsumes only one characteristic of all existents. Even universe isn't fully interchangeable with existence. It's just the concept that comes the closest to existence in scope. I used it because it's the same concept Ayn Rand used in the Appendix of ITOE in explaining what she meant when she said "existence." But even then, she just said that it is "in a certain way, close to the concept 'universe,'" rather than saying they were the same.

I've read all the way up to then end of the section on knowledge as True Belief (201d). I have to say, I'm rather confused as to what his point is for the bulk of this section. It seems as though all the way up to 200d, he's arguing against the possibility of false belief, rather than whether or not true belief is knowledge. The only point I can see to this is if he intends to indicate that it is unecessary to put the qualifier "true" onto the definition at all, since there is no possibility of a false belief. But, this isn't his intention at all, so I'm not really sure what he's getting at. His first argument against the possibility of false belief is flawed. It completely neglects the possibility of having knowledge of some aspects of a thing, but not of others. In his second argument, he appears to take a complete about-face where the fallibility of sense-perception is concerned. Where before, he regarded it as fallible, he now regards it as infallible, and then ascribes that infallibility to thought as well. I found the third argument to be extremely unclear, although it seems to have something to do with the impossibility of being able to convince oneself that A is non-A. Of course one can't (honestly) do this, but it neglects the idea that one might be honestly unsure about what A is. I think the "wax tablet" section amounts to allowing for the possibility that one might remember something incorrectly, and concedes that a false belief may be possible in the presence of a "mistmatch" between memory and perception. Plato objects to this, however, on the grounds that there are some false beliefs (such as in mathematics) that cannot be conflicts between memory and perception, since mathematics, in his view, is not derived from perception. Of course, mathematics can be objectively grounded in perception, so his objection doesn't really hold water. The final section on the aviary is an attempt at explaining how it is that we can have these kind of mismatches. Basically, the big problem with this section is the same problem that he has been facing throughout. He continues to regard concepts as having some sort of actual metaphysical existence apart from the objects of sense perception, almost as though the task of the mind isn't to learn about the objects of sense-perception, but to "match up" concepts with the objects. Finally, at the very end of his argument against true belief, he says something worthwhile. Here, he accepts that knoweldge must have an empirical base, and explains that one might be persuaded to believe something without empirical evidence, and that even if the belief is true, it is not knowledge.

The open-ended nature of concepts is discussed in ITOE, on pages 17-18, 26-28, 65-69, 98-100, 147, and 257-258. In OPAR, page 5, Peikoff says, "[Existence] subsumes...everything which is, was, or will be." It seems as though you are making the exact mistake I was trying to point out, which is equating the axiomatic concept "existence," with the concept which means: state of existing or being, a form of the verb "to exist." This is not the way Ayn Rand used the term. She used it in a manner that was synonomous with "universe." Sort of a collective noun subsuming all particular existents.

Daydreaming certainly doesn't help me to fall asleep, but I'm kind of an odd case where sleep is concerned. I have extreme problems going to sleep, and have had to take sleeping pills since I was a kid.

You can't really say that it's ludicrous without first finding out what he means by mind. I think I'm pretty safe in speaking for him here, since after reading a million posts about his friggin dog, I'm certain I fully understand his position on animal consciousness. What he means by mind is "conceptual consciousness" or "capacity for thought." Here, I strongly warn you against throwing around the term "volition" too loosely on an Objectivist forum. Volition, in Objectivism, refers to a very specific phenomena--it refers to the ability to regulate the conceptual level of consciousness. In Objectivism, it is not the same thing as any primitive choice or self-motivation (both of which are valid, but different concepts). As for the rest of your post, it takes us into the realm of neuroscience, rather than philosophy, so I'm not qualified to make any comment whatsoever.

The reason I thought it might be necessary to point out what "existence" is in Objectivism is because I inferred from your comments that you might be operating from the "state of being" concept. For instance, when you used the idea of something that has not yet been created as an example of a non-existent. In Objectivism, the concept of "existence" subsumes everything which has existed, currently exists, or will exist in the future--that is what is meant by a concept being "open-ended." Also, the idea of existence without existents is a contradiction. A non-existent is something which does not exist, and is not subsumed under the concept of existence. Dave Odden's explanation of the "empty space" problem can suffice as my own, as I agree with it entirely. For one, how can my posts lack argument entirely and attack a straw man? Attacking a straw man would mean I was arguing against a false position, so you're saying that I'm both arguing and not arguing. A true description of my posts is that they lacked any argument whatsoever. This is because its pointless to pose an argument without first determining the context of your opponents position. I'm not sure if you are aware of these aspect of Objectivism and reject them, or are completely unaware. I'm not making attacks, so don't bother defending. Both of my posts were entirely valid. The first for the reasons I have already explained, the second, because that dichotomy is popping up all over the place in your posts. I was unsure if you realized how irrelevant it all is in the face of Objectivism. If you do realize, and reject it, then why are you here, posting on a forum dedicated to the exploration of a philosophy you reject? I do not make indirect attacks. Ever. I find that to be highly dishonest and am offended that you would (groundlessly) make that assertion. A question is not an attack. If I'm attacking your ideas, trust me, it will be abundantly clear that I'm doing so. Check my post history; I'm sure you will find that the behavior you are mistakenly ascribing to me would be extremely out of character.

I'm glad you guys liked my jokes. For Inspector's benefit: In case you misunderstood, the "Life is short..." line was a massive oversimplication for comedic purposes. I don't mean to give the impression that that is my literal view, in its entirety. It's doubly true for guys. The entire sexual experience (for heterosexuals) is entirely dependent on the guys continued arousal, plus the female "machinery" is a lot more difficult to work. Take this to heart, Jennifer: No matter how stressed out a woman is about being a good lover, it's nothing compared to what we men go through over it. I don't claim to speak for all men, universally, but I think it's generally the case.

I am highly affended at your mockery of Him and His Noodly Appendage. How dare you blaspheme by asserting that He is bound to any size such as "Giant." The Flying Spaghetti Monster may take any form he wishes, which means he can be any size he wishes, as any bonafide Pastafarian will tell you.

LarkLadyInn- Are you aware that Objectivism rejects the split between a priori and a posteriori knowledge entirely?

I don't like calling sex "experimentation." I think early sex is better called "practice" or "rehearsal," lol. It's not really a very experimental thing. (Unless you'r into some really freaky stuff, in which case, put on your lab coat and have at it...) But, I beg to differ. Just introspecting my own teen years... yes you can discover things by having sex. Not that a thirteen-year-old should go jump in the sack to figure it out, but once someone is ready (and I think most people are ready in the mid-to-late-teens). You do learn a lot--about sex. And that's important. To sit around waiting until it's "perfect" or you've found the "perfect person" is just silly. Sex should be a response to values, what those values are (most of them) is optional. I don't think Ayn Rand intended to give rise to the almost puritanical interpretation a lot of people give to her statements about sex (she did say the best "one can find"). Life is short. Screw like bunnies. Just don't hate each other whle you do it. The end. You'll be more agressive than usual until you remedy the situation. You know the pope had a subscription to Playnuns. I find it really hard to believe he went 400 years, or however long it was that he lived, without ever once self-sinning.

In the typical philosophical usage, "mind" is a concept which refers to both the brain and consciousness, taken together. Just because you are using the same word, though, doesn't mean you are using the same concept. That's why I'm trying to get precise definitions out of you. The brain (typically) refers to the physical organ, and all of it's various hormonal and electrochemical actions. Consciouness (typically) refers to the state of awareness which, most likely, has a very complex, mutally causal releationship with the brain. I'm not really concerned with typical usage, though. I'm concerned with pinning down what you mean. I am extremely confused by your use of the term "abstraction" here. Everywhere I've ever seen that word in relation to consciousness, it refers to a specific action of conceptual concsciousness, rather than the entire thing. What I'm trying to wrench out of you is two things: to what category of things does "consciousness" belong, and how is is differentiated from everything else in that category. Hold up. I highly doubt that anyone here thinks animals are not conscious (if they did, then please quote it). That is not what Objectivism says, and not what anyone in this thread has said. To assert that no animal is conscious would be ludicrous. Anything with sensation is conscious. As far as I know, this means all animals, including insects, but I'm far from a biologist, so I'm not gonna say that's a fact. What Objectivists (typically) say is that only humans have a conceptual consciousness. This however, is not part of philosophy, per se, so I wouldn't say that it's a part of Objectivism (although it is something that Ayn Rand wrote). I leave open the possibility that conceptualization may be discovered in other species at some point in the future. That's perfectly reasonable. P.S. I urge you to not assume that everything people say on this forum are part of Objectivism--especially the more ridiculous things. The only thing that speaks for Objectivism is Ayn Rand's writing.

You're right, feral children do not have volition--they are essentially animals. To the best of my knowledge, only one truly feral child has ever been studied (a girl, I think), but I might be wrong; it might also be that she was just the first. If I remember correctly, what the study showed was that, through lack of use, the neural pathways necessary for conceptual thought became comepletely useless and sort of sealed off, leading to the (very interesting) conclusion that social interaction is vital to the development of the conceptual level--I think there's probably a lot of truth to that. I don't doubt there are other disorders which could lead to individual non-conceptual, non-volitional humans as well, but in my previous post I was more talking about humans qua species, rather than qua individuals.

Yes, it does. If there are no existents, then what exists? Also, in Objectivism, the axiomatic concept "existence" is not synonomous with "state of being or existing." It's "everything which exists," which includes the state of being.

The standard that exists prior to the choice to live is a standard of action, not a standard of value. It is a standard (of sorts), but is not a moral standard. I actually changed my position on that preference, when I learned (as part of this discussion ) that the choice to think and the choice to live are the same exact thing, viewed from a different perspective. I still recognize a difference between "alternative" and "choice," but I've lost any reservations about referring to the fundamental choice as "a choice to live."

Since you initially proposed a debate, why don't you clear up the ambiguity over the term "mind" by providing a definition, in your own words, which includes a genus and differentia. Once the term is clearly defined, it will then be clear exactly what it is you were looking to debate. It'll probably increase the likelihood of finding an opponent. I see that you provided a definition in the very first post, but it leads to two other points which needs clarifying: What is a "collective consciousness"? Do you mean to include such consciousness in the concept of "mind," or is it excluded?

I'm guessing it's somewhere around, "Hmm...."

Humans did not acquire volition. Humans have had it as long as they have existed. That's a minor technicality though. Throw A & C out the window. Your mistake is in B. Volition does not presuppose evolution. What volition presupposes is a conceptual consciousness, since it is an attribute of conceptual consciousness. Within the context of a conceptual consciousness, volition is axiomatic and cannot be reduced any further. Even a conceptual consciousness does not presuppose evolution. Although, scientifically, we are abe to say that humans, a volitional animal, evolved from non-volitional animals, that is not the same as presupposing. Volitional, and conceptual consciousness, could hypothetically exist without the existence of evolution--metaphysically. It's just that, scientifically, this isn't the case. I'm not an evolutionary biologist, but a friend of mine is, and the evolution of conceptual consciousness is the specific problem she is interested in working on. If you have any specific problems, I'll be glad to ask her if she has an answer, but the how of it is a subject for highly advanced science. Whoah, whoah, whoah! Hold up here. What do you mean by "subjective world (the mind)" and how does it differ from the objective world? Why isn't the mind part of the objective world? What gives you the idea that the objective world is entirely physical? What do you mean by mind? Do you mean consciousness? The brain? Or both? Typically "mind" refers to the brain (a physical phenomena) and consciousness (a non-physical phenomena) integrated into a single concept. Mind, in this usage, has both deterministic and volitional aspects to it. There is an area of Philosophy dedicated to this study: Philosophy of the Mind. Harry Binswanger's lecture, The Metaphysics of Consciousness, covers Philosophy of the Mind. I haven't listened to it, though, so that's all I know about it. Also, Diana Hsieh wrote a paper on the topic, which was linked to earlier in this thread. The objective world is the only world that exists, but it consists of both physical and non-physical things. The deterministic nature of physical existents does not contradict volition, because it is an attribute of a non-physical thing: conceptual consciousness. Although conceptual consciousness is most likely a product of the physical brain, to assume that this means consciousness is physical and follows the same physical laws as the brain is fallacious. Using "subjective" in this manner is either highly confusing, or flat out wrong. I'm going to go with confusing and suggest that the term "personal" might be more accurate for what you're trying to say. Replacing "subjective" with "personal," the answer is: you don't know. But who cares? That doesn't change the fact that you are percieving the same characteristic of the same object as the other guy. I hope I've helped you to uncover some assumptions you were making in your questions. It's important, when thinking about these things, to understand exactly what it is you are assuming, and even a question can smuggle in all sorts of unrecognized premises.

So all those romantic comedies Meg Ryan did aren't love stories? Breakfast at Tiffany's isn't a love story? All those musicals from the 50s aren't love stories? Ayn Rand's novels aren't love stories? I'm not debating that there aren't love stories which have tragic endings. But it's not part of any sort of standard formula. In fact, the only love-story formula I'd heard before yours was: boy meets girl, boy loses girl, boy gets girl back. That said, I don't like the vast majority of loves stories out there, because they're too sappy. Judging by what I've seen in this thread, Brokeback Mountain probably isn't much different in that regard.

If there is no standard by which a choice is made, how is there not an equal probability? How is it not a constant, i.e. ongoing choice? Good and evil depend on some standard of value, though. Someone who doesn't choose to live can be neither good nor evil. That's the whole point!!! Anyway, I strongly disagree with the idea that most men start out good or evil and stay that way. Ayn Rand's characters were abstractions, not real people. Most people are neither all-good nor all-evil, and most people's moral status changes over time. Many of the very good people I know, at one time in their lives were not-so-good, corrected their wrongs, and moved forward (myself included). It's not really all that useful to consider might-bes without looking at what it would mean to take them as ares. I'm abandoning this topic (I might return to it if I see something that really pique's my interest). I've said just about everything I have to say on the subject.