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Hugoist

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  1. I think this misunderstanding is the seed of Objectivists' discontent with the word. I, for one, use it freely to describe myself. I do so because the word doesn't mean "you can believe anything as long as..." The word simply means "advocating minimal government" or something like that - a word's definition can be found easily in any dictionary. To repeat the essence of a previous post of mine, by the logic used to throw out the word "libertarian," we should throw out "selfish" and "egoist" as well - "selfish" can mean cheater in ordinary parlance, and "egoist" can mean irrationalist egoist. Just because a few people believe that one "can believe anything as long as..." doesn't mean the actual definition of the word contradicts the tenets of Objectivism. I only bring this up because I think using the word would help Objectivists clarify their position in conversation in which lengthy oration is not appropriate or possible.
  2. I don't understand why some Objectivists object so much to "libertarians." The word roughly means a person who advocates a lack of government force in economic and social matters. I have trouble arriving at the view some have that that implies subjectivism or an "anything goes" attitude. It seems that saying that, since there are evangelical, irrationalist, and anarchist libertarians, "libertarians" must be wrong implies that since there are evangelical, irrationalist, and anarchist free willists, free willists must be wrong, and that since there are irrationalist and anarchist egoists, egoists must be wrong. I'm thinking there must be something I don't know in the story behind this antipathy. Thoughts?
  3. Sure. Kant coined the term "categorical imperative," I believe; in any case, he's usually associated with the term more than anyone else. He had four "formulations" of the categorical imperative. He believed (I have no idea how he believed this, because it seems absurd to me, so don't ask me why) that all four of these formulations expressed the same basic idea. One formulation was "act in such a manner so that you could will all others to act the same way." Another formulation, which, by the way, appears more or less word for word in Rand's writing, is "Treat human beings as ends, and never as means." Clearly, these are not anywhere near the same idea. But the idea that one shouldn't steal the laptop because one wouldn't want theft to be more common in society would be an expression of the first imperative I listed above.
  4. I think snide, pedantic *sigh*s should be reserved for people who are familiar with the terms they use. Anyone who seriously thinks that categorical imperatives are contextless absolutes "that must be followed "just because" has not read up on the subject. That definition would not fly even with philosophers who strongly oppose the idea. They're universal laws governing actions at all times and of course most of them have a contextual backdrop ("Don't kill" only applies when the entity acted upon is human; even if it were to apply to animals, one could state the imperative "Don't act upon your thoughts when you are thinking of killing" - here the context is "when you are thinking of killing" - the point is that there are no contextless laws and what I think you mean by contextless is "inflexible," which is different. But "just because"? I'm really not even sure where that comes from. My question was (and is) in earnest, so don't get uncivil. Galt's voice-activated lock system employs a statement which sounds very much like a categorical imperative (something to the extent of, I will never live for another man, nor will I ask him to live for me). Why the second part, if there doesn't exist some implicit categorical imperative in Rand's thought? As I think I showed above, one can't honestly say it's always in one's own self-interest to refrain from force in ordinary circumstances.
  5. True, but if I could get back on topic, to whether Objectivists believe in categorical imperatives... I'm not sure the question has been settled to my liking. I know Objectivism fairly well, and have read OPAR, including what it has to say on force and morality. I think we should try not to get hung up on the implications terms have had historically and think purely about their denotations. Certainly, Rand never believed in something like Kant's categorical imperatives. However, one can easily consider a situation in which, as nimble states, violating rights in non-extraordinary conditions would be in one's best interest. The no-risk theft situation is a good example. Suppose I can steal a laptop without any risk of being caught because I see a man carrying one walking in the shadows on the streets of some lawless city and I have a gun. This is a use of force. One can't honestly say that for what philosophers call "pragmatic" (want of material goods) reasons one shouldn't take it. You can't say the Objectivist ethos of regarding productiveness as the highest expression and instigator of happiness prevents a rational person from stealing it - if anything, a laptop would make you more productive. You can't say you won't steal it because you couldn't live in a society in which everyone stole -- because besides the fact that this reasoning would be one formulation of the categorical imperative, your theft does not increase the chances of other people stealing from you. Even if the man you steal from becomes a thief in indignation, the chances of his stealing from you don't prevent the theft from being pragmatically beneficial on the whole. And assuming this man is a stranger, he can't have any value to you, unless you accept the (non-Objectivist) idea of unconditional love. So thus far, the Objectivist has no reason I can see not to steal. In laying out his position against force, Peikoff says that force is wrong because "force and mind are opposites." Since force and mind are opposites, using force against another is anti-mind. However, we need to take into account that we are talking about two different people involved here: the force of the actor and the mind of the victim. The force of the actor harms the functionability of the mind of the victim, not of the actor; under the precept that one has no duty to act selflessly, this harm should not be taken into account in the absence of any categorical imperative. Therefore, it seems obvious to me that a categorical imperative is needed, and I'm not sure Rand would agree with Peikoff's analysis (given the way characters in her novels seem to perceive force). This is, of course, assuming that Objectivism does indeed want to condemn thuggery, which I don't think is a great stretch. Nietzsche is the representative figure of amoralism. Without a categorical imperative, we sound like Nietzscheans here (in rejecting moral codes which may impinge upon our self interest), and thus amoralists, and lack of morals is not a tenet of Objectivism. I am not an amoralist, by the way, despite the fact that Nietzsche is in my signature.
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