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DiscoveryJoy

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  1. True. There are many examples where you can identify such relationships, examples that have nothing to do with object vs percept. Examples where you just deal with content within the perceptual world alone. Just take a tree: One branch has many leaves: One-to-many. Or two human beings can have multiple children. Two-to-many. And on and on. Don't see how this gives any lead as to what the relationship between external object and percept is, though. Or why concepts of one or many etc. would have to be based on the premise of a one-to-one relationship between external object and percept. Sure, the senses are necessarily valid. Meaning: The percepts that the senses give us are fully real. They (the percepts) are not constructed, imagined or subjective. They are the observed content, the things of which we become aware of in the most direct sense possible, and they are irrefutable. But how does that make any statement on how those percepts were produced during the preceding process of perception? How do we know how many external objects were necessary to produce one percept? If you don't understand the justification for the latter questions, let all of the following serve as a highly important insight into my psycho-epistemological process: How do we know that such a thing as some kind of "senses" is even necessary for us to be conscious of anything out there at all? Well, we know it, because to be conscious at all, we need a means to consciousness. Consciousness cannot somehow magically wrap itself around one external object after another wherever it wants to in that large and unlimited universe. Rather, reality must act on some kind of medium where all the external objects' influences are bundled together, a medium that is condensed enough so that consciousness can just cling to that medium without the need of leaping from one external object to another. That medium is what may properly be called senses. So we know we have such senses, even without any reference to the things we call our "eyes", "ears", "nose" etc. whatsoever. We can deduce that we must have some senses from the fact of our being conscious alone. But we don't know what those senses are, because our consciousness can only be in direct contact with the percepts. The percepts which those unknown but proven-to-exist senses must have produced in interaction with some external objects. So what then are the things we call our "eyes", "ears", "nose" etc.? Primarily percepts, right? I mean, what else could they ever be, if anything our consciousness can ever get in direct contact with is percepts? So those so-called "sense organs" must be percepts, too, just like anything else. Or can eyes, ears and noses be our means of perception at the same time? Well how, if they are actually just the result of the latter? Can something be both a means and a result of perception at the same time? How would that be consistent with the law of identity? Our so-called "sense organs" have yet another quite funny thing about them: Their co-existence strangely correlates with our ability to be aware of both them themselves and the entire rest of our perceptual world. Their existence and certain interactions between them and other percepts we observe in our perceptual world happen to be empirically necessary so that we can have awareness of both them and the other percepts. To put it in similar terms as before: There are certain objects in the external world. They necessarily must interact with some senses (I don't dare to say those senses are our "eyes", "ears", "nose" etc.) so that the result is a "man" or a "tree" or a "feather" etc....OR EVEN an "eye", an "ear" or a "nose" etc. which are things we like to call "sense organs". The sense organs - or at least some of them - must always be among those results, otherwise reality simply doesn't allow us to be aware of the other things, either. That's just the rules. Just like the analogy in an ego shooter computer game: See the world on your computer screen? Notice the little man in the foreground, too? Notice him suddenly get shot and disappear from the screen? The entire screen turns black. You're dead. Not allowed to observe the virtual world anymore. Game over. That's just the programming of this computer game. The little man was your sense organs. You there, the guy sitting in front of the screen, was your consciousness, observing both the man and the rest of the virtual world. The program code was and still is the external objects that interacted with the computer hardware (your actual senses) to produce the output, i.e. the percepts on the screen, for you, the observing consciousness. Note that the game could've been written in a way without the entire screen turning black if your little man dies. But it wasn't. Don't ask me why. It just wasn't. Also note that potentially many program code objects could have been necessary to produce just one thing in the virtual world on your screen. Or one such object to produce many. So the question remains: How do we know whether "The form or perception (i.e. the percept) does not contribute anything that the entity-object does not possess in regard to the metaphysically singular status of bounded particulars."? Why does there always have to be a one-to-one relationship between object and percept? Why not many-to-one? Or one-to-many?
  2. Just to make sure we're still on the same page: There has obviously been a misuse in terminology in forming the leading question of this topic. 1. The thread should properly be named (admins please edit, if possible): Relationship between Object and Percept in perceptions 2. Were we stand now is the following: Perceptions mean the following: "There is an Object in reality that exists independent of my perceiving it. When it acts on my senses, I perceive it in the form of a particular percept." This rules out the possibility of "object" and "percept" being synonyms. Percepts are a product of object-sense-interaction. They exist only while we are perceiving them. They cease to exist when we fall asleep. Objects do not. So my question is: How do we know whether "The form or perception (i.e. the percept) does not contribute anything that the entity-object does not possess in regard to the metaphysically singular status of bounded particulars."? Is there anything inherent in the nature of perception that necessitates this? Why does there always have to be a one-to-one relationship between object and percept? Why not many-to-one? Or one-to-many? A key motivation for answering that question is to know that individual rights are justified, so that anybody - independent of his form of peception - can always be held accountable for violating them.
  3. Yes, you're right, my question doesn't follow from them merely being different concepts. That's why I have tried to rephrase my question, since I had gotten the semantics of the term "entity" wrong. I am replacing it with "percept", hoping that it clears all misunderstandings.
  4. Yes, and that is, with more than one form simultaneously, i.e. multiple forms, i.e. multiple sense data objects, i.e. multiple percepts. Why not? But really on the perceptual level, not just the sensual one you are mentioning here (sight or touch). Say, something like an apple out there, being perceived in the form of two billiard balls.
  5. OK, I'll look into it, but if your quotes are right, then I was really just using the wrong terminology for the question I wanted to ask. Instead of "entities", I think what I should have used is the term "percepts". Does my question and all the explanations I have made make sense if you replace "entities" with "percepts" everywhere? Now a percept is clearly form-dependent, right? "percept" = an object/entity as it arrives in our consciousness, i.e. the result of the interaction. Sorry for the confusion, my mistake.
  6. Okay, will probably have to go into more details to explain my psycho-epistemic process. But to give you something right away, just the following. Maybe its better to start with this. If you already detect the error right here, then let me know. Otherwise I would have to get into even more details: 1. Looking at http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/entity.html I read: "Of man’s five cognitive senses, only two provide him with a direct awareness of entities" "provide" as in "giving him something" (the senses do). Doesn't this make it obvious that the entity lies in the stimulated senses? ("stimulated" meaning that an object had to stimulate them). In any case, that the senses are definitely part of what is "the entity"? Obviously, the senses cannot provide us with a direct awareness of external objects, since our consciousness lies behind the senses. They do not "provide" in the sense of just "handing over" external objects to us like a hot potatoe. Yet they provide our consciousness with something that is related to external objects. The senses provide our consciousness with the stimulated state of our senses. Hence the term "entity". 2. In the lecture, look at the description about the "energy puffs": It says that when the energy puffs which comprise external reality (= certain objects) interact with the energy puffs which comprise human beings (= our senses, in part) the result is: "A man" or "a feather" (= entities), or .... Note the words "interact" and "result" here. My understanding of "result of interaction" is that of some kind of output, i.e. a product (the word "product" or "produce" is also mentioned in that passage of the lecture). Like in a chemical reaction. Output un-equals Input. The input being the energy puffs that make up the object. They act on the energy puffs that make up our senses. And the output is "a man", "a feather" etc. Remember, output un-equals input. So if the objects are the input, and the things we become aware of ("man", "feather" etc.) are just a "result" (the output) and if we call the latter things entities, then: Voilà! Objects un-equals entities, too. Because: Output un-equals input. After all, you wouldn't equate the inputs and outputs of photosynthesis to each other, would you? So why equate objects and entities? 3. I hope you don't think that what I am presenting here is Kant. I understand that Kant would pretend like there is some manipulative mental activity going on in the interaction between object and senses, which I am excluding. We get aware of entities only after they have already been created as a result of the interaction. Of the interaction, not of our mind. 4. I hope you are still not running mad yet. Thanks for your enduring patience and interest ;-) 5. I still have all the energy puffs necessary to create a drawing that depicts my understanding, if necessary
  7. No, I wasn't trying to make a hypothetical statement. I thought I was properly representing what is discussed on http://campus.aynrand.org/classroom/70/: Ayn Rand Campus -> History of Philosophy Lecture 22 -> The Validity of the Senses -> The Objectivist Position and in Ayn Rand Campus -> History of Philosophy Lecture 22 -> Sensory Qualities as Real -> Effects of Causal Primaries Real My "quote" is what I gather from that lecture.
  8. Well, the last thing I read from you was post #137. To your example: You are talking about "independent existents". What do you mean by "existent" here? A necessarily coherent thing? Or just "something", possibly a collection of multiple things, each of them coherent? If the former, then no, being is not a contribution from the form of perception, since it was already there before. If the latter, then yes, being is a contribution from the form of perception, since it wasn't there before. In any case, whatever the answer, the perceiver is just lucky or in bad luck, since different senses could very well have had different results when interacting with that existent.
  9. Hey guys, I have decided to create a new thread to continue the leading question that has been raised in the following thread about the Matrix: http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=8011&page=6#entry335892 We have been faced with the following claim: "The form or perception does not contribute anything that the entity-object does not possess in regard to the metaphysically singular status of bounded particulars." It has also been claimed that "object" and "entity" are synonyms. Judging on the Objectivist view on how perception works, I disagree, since perceptions means the following: "There is an Object in reality that exists independent of my perceiving it. When it acts on my senses, I perceive it in the form of a particular entity." This rules out the possibility of "object" and "entity" being synonyms. Entities are a product of object-sense-interaction. They exist only while we are perceiving them. They cease to exist when we fall asleep. Objects do not. So my question was then and is now: How do we know that "The form or perception does not contribute anything that the entity-object does not possess in regard to the metaphysically singular status of bounded particulars."? Is there anything inherent in the nature of perception that necessitates this? Why does there always have to be a one-to-one relationship between object and entity? Why not many-to-one? Or one-to-many?
  10. Anything wrong with my post about three days ago? Why was it deleted?
  11. Don't worry, I'm patient. Take your time.... ;-)
  12. Well, why not proof in the form of "the claim has been founded"? But directing my thinking would already help. I don't see why a book-length argument is necessary to get the basic line of argumentation. That would seem rather empiricist to me. And since we are in this forum - I mean from an Objectivist perspective, of course. Not sure about Kelley as a reliably Objectivist source. He is in disagreement about Objectivism as a closed system. So the question to the following claim remains: "The form or perception does not contribute anything that the entity-object does not possess in regard to the metaphysically singular status of bounded particulars." (Plasmatic's statement) How do we know this? Is there anything inherent in the nature of perception that necessitates this? Why does there always have to be a one-to-one relationship between the object and the entity? Why not many-to-one? Or one-to-many?
  13. Seems to me there is no such proof so far. Just considerations in the realm of "well, but it would seem rather odd otherwise", like the ones I have already made.
  14. Well, I hope so, that's exactly my point. Would be great to proof that. How do we know this, given that all we have is our form of perception?
  15. Well, if entities are really the results form object-sense interaction, then yes, senses do produce entities. In interaction with objects, that is. Entities don't exist independent of perception. Objects do. "Created by the mind" is something completely different than "created by object-sense interaction". The question is, if we sense an object created by software, whether that software wouldn't have to first bundle that object together in some coherent form/location in whatever memory that requires, before it splits it up and distributes its parts to the components of our sensory apparatus. If there is a way to argue for such a logical necessity, one could maintain that even software objects are real objects.
  16. I mean independent of the viewer. An objective basis would be: "There is a coherent object in reality that exists independent of anyone viewing it. It is a coherent object, and that coherence is not produced by any interaction with my or anyone else's senses, but the object is coherent in and of itself. If it acts on my senses, I perceive it in the form of an entity. Many such sense-independently coherent objects exist, I perceive them in the form of human biological organisms. I can therefore claim that they have individual rights that are objective. Maybe someone else perceives them also in the form of human biological organisms, perhaps in different colors etc., but that's not so important. The important thing is he perceives them as such entities. If he does, he can understand and accept my claim for their objective individual rights. If he does not and the coherent objects are all lumped together into just one single human organism in his perception, he can claim what he wishes, but obviously he is wrong to ascribe individual rights to what he perceives for the moments he is not perceiving it. Because what he is perceiving has no coherence and self-sustainance while he sleeps."
  17. Given the most recent posts on "object vs entity" in this thread, I'm not sure who now represents Objecitivsm better. So I gather the following: Something acts on our senses. Whatever it is independent of our senses, whether a metaphysically coherent object or not, it is still something. The sum of all of its parts or whatever else it may be. If that something interacts with our senses in such a way that it produces a single entity, we call that something "an object". This is justified in the same sense like we could call any scattered amount of computer data "tied" together by a coherent graphical visualization a "data object". If that something interacts with our senses in such a way that it produces multiple entities, we call that something "multiple objects". So the question still remains: If the same something produces just one biological entity by interaction with one person's senses, but multiple biological entities by interaction with another person's senses, where is really the objective basis for individual rights?
  18. Its arbitrary to assume that there is a God, for example, so yes. The topic this has led to is what morality should be founded on. For this we need an Objective basis. A basis that is and will always be true, independent of the observer. So we have to find one that is immune to every potential possibility. Even to the one I described. Or don't we? And I thought I had done my best to keep objects and entities apart in my posts. Again: We perceive objects (things external to our senses) through certain means (our senses) in certain forms (entities). How could this be any more distinguished?
  19. Well, quite simple actually. There is a certain group of objects out there that we perceive in the form of multiple entities, multiple people. We abstract among those people and call them a "tribe". Now supposing someone else perceives the same group of objects. But when those objects act on his senses, what comes out of it is just a single entity. Not multiple people to abstract a tribe from. But just a single entity. I would say he is perceiving the tribe, but not in conceptual terms, just as a percept. But that thing to him is an entity and he can only observe how that entity seems to have a tendency to preserve itself. Which is normally what he should observe. Because if every member of the tribe preserves itself, then the side effect is that the tribe preserves itself, too. So he must conclude that the tribe is a unit of reality and the basis of morality. That an action is moral only if it serves the tribe. Or anything about that make no sense?
  20. How does Rama-Kanda even answer "yes" or "no" to my observations? And I don't know if anyone realizes what it implies for Objectivism's whole foundation of individual rights. If what we call "separate biological organisms" obtains its status of "entities" only as a product of object-sense interaction, but otherwise - independent of our senses - may be multiple, completely loosely spread incoherent objects... What would that mean? What if someone else simply perceives a tribe as an entity? Or a race? Or a certain gender? Not in conceptual terms, but really just on the perceptual level? To him it would mean that this (the tribe, the race etc.) is the unit of perception that seems to strive towards self-preservation and therefore needs to be pursued. Not some individual. Or the other way round: If I'm the only one who perceives myself as an entity, why would other people have to protect my individual rights, if they don't even perceive me in the form of an entity, not to talk of as a human being?
  21. Because it is either this or that - one way or another, it has to be something. We have to assume something about what we are dealing with or suspend judgement by not dealing with it at all. In the latter case, it would mean that dealing with it serves no purpose. If there is a purpose, then reason - not the purpose - should guide our assumption.
  22. Because otherwise, there would have to be a conspiracy of the most unbelievable kind. Of course we have to - to some extend - just assume that there are other people out there that also have consciousness. That there are not just robots created by some hyperintelligent designer. And from the sum of all facts we know, we just have to logically deduce that the person we hear on the phone is the person we could meet in person.
  23. Because that is what it means to perceive: To perceive by some means and in some form: Your eyes are the means, colors and shapes are the form. Your nose is the means, smells are the form. Your ears are the means, sounds are the form. But if we perceive that which we call our senses, like our eyes, nose and ears, it means then that we must be able to do so - again - by some means and in some form. So we perceive our eyes in the form of certain balls with a retina and all the other properties. But what then is the means through which we have perceived our eyes? Our eyes themselves? Sounds very strange to me. How can something be a form and a means at the same time? It would mean that lightwaves interact with our eyes and the result is....those very same eyes! As if to say the eyes somehow magically duplicate themselves. But of course, they can't be the same eyes, since one pair of them had to interact with lightwaves, and the other pair of eyes had to be produced by that interaction so we could get aware of it. Instead of relying on such a bizarre theory, I would rather say that we don't know what our actual senses are and that what we call our senses is just proxy objects to our actual senses that correlate with our awareness of objects. We can never know what our actual senses are, because we can never perceive them directly.
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