DiscoveryJoy

Also, not sure what to make of this statement involving the term "faculty". It seems that what is really meant by "the result of the interaction" is not really that what it sounds like. If I think of a "result", I think of a separable output of something, as from a machine. By it seems like in this answer, "result" doesn't really mean that. It means something he calls "a faculty". What exactly does it mean to be "a faculty of something"? If this faculty is a "property of the interaction", then what does that mean? Is it like "redness is a property of this apple, inseparable from it"? But if that's the case - if it is the case that our percepts, too, are such "properties of the interaction", then how could our consciousness observe them as "things", if they're not?

We first become aware and notice there is "this thing" and "that thing" etc. We don't start by knowing there are senses, or things that interact with them. We start by knowing only, there is "this thing" and "that thing" etc. If the term "entity" is really form-independent, then "entity" is not the right term that puts the "this thing" and "that thing" etc. under one concept. Its only "percepts" that does this. If its not "percepts", then I don't kow what other term would fit. "Mental objects"? "Objects in consciousness"? I thought "percepts" is the right term, so I'll continue to use it. We must first have this concept of "percept". And of consciousness. Otherwise we couldn't formultate the question: "How did the percepts come into our consciousness?", or "Are the percepts the primary causes of existence?" I don't see how else we could reflect on such general questions without first having the concepts at hand that these questions depend on. Then we can try to answer those questions. We can argue that in the big world out there, there seems to be so much stuff. How could all this stuff reach our consciousness directly just like that? Doesn't make sense, there must be a medium, a means to consciousness. And all this stuff out there in reality must have acted on that medium, so that the result is the percepts we get. So we must also conclude, that the percepts are actually not really primary causes, but come from stuff that must be out there and the medium that must be close to our consciousness. How do we call all this stuff that acted on the medium? Right, entities.

To the neurologist. Where's the contradiction? Let her first regain her ability to observe percepts. Note: Percepts, not just sensations. Let the neurologist repair whatever is damaged, so she can then rise up again from the automatic and baby-like sensational to the equally automatic perceptual level, and then form her concepts. But I also hope you don't mean to equate the term "concept" with "entity". As you also seem to falsely equate "sensations" and "percepts", just like Hume does.

Hope you see my recent answer to Eiuol relates to this.

What makes me say that is: If we only have direct contact to percepts, then we first have to form the concepts of "percept" and of "consciousness" from the many percepts we are aware of. After doing that, we can ask: How is it possible for us to be aware of the percepts? And what is their metaphysical status? We can then create a line of argument leading to the idea that there must be something like a means to consciousness that has provided us with the percepts (see my line of argument right after the illustration). Part of this idea is also that certain other things must have acted on that means to consciousness. A term for these other things is "entities", abstractly defined. About the first paragraph: Aren't you just saying "it depends on how you define the term 'apple' "? About the second paragraph: Yes, IF it's the last one. Why is it?

"Linked to awareness by abstraction"? Why to awareness? I'd say to be aware of a percept is already to be aware, no need to link it to awareness otherwise. Just a need to link it to that which exists independent of our senses. Explained away correspondence? Why? I realized right from start (see my illustration) that there has to be some sort of correspondence. The question is what sort of? 1:1? n:1? 1:n? etc. "percepts might contain more (or less) content than is presented by your senses"? I'd say that percepts are what is presented by our senses. And they correspond to something that exists independent of our senses. And that's where the question of "what sort of correspondence?" comes in. Yes, you can. You can be aware of the percepts. That's what you start with. The choice to integrate them into or to use them to create concepts is yours. In other words, the recognition that they are percepts, that they come from your senses after some external objects have acted on them, so there must be some external objects.... - recognizing that there actually is such a thing as perception and that what you get to be aware of is only its product, is your choice.

Because we know external objects only through abstraction, through the conceptual level. Without thinking, i.e., with only the perceptual level, we can only know percepts. Their correspondence or a lack thereof to objects can only be known through the conceptual level and logical integration. Exactly! Only of percepts. That was the whole point right at the beginning of the illustration. An object can never reach your conciousness directly, only a percept can. It is only conception based on perception that then allows us to be aware of objects. Be aware of them indirectly, not in the direct sense of our consciousness having direct contact with them. We know objects only through inference in an abstract sense, i.e. from the fact that we have percepts. As something we cannot directly consume but we know must exist somehow. That's why the whole issue of correspondence seems so difficult to answer.

Well, yes there is: Even if you're blind, you can know you have eyeballs by touching it, feeling it with your hand. If you do that, the percept of some rubber-like ball pops up in your head. Do you really think that this is what most people would subconsciously hold when their consciousness gets in contact with the forms? I think we rather define our world in terms of the percepts alone. And what we subconsciously really mean by "this thing here" and "that thing there" is just the percept. Without any reference to the whole process necessary to produce that percept, without any reference to the fact that they actually are percepts. By asking "how do you know" I meant not "what are all the physical processes involving sense organs that enable us to know" but just "tell me, what you have to do to know that the eyeball exists"

Thanks for your many comments, I will get to them some other time (not ignoring you).

Some of your comments have led me to ask the question: How do we know we have certain things we call "eyes" etc. That is, completely irrespective of their function. If you say that functionality is already implied in the concepts or definitions of eyes, noses etc., then fine, let me better ask: How do we know we have eyeballs etc.? I feel compelled to ask this question because from your comments I was under the impression that you don't think eyeballs etc. are percepts. That claim is a contradiction to me, a contradiction to the fact that we do not need to form any abstraction to know we have eyeballs etc. Do you agree then, that just eyeballs - not eyes - etc. are percepts?

Not really asking about the mechanism of perception here. Just asking "how do you know you have the things you call eyes, ears, etc.", irrespective of what purpose these things serve. Just the senses as things. I'd say you know them not by abstraction. You don't deduce that there are certain round balls in your face, but you know it directly when you just touch your face with your hand. You don't deduce "yes, there must be some soft ball in my face, I know this from abstract theory". You know it from directly perceiving it. Which means, there is nothing wrong with saying that your eyes are percepts. But how would the senses even be allowed to perceive themselves? Maybe one can solve this dilemma by recognizing that there are several senses, and to perceive one, you must use another. Perceiving the eye (irrespective of its visual functionality) by means of touch, perceiving one of your touch organs (irrespective of their tactile functionality) by means of another one of your touch organs and your eyes, etc. Each sense organ (or parts of it) can take changing roles (a percept or a means to perception), depending on what is being perceived at the given moment. But you can never perceive one of the sense organ objects directly by means of the very sense organ object you want to perceive. You must always resort to your other sense organs for that. I think this way, it might all still be logical and non-contradictory as a whole. Not sure about the difference between "analysed as distinct" and "divorcing" here. What I mean is regarding the percept and the process as metaphysically separate things. How would it stop me from also recognizing the role the process has for producing the percept, as long as you can establish a causal relationship between the two?

Don't you think this is self-contradicting? Where is the problem with divorcing percepts from the process? In other words, where is the problem with divorcing result data that our consciousness absorbs from the process that produced that result data? Consciousness is a process, right. A process of objectively becoming aware of that which has been produced. So another process precedes it. The process of producing that which one may then become aware of. So there are two processes: The one of producing data and the one of becoming aware of it. Inbetween these two processes there is the data. That data is the output of the former, and the input to the latter process. So there are really three things. It's only that something must do the producing for you to do the consuming. It's only in that sense, that the form (the data) doesn't exist on its own.

Well, I would have to ask then: How do you know there even is such a thing as eyes and touch organs? If you say, you cannot perceive them by at least some means, how do you even know they exist at all? And why do - all of a sudden - medics and neuro-scientists do have the ability to look AT sense organs? The funny thing is though, that Objectivists would probably stone you for that :-D They would probably say that there is no "representation" of anything, because they somehow merge the whole thing - the external objects and the form of perception into one. Which is legitimate, since there is no such thing as only the form or only the external objects during perception. Seems to me that this allows them to say "we are perceiving external objects directly", since they always hold the necessity of form in their sub-conscience. They identify the fact that they implicitly perceive external objects by perceiving forms. I see the justification for this, but still don't see how it solves the problem of correspondence. Looks more like just a linguistic rearrangement to me, one that allows for a higher epistemic self-satisfaction. Because I think that most people attach to the term "perception" the mere semantics of becoming aware of the content (the form), irrespective of how it came into being, not even recognizing that it actually is a form. They just want to know "there is this thing" or "that thing" and want to know the metaphysical status of the form by asking: Does this thing (by this they only mean the form) exist so, independent of our senses? If yes, then "yes, we are directly perceiving reality the way it exists external to us" (which naive realitsts hold). If no, then "no, we do not perceive reality as it is, but only a representation". Extremists like Kant would go even further and pretend like we created the forms - not with our own senses - but somehow with our own mind. I don't see the problem with focusing on the form separately and asking about its metaphysical status. One can do that and at the same time formulate true statements.

I have said what they are if not: Just another set of objects in "the world our consciousness observes". One that is subject to certain correlations with other objects from the world our consciousness observes, too. As I explained here: Well, there has to be a means of consciousness one way or the other, whether sensual or not, and I have explained why here in detail: I have explained it as a derivative of only the axioms of consciousness and identity: Well, first of all, we are neither babies nor low-level insects, so pure sensations isn't something we perceive anymore. But anyway: Yes, as I said, we can observe the interaction between the senses and other objects within the world our consciousness observes. In other words, we can "sense the sensing". But that sensing merely correlates with the "feather" and the "tree". We only know: The latter two objects are in our consciousness only when that sensing happens. We don't know why. You're missing part of the point. Part of the whole point is that it seems to be unanswerable to me what really does the producing, except in abstract terms (some external objects and some means to consciousness interacting). If we could observe what does the producing, it would immediately raise the question of "by what means did we observe that thing"? We would have to deduce yet another means to observe "the thing that does the producing". Another means unequals "the thing that does the producing", because otherwise, it wouldn't really be the means. So in any case, there is no ultimate answer to what really does the producing. Except in abstract terms. If - in equally abstract terms - it is possible to answer my question regarding one-to-one correspondence, that would be fine. Well, if the means of consciousness are sense organs, how come we can perceive them, instead of just using them? By what means did we perceive our sense organs? By using our sense organs? What sense organs? The ones we perceived? Perceived by what means? .... I don't see how you can live with this dilemma. I don't see how you cannot see the infinite regress this entails. The contradictions. The non-identity of the senses. This is what I have explained here to integrate the senses into the big picture without such contradictions/regress/dilemma: ...then our sense organs would move into the grey box, into "the world our consciousness doesn't observe", which totally contradicts the facts. Obviously, our consciousness does observe our sense organs. I do, for the reason stated above: Our consciousness observes them. Perhaps your next addition - on top of the ones you already mentioned - would be to just extend the yellow box so that it swallows the right blue box? Well, that would totally leave unanswered how the senses (then in the blue box) get into our consciousness. Even an abstract explanation would be missing in the drawing. Well, which one is it that you mean? Objectivist (Rand) or Presentationalist (= Kant)? Or is it, as I gather from your previous arguments with Plasmatic, that you don't think they are complete opposites?

Okay, here we go. Closely compare the following words to the illustration above, or print out the illustration, or download it and put it on your 2nd screen (if you have one) to avoid scrolling up and down all the time: Let's start with the tree and the feather. We are aware of something which we call a "tree". And of something else which we call "a feather" (see the two upper white boxes on the right). No knowledge of anything else is required to know that the perceptual "tree" and the perceptual "feather" exist. No knowledge of any senses, no knowledge of objects acting on any such senses. The tree and the feather are a facts "out there", in the sense that they exist independent of our consciousness. Whether or not they exist independent of our senses or of other things is a completely different question of its own. Things like the tree or the feather are part of the world our consciousness observes (hence the light yellow background). Things that our consciousness is in contact with in the most direct sense possible and that we do not have any need or freedom to deduce from anything else. It is only further reflection that allows us to know that there must be something more out there than just the things like the "tree" or the "feather". What sort of reflection? Well, the very fact that we are conscious of anything at all tells us that we have consciousness. The fact that we have consciousness tells us that we have it, that it exists. The fact that it exists tells us that it is something, that it has identity. The fact that it has identity tells us that it can't just be "everywhere", floating around, docking to arbitrary objects in an infinite universe, instantly, simultaneously and at its own whim, but that it can be consciousness only of something that happens at a fixed and condensed medium that it is permanently attached to: That there must be a certain means to consciousness (see right blue box). And that some external objects (see all the left blue boxes) must act on that means, interact with it, so that this interaction (see left red box) can produce (see red continuous arrows) certain results (see all the white boxes) for us to be aware of. Only thereby is consciousness even possible. But if we are aware only of the results, then we are aware only of the results. So all that consciousness really is, is the awareness of interaction results. Not of the external objects per se, not of our means to consciousness per se, but only of the results of their interaction. This does not mean that those results are subjective (they are the most objective thing on earth). It does not mean they are some sort of narrative, or invented, or constructed, or anything else of that kind. They still just are what they are: Results. And objective facts. Directly observed by our consciousness. It does mean, however, that they exist only as long as the external objects are interacting with our means to consciousness. Because for the time that nothing is interacting with our means to consciousness, there is really just the external objects and our means of consciousness, both in no contact with each other, hence no result produced, hence nothing to be conscious of. Only the external objects are really always "out there" in the truest sense of the word. It is, however, thinkable, that the results could exist even in moments when we are not conscious of them. I see no contradiction in the idea that the external objects interact with our means to consciousness, producing the usual results, but these results for some reason don't reach our consciousness. If this is how consciousness must work, then this is how consciousness must work. It means that all things that we are directly aware of are results. Only results, and nothing but results. Results of an interaction between some kind of external objects and some means to consciousness that our consciousness must be clinging to. Whatever those external objects may be, and whatever that means to consciousness may be. We know that the latter two things must exist, and we know this necessity from the very fact of our own consciousness only (We do not know this necessity from the fact that we have sense organs.) We don't have any direct awareness of these two things, they are logically deduced abstractions, so they are part of a world our consciousness doesn't observe (hence the light grey background). We have established that the world our consciousness observe is a world of results only. Since this is universally true, it also holds for the things we call our sense organs (see lower white box). After all, we are aware of them directly, they land in our consciousness without any invention or construction or any other manipulation on our part. And since our consciousness still works the way I described, the senses must be results, too, just like anything else, and for the very same reason: The very fact that we are directly aware of the senses means that we must have gained consciousness of them through some means, by some external objects acting on that means. Just like we gain consciousness of anything else. So how do we deal with the idea of "our sense organs being our means of perception"? Well, it is legitimate to say that there is a real unidirectional correlation between these sense organs' interaction with, for example, the feather (see right red box) and the feather itself. We (i.e. our consciousness) can observe the feather, yes (see green arrow B ). But we can observe the feather only in cases where it is also at the same time possible for us (or at least someone) to observe its interaction with our sense organs (see green arrow C). We can establish what the relationships are: Interaction means feather observed. No interaction means no feather observed. All these observations are direct observations within the world our consciousness observes. Normally, we would be inclined to say that "the senses are our means to perception, to consciousness". But then, if they are our means to consciousness, how come we (our consciousness) can observe them directly? Why are they not in the right blue box? Shouldn't it be impossible for our consciousness to observe its own means to it? After all, if the senses really are our means to consciousness, they shouldn't be its direct content (the result) at the same time. But they are its content, since we are directly aware of them. So they cannot be our means to consciousness. So what there is, is: Some external objects that act on our actual means to consciousness, producing the resulting "sense organs" of which we become conscious (see green arrow D). And the sense organs' interaction with e.g. the feather (see right red box) just happens to correlate (see dashed red arrow) with our consciousness of the very feather. That's all there is to say about "the sense organs". But the main question I have still stands: How does the tree that our consciousness observes correspond to really just one bounded particular, i.e. one external object, of the world our consciousness doesn't observe? How do we know its not, for example, the three external objects marked with "A" in the drawing corresponding to the tree which we then become aware of in observation A? Or more generally, how do we know there is really a one-to-one correspondence. Not many-to-one?

Abstract ideas can be very confusing and an image often tells more than a thousand words. For this reason, I have created a graphical illustration about my epistemic psychology which I will soon publish here with some words. After that, many things hopefully get clearer so we can deal with your recent posts, while being on the same page.

Well, it is hard to define for me what "completely corresponds to" should mean. We perceive in forms. With colors, textures, shape, you name it. Certainly I don't expect those things to be found in the external objects, though that would be great, of course. My focus was therefore on quantity. On whether for each perceptual object, there exists exactly one bounded particular out there that created that percept. Exactly one. Not more. And vice versa. That would suffice to defend individual rights. Also remember what I think about senses. I derive their existence from abstract theory starting from the fact of my own consciousness, not from witnessing the particular senses we know. So if you say "the nature of your senses", you have to keep in mind whether you are just talking about empirical properties of the senses we know, or about properties of the abstract senses as I defined them. So when I say "external object", I'm not just talking about the perceptual objects like some "rocks" that we can observe act on other percepts that we call our "eyes" etc. I'm talking about primary causes. Things really not in direct contact with our consciousness.

Well, why not? Yes, a percept isn't produced by consciousness, that's part of what I'm saying. And why shouldn't unconscious percepts be a potentiality, after all, they are just things. Unless, of course, if it is part of the definition of "percept" that they are perceived by someone. But in that case, it is still possible to define a new word for that which our consciousness is in direct contact with and assert that it can be unconscious, i.e. with no consciousness perceiving it. Where's the problem? I think that the cognitive achievement of understanding this possibility would also be a good test of whether one has understood the primacy of existence. Well, maybe I don't know too much about hallucinations to tell whether they can be classified as percepts or not. So there are two possibilities: 1. Either it is necessary to put some interpretation into it for the believe in its reality to work. Just like you do in a dream or in everyday situations. In that case, there are some elements of interventions in it, so it is not a percept. For example, I am perceiving something from my window that I have no doubt is a tree, but I'm of course also too lazy to go out there and touch it to really confirm that. So I'm also putting some interpretation into it. But I could at any moment go out there and perceive it fully. If I can walk through it, though, I would have to call it a hallucination. 2. Or it really is a percept. That wouldn't change anything about it being real. A real perceptual object. And in a different camp than "fabrication", for which interpretation would be necessary. But how would you even then tell whether its a hallucination? If you say, you can't, well, why would you then even call it "hallucination"? And by "can't" I really mean can't, as in "you can really go through both the experiences equal to sight and touch and still can't tell the difference". Not just "seeing a ghost but you can still throw a stone through it".

By that I mean, it seems like you are getting my question right and starting to recognize its justification.

It takes me quite some time to understand some of your formulations or your choice of vocabulary, but there largely seems to be a proper understanding of my problem now. Will go through it all more closely later...

Yes, I have listened to the "All forms of perception are forms of perception"-part, if that's the one you mean. I also got that he somehow wants to demonstrate that everything is connected to everything. And that he concludes that "we do perceive reality directly". Don't really see the benefit of knowing that, since to me, perception is still one thing, getting perceptual objects into consciousness is another, and in the end of the day, we are still in contact with a product of interaction only.

It is different, because I don't think that the perceptual level requires the conceptual level. Therefore I don't like to call it "the phenomenal" world, because that term somehow implies exactly that (i.e. the perceptual level requiring the conceptual level).

You got my question only half-way right. Yes, my question is, how do we know what we perceive - the percept that we are confronted with - is really of a bounded object in the external world (if that's what you mean by "real object"). But definitely no, by no means am I asking "rather than a hallucination or a fabrication". To the contrary, I'm asking "rather than just a real perceptual object (nothing more but certainly nothing less either)". That's actually an important distinction I've been struggling to make clear throughout the entire threat. I do not believe in the primacy of consciousness, but of existence. Hallucination, fabrication or subjective construction etc. requires consciousness, they are one way or the other the product of conscious interpretation of some data. Perceptual objects do not require consciousness and are not any product of conscious interpretation, they are taken in passively and unaltered and therefore have no choice to be anything other than objective facts. They are just the product of some physical interaction, and therefore fully real. They could also just be spurting around for themselves, if not for some reason they happen to reach our consciousness as they do. I just don't get why you guys never seem to distinguish between independent of the senses and independent of consciousness. Those two are two completely different things. Something can be a fact of reality independent of consciousness but not independent of the senses. And that is exactly what percepts are. They are part of objective reality external to our consciousness. To what extend they give us a right to make claims about the objective reality external to our senses is an entirely different question of its own.

Not sure what you're saying here. If you're looking into a mirrow or if you just use your hand to feel your eyeball, what are you doing? You are getting the percept of an eyeball. Your consciousness is fed the direct information that there is an eyeball to know. If consciousness can only aquire the result of perception and if what it aquires in this case is an eyeball, then the eyeball must be a percept. I agree about what the form of perception depends on in 1) and 2). You say "in that sense", object to percept is one-to-one. Well, yes, but only in that sense. But that's not the sense in which one-to-one is thought of. Just by lumping whatever the external object/s is/are into one super-term of "one input", doesn't make that "one input" really "one bounded external object". Anything can be an "input". Just as a function can have many parameters, which we might then call the "one input". Again, how can this be claimed, since we don't even know anything about that thing to which something is added or not added in the first place? We cannot compare our percept to anything.

Because our consciousness is not in any direct contact with the external object of the branch. Only with the percept of the branch. So its perfectly legitimate to assert the one-to-many in the perceptual branches having many perceptual leaves, since you're staying in the perceptual world this way. What you cannot do is claim that the external object of the branch is really one bounded particular independent of your perceiving it. You cannot make any unquestionable statements of this kind about things that you're not in contact with. Which example do you mean here? Still talking about the branches?