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2046

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Everything posted by 2046

  1. 2046

    Immigration restrictions

    I don't mean prove guilt as in convicted of a crime. I mean meet positive standards before acting. If you are familiar with English common law there is such a principle based on private property rights called castle doctrine (as in "a man's home is his castle") in which a man has a right to repel unwarranted state intrusion from his property. The doctrine has been extended via English case law to ones person, papers, and effects, which are codified in the fourth amendment as requiring the government to demonstrate probable cause before subjecting a person to screening. If the government is required to meet an evidentiary standard before subjecting the citizen to screening, then that seems to call into doubt indiscriminate and general border screenings, even ones Objectivists seem to favor. Warrants have to be specific and individualized suspicion required of a search is a determination of when there is a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring. In the English case law Entick v. Carrington (1765) the chief judge said that general warrants were not the same as specific warrants and that parliament could not authorize general warrants.
  2. 2046

    Immigration restrictions

    I'll throw this out there for consideration. Take what may be called the "moral parity thesis" which has two parts (a) what counts as a threat from an immigrant is the same as a domestic resident and (b) what counts as a "political threat" is the same for a normal threat of assault. (Surely being on the other side of a border can't effect what rights you actually have?) Asking what if, instead if "make an unjust law" someone is say "someone should kill Jones" and no doubt a court having the task of applying the moral parity thesis would have to judge the extent to which any hostile action was actually taken. In the "someone should kill Jones" case only actually saying "I'm going to kill Jones" and only actually taking concrete steps to do this counts. In US civil law, "terroristic threats," "intimidation," and "assault" (which includes intent to assault) would have to be applied to the would-be socialist partisan. So if as currently, having the mere belief of wanting to commit a crime isn't enough to count itself as a crime, not even advocating "Jones should be killed" or "I would like it if Jones were killed by somebody" or forming an anti-Jones rally publishing an anti-Jones article. Only overt and imminent violent act or the display of intent to actually physically harm, such as planning, organizing, funding, as you say "activity" and not mere "belief-having" or "wishing" or even "advocating" will do. Saying "I'm going to kill Jones" is criminal, but not "I would like it if Jones were killed." If this analysis applies to political parties too, then forming and advocating socialist parties, including Nazi ones, but taking concrete steps to seize power could be treated as threatening under (b). A Fritz Kuhn could organize his rallies and goose step and so forth, but an Allende could be deposed. And so under (a) mere belief-possession or expression on the immigrants' behalf for wanting socialism or saying "we should allow cannibalism" or similar dark humor and the like can't be a threat in the same way that someone merely expressing wanting 2046 to be murdered isn't a crime. Under the moral parity thesis, Mister Swig's immigration restriction would not survive. Note that if one takes mere belief-possession of wrongdoing to be a crime, then literally any political party except the Mister Swig party would be illegal. Not even a Capitalist or Objectivist party because these people constantly disagree with one another all the time about what counts as force or crime. Any non-utopian system will have to acknowledge the concept that men have differing interpretations of reality and have mechanisms for resolving this peacefully. In fact, such is one might say a basic requirement for a free society. John Locke in the Letters Concerning Toleration, for example, that having differing interpretations of justice is just part of being human and a consequence of epistemic objectivity. To paraphrase Mises, the "ban all non-x political parties" can never imagine anyone other than himself having the power to liquidate his enemies.
  3. 2046

    Immigration restrictions

    Some people (most notably people who are trying to ape Rand) think throwing "objective" in front of various words seems to have some very special powers. What philosophical content does the distinction add? A contextual qualifier? What does that even mean? A "threat" is an acontextual one and an "objective threat" is a contextual one? Is that philosophically useful? What content does that even add? If I'm constructing an argument does that enhance the argument in any way? Do you see the problem here? What kind of objectivity is even being invoked here? There's at least 12 different notions of objectivity in philosophy denoting various things, and it's not clear what you're even trying to denote here. Value-objectivity? Epistemic-objectivity? Rand's understanding of objectivity as epistemic-objectivity is based on her theory of concepts which she claims treats concepts "as neither revealed nor invented, but as produced by man's consciousness in accordance with the facts of reality" (ITOE 54.) In other words, concepts are instruments for human knowing whose content is dictated by abstraction from perceptual data. "Objectivity" is a concept denoting normative epistemic method, not a positive description of the content or nature of things. To say "oh no, you see, I only mean 'objective threats' here" really adds nothing to the content of just what a threat is, and when you use it as if does, it comes off as a kind of category mistake. Threats aren't "objective," threats are threats. Making the distinction between "threats" simpliciter and "objective threats" is really just another way of saying "only the threats that I want to qualify as threats count as threats, you see," which of course is to assume that which you need to prove. What is a threat, and what is it a threat to, how is it a threat, and why is this a purpose of government, and what problem is this solving for a social system? Saying "x, y, and z are threats to the general welfare or public good and thus are appropriate for government action" is just about the vaguest and meaningless argument one can concoct. Adding "but it's an objective threat in a certain context!" is a question begging redundancy.
  4. 2046

    Immigration restrictions

    In endorsing political end X, the logic of the position does lead somewhere, even if you don't want to recognize it. If you endorse thoughtcrime for immigrants in the name of preserving the general welfare, the logic of the position will lead to policing thoughtcrime amongst the domestic citizens on the same grounds. Your approval of it is irrelevant.
  5. 2046

    Immigration restrictions

    Let's start over because I already responded to that post. That post doesn't qualify as an argument. An argument has a major and minor premise connected by necessity to a conclusion. In that post you establish "public safety measures" which leads to "objective threat" which leads to "barring anti-American beliefs." You see the problem here? The conclusion is unconnected to the premises, and the premises contain no reason for their support. It is as if I said "my government policy is intended to be a species of public decorum measures. The government must first, before you can act freely, determine if you represent and objective threat to politeness. Therefore it follows that you must submit to screening for rude beliefs. Then you can move about after such a determination has been made." Nor are matters made better if I shift the scope of the society to a western frontier. "It is as if, in a small Western frontier, the town were to establish politeness protocols. After all, don't want folks going around being rude. Now extrapolate that onto a fully modern society." You see how this example adds nothing in the form of reason-giving work to the bad argument? Why don't you try to reformulate your own thoughts more clearly and distinctly. You start off with what you think the task of government is trying to solve, what principles you think will solve this task at the political level, and how belief-control policies necessarily follow from those principles. Try to put it in logic book or syllogistic format.
  6. 2046

    Immigration restrictions

    My point wasn't to demand an exact blueprint, but to point out, to echo Eiuol's comments, that in advocating end X, you have to know what it is about the means to X that makes it good or choiceworthy. Social phenomena takes places on multiple different and conceptually distinct levels of varying degrees of generality and specificity (the ethical, the psychological, the linguistic, the economic, the political, the legal, the constitutional, the strategic etc.) to be sure. But those levels are always systematically interrelated (such was a great point of Ayn Rand's cultural criticism.) In analyzing social phenomena, the analyst can certainly focus on one of these levels while shifting the others into the background but never treating them as separate from each other or completely ignoring them. If you don't know anything about the means to political end X, you can't sufficiently explain or justify X. Echos of this are in criticisms of, eg., Chomsky's advocacy of anarchism with his refusal to explain what it is his system would include or how to achieve it. Moreover, even in endorsing a set of philosophical principles regarding X as an end, the logic of those principles does lead somewhere, whether you want to think about those means or not. If you endorse screening immigrants for thoughtcrime, whether you personally wish to acknowledge it, the logic of your position will lead one to endorse screening natives for thoughtcrime, eugenics for childbirthing and thoughtcrime, internal propaganda for thought control, and the doctrine of prior restraint as a legal policy. Even if you explicitly make an exception to refuse these consequences, you can see due to the consequences of accepting the original principles, that does not matter. Followers won't have to be committed to those exceptions.
  7. 2046

    Immigration restrictions

    Here's another thought experiment that I hypothesize to explain why all of these arguments (to the extent that they are mostly raw assertions) are so unthoughtful and easy to shoot down. They are not complex philosophies. They are not made by reference to some standard by which we can judge the moral worth of an action, or by reference to one principle or norm for living in a human community (even a non-national one.) Just like most "Marxists" don't even know Marx' mature theoretical metaphysics and philosophy of historical materialism and reason themselves into socialism, they start out with ressentiment and look for rationalizations. The cause, as is here is primarily psychological motivation. Whether in this case be racism or fear of the other, or some foggy fear of losing cultural identity, I don't know. And so the immigration restrictionists don't start out with some principle tied into an integrated political philosophy that leads to restrictions on movement, like conservative or communitarian thinkers. They start with the need to restrict and then post hoc look for fuzzy and vague notions to paper it over. To experiment with this I suppose the following scenario. Suppose some wealthy landowner in Texas offers for rent some land, and receives 1 billion Zulus, Hindus, Ibos (Nigerians), Albanians, and Bangladeshis (ZHIABs.) Posit that all 1 billion ZHIABs are, at the time of entry, totally free of contagious pathogens, non-criminal and non-terrorist, 100% peaceful and non-rights-abrogating individuals. But the ZHIABs all carry with them their cultures and will import that into the US. Would then, we imagine any of our immigration restrictionists saying, "well okay, I'm fine with the ZHIABs living here then. They've passed the test. Welcome to America, ZHIABs!" No of course not. Something tells me, for some reason or another, some new criteria will be concocted.
  8. 2046

    Immigration restrictions

    But you realize this hasn't solved or even attempted to solve any of the issues raised in the previous post. This does not solve the positive-negative rights tension. Nor does it explain why, if you're justified in demanding one set group submit themselves to be scanned by your technology, why does the other group get to be exempt? They might violate rights just as well, better scan them too. And childbirthing also. Suppose the foetus can be scanned to see if it will violate rights and commit crimes against currently living citizens in the future. If so, then it must be barred form entry, ie., forcibly aborted, on the same grounds. If your argument against immigrants works, as newcomers, then it works for foetus scanning on the same grounds. If the mother refuses to be scanned, then police activity must take place. You guys really have not thought through your positions.
  9. 2046

    Immigration restrictions

    Polygraphy is widely criticized.[15][16][17] Despite claims of 90% validity by polygraph advocates, the National Research Council has found no evidence of effectiveness.[16][18] The utility among sex offenders is also poor, with insufficient evidence to support accuracy or improved outcomes in this population.[19][20] But let us suppose your test is perfect and infallible. Suppose I go to your house and ask you "Are you going to leave me alone?" You respond that you're not going to answer me and tell me to begone. I then go to your workplace and again pester you "Sir, are you or are you not going to leave me alone?!" Again you dismiss me. I go to your church, your kid's school, your wife while she's shopping. "If you don't answer me, I'll arrest you and deport you! Now are you or are you not going to leave me alone?!" There's something odd about this behavior I'm exibiting. I'm subjecting you to harassment in the name of making sure there's no harassment. You don't owe me an answer, you don't owe me anything, under a negative rights conception. You only owe me not to interfere with my life and property, which you are not, even when you are not answering my repeated questions. If I am to force you to answer me, I am thrusting a positive obligation onto you. This is not compatible with basic negative individual rights. I refuse your test and your request for positive action on my behalf for your ends. What now? If your answer is to subject me to government force, then your demand has some problems. And it is a "demand" not an argument. "I think this is moral and proper" is an assertion, not an argument.
  10. 2046

    Immigration restrictions

    The fact that there is a law about X says nothing about why there ought to be a law about X. I'm not trying to be snarky, by the way, but my comments are designed to show you that your arguments are greatly underdeveloped. You haven't really done anything other than state your opinion that those with "anti-American beliefs" (whatever that means) ought to be banned. An argument is something with a major and minor premise connected by necessity to a conclusion. You've given us a raw statement. Suppose I gave the following argument: In my view an objective impoliteness is not an intrinsic impoliteness. So it would have to be identified in whatever context applied to your particular situation. In our current situation, I think we should screen immigrants moving from Brooklyn to Queens for objective impoliteness, to be determined if their are holding rude-beliefs. I abstract away from your notions of "threat" and "distress" and "anti-American" to help you focus on the structure of the above argument. Notice how the premises are not supported at any point by argument? Notice too how the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises? Adding "contextual" and "objective" in front of certain words doesn't help either, it doesn't actually add or modify any content. Moreover it has many additional problems. It endorses prior restraint theory. Now before I can take an action, I have to prove to the government that I don't hold certain beliefs. This breaks the principle that the government has to prove that I acted wrongly before subjecting me to state action. Additionally who is the one to decide what beliefs count as anti-American? You and your gang? How are they to provide this "screening?" A standardized test? Can't the subject just answer "I love America" even if they held anti-American beliefs? What could your test accomplish? Would you then ban groups based on perceived identity? Again, then eugenics and propaganda, or childbirth must be controlled too, on those grounds. It's great that you recognize essentially "I want to ban people that hold beliefs that I don't like" but your viewpoint has a lot to answer for. And adding "they are objective threats" or "they cause me objective distress" doesn't to the reason-giving work you seem to think that it does.
  11. 2046

    Immigration restrictions

    What about domestic citizens that have anti-American beliefs? Shall we afford them the opportunity to attend our reeducation camps or shall we just deport them with the migrants? And what if I live in California, but only have anti-Nevadan beliefs, shall I be permitted residence in California, but not travel to Nevada? And surely childbirth must be permitted only to loyal pro-American families, for we must ensure that these newcomers also do not entertain anti-American beliefs.
  12. 2046

    The Case for Open Objectivism

    Hello, police? These brown people are disturbing me, all sitting in their house having dinner and such. Go get 'em.
  13. 2046

    The Case for Open Objectivism

    This analogy only works if the entire country is like one big "house" that the government owns. Since it is not, what this would have to mean is that you claim the power to restrict visitors that I have judged to be of value to me from visiting my house because you don't like their views (or really what you perceive their views might be.) Restrict your own visitors from your own "house" at your own expense.
  14. 2046

    The Case for Open Objectivism

    And again Eiuol and I already explicitly denied this atomistic fallacy, and explained why from the fact that even though we do believe "human sociality matters," it doesn't follow that "groups must be controlled for." Your argument is a non sequitur and your constant mantra-like repetition is ignoring what we are actually saying. You are knocking down an imaginary naive individualist strawman.
  15. 2046

    (My answer to) four objections to Objectivism

    Nice, where'd you pick that one up from?
  16. 2046

    The Case for Open Objectivism

    Indeed there is a tension in his thought and it can only be resolved by one of the two factors "trumping" or taking primacy over the other. Either rights will trump and "race/tribe" will be dilluted, or race/tribe will be trump and "rights" will be dilluted. Both concepts can't stand as is, one has to give way. Given his definition of "rights" earlier, it's clear that he has already committed himself to his social ontology (which I commented on earlier) and thus "rights" become permissions that the race/tribe allow you. In this way, Azrael has an "atomistic" myth of his own, since since race/tribe is equivalent to the self-sufficiency he falsely attributes to us at the individual level.
  17. That may be fine, but let me be clear on what my argument is. I'm saying transcendent and universal in form of argument, not transcendent and universal in geographic scope of its conclusion. We have already seen Hazony's favored nationalism³ requires deontic-like claims. It may be that for his nationalism², he is searching for some formal property of "liberalism" that will lead him to "we must have multiple states, and not one world government." But, as my argument above stresses, liberalism is a specific kind of solution ("basic, negative individual rights and private property") to a specific kind of problem ("what is government and why do men need it?" or more abstractly the problem of human community.) Thus, someone working from an inductive and largely Aristotelian-in-spirit framework doesn't require one truth to rule them all, or for norms that are deontic, or transcendent, or universal/universalizable, or that solve all political problems. We work in terms of principles where the fitness of said principles is determined by (a) what in reality gave rise to the need for them and (b) how well they solve those problems. Liberalism is one solution to one set of problems. Not-having-a-world-government (Hazony's nationalism²) is another (questions of centralization-decentralization in scope and structure.) For this reason we are not bothered by Hazony's "liberalism cannot justify dividing that function up over different parcels of land" problem.
  18. Why not? Sure, liberalism contains no a priori principle from which to deduce such a division of functions, there are many different ways of conceiving different types of government forms as liberalisms. You can't start with "should we have one world government, or many?" and then go "liberalism doesn't tell me!" You have to start with the anarchist's challenge, what is government and why do men need it? If you start a chain of reasoning that ends up with you need a government to protect liberty (that is, basic negative individual rights and private property) then you have a rough outline of liberalism. You can then ask what kind of constitution would best accomplish this: should we have a liberal monarchy, a parliament, an aristocracy, etc., should we draw names out of a hat, and so on. You look at various institutions and ask what incentive mechanisms these have for making the government work, and the centralization-decentralization issue is a part of that. At that point, one can address whether one world government or various national states would be a better political/legal framework for liberalism within that. It's an inductive enterprise, and there may not be one specific transcendent or universal answer, no neat little principle, but you may end up with a range of best options for what is appropriate for a given geographic area, a given culture, at a given time, etc.
  19. 2046

    The Case for Open Objectivism

    So... But like... You're literally affirming what Eiuol is saying...
  20. Well here we find a definite rub of contention. I'll leave aside the logic involved in how you can have a non-consensual mutual loyalty, here. But how does one "receive" or "inherit" a duty towards such a collective that establishes demands on individuals regardless of whether one consents? How is this demand "established"? How is it "received"? How is it "inherited"? A moral necessity to perform certain actions just intrinsically present, without regard to any ends of the individual, is something from a duty-based paradigm of ethics. If this is the deeper ethical structure underlying Hazony's conception of "nationalism," then ultimately this may indeed forebode a rejection of liberty. The demands of duty towards our inherited collective establish a "moral pull" on us that we cannot alter. But if one were to reject this ethical paradigm and accept an account of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics that is sufficiently individualistic, social, pluralistic, and objective, then one may have trouble being bothered by such collectivist guilt trips. Next he'll be claiming liberalism promotes the "atomized individual" gasp! Nor does the rest of the argument really follow. Arguments about the family can take place within a liberal polity. Arguments about the family cannot really proceed on equal footing when the political/legal system structurally prejudices one form of familial connection over another. Who then is trying to force someone to submit to their pre-determined universalist vision? It is possible the relationship between the ethical order and the political/legal order is neither direct nor isomorphic. Even if there are familial obligations (consistent with an Aristotelian-Randian account of human flourishing, eg., oikeiôsis) it hardly follows this is a concern of politics. The domain of moral obligation may be wider than the domain of political/legal action, so we'd have to know what justifies, if anything, moving from one to the other. ("Family is a human good" to "you must be forced by the political/legal system to maintain any given familial memberships in such and such form.") But regardless, it's hard to see how this is an argument for nationalism² or that nationalism² is an argument for family-tribal statism? (1) there ought to be varies national states, instead of one-world government (nationalism²) (2) there are responosibilities that are intrinsic to both inherited and adopted membership in collectives of this kind, establishing demands on individuals that do not arise as a result of consent and do not disappear if consent is withheld. Both 1 and 2 are coherent with each other, but does 1 necessitate 2? Clearly not. Is 1 and 2 then serving as a package deal for nationalism³ ("You must be forced by the political/legal system to live for the sake of family, clan, or tribe, that this constitutes moral service to the unchosen group, the group into which you were born, the group to which you were predestined to belong by the sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient power of your body chemistry"[VOR 117])? Is 1 really the guiding principle doing all the work in this version of "nationalism," or is 2? If so, how is this brand of nationalism not just plain old tribalism and statism?
  21. This is all nice and everything, but it cannot be simply assumed that the basis for a political/legal structure is "we should extrapolate from epigenetics", nor did you explain how this can suffice as a principle. As stated in the other thread, to which we are now simply repeating, since human flourishing is both individual, social, and diversive, a principle is needed that encompasses an open-ended and cosmopolitan range of social connectivity that is not static and limited, nor pre-set and pre-determined. Saying "well according to epigenetics, we seek a variety of relationships" is just restating the problem in different words.
  22. Okay, but then you have to ask what work is nationalism² really doing here? What problem is it solving? Since people do, in fact, hold nationalism¹ and it has historically been what we refer to by the word "nationalism," what is to be gained by adopting nationalism² as the new "nationalism"? Just like the Sophists of old played word games and used the power of equivocation to advance their views, we have to be careful with what the answer to the above is. Take the following claims: 1. There should be national states, viz., there should be no single one world government. 2. Such national states as do exist should be formed on the basis of X. Whatever X is said to be here, it cannot be that simply holding to (1) provides a reason for it. So asserting nationalism² here, cannot provide a basis, any basis, for any principle on which to structure any particular social and political institutions. It isn't really a normative political principle at all, except for opposing world government. It doesn't say anything about what those national states should be. Nationalism²/(1) maybe be one organizing principle, compatible with a great many of other principles, both those such as hate-mongering and chauvinism, protectionism and immigration barriers, as well as a cosmopolitan liberal capitalism. Seems like with enough packaging, the "virtue" this nationalism² is servicing, could really be any political order short of a one world government.
  23. On the first paragraph, none of that is necessary for a liberal political order. I could just as well turn the tables on you, yes people's values and interests are limited, yet varied and diverse, that is precisely why a cosmopolitan liberal order is an answer to the problem of human community that is designed precisely to respect this diversive, yet limited aspect of human interests by not organizing the political/legal structure around one specific language or tribal affiliation. Language use, as Mises points out, provides a natural bases for shared value, and so while certainly shared language can help start a political order, it doesn't end there, and a lingua franca develops spontaneously on the market to solve problems of connectivity and shared values without needing to force anyone to submit to it. Likewise, uniform legal structures develop spontaneously due to repeating interactions on the basis of limited, yet diversive shared valuws without having to have a philosopher-king design a static universal law and force people to submit to it. On your conceptual framework around the definition of "nationalism," whether I am internalizing imperialist lies and oppression is an emotionalist non-argument. Let us say we have two meanings here: nationalism¹ "my nation is the awesomest and should conquer the other ones in some way" nationalism² "there should be different nations and not one world government" Note that these are not mutually exclusive or incompatible claims necessarily. If we do that same for imperialism, too, then we have a real set of packaged deals here. Moreover nationalism² is both coherent and compatible (as Mises points out) with a cosmopolitan liberal order. Is this new conceptual framework a help to understanding, or a hindrance? Is it making packaged deals?
  24. A cosmopolitan state based on universal legal structure and shared values, and not on family, tribe, and clan? Does your taxonomy define that one out of existence? Or would you call this imperialist domination, no doubt? A problem with this analysis, not only in that it seems to package deal tribalism and decentralization on one hand and world-government and cosmopolitanism on the other hand, is that it seems to sap the meaning to the terms. Nationalism no longer means "my nation is the awesomest, and we should conquer those other ones with military force" because that would be an imperialist nationalism, which can't exist according to you. So that ("my nation is the awesomest...") would be a form of non-nationalism now, a the-exact-opposite-of-nationalism. Imperialism, which used to mean a country seeking military domination over another, now means a peaceful and liberal country extending its scope of commercial trade and free migration with another liberal country would be imperialistic centralization. At what point does redefining already-existing terms into unrelated new terms become unhelpful? If the question is "should we have one world government or a multiplicity of different countries"? that seems one valid question, but to give those two positions the names "nationalism" and "imperialism" seems to package deal some already-existing meanings. There are many nationalisms and imperialisms and they don't all fit nicely into your little boxes. Perhaps I may suggest use the terms "multi-nationalism" and "supra-statism"? Or "global poly-governmentalism (GPG)" versus "global mono-governmentalism (EMG)"? We should seek to deconstruct package deals, not construct them, should we not? The same applies to things like "globalism" and and the immigration debate today, that help obscure rather than elucidate.
  25. 😂 Ludwig von Mises on Liberalism, Nationalism, and Self-Determination By Richard M. Ebeling https://www.aier.org/article/ludwig-von-mises-liberalism-nationalism-and-self-determination
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