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Eiuol

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About Eiuol

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  • Experience with Objectivism Rand related: All major works. (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Virtue of Selfishness, Atlas Shrugged, etc)

    Peikoff related: OPAR and three lecture series (Objectivism Through Induction, Understanding Objectivism, Unity in Ethics and Epistemology)

    Tara Smith related: Most things, including Viable Values and Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics.

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  1. Dunno, I don't know what "strictly pragmatic" means here. All concepts are useful, but aren't -only- measured by their utility.
  2. From the article. But this is basically what philosophy of mind a information needs to be a significant field of philosophical study. Among our mundane and technical concepts, information is currently not only one of the most important and widely used, but also one of the least understood. We need a philosophy of information. nd language does. He's not wrong, but he's behind the times. Perhaps ethics is a bad field to be in. From my limited experience in upper level academia, the jargon-laden works are in a some humanities like sociology or gender studies. Philosophy isn't doing so bad. On the other hand, cognitive science is my area. I only really deal with people concerned about information, knowledge, and concepts.
  3. The entity itself. That is, any meaning comes from particulars, and exactly those particulars. Any uniting essence is epistemic as far as being a mental construction, classifications of particulars of features that other particulars also have. There is nothing that unites this cat and that cat as the concept 'cat' except my identifying a similarity between them. There is no "perfect" cat either in the sense some features are not shared. This is how I understand Rand as not a nominalist but not like Aristotle either. I believe nominalists like Wittgenstein deny that perception is direct or at least would argue for some subjective notion of perspective.
  4. To add to this: while of course we can commend people for helping to fund an objective legal system, paying legal fees for a legion of good lawyers suggests that the system has issues. Would Hogan deserve less justice if he had no money to afford lawyers? The law is one area where the market isn't a good idea - there is no -market- for justice, as there is no -market- for violence. So setting caps may make sense - such a regulation is permissible when the point of law is that it underlies all of society. If unbalanced punishment were the only option, this would not be justice. I find "it'll take care of itself" isn't reassuring either - there has to be a definite means provided beforehand. Markets don't need that, but legal systems do. A lot of non-liberal leftists (e.g. Communists) largely claims that ANY capitalistic society with markets cannot implement equal justice. But the important thing about Oism is importance of the law as the means to protect a person from rights violations. The markets in a society have no say in forming legal systems, as proper law is the -basis- of those markets anyway.
  5. That doesn't mean 71% of animal torturers harm people. Indeed, there are moral quandaries with animal torture, but it doesn't mean animal torturers are a threat to human lives. EDIT: You misread the stat, it says 71% of domestic abusers harm animals too. It's not 71% of animal abusers are domestic abusers. That's why my post seemed odd at first.
  6. I'm not sure you noticed exactly the problem I'm trying to solve. I phrased it this way: As characterized, perceptual ontology is immediately vulnerable to subjectivity in metaphysics. I point out the implications to epistemology, true, and ask how one would -know- what an object is. But the bigger issue is what in fact exists as an object regardless of perspective. If I simply say "some objects are ungraspable" then I am forcing the problem into questions of epistemology and taking for granted that I rejected the law of identity. But we already know anything metaphysically real is graspable in some way - so all I'd need to do is define 'object' in a way that still works with identity. Yes, the beard problem is quite similar. The difference is that I'm asking why a beard isn't an object but a molecule is. I'm not asking about a conceptual category. It's not the only solution. I mean, the final words in the paper are a possible and rational solution. We know -this- solution ("invisible and ungraspable objects") is impossible because it requires a God or some totality that goes beyond human comprehension. It's part of my writing style to offer bad solutions first because it frames why it matters that I provide any answers.
  7. A simpler way to look at it is that the whole book is about -Dagny-. I barely see Galt as a hero personally because he's more symbolic as a supporting character. It seems that monomyth really just isn't relevant to narrative arcs with static characters. Galt isn't a refinement of monomyth then. Just based on what people are saying, as cool as Campbell's work looks, monomyth only really works in the narrower sense of particular dynamic heroes, not narratives in general. Or maybe that's the point?
  8. To get this on track again, I'll address two points that seemed to get at the meat of my essay. Relationships pertaining to consciousness and mental existents don't contribute to objecthood because those relationships are already understood to be created by the mind. We already notice as self-evident that consciousness is not primary. Furthermore, I'm aiming at identifying what exists apart from one's awareness. Introspection shows that there is an identity to who we are as thinkers, but looking "deeper" into that doesn't alter that this is a feature of an entity all the way inside. Keep in mind these ideas depend on at least already thinking Rand is right about the axioms, and her notions of what concepts are as distinguished from entities. This so-called failure to integrate is unrelated - the concept existent already does that job, and existence itself includes all existents. I'm writing about -concretes- (hence the title saying "universe", not "existence"). Time is not a unique attribute, but its application to ALL objects is emergent. There's a sense of time relating all objects in motion. By relating all these objects together, we attain a unified universal time that is unique to the the whole of reality. But even with times relative to two molecules, time is emergent. It exists only when there is a systematic relationship. On the other hand, I am not aware of notions of time that can apply to singular objects. If there is no possible type of time like that, I'd argue that time being measurable is thanks to an emergent property that "enables" time (that time is only real as far as being part of a total system). No "universe as object" would mean there are gaps in reality where causality and time does not exist.
  9. Any evaluation of a person's actual threat to others isn't going to be a matter of how distasteful an act is. You would look at what a person does that would be dangerous to others - harming animals isn't really proof that the person intends to harm other people or fails to understand that humans are a hard limit. Is torturing an animal for pleasure really all that different than killing a cow for a great tasting burger? We don't go saying meat-eaters are more likely than vegans to kill and eat people. So, while there are reasons animal torture are immoral (depending on the reason and the animal), people harm animals for pleasure on a regular basis.
  10. Pet theories as in nonsense theories you use for odd arguments. Jung is not a serious psychologist at all. Serious objections are welcome, not mysticism.
  11. Nouns are the same thing in all languages. Not all nouns are entities, e.g. "happiness" Uhh... Please Ilya, the forum isn't for your pet theories. That's why I reject it. I won't respond to more as most of your comments appear as if you wrote them before reading all of the essay.
  12. Anytime one has a concept, existence is implicit. Implicit is any pre-conceptual sense of all the content that makes up what the explicit concept would be. One doesn't "think of all concepts" at once at all here, no idea how you got that idea.
  13. Rand said that the concept of existence is implicit in all concepts. When a concept is implicit, it is unformed (my phrasing) - Rand expands on it in the appendix. But then the concept 'existence' is as explicit as any other formed concept. " Axiomatic concepts identify explicitly what is merely implicit in the consciousness of an infant or of an animal. (Implicit knowledge is passively held material which, to be grasped, requires a special focus and process of consciousness—a process which an infant learns to perform eventually, but which an animal’s consciousness is unable to perform.) " That's in the lexicon, not any of the "deep cuts" in Rand's writing. The concept 'existence' only exists in your head, while the referents are all and every existent. As such, existence itself isn't all in your head - so SL is saying that you see existence itself as "all and only in your head". The issue seems to also be that you don't notice that the "concept of X" isn't the same as "X" according to Rand. "X" doesn't even need to be metaphysically real (e.g. Easter Bunny, the ghost of Elvis, the astral plane, contradictions). In this case, there's the axiomatic concept 'existence', then there's existence itself. Kyary is onto something that I also noticed, Ilya. You seem to be going towards the way some Hindus and Buhddists think of existence. See Nagarjuana: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagarjuna
  14. No, a concept is an existent because it is a discrete mental something.
  15. Existence -as a concept- is an existent. That's how Rand uses the word existent. Thus the problems you have for interpreting 3 and 4 above should be resolved.