Eiuol

Because specifying the system that integrates sensations is what perceptual psychology does. A "magic integration" is what Binswanger requires, but I've been explaining from a philosophical angle that perception implies an integration of individual "raw" sensations that you are not directly conscious of. From my own studies of perceptual psychology, it's a pretty basic fact that there is "raw" input and a resulting complete perception. There are many theories of how the process occurs, but it is induction here that further informs us of Rand's philosophical theory on perception. The improvement over Kant isn't that the proposed process is perfectly rich information, but that perception isn't "created" by the mind - Kant implied that because there is a process, it will never capture anything in itself. Perception can't be "wrong" or even "right", especially since there is more to the mind than consciousness. If you suppose no process at all (the alternative to the "demon"), then you are suggesting an "irreducible consciousness" which is really back to Cartesian dualism, i.e. the mind as a distinct entity rather than an active process. If there is another alternative, explain it to me.

Buddha, all that is correct and I know all about those scientific details. But it says nothing of experiencing sensations in the sense of "components of perception". Those babies still see entities, albeit not as well as older babies. That doesn't mean they are experiencing an individual sensation. The point is that Rand used two senses of sensation on the same page. Of course, it's easy to disambiguate what she meant (as with many philosophers).

So, either one can experience sensations directly, or not. In one sentence she is clear to say no one can, then implies that infants can at some point early on. I don't think Rand contradicted her ideas, but the wording by Rand is imprecise. I don't need to do linguistic analysis to figure that "sensory experience" is about "what it's like to have an experience" not "experiencing sensations". I'm not sure, though. Still, I think it's clear that her view is one cannot experience sensations, but can experience integrated sensations i.e. perception.

The word sensation is sometimes used to mean "what it feels like", but I don't think that's what Rand meant. She was talking about the components of perception, and probably that you can't experience sensations. You can infer that you have sensations, but the sensation itself has no feeling that you are directly experiencing. Perception is what "feels like" something, at least that's what I infer about Rand's statements. "Sensations, as such, are not retained in man’s memory, nor is man able to experience a pure isolated sensation." "A “perception” is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism, which gives it the ability to be aware, not of single stimuli, but of entities, of things." http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/sensations.html

This is partially right; any process must have content, so sensations are the content. There has to be mental content between sensory input (the event as Binswanger described) and perception. That paper is not based on specialized knowledge, you can avoid even mentioning the experiment. There is nothing specialized to say not all mental content is conscious. Representation and presentation aren't the same. I should've said isomorphic.

Nope, but it needs content. Sensory input straight to perception skips anything that the inputs are converted into to even establish perception. Dualism, then, is in the sense that there is a sudden conversion of inputs from the world into a whole and complete perceptual entity. It's a scientific question to say how, but not that you need something intermediary. The the inputs have to be individual inputs that are represented/presented (isomorphic) mental content of some kind. Then perception can happen. Also, that paper, the experiment it cites is irrelevant to my idea. The interesting part is the idea that not all mental states are conscious states.

The "error" is just difficulty finding the words I want. Note that I didn't say "entities are epistemological", I specifically described how they are metaphysical. I shouldn't have implied that cognition is what defines boundaries in all cases, I only mean that boundaries selected are not metaphysically defined - your perceptual organs do that for any first-level entities, which is not a conceptual process because it is automatic. By metaphysical, I only mean aspects of reality that exist even if you never existed. All entities exist at once, it's just that it is like a giant blob and it "melds" together until you make fine distinctions - reality is continuous. I'm using metaphor because I'm lacking the words to communicate my idea.

I only asked a question, I didn't make a claim in your response to me. Still, entities are epistemological to the extent that a mental process is used to allow you to see anything as an entity in the first place. Metaphysically, entities are not inherently "there" nor does Objectivism suppose ontologies are valid to say what fundamental entities there are - no such fundamental entities exist. There is hierarchy of knowledge which has fundamental entities in some form, but that is entirely epistemological and not an ontology. Entities exist and all entities have an identity, that much is metaphysical. But that boundary is 100% the result of mental processes. In other words, what you define to be an entity is something perception establishes. If all consciousness were gone, there would be literally nothing to establish boundaries. The only boundary is the universe itself in that case. Jupiter wouldn't disappear, all of its features you see as Jupiter will remain, but it just has no one to distinguish it from the rest of reality or label Jupiter as an entity. I happen to agree with Buddha.

There is no evidence that he was designated an intellectual heir. Just something important to know that is commonly taken for granted - there is no authority on Objectivism, only Rand was and will ever be. Of course, you are the authority of your own philosophy, accepting elements of Objectivism or not. That's why I think of myself as a student of Objectivism, not an Objectivist specifically.

"It is here that Protagoras’ old dictum may be given a new meaning, the opposite of the one he intended: “Man is the measure of all things.” Man is the measure, epistemologically—not metaphysically. In regard to human knowledge, man has to be the measure, since he has to bring all things into the realm of the humanly knowable. But, far from leading to subjectivism, the methods which he has to employ require the most rigorous mathematical precision, the most rigorous compliance with objective rules and facts—if the end product is to be knowledge." http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/measurement.html “Cognition and Measurement,” Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 7–8

What happened to "man is the measure of all things"?

Not really, it would be dualism to suppose that there is not some process that creates a percept, i.e. establishes first-level entities. Inputs of some sort are needed for that to happen prior to your being conscious of them. Then inputs have to be put into some form, prior to your being conscious of something that exists. Otherwise, you would be immediately conscious of everything, basically fundamental with no components to it - as any dualistic theory of mind supposes. Besides, there appears to be no case for Binswanger that Rand made any error of reification on sensations.

Rocks don't even have mental states, so they are non-conscious. The topic refers to any entity that is able to have conscious states, though. 2 is non-conscious, though you can become conscious of what it feels like. 3 is non-conscious, except you can't become conscious of what it feels like. 4 can be conscious or non-conscious. Reflection is one way to be conscious, but you can be conscious in the sense you are perceiving the world in a particular way. All reflection is a conscious state, but a lack of reflection doesn't always mean a mental state is non-conscious. 5 is a mental state that is non-conscious. That is, the percept is created without your being aware of the method happening as you would in concept formation, as automatic entails. However, once a percept is there, you will become conscious of your perception. I'm not liking the word 'of' since that implies reflection or ability to think about mental states. Basically, I mean conscious in the way you can know a fire is hot without having any concepts. And there is a potential to reflect upon the heat, i.e. a concept of heat can be formed. If it is impossible to reflect on a mental state at any point, and if it is content you can't access (like 3), then the mental state is non-conscious.

Keep in mind I'm not arguing against Binswanger exactly, just the portrayal of his argument here in this thread. The point is that Rand didn't reify, and that if he thinks she reified, then he's arguing against some fundamentals that Objectivism holds as true. That is, Binswanger's recouching is a different viewpoint entirely (which incidentally is wrong). I got some ideas from this paper. https://wfs.gc.cuny.edu/DRosenthal/www/DR-Libet-Timing.pdf I'll explain in a moment. I believe Binswanger's thesis that "consciousness is not reducible" is essentially that if you are conscious, then that conscious state does not consist of any non-conscious components. Unlike my earlier characterization, by this view, some states might be non-conscious, while any conscious state only ever existed as a conscious. A state can't move from one to the other, because if it could, then consciousness would be reducible. More specifically, a percept that you are conscious of cannot have sensations as components - by Rand's view, you aren't conscious of any sensations in a meaningful way since a percept groups them automatically. For Binswanger, there is no in-between or transition. But Rand's view can be rephrased a little. Percepts consist of non-conscious states; all sensations are non-conscious by virtue of being used automatically by the brain. Percepts are not necessarily conscious, but may be. This means that at least some conscious states are reducible. (I personally think all conscious states can be, but I'm not sure if it's entailed by Rand's view.) I find that all that relates to the choice to focus. Some states become conscious by some way of choosing to focus. Perhaps sensations are accessible to the degree that as soon as you focus, sensations are automatically converted into a conscious state of perception (not unlike how as soon as a word is formed, a concept is necessarily formed). The perhaps part doesn't matter, what I'm getting at is that the choice to focus is transforming a non-conscious state into a conscious one, and sensations are a form of non-conscious state required to reach a conscious state of perception. The paper I linked is relevant because it makes the point that mental states can become conscious from a state that begins as non-conscious. Epistemologically, conscious states come first, as it is impossible to break a conscious state into a non-conscious state - you wouldn't be conscious of the non-conscious state! Nonetheless, there are plenty of reasons to say the whole process involves more than what you are conscious of.

Why? In some senses, they aren't. In some senses, they are. Rand doesn't state this, but Peikoff makes a distinction of how fluids are entities in one sense but not another. I think his distinction is an implication of Rand's view.

I'm using "conscious state" to refer to awareness of your being conscious, and also any state that you can access the contents of. Reflection is part of that, but so is the ability to move your eyes to focus on a tree.

Thesis A is fine. Thesis B isn't. The whole essay never once quoted Rand. The weird thing is, the metaphysical vs manmade distinction is nothing more than some facts are a result of human choice, and others aren't. After 3.3, the essay fails to summarize/clarify the "Randian Distinction" by discussing whatever the author attributes to Rand without any quotes of Rand's. It's just poor scholarship - to criticize a viewpoint of a specific philosopher, you need their words.

I'm being technical, as Rand was in the relevant section. Rand, as I recall, meant it either as at most a fleeting feeling that you wouldn't be able to even remember, or simply completely inaccessible to conscious thought. Binswanger seems to believe that all mental states are conscious states, or that the only mental states that exist are consciously accessible (i.e. continuous). That's where sensory input was a clarification: if perception can't be broken down, then sensations by Rand's meaning are better thought of as a physical event (non-mental).

For one, the brain does put together sensations (the particular way that your sense organs detects many features). The brain integrates, for instance, what is first taken in by rods and cones in your. The inputs become sensations. This is a scientific argument and not Binswanger's special area of knowledge. But Rand fortunately is only claiming that percepts are made up of something, lest we want to absurdly claim that we always see the totality of an entity instantly as a whole and all its pieces. That is essentialism, i.e. wrong. Sensations are not states of consciousness. Rand doesn't claim this. I don't know anyone who says sensations are states of consciousness. Sensations in a basic way can't be noticed or accessed. Not all parts of the brain's functioning are accessible. Binswanger's claim, then, works out to be a claim that the contents of the mind are continuous - meaning if you can't access something, it doesn't exist in the mind. Thus, of course Rand is reifying. I find that Rand accepts a view that some aspects of the mind are inaccessible. For example, that's why you can't simply reason your emotions to be "correct". I think it's also why, according to Rand, you can't do anything with sensations as such. Basically, although I should read his book, Binswanger has a notable disagreement. He's not improving Rand's position; he is taking a different position entirely. I don't know his exact argument, but I can argue that Rand didn't reify sensations.

Does Binswanger explain how this is reification? And what does he mean by sensationalism? Sensationalism is usually sensation and cognition are all you've got.

The point is you'd have to observe a system to know how the components interact. I said deduce rather than observe for this very reason. I wouldn't be able to study isolated components and then know how a system of those components interact. I can't study only neurons to figure out how the brain works, I have to study a system. I can't study only a molecule to figure out how life works, I have to study them as a specific system.

I know I've posted today, but bigger posts I do later in the week. The mind/cognitive science is the area I've studied the most, but a lot of biology has systems that is good for discussing emergence. Society is okay sometimes, at least in terms of whole economic systems. Chemistry is a good field that, but I know the least about that. Geology, in terms of how two minerals with different behaviors yet identical elements as in diamonds or graphite. Meteorology, ecology. Anything with a notable system, really.

Would you clarify what you mean by "contents of the mind"? There are two senses that are usually meant by "contents of the mind". One is to actually know what the content feels like in the same way as someone else while also knowing that content in the same way as someone else. In this sense, I agree with you. But another sense is to know *something* about the contents. For instance, I know to write your sentences, you need to make linguistic representations of some sort. Perhaps I can go further by the grammar you used, and what a mind does for representing grammar in a specific way. I won't know your beliefs intimately, but I know a little bit about your contents. To explain this better, at a bare minimum, you know I have beliefs, just not what they are exactly - you know I'm not a zombie that has no mental content.

There's a reason there's a question mark. That sentence was a question about if I understood. The other sentences were using premises you presented, not paraphrasing. If it's nonsense, that's exactly why your argument/position made no sense! I never claimed you said or meant to imply what I wrote, but the implication and logic of what you said is still there. The confusion line was a joke, another way of saying "nope, you're wrong".

In this context, it means that even if you knew all there is to know about the components, you can't deduce how the system of those components works - you'd need to observe the system as a whole to see how it works.