Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum

Eiuol

Moderators
  • Posts

    7059
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    159

Everything posted by Eiuol

  1. Can you give an example of entity A that may do one of two actions in context X? I don't mean an example of metaphysical possibility where entity A may act in several ways depending on the context. I'm thinking that if an entity can act in multiple ways in identical contexts, then there is no way to determine what any entity at all would do. Its identity would be random and metaphysically probabilistic since context would be insufficient to say what an entity will do. If say, in a context of falling down a hill, a boulder may keep rolling, or suddenly stop rolling, you have no way to say what a boulder's identity is. An entity cannot act in a way different from its identity, meaning it will only act in one way. The causality flows differently for computations and methods, but even then, at any particular moment, those methods will be used in only one way: according to the identity of the entity and its way of doing computations.
  2. Nothing at all. Being artificial is not important. Being natural is not important. All it points out is if it's man-made or arose on its own.
  3. I'm aware of occluded objects. Occluded objects are by definition not what I see in front of me. That means your answer is insufficient. At best, you've given a starting point, but it doesn't answer the OPs question. Note the quotes dream_weaver gave, which point out that existence is an abstraction from all facts, indicating that its referents are also non-perceptual as well as perceptual.
  4. What does that have to do with living, though? In other words: So what?
  5. But existence is everything, there is not "something else" to distinguish it from. Concept formation requires a comparison by Rand's theory. I agree with the point being made, that our awareness is how we conceptualize existence, but awareness isn't so simple as what you see in front of you. That's how a baby would do it - so some babies fail at object permanency. To make existence into a full-on concept needs a comparison to something besides itself, which is still not possible to do well by simply closing your eyes. Keep in mind the appendix quote in question was published posthumously unedited by Rand in a Q&A, so if pressed, she may have improved her answer.
  6. If I agreed, you wouldn't say I lacked knowledge. The only evidence you provided that I lack knowledge is, well, nothing at all, so the only evidence I have is my disagreement. It is patronizing to provide no reasons. I wanted to be more precise than "what you see", otherwise, I'd have to question that the sun exists since it's night time. Existence needs to conceptualize what you don't see, too.
  7. What does being alive have to do with being not artificial? Intelligence without consciousness is a stolen concept, but living without being natural is not.
  8. Eiuol

    Owning Land?

    It's not the land per se that you own. What you own is a right to action over an area of land. It isn't the soil itself that matters here. The production involved originates in figuring out to make use of the space. Farmland is an easy example to discuss, because to farm requires knowing how to properly prepare the area so crops can grow.
  9. Because Rand doesn't see that there should be a market for rights protection. A government would not be coercing anyone as long as it is protecting rights. How would it pay its employees? Like any place else! I suppose if you mean competition is needed to properly determine how to set its prices, well, you're asking the wrong question. Either demonstrate that there should be a market in rights protection, or say why rights protection should be done in the same manner as in a market like trading crops. As an aside, if you don't like the government (assuming -this- kind of government), just sit there. You'll be left alone.
  10. Sure, but not all methods employed are conscious like that. Intelligence requires some innate mechanisms separate from consciously developed methods, otherwise we'd be asking how the earliest methods were developed without innate methods. As you said, methods aren't knowledge itself, so it's no issue to suppose an innate mechanisms exist. This robot is at least an example of pushing pseudo-moral reasoning as far as possible before conceptualization is needed for real moral reasoning.
  11. What? Because I disagreed with you, I must need to study more? I don't like being patronized.
  12. But when you block my view of something, I know it exists. By definition, a blocked object is something I don't see. The issue in the OP is that there is no way to compare an abstraction to itself. Existence is compared to... what? If no comparison is possible, then it'd be a proper noun. As an axiomatic concept, it seems the only comparisons you can make is when you're considering abstractions like contents or changes in form. "What's in the cookie jar?" "Nothing". There are probably crumbs, but the set of items in the jar is effectively 0. That's a very basic level, so I'd bet working from there inductively is important. Something like comparing empty sets to the set of everything. Just taking a stab at a possible answer.
  13. What is it, then? I'm not sure if you're saying intelligence itself is absent any method at the very bottom (i.e. there is no innate computational or algorithmic method anywhere), or if you just mean to say intelligence is more than merely deductive methods.
  14. Clarification: when I said "non-material entities exist insofar...", it was probably better to say "in a sense, we could say they non-material entities exist [for the reasons I gave], but non-material existent makes more sense if we want to talk about abstractions". Entities are supposed to be concrete and directly perceived. You can't directly perceive your own consciousness unless somehow there is a consciousness outside you have access to.
  15. It is impossible for an immaterial, non-physical entity to have physical effects, period. This is the realm of the supernatural: God, ghosts, magic, ESP, etc. Non-material entities exist insofar as they are enabled by concretes, but we abstract away concreteness for purposes of concept formation. As for free will, it too is an abstraction. Epistemologically, free will and consciousness are irreducible, but metaphysically, they are not separate "things" of a special type different than concretes or matter even.
  16. I don't hold a position of determinism or not, the term isn't accurate for my position. I talk about free will on an abstract level, I do not equate it to what occurs on a level of concretes. That also applies to why I am not a reductionist - generally determinism is a form of reductionism where all phenomena are adequately explained by summing up component parts down to some fundamental level. Abstraction is important, yet I won't take a non-determinism position where some things are fundamental yet non-physical, namely, two fundamental "types" i.e. a dualist view. Nor will I say there are even two fundamental "types" of properties i.e. a property dualist view. Even more, I reject indeterminism, where causality is random essentially. So I reject any kind of view of causation besides the law of causality where entities necessarily act according to their identity. That is literally magic. I need SOME real-world link so that non-physical can interact with physical. Descartes had the pinneal gland. Round things are physical, and while roundness is non-physical, it is always inherently part of a physical entity. If consciousness is inherently part of anything in reality, then it is constrained by physical laws, just as roundness is constrained by physical laws, and the wildly complex non-physical phenomena like biological respiration. We can abstract away physical laws, sure, as long as we remember those laws didn't really disappear. The quoted passage above shows that the conclusion was assumed at the start: "What one cannot do is "explain" the choice to focus (or not to) in the sense of specifying some antecedent factor that MADE one choose the way one did. This fact constitutes a philosophical problem only for those who equate causality with necessitation." The whole QUESTION is if there are antecedent factors that necessitate the way one chooses. There is no explanation of this, hopefully it's explained further in the book. The problem is that although he shows free will need not contradict causality, there is quite a bit of science to discuss before Binswanger can say that antecedent factors cannot necessitate choosing to focus. Not that science is "more important", but because the level of analysis here is detailed. There is good reason Rand wanted to study math and neurology [what nowadays we'd just call neuroscience] to understand man's mind better - deeper questions require deeper knowledge of reality. I think Peikoff said Rand wanted to study that, but I don't recall if she wrote it down or what. There's also good reason why modern philosophy of mind is basically now a hybrid of philosophy and science - I don't know if it's possible to distinguish "cognitive scientist" and "philosopher".
  17. I don't use any terms related to determinism. It is a word that creates many problems of connotation. There's causality, that's as far as I go. Things are "determined" in that what happens is necessarily going to happen. By the information I've taken in perceptually and that there is a method - abstractly speaking - always used to make a choice as I did, I will end up making a decision. Things are "nondetermined" in that a decision is not a domino-effect of events. As an active process, decision making needs to be abstracted away from the physical mechanisms. There is no special causality, or special identity, or special existence. Binswanger is inventing a new metaphysical principle to suggest that some things don't operate along normal causal laws, and that as an irreducible primary, it can act on matter as non-matter, and itself does things matter cannot. So he's a substance dualist just like Descartes, where we're left wondering how this unique non-physical mind interacts with the physical body. I haven't read the book, to be clear, but so far I see no value in doing so.
  18. That's called magic. You have said here that consciousness is a SPECIAL SUBSTANCE with an identity of SPECIAL CAUSALITY to ALL of existence. This isn't just saying consciousness is a complex phenomena that cannot be analyzed via physics alone, it's saying consciousness exists in its own SPECIAL realm. I am using caps to emphasize that Binswanger is a dualist that is just as bad as any other dualist. Binswanger seems to think there is a correct version of dualism. Nothing initiates actions on its own accord, as causality happening isn't up to anyone. I don't decide to initiate the causal events happening.
  19. Because that treatment didn't cause the injury. You made it clear you ran after getting rid of the orthodics, then got injured. If you didn't run, then the injury wouldn't have happened. All you can say is you weren't properly warned - which may be subject to a malpractice suit, I don't know. It may be common practice to say "do not stop using the orthodics without proper doctor supervision".
  20. Rhetoric is just style of speaking and persuasion... it isn't necessarily absent of reason.
  21. Picky in that sense sounds more like the repression I'm saying is unhealthy. I used scare quotes to suggest that having a sexual desire based on some type of emotional bond is the case for anyone. The bond may be shallow and superficial, but attraction itself under an Objectivist is inherently a matter of mental and physical aspects being directly related. Separating the two is impossible, and trying to do so creates problems in oneself. The heroes in Atlas Shrugged are anything but superficial, so attraction is related to their high standards. Demisexuality is redundant though, as all people experience attraction based on some bond. That the bond required is deep or not doesn't require a special label, unless we want to say attraction based on bonds is a unique type of attraction. I agree with you that there's no apparent reason to single out sex. However, I would say desiring those things independent of a mental connection is expressing a mind-body dichotomy, or at least views that are not integrating mind and body. Some sort of bond, at a minimum, is required to at least feel okay being touched. Massage may be an exception, as its purpose is different than a hug. An individual's minimum may be higher, though. Rand didn't talk about other physical contact, so I see that as a problem for demonstrating the strength of her views on sex specifically. The key point, though, is that desire for sex is inseparable from emotional connection, for anyone. I say the same about other affections. For the record, I'm not saying casual sex itself is always bad. I'm only saying, ultimately, be aware of how your mental and physical desires are related.
  22. Emotions aren't a thing to "control" in the sense you mean. No, you don't decide or even choose in the moment what to feel. You have no choice at the time but to feel as you are feeling. There are many choices that result in feeling as you do. Repression is not part of a rational plan of action since it would be in part denying that you haven't totally agreed with Rand's view anyway, and denying that you have your own convictions about sex. For Rand, her main point is that your views on sex and deeper philosophical views determine who you may be attracted to in the first place. She goes further to say virtuous people wouldn't really fall for anyone other than who is their highest value. There is nothing to repress. If your views are different than that, you wouldn't fall for people other than those who meet whatever criteria you've set. Demisexuality is a silly term I find, as though being "picky" is "special". To be sure, Rand would say another view is immoral, but it doesn't follow that therefore the Objectivist view on how to lead your life is to repress any emotion that represents or originates in views against Rand. If you have rational reasons (i.e. benefits your life long-term) to suggest a different standard of sex is appropriate, follow it. I'm not sure why this matters in the conversation. This is about normative claims regarding sex, so it translates to "people can experience sexual desire differently", which wasn't in question. The important question is: What is the life-affirming view man qua man to have on sex? Desire independent from a person, or desire independent of any mental connection, are both expressions of a mind-body dichotomy. Sex is a whole experience, and to explicitly compartmentalize desire is not life-affirming at all. Still, human nature and sex are quite related, which is part of why Rand said sex is too important to take lightly. And in my view, that also means to carefully evaluate even your current ideas on sex.
  23. I asked a simple question: Why should I follow the golden rule? I mean, I already don't use it and think it's bad to use it. I didn't ask why be moral, I'm asking why the golden rule is a moral principle. I'm saying there is no reason to call it a moral rule; it is not a "moral shadow" in the first place. But you're suggesting there is a reason, so I'm asking what the reason is. The only reason I saw is that others would harm you if you harmed them. That's a morality of fear. If I were literally more powerful, whether it be brute force or political pull, I could harm someone and they'd be unable to harm me. That's why, as a moral principle, it isn't so good. As a strategy for specific circumstances, like MAD or when legal systems were primitive, it works alright, but I wouldn't go so wide to say it is a basis to rights.
  24. Asking for myself here since I haven't read them entirely: How do these references reply/answer the OP?
  25. For what it's worth, a degree really only indicates knowing a lot of facts, but it really doesn't establish a doctor's skill with logical thinking. I've experienced many doctors who know plenty of facts, but fail to use logic, and just do whatever works statistically for similar symptoms. As a specialist or not, anyone can identify failure of logic. Whether failure of logic leads to malpractice is a different issue - the point of the thread. Clive didn't say he's blameless, but the original doctor, to what degree is that doctor to blame? At the least, vigilante is not necessary, there's no apparent reason this issue can't be taken to court.
×
×
  • Create New...