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Everything posted by Boydstun

  1. Boydstun

    Which Eternity?

    . SL, our quickest perceptions of objects or events is one or two hundred milliseconds in duration. We have some quicker processes of perceptual discriminations occurring (requiring) only about ten milliseconds. There is nothing physically significant in the demarcation of past and future existence about those particular intervals of “the present” of our experience. In our “instant” of perceptual consciousness (or of any consciousness) of a physical object, there are atomic transitions taking place in the object down at the level of 10-to-the-minus-18 seconds and nuclear transitions taking place in those atoms down at the level of 10-to-the-minus-23 seconds. In an instant of observation is an ocean of objective time. Transitions, actions, and processes are part of existence. They are existents, and the entities to which they pertain are existents. An episode of alterations is part of existence no matter the rate of its transition or epoch of its occurrence. I'd not confine existence or Existence to a particular point or particular limited interval in its duration. No dividing line of past and future existents should be treated as containing all that exists. And if we say only that that dividing line is all that exists at that dividing time, that's true, but it does not preclude existence at all times being included in the all that is Existence.
  2. Boydstun

    Which Eternity?

    Grames, it's a fact that from now all the way to tomorrow there will be photons. You seem to confine Existence to only the present. Only to actualities in the present? What about potentials of the present actualities? Would you count them as part of Existence? Rand did count those potentials as part of Existence, though she did not write about it (ITOE Appendix). Aristotle thought it true now that a sea battle either will happen tomorrow or not happen tomorrow. That disjunction would be a fact now about tomorrow. I don't know if he would count all facts as part of what we are calling Existence, though I don't think he was confining Existence to present actualities. How do you conceive present traces and indicators of the past, such as the rings of a tree trunk? Surely they are indicators of part of Existence, indeed past actualities.
  3. Boydstun

    Which Eternity?

    Grames, I too capitalize the term existence to indicate I'm referring to the entirety of existents. When referring to the existence of this or that, of course, it's lower case. My full convention, which I call out in my book, is this: I use lower case when talking about existence in general or existence per se or existence as such. I use Existence to refer to existence as such at the whole of it. I use Existence, as did Rand also, to mean the totality of existents, and like Rand, the Universe. I mean the full Universe, regardless of whether its particulars are fairly directly observable (the light of this computer screen) or not so directly (such as the mass of the earth exactly three billion years ago is detectible fairly). There is much in the past I count as part of Existence, though it is not observable at all by now, such as the weight to the nearest ounce of each of my 32 great-great-great grand parents at the time of their very last heartbeat. Then too, and this also is merely in the classical regime, which day will be the day of my death cannot presently be determinately computed because that reality in the future is not yet a determinate reality---siding here with Peirce and Aristotle, contra Rand and Leibniz. Future indeterminates are also part of Existence.
  4. Boydstun

    Which Eternity?

    . Thanks for the further info and reflections, SL. I agree we should not go with the Newtonian type of view of time as flowing by on its own, independently of activities of matter (and energy). Newton thought of space that independent way too, and space he took as coeternal with God, not as something created by God. (The distinctions of various kinds of eternity did not begin with Objectivists, viz., with Leonard Peikoff in that lecture Q&A.) I don’t recall if Newton conformed to the standard theology that time was created by God when God created the world. (I know Newton had some nonstandard “Christian” views. Jesus was not the son of God. One biographer quipped: “God did not need more than one son.”) Hi Grames, Rand was indeed focused on a minimum claim, which comes up in refuting the fairly standard mystical view that there is a being, namely God, who is unchanging and who created the world and time from nothing and who is not Itself in time. In the course of her argument against such a First Cause of the all that is existence, Rand held forth Existence as a whole as being outside of time. So there can be no rational talk on her view of whether the universe has always existed or only for a finite time. Both are ruled out by the fact that time simply does not apply to the whole of existence at all. Her later expositers try to paint hers as a rather non-constraining position within which scientific cosmology (which mostly has built up since she was living) could rationally go wherever the experimentally successful and observationally successful modeling of the universe may go. That is incorrect. Her position rules out rational consideration of whether the universe has existed forever and whether it will exist forever into the future. Here are some of the statements she made or approved: NB – “The concept of time applies to events and entities within the universe, but not to the universe as a whole.” (1962) AR – “We can’t ascribe space or time or a lot of other things to the universe as a whole.” (1969/1970)
  5. Boydstun

    Which Eternity?

    Concerning Rand’s view, I see from posting this little piece on the blog of Irfan Khawaja I’ve caused some unnecessary confusion by my order of presentation. In my first paragraph, only the first sentence was the view of Rand. The rest of her view does not come until the fourth paragraph. She did not follow the natural progression from “no creation or annihilation of all that exists” to “the totality of existence is endless in time, past or future.” Rather, as in my fourth, final paragraph, Rand simply denied that time is something that could apply to existence as a whole. The first presentation of her view in print, so far as I know, was in that 1962 article by Nathaniel Branden. He was also presenting that view---time is inapplicable to existence as a whole---in his lecture series The Basic Principles of Objectivism. He brings up the issue in offering a rebuttal of the First Cause argument for the existence of God in the ex nihilo Creation context, that context being commonplace in the culture. Branden and subsequent Objectivist expositors of Rand’s position continued to address the question of the finite or infinite extent of time through which the universe exists (the universe being what they meant by all that exists, including mind as part of the universe) as affiliated with the idea of an external cause of the existence of the universe. In their Objectivist view, the whole did not require and could not have a cause, the idea of cause is inapplicable to this ultimate whole, and the idea of time is also inapplicable to this whole. They would say (Peikoff in his 1976 lecture series The Philosophy of Objectivism) that it is sensible to say that the whole of existence is eternal if meaning by that that whole is outside of time, but not sensible to say it is eternal in the sense of existing through time without end or beginning. Being outside of time, of course, would also mean that the whole of existence could not have a beginning or end in time. These proponents of Objectivism were like Ayn Rand in their education. They were thinking about these issues in the history of classical philosophy, such as the history set out in the Sorabji book I cited. That really won’t suffice. It was not until the 1960’s, if I recall correctly, that the idea of black holes (infinitely dense but finite mass) and an Initial Singularity took hold in physics. Black holes are singularities too. When physicists come to implications of physical infinities from the mathematical devices that are otherwise successful in describing physical realities, they look for things that prevent such infinities in physical reality. The infinities had been in the mathematical equations for spacetime implicit in Einstein’s field equations for general relativity (1916), but for a few decades, if I’m recalling the history of black-hole theory correctly, it was held that a specific physical factor would prevent gravitational collapse of matter and energy into the spacetime singularity we now call a black hole. But by the 1960’s physicists had shown that the preventing factor did not prevent after all, and theory of black holes and of a Big Bang singularity were off and running. And with enough decades and expense since then, the tests and spectacular accuracy of Einstein’s GR have been in our headlines. Physics and me with it certainly reject the idea that the universe as a whole is outside of time. The time being marked by the coo coo clock behind me and the time being marked in the corner of my computer screen, is the time there is and the only time there is (contra Heidegger). It is physically real pure-time slices on the physically real local spacetime. Following the GR equations for the universe as a whole back in time, all of spacetime was a point with absolutely zero extent. Time appears in that picture to come into existence at the Big Bang, and it comes into existence with mass-energy afoot and having the same amount of mass-energy as there is in the universe today. But physics has had, since facing up to that startling picture, a new intervening factor for that Initial Singularity, though only down at the so called Planck scale of spacetime (one over ten to the 35th power, as I recall), a tremendously small smallness about that projected absolute initial point inferred from the classical GR equations: quantum field theory yet needing to be fathomed in that situation. So they say the quest of physics for what happens way-close-about the Initial Singularity is not yet done. My new thought, explored in my post, is that I’ll go ahead and argue, as I did, from the philosopher’s chair, that ‘final physics’ will find the mass-energy (ever some nonzero amount) of the universe has existed forever and will exist forever. I’m looking forward to the further remarks from Eric on this topic, with his physics background. And I appreciate any thoughts on this on very general philosophical grounds as well. SL, your conception of the necessary attachment of time to processes is in tune with modern physics so far as I know. The overly poetic presentation of the modern-physics standpoint in Carlo Rovelli’s The Order of Time (2018) may dispute that, it seems to contain a lot of talk-pedestrian exaggeration, but I’ve not gotten to really study this little book yet. Concerning language about time, I’m studying at this time, the book by Olley Pearson Rationality, Time, and Self (2018), which includes assimilation of tense logic. I might be able to parlay some of this later for this thread. I’d be careful not to slip from thinking of time as being relational to processes and alterations to thinking of the temporal relation as being only something from our constitution for perception and intellectual understanding, for making the world orderly and intelligible for us. Kant made that subject-side move, and Leibniz took relations to require mind. Wrong and wrong. Time is physical, even if relational. We measure it, our bodies register it, and there’s all too little of it.
  6. Boydstun

    Which Eternity?

    Which Eternity? Rand held her axiom Existence exists to include that the universe as a whole “cannot be created or annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence” (1973, 25).[1] One would naturally suppose Rand was thinking that immunity from creation or annihilation means the universe has existed an endless time in the past and will exist an endless time in the future. Plausible as that picture appears, might the axiom Existence exists not strictly entail the endless duration of Existence? Might it entail only that at no time was there nothing at all or that at no time was there no time, yet not also entail that the duration of the existence of Existence extends into a past that is infinite?[2] Might the boundary of the past be finite, and at the first, the universe have its present mass-energy (as in classical GR back to the Initial Singularity) and be passing time, yet since it was the first of time, there be no "before" that first, and it simply not be sensible to talk of a "becoming" from a "before" the first? In our philosophical reflection, should we prejudge the physics of whether the universe of mass-energy and its spacetime extend into an infinite or only a finite past? Should that issue be left to scientific cosmology to settle? Nearby issues such as whether time, space, or spacetime in any way have causal powers and whether there are more primitive physical elements from which spacetime arises should not be prejudged by philosophy, I say. Rather, those issues should be left open for scientific cosmology to settle. I think, however, that philosophy can and should go beyond observing that there was no time and will be no time at which there was nothing, go on to the conclusion that Existence is eternal, meaning endless in past and future. If no Existence at all, then no character-identity at all. Had Existence come into existence, it would have to do so in a specific way, yet that way would be some character-identity, which requires some existents and is an existent, and by hypothesis there were no existents. Coming to be without a way, as Parmenides realized, is nothing.[3] Moreover: Coming to be is itself an existent. Coming to be of the all that is Existence would be coming to be of any coming-to-be at all. That cannot be sensible unless there were some background existence lacking any coming-to-be. But by hypothesis there was no existent of any sort—thence no existent lacking coming-to-be—before the coming into existence of Existence.[4] Therefore, Existence has no beginning. Then too, absent power of coming-to-be of its entire self, Existence cannot come to be not. That is, Existence has no end. Rand did not accept the idea that the universe as a whole is in time. She thought that time was one of those things applying to things within the universe but not on up to the entire universe itself. One might sensibly say, in Rand’s view: Existence, the entirety of all existents, is eternal in the sense that it is outside of time, but not in the sense that it exists endlessly.[5] That is erroneous. As my life advanced in time, so did the Milky Way advance in time, Andromeda too and on up to the whole universe. That is how our modern physics has it also. The universe has a certain age since such-and-such event, most importantly, since the event of the Initial Singularity (or Planck-scale of the spacetime around that classically projected event). Existence as a whole endures through definite time, and that is not to say that time or alteration can exist without other sorts of existents. Notes [1] Cf. Aristotle, Cael. 279b4–84b5; Broadie 2009; Sorabji 1983, 205–9, 245–49. [2] Cf. Lennox 1985, 68. [3] “What coming to be of it will you seek? / In what way, whence, did [it] grow? Neither from what-is-not shall I allow / You to say or think; for it is not to be said or thought / That [it] is not. And what need could have impelled it to grow / Later or sooner, if it began from nothing?” Gallop 1984, Fragment 8, lines 6–10. [4] Matter is mass-energy having nonzero rest mass. Only matter and its changes can be a clock. Were the universe to contain no matter, only pure energy, there would be nothing registering the advance of time. So far as I know from modern physics, time would yet advance while a pure-, all-energy of the universe and its changes (say, internal propagations at vacuum light speed) existed. A universe purely energy, of course, would be an existent. The current picture from scientific cosmology is that the quantity of mass-energy in the universe today is the same there has been all the way back to the Initial Singularity. Particles of ordinary matter, the neutrinos (they have nonzero rest mass), emerged after the first ten-thousandths of a second following the onset of expansion of the universe from the Initial Singularity. Dark matter, having rest mass, may have been present before the neutrinos. I gather that at the present state of scientific knowledge the remote future (years from now about 10 to the 100th power, whereas the present day is only about 10 to the 9th power from the Initial Singularity) of our ever-expanding universe will contain only or very nearly only massless particles such as photons and gravitons (Penrose 2011, 139–49). [5] Branden 1962; c. 1968, 82­–83, 101–2; Rand 1990 App. 273; Binswanger 2014, 26. Cf. Peikoff 1991, 16; Gotthelf 2000, 48. References Anagnostopoulos, G., editor, 2009. A Companion to Aristotle. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Aristotle c.348–322. B.C. The Complete Works of Aristotle. J. Barnes, editor (1984). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Branden, N. 1962. The “First Cause” Argument. The Objectivist Newsletter 1(5):19. ——. c.1968. The Basic Principles of Objectivism. In The Vision of Ayn Rand 2009. Gilbert: Cobden Press. Binswanger, H. 2014. How We Know. New York: TOF Publications. Broadie, S. 2009. Heavenly Bodies and First Causes. In Anagnostopoulous 2009. Gallop, D. 1984. Parmenides of Elea – Fragments. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Gotthelf, A., editor, 1985. Aristotle on Nature and Living Things. Pittsburgh: Mathesis. Gotthelf, A. 2000. On Ayn Rand. Belmont: Wadsworth. Lennox, J. G. 1985. Are Aristotelian Species Eternal? In Gotthelf 1985. Peikoff, L. 1991. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. New York: Dutton. Penrose, R. 2011. Cycles of Time. New York: Knopf. Rand, A. 1973. The Metaphysical versus the Man-Made. In Philosophy: Who Needs It. New York: Signet. ——1990. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. Expanded 2nd ed. H. Binswanger and L. Peikoff, editors. New York: Meridian. Sorabji, R. 1983. Time, Creation, and the Continuum. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
  7. I just learned of a 2-person game from the Bronze Age (4000 years ago). Today's archaeologists evidently call it 58 Holes. If I understand correctly, the game Chutes and Ladders is that game. (I'm not a game person, as an adult, except for a period of playing Scrabble, which I liked---but no time for it in many years.) The game had been found in the Near East, but in November, Walter Crist of the American Museum of Natural History in New York discovered that it was also played in Azerbaijan, which is about a thousand miles north. SCIENCE NEWS (12/22/18) quotes Crist as saying "Bronze Age herders in that region must have had contacts with the Near Eastern world [eg. Iran]. Games often passed across cultures and acted as a social lubricant."
  8. William, I link below a good book of modern formal logic. (The author has another book on mathematical logic, which is beyond this much logic.) I learned a lot from it, and he has some neat historical notes at the ends of chapters. This logic is not a rejection of Aristotelian logic (leaving aside A’s modal logic, which is a further area, beyond what we’d think of as standard formal logic, and beyond the scope of this textbook), certainly not whole cloth, though it assimilates advances in deductive logic attained in the late 19th and early 20th century. I’m not aware of anything Rand wrote decrying modern formal logic itself. She probably never took up mastery of the contents of the textbook I link here. I’d think she would have taken issue, however, with common philosophies of logic with then-current views on the ways in which logic is situated with our understanding of the world. I’m thinking of the various views on logic expressed by Dewey or Nagel or Wittgenstein (in his later phase). When I look into the Index of The Letters of Ayn Rand, I find no entry for logic, only for basis of logic. The basis of logic in her philosophy (and I concur in this view) and setting the nature and use of logic in serious sensitivity to that basis was a part of Nathaniel Branden’s lectures in those days The Basic Principles of Objectivism and later in Leonard Peikoff’s Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. Beyond those, I incline to take issue, springing from Rand’s view of the nature of logic, with a couple of ways in which inference is treated in standard modern logic texts. But this is no wholesale rejection of formal modern logic, the contested friction points are actually old, and there are contemporary experts on both sides. https://books.google.com/books/about/Methods_of_Logic.html?id=liHivlUYWcUC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false
  9. Merlin, Concerning the rationality and the explanatory virtues of Cantor’s extensions of finite arithmetic, and the prior failure of the part-whole approach by Bolzano, you might like to look into pp. 207–12 of Philip Kitcher’s The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (if you’ve not done so already).
  10. Most recently, from Prof. Miller: Aristotle - On the Soul and Other Psychological Works Notre Dame Review ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Peek into Fred Miller's paper at Ayn Rand Society Meeting 2005 here. I expect this paper will be included in a planned volume on Aristotle and Rand in the series Ayn Rand Society Philosophical Studies.
  11. Boydstun

    Health & Evasion.

    . Akilah, The tale of Beauty and the Beast or Victor Hugo’s novel The Laughing Man or the play Cyrano de Bergerac dramatize in extreme form something pervasive in real life: It is inner life, one’s soul, and inner health with its inner beauty that is the realm of moral character. That character is displayed in real life in outer life behaviors, not in outer beauty. Don’t judge people such as the four real men you mentioned to be “seemingly” lacking in concern with or effort for their health because they appear not beautiful to you. That is not sound and would be a disastrous way to proceed with your life in the social world. If you have issues against Rand’s philosophy, go right to those, and state them directly. Don’t settle for glancing blows against the philosophy by attacking its exponents personally. That is junk. Attack the philosophy position-by-position head on. (Even if you agree with points in the philosophy, consider what arguments and evidence can be mustered against them and what you think about those counters specifically. This is philosophic understanding.) Think about the philosophy itself, and give your objections and counter-reasoning. That is the stuff worthy of smart heads. Some examples: Rand held that the only way of winning knowledge was by rational processes. True or false? What can be said against this view? Not against the person holding the view, but the view itself. Rand held that every individual and their life is an end in itself. True or false? . . . Rand held that the purpose of morality is simply to help one live and enjoy oneself. True or false? . . . Rand held that the justification of a national defense is the protection of individual rights. Really? . . .
  12. . “In the poem ‘Human’ (1903), Gorky says of the new man that he is lost ‘among the desserts of the universe . . . on the little piece of the earth’. Yet, ‘he is going bravely ahead! and higher! On the way to victories over all the secrets of the earth and sky’. . . . “‘There was a cold wind outside, and an empty stretch of land under an empty sky” (Rand 1957, 15). The train encapsulates all the problems of a society that is living---and dying---due to the principles of collectivism. . . . The desert is the symbol of a hostile world in the novel: it is made obvious in the scene depicting the crash of the train at the Arizona desert [1160-61]. . . . “. . . In ‘Human’, Gorky glorified the new type of human, who is a creator and whose major impulse is Thought. . . . . . . “But there is a great difference between Gorky’s Human and Rand’s ‘new human’. . . .” JARS 18(2):326-27) --From the paper in that Winter 2018 issue of JARS: “Ayn Rand’s ‘Integrated Man’ and Russian Nietzscheanism” by Anastasiya Vasilievna Grigorovskaya, who has a number of publications on Ayn Rand, in Russian, and who is working on the first doctoral thesis about Rand in Russia (Tyumen).
  13. Doug, I don’t think that the philosophy of Ayn Rand nor any other particular philosophy—whether rational, irrational, or mixed—will ever come to be the guiding philosophy for all autonomous humans. Were such a philosophic frame ever accepted universally, then just wait. In time diversity of frame would return. Not returned after 100 years? Wait. It would return. But more realistically, the course is never going to result in any one particular philosophy being universally accepted. I mean freely accepted, but that just means really accepted. There can be nuclear exchanges that do not result in total extinction. Wait. The finale one not happened after 500 years? Wait. It will come. I don’t know if you’ve ever read the neat book This Perfect Day by Ira Levin. In that story, there is massive secret coercion being committed on the world population by a central authority, making the people peaceful as well as completely determinate and coordinate in their productions and consumptions and life spans. But there will be leaks, sooner or later, of individuals slipping out of the system, returning to their own free mind and body, and they will join together with other leaked fellows and fight the world system. Stephen
  14. . Nuclear war is not an idle threat. It is a real threat. Multiple states having great nuclear weapons capability---USA, Russia, France and some others---together with the real potential for use in an escalating international crisis is how nuclear deterrence has been able to work so long as it has. There was no guarantee it would work this far, but on the other hand, our understanding of mutual unacceptable damage and our moves to secure it were our best move in the circumstances. All-out nuclear war will happen sooner or later. I suggest that internationalism on that issue, specifically nonproliferation meddling in the programs of other countries, is a way of pushing that finale of the human world, including all the peoples of all the nation states, to later rather than sooner. Silence on this reality will not make it go away. The human world changed with the Bomb. Even if mutual nuclear disarmament were someday attained, human nature will not change, and the technology and new production will come back to that ultimate, total human demise. Our best move is to push out that demise to the farther future, and pure nationalism, a nationalism that would include non-intervention on this issue of ever more countries attaining deliverable nuclear explosives, rather hastens that future extinction. I do not take the end of the race of men to diminish a whit the glory that our kind existed and was what it was. Our kind was an end in itself, just as each individual and mortal human life was an end in itself. I think a book today on nationalism that does not address effect on the nuclear end-date would be myopic.
  15. This note too is not on experimental tests, but this seems a fair place to put it. Since Stephen Hawking made the theoretical discovery of particle/anti-particle pair production at the event horizon of black holes, many couldn’t help but think he was touching some key to future profound unification of quantum mechanics and relativity. For Hawking had drawn that conclusion we know as Hawking Radiation by doing quantum field theory in the spacetime structure at the event horizon. This possible key seems to be taking further tantalizing shape by recent work on quantum chaos effects in black holes. Douglas Stanford
  16. sN, Looking into the New Testament just now, I see that Jesus gave two overarching commandments. Firstly, to love God with all your heart and mind; secondly, to love your fellow humans as you love yourself (Luke 10). I gather he thought you should be loving yourself. This prophet was going around, as the story goes, performing miracles to good purposes for humans of earth. So there is a large reservoir of mystical power in the background of the moral perspective he declares. He says he is adding to and completing the old Commandments, and he gives some examples of how to go above and beyond their letter with an understanding of them grounded in love. Not only do not murder, but do not be angry with your fellow human nor call your fellow a fool nor look down on your fellow. Else be punished by God. Make peace with your fellow before coming to the altar to leave a gift for God. (And don’t be making a big show of your gifts to God or to your fellows.) In some cases, he reverses the old precepts. Down with “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.” Rather, do not resist evil. Turn the other cheek for the evildoer to hit as well. Down with loving only those who love you. “What credit is that to you? Even the tax-collectors do that!” Love your enemies as well. Then you are sharing in the perfections that are possessed by God (Matthew 5). His moral rationales are shot through with alleged reciprocities of benefit to one performing the good act. These are benefits, physical and social, coming back to one who sticks with God in letting go of benefits for now. The coming back will be from other humans or from God. In his model prayer, Jesus says to ask God for the bread one needs and to forgive one’s failures, as one is forgiving the failures of others (Luke 11). Some reciprocity here, and nothing against bread for oneself. Beyond keeping the religious law, Jesus tells one wealthy man who keeps the law, yet still feels incomplete, to reach perfection by giving all his possessions and money to the poor. He’ll have riches in heaven if he does that. Meanwhile, join Jesus in his crusade (Matthew 18). From the Sermon on the Mount: “How happy are those who know their need for God, for the kingdom of Heaven is theirs! “How happy are those who know what sorrow means, for they will be given courage and comfort! “Happy are those who claim nothing, for the whole earth will belong to them! “Happy are those who are hungry and thirsty for true goodness, for they will be fully satisfied. “Happy are the merciful, for they will have mercy shown to them! “Happy are the utterly sincere, for they will see God! “Happy are those who have suffered persecution for the cause of goodness, for the kingdom of Heaven is theirs! “And what happiness will be yours when people blame you and ill-treat you and say all kinds of slanderous things against you for my sake! Be glad then, yes, be tremendously glad—for your reward in Heaven is magnificent. . . . “You are the earth’s salt. . . . “You are the world’s light. . . . (Matthew 5) I rather think that building a case for altruism—or for socialism or for capitalism—based on the teachings of Jesus is far off the mark. Altruism is the doctrine that moral goodness is from sacrifice of self for the benefit of one’s fellow humans. Jesus-likeness without God at center of moral goodness should be laughed out of court. (The translations are by J. B. Phillips.)
  17. . I've noticed the failure of Jesus to preach altruism in the Bible. "Love your neighbor as yourself," which was also trumpeted by Paul, hardly measures up to such dicta as "Service above Self" (Rotary Club).
  18. You might get a chance to know because you seemed to be dying and then it turned out you did not. That happened to me. I know. It was about the matter of fact of how far and not farther I'd gotten with my intellectual discovery and creation, and lastly just about me and the one I love, just a lighted disk of light with only the two of us in it and only dark and irrelevance and nothing all around that disk.
  19. SL, interesting question. Somewhat before I read Rand, I had turned in just a few quiet moments alone from being a life-long devout Christian to the realization there is no God. I was 18. There was a great cleanness that the fierce victory of truth brings to one against all prior evasion, such as in the realization of Cheryl about her husband in Atlas. I had a momentary feeling of loss along with the realization of how much I had loved God. It was like the end of a love affair, though with the difference that the object of that love had never existed. That feeling of loss did not carry on beyond that moment, unlike end of a love affair with a fellow human. There rushed in in those moments a vast feeling of benevolence for all mankind, I think because of the realization that no one was watching over them. That feeling is constant with me, though without an accompaniment by any sense of loss, only that I watch over them and love them. Nietzsche counted the "death of God" as a liberation, but also as a fearful event for all, such as an earthquake. He thought of it as a loss of anything to esteem, although he proposed we can set up new things to esteem at least for a long while, until we overturn those things too, and move on to new values. And all of this wrenching and aspiring he considered a nobleness of soul. It was elevation of a neurotic psyche, and of a man who lacked and derailed real science and regular commercial or familial labor and who lacked appreciation for the four-square limits of human being and accomplishments in the world as it is.
  20. . Here is some work related to Peikoff’s treatment of Locke on philosophy of logic in his 1964 dissertation. The Peikoff 1985 cited herein is a bit of his dissertation. I wrote this paper in 2012. Contradiction and Red/Green – Locke Recall Ayn Rand’s law of identity in application to attributes, such as color. “Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification. / Whatever you choose to consider, be it an object, an attribute or an action, the law of identity remains the same. A leaf cannot be . . . all red and all green at the same time . . .”(1957, 1016). The logical character of the proposition that a particular surface cannot be all red and all green at the same time has been controversial. In Book 1 of his Essay concerning Human Understanding (EU), John Locke held “principles of demonstration ‘Whatever is, is’ and ‘It is impossible for the same thing to be and not be’” (EU 1.1.4) as unnecessary for the acquisition of all knowledge. “These maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason . . . . How many instances of the use of reason may we observe in children, a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim, ‘That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be’?” (EU 1.1.12). In Locke’s view of development, one first gets ideas of particular things through sense impressions, then general ideas by abstraction from the particular ideas. Before one has learned that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be, indeed, before one has learned to speak, one has learned that bitter is not sweet, white is not black, and red is not blue. Upon that and upon coming to speech, one learns that wormwood and sugarplums are not the same thing, that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing, that a square is not a circle, and so forth. Upon the same grounds that one came to know those differences, one later comes to know that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be (EU 1.1.15-20; 1.3.3–4; 2.1.6, 22–26; 4.7.9–10). Turning from development of knowledge to its structure, Locke goes on to say in Book 4 that in apprehending that white is not black or that a circle is not a triangle we do so directly. Knowledge that our ideas of these things are mutually exclusive is not known by demonstration, hence they require no principles of demonstration such as the principle of noncontradiction. We grasp the exclusivity of black and white in a self-evident perception, which Locke calls intuition. Like Plotinus, Anselm and many others before him, Locke thinks of all other knowledge as dependent on intuitive knowledge. The latter is the ultimate source of all certainty in knowledge. “A man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater certainty than to know that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it to be; and that two ideas, wherein he perceives a difference, are different and not precisely the same” (EU 4.2.1; see also 3.8.1; 4.7.4, 19). Is the sum of the angles of a triangle the same or variable from one triangle to another? Seeing the sameness of that sum and the sameness of that sum to the angle of a half-circle for all triangles in the Euclidean plane is not self-evident, but requires demonstration (EU 4.2.2). Each step of a demonstration, in Locke’s view, requires intuitive knowledge (EU 4.2.6). The mind can perceive immediately the agreement or disagreement of each step in the demonstration just as the eye can immediately perceive that black and white are distinct and whether a white paper is entirely so or contains some black marks (EU 4.2.5). It is intuitive knowledge alone, in Locke’s sense of the concept, that is at the base of human knowledge, certain or probable (EU 4.2.8; 4.2.19). It enables the certain demonstrations in geometry, demonstrations with the ideas of “extension, figure, number, and their modes” (EU 4.2.9; a triangle is a relatively simple mode: 2.12.4; 2.31.3; 3.3.18; 3.9.19; 4.4.6; 4.7.9). We enjoy accuracy in making and discerning differences in our simple ideas of extension, figure, and number because they are quantitative. (On simple ideas, see EU 2.2.1; 2.3.1; 2.5; 2.7.7-9; 2.30.2; 2.31.2, 12; 2.32.9, 14–16; 3.4.11, 14; 3.8.2; 4.1–2; 4.3.1–21; 4.4.4.) Those ideas are of the primary qualities of things such as Rand’s leaf. Secondary qualities apparently of things, such qualities as colors, are ideas produced in us by the impingement of particles endowed with only primary qualities. In Locke’s day, there were no ways of measuring relations of sameness and difference in the degree of a secondary quality, though he ventures to suppose that greater intensities of primary qualities produce greater degrees of a secondary quality. There are presumably degrees of differences in whiteness that we cannot discern, degrees corresponding to fine degrees of differences in primary qualities that could produce them. All the same, there are degrees of difference in secondary qualities we do perceive, and such intuitions suffice to found inferential knowledge beyond subjects such as geometry or mechanics. Where the difference in discerned difference in a secondary quality “is so great as to produce in the mind clearly distinct ideas, whose differences can be perfectly retained, there these ideas or colors, as we see in different kinds, as blue and red, are as capable of demonstration as ideas of number and extension” (EU 4.2.13). Where Locke has written “as capable of demonstration,” I think he means “as capable of use in demonstration” (though he could mean additionally what he argues elsewhere in the treatise: there is equally zero capability of any of these different kinds being discerned by demonstration). Is a sheet of paper before Locke, a paper waiting for the first impression of his pen, all white? Even if it is everywhere white, is it anywhere also red (yet not pink) or black (yet not gray)? We have no direct verdict below our visual thresholds. How does Locke have us know for sure that if the sheet is all white, it is in no part also red or black? Leaving rather faint the issue of how we know secondary qualities are always produced by primary qualities (cf. Ayers 2011, 146–51), Locke sinks intuitive knowledge concerning imperceptible secondary qualities into the bedrock of intuitive knowledge of primary qualities (EU 4.2.11–12; 4.3.11–13, 15; cf. Descartes 1632, 3–6; 1647–48, 255–56; on Locke’s distinction of primary-secondary, see EU 2.8.9–23; 2.30.2). Locke maintains that for any particular object whatsoever, at a particular time, its extension will be a particular extension, excluding all other particular extensions; its figure will be a particular figure, excluding all others; its motion will be a particular motion, excluding all others. He maintains furthermore that particles of light reflected from a definite part of an object to a particular place of a viewer cannot appear both yellow and azure. “For it is as impossible that the very same particle of any body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the rays of light, as that it should have two different figures and textures at the same time” (EU 4.3.15; see also 2.32.14; unique awareness from unique physical inputs had been embraced also by Descartes, supra; Des Chene 2001, 139–40). Locke generalizes these various sorts of particular exclusion: an object cannot have two exclusive degrees of a given quality simultaneously. Locke realizes that the impossibility of a leaf being all red and all green is a case of the principle that it is impossible to be both A and non-A. After all, he takes the latter principle to be a generalization of such exclusions encountered in leaf color, fortified by underlying exclusivities in the characters of primary qualities (cf. EU 2.27.1, 4). To say the impossibility of a leaf being at once all red and all green is a case of the logical impossibility of being both A and non-A is not to say the impossibility of the former case derives from the impossibility of the latter general principle. That redness of entire leaf and greenness of entire same leaf are mutually exclusive is not shown by the general principle there are mutually exclusive attributes of entities in existence. Locke correctly recognizes that. “These particular instances, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the understanding than the general maxims [superfluously] brought to confirm them: and it was in those particular instances that the first discoverer found the truth, without the help of the general maxims: and so may any one else do, who with attention considers them” (EU 4.7.11[3]). One weakness in Locke’s sensualist tendency to inductively warrant the necessity of noncontradiction by necessity of exclusions one encounters in sensory qualities is noted by Leonard Peikoff. Leaving the necessity of the principle of noncontradiction as only a necessity encountered in sensory qualities “seems to invite an immediate Humian type of refutation” (Peikoff 1985, 199). Locke’s theory of abstraction is inadequate to the task of delivering from perceptual bases the principle of noncontradiction, noncontradiction in particular and specific identity, noncontradiction in natured entities, their actions, and their attributes. In Locke’s view, we do not attain certain knowledge of the essential natures of physical entities, unlike the situations of our knowledge of simple sensory qualities (primary and secondary) and of mathematical entities. Staying within his view, there is no possibility of arriving at Rand’s absolute principles of identity and noncontradiction through the objects of the senses (EU 2.1.3–9, 22–26; 2.8.7–8; 2.10.6; 2.11.1–9; 2.18.6–7; 2.22.4–5; 2.25.9; 3.3.6–20, 28–38, 49; 4.4.1–6; 4.6.4–16; 4.7.4, 9–10, 16–19; 4.8; 4.11.13–14). It is a defect of Locke’s view of color qualities that it is set on difference and sameness in sensed qualities as secondary and their tie to qualities as primary. According to Locke’s scheme, the former, such as the qualities red and green, are in us; they are modifications of our sense organs, thence appearing in our minds, wrought by impinging primary qualities. Rand is set, rather, on the leaf and its color nature. Yes, red and green are different things. Yes, part of the story of how we attain express understanding of the principle of noncontradiction is by prior learning of sameness, difference, and exclusivity encountered in experience. But the sense of noncontradiction Rand is deploying—the sense of identity and exclusion Rand is deploying—is of natured entities. One does not need to know anything about the travel of light to the eye, the physical nature of light, the physiology of the eye, or perceptual thresholds in order to know that it is of the nature, the identity, of leaves and our visual power that no leaf can be at once all red and all green (cf. EU 4.11.2). Thanks to a presentation of Paul Churchland’s, I have experienced afterimages that seem to be entirely of two distinct colors at once. That experience has now become available to me (more tenuously) in Churchland’s chapter on chimerical colors in Neurophilosophy at Work (2007). I follow the viewing procedure, and in figure 9.11, I get to see fading afterimage discs that are at once mauve and black or at once blue and black and so forth. The point of constructing this figure is for the experience of what Churchland calls “impossibly dark” afterimage colors (the scare quotes are his), not to show patches of afterimages that are two colors at once. I leave it for the reader to dig into this important book’s purposes and their fulfillment. Afterimages are always fading. What I am experiencing as mauve and black “at once” is occurs while mauve is turning to black. Whether this experience is rightly a case of seeing a portion of surface, screen or page, as two colors could be reasonably disputed. Suppose it qualifies as such a case. It can be taken under wing in Rand’s picture by saying that leaves have their color nature, afterimages have theirs. The same sort of assimilation could be taken were it the case in the future we learn (i) that canonical reflectance profiles of a surface (Churchland 2007, Ch. 10) can be made two canonicals at once by some treatment of the surface and (ii) our visual system can be made to discern them distinctly when artificially and appropriately altered by, say, an electronic apparatus. Were leaves susceptible to said treatment giving them two canonical reflectance profiles, then in Rand’s conception of noncontradiction in attributes, we should say untreated leaves have their color nature, treated leaves have theirs. In the experience of Rand or Locke, it was not only the surfaces of leaves that were not anywhere at once both red and green. The same was found of any physical surface whatever. It was found likewise for volumetric color. Locke, and Rand too, might recall a certain liquid which when poured into another produces two colors; but the orange and azure produced are regional in the volume, not both simultaneously throughout (EU 2.11.3). Locke, like all of us, would want to look into the particulars of the physiology that make afterimage “impossibly dark” colors possible. Understanding of this physiology indeed enabled prediction of this previously unknown effect (Churchland 2007, Ch. 9). Locke could be pleased to see that afterimage colors have their bases in some primary qualities. These colors, like all experienced colors so far as we know, are patterns of nervous activities transforming retinal patterns of activity. Afterimage effects are artifacts of a visual system adaptive in its evolution to color perception of the world. The exclusion character of different canonical surface-reflectance profiles is present in the exclusions of the pattern of nervous activities that are color. But the particulars of this transport of exclusivity shows that Locke’s reasoning from exclusions among primary qualities to exclusions among secondary qualities was spurious. Returning to Locke’s sensualist epistemology more generally, afterimage experience of two colors everywhere in a region and my futuristic technological scenario quake Locke’s claim that we know the essence of colors just by knowing red is not green and not blue and so forth. Our knowing distinct simple ideas of qualities, secondary or primary, and our putting distinct names on these distinct ideas is insufficient to capture their exclusionary character, their essential natures as attributes of entities. Let the quake shake off that pretension of closure. It remains for Locke and everyone that “red is green” is a contradiction of experience or a contradiction of correct labels. Experience supporting “red is not green” can still support a principle of noncontradiction that recognizes there are distinct items in the world and distinct names to keep them straight. These remains are, however, not distinctive of attributes. They fall short of recognizing the radical general dependence of attributes on their entities and recognizing the full structure of noncontradiction as it applies to attributes. There is more trouble for Locke. We have seen he held we grasp the exclusivity of red and green by self-evident perception, which he called intuition. Though we become ready to grasp the general exclusivity of A and non-A by such previous sensory experiences of exclusivity, the former is self-evident and self-evident in the same way as the latter (EU 4.7.9–10). If the intuition that nothing can be at once all red and all green were self-evident in the same way as red not being green is self-evident, then fallibility of self-evidence in the proposition that nothing is at once red and green all over shows fallibility of self-evidence for the principle that nothing is at once A and non-A. My afterimage experience and my futuristic, scientifically informed scenario indicate fallibility in the “self-evidence” of the proposition that nothing is at once red and green all over. Time to check premises, for the result that contradictions are not perfectly self-evidently false is patently false. We may have also some trouble for Rand, but as suggested already, it can be skirted without significant alteration of her metaphysics. In saying a leaf cannot be at once all red and all green, she may have been relying on an Aristotelian sort of dynamical contrariety among colors themselves. Then regardless of what surface or medium may sport colors, the colors dynamically exclude each other at a given place. Her language is pretty strongly against this interpretation, for she speaks of leaf color, though that could by slim chance indicate merely that the dynamical contrariety of colors holds for all surfaces, including leaf surface. Any such line of thought about attributes can be omitted from Rand’s metaphysics. There remain more than enough riches of identity to get beyond Locke. References Ayers, M. 2011. Primary and Secondary Qualities in Locke’s Essay. In Primary and Secondary Qualities. L. Nolan, editor. Oxford. Churchland, P. 2007. Neurophilosophy at Work. Cambridge. Descartes, R. 1632. Treatise on Light. In Gaukroger 1998. ——. 1647–48. Description of the Human Body. In Gaukroger 1998. De Chene, D. 2001. Spirits & Clocks – Machine & Organism in Descartes. Cornell. Gaukroger, S., editor, 1998. Descartes – The World and Other Writings. Cambridge. Locke, J. 1690. An Essay concerning Human Understanding. A. C. Fraser, editor. 1894. Dover. Peikoff, L. 1985. Aristotle’s “Intuitive Induction.” The New Scholasticism 59(2):185–99. Rand, A. 1957. Atlas Shrugged. Random House.
  21. Welcome to OBJECTIVISM ONLINE, Terry Lewis. In addition to what is in the links you provided, a very informative history of American law in this area is The Emergence of a Free Press by Leonard Levy. That concerns freedom of ordinary citizens to express ideas, particularly ones critical of the government or governmental officials. The restrictions abridging such political freedom, in the British and American history, of concern in this book are government force, such as torture and execution, law of libel, and shutdown of printing outfits. In business firms, the stick is of a different genre, such as being fired. My own impression with business firms is that speech or other expression that distracts or detracts from the ultimate product or service of the firm is suppressed best it can be. That makes sense. In closed doors, of course, policies and projects are debated by the appropriate managers of the firm. There is a nasty little thing in this area that can go on in firms. In large firms, there can be 'soft' training of employees that can include collections of employees guided in discussions that include any sort of criticism or suggestions. These can be scams in which the information the firm is really interested in is further insight into which employees are problematic. (I'm sorry to say, but one of the saddest things I encountered in business were employees that could care less that we were producing or what we were producing or how well. They took no joy in that or in the brotherhood of coworkers dedicated to the productive purposes.) The interests of the firm are pervasive in its operations, but, of course, there is always 'politics' there, with the small p, as individuals and groups jockey for personal advantage and for vision and character of the firm.
  22. I don't see how the emotion of surprise is a derivative of more fundamental emotions or is a class under some other emotion. Basic Emotions
  23. (To see text of these poems most clearly, click on the photo.)
  24. . Indefinite Causal Order in a Quantum Switch I hope to return to the paper linked in this post, as well as to those in the previous post to specify their relations to physical principles in the everyday, non-quantum regime of our experience. I conjecture for now that the paper of the present post is talking of causality in the secondary, diluted sense which it is talked of by Kant in the Second Analogy of Experience of Critique of Pure Reason. There he tried to defend a principle that "all changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect." But the primary sense of causality is not that dilute one, and anyway his proposed principle is false even in classical regimes (which is what Kant was talking about because that was all that was known of at that time). That a body is moving with no net force applied to it, hence moving in a straight line and at a constant speed, which is a rule of its change of location, does not entail some underlying cause to explain the rule. My conjecture, without having dug into the paper yet, is that the causal order it speaks of is that thin sort that Kant was grappling with and not the stronger, primary sense of cause. The primary sense of cause is one thing making some change in another thing occur. It matters for me which sort of causality is being talked about in the paper because a metaphysics should be formulated to assimilate the entire firm scientific findings of one's era, as Kant tried for in his era and Aristotle tried for in his era.
  25. . Beauty – Francis Kovach Part III It remains to set out Kovach’s essence of esthetic experience itself and its consequences. Within those districts are esthetic intuition and esthetic judgment. Let us call the cognitive component of the essence of esthetic experience itself esthetic cognition. Clearly, esthetic cognition in literature is partly suprasensory. The meanings of words and sentences are conceptual. Esthetic cognition in literature is at least partly intellectual. “The full beauty of the poetic work is knowable only by the intellect in cooperation with some external and some internal senses” (PB 305). Similarly it goes for songs that have words and librettos of operas. Intellect is engaged in the discernment of this beauty. What of the beauty of nature, city skyline, or nonliterary art? Is suprasensory intellect, such as the conceptual faculty, required to discern their beauty? The senses can reveal the multitude or variety of parts composing the beautiful object, natural or artificial. In the view of Kovach, the directly perceivable colors, shapes, movements, and tones are principles and terms of relations between their multitudes and varieties, but they are not such relations themselves. In particular they are not the unity of proportionate components in the beautiful object arising from the relations all those directly perceivable elements have to each other and to the whole. Material beauty is a unity that is sensorily incognoscible; it requires an act of suprasensory intellect to be recognized. In further support of that conclusion, consider that not only literary arts, but nonliterary ones have a theme, an artistic idea “manifested, expressed, or symbolized by the artwork in such a way that the entire arrangement of all its parts is made according to the idea as the exemplary cause of the artistic order” (PB 306). This consideration lends some support to Kovach’s conclusion that the unity that is material beauty of art requires suprasensory intellect for its recognition. But I think the strength of this consideration’s support is only about half what my Prof. Kovach gauged for it. To bring this consideration to bear, he uses the following premise: “To recognize an order or arrangement without recognizing the principle of that order is certainly impossible” (306). I reject that premise. One can find a literary passage beautiful, state some of the reasons for that, yet realize there are some other reason(s) it is beautiful that one has yet to formulate. Similarly, one child may have become able to arrange sticks of varying length parallel each other in strict order of increasing lengths, made plain by aligning one end of each stick flush along a base line. A somewhat younger child not yet able to do that might come along and take pleasure in the final arrangement, I’m pretty sure. She could recognize the arrangement, she could respond to the order, yet not recognize the principle of the arrangement or order and not yet be able to make such an arrangement herself. Rand thought, and I concur, that we can perceive some similarities without yet understanding the bases of those similarities. Surely that is so for some beauty as well. Notice that “visual harmony is a sensory experience and is determined primarily by physiological causes” (Rand 1971, 1044). I shall grant Kovach that whenever beauty is discerned some principle of unity made of proportionate parts has been registered. Sometimes that registration cannot obtain without intellect, even if only imagistic and schematic intellect. It seems unlikely intellect is required in other cases, as in cognition of a beautiful tone. In the case of artistic beauty, I shall grant Kovach that some intellectual cognition has occurred if one has glimpsed something of the artist’s idea. I’ll take visual art minimally to be a craft of illusion (or perhaps a relative of such craft) having an idea or theme, composed of parts integral to that theme and contrived to occasion contemplation of the work as an end in itself. Beauty has been the main way of winning that aim, and if one has glimpsed something of an artwork’s idea, experience of the work’s beauty has likely engaged intellect even if only schematically and nondiscursively. Watch Gimbologna’s Mercury as you walk around him. Ignorant of who was Mercury, the meaning of the iconography in the statue, and the circumstances of the artist, what Mercury does before you and in you is lift off the earth (and your mind has been touched by a mind like yours across 400 years). This is only one idea for a sense of human body lifting off earth. Mercury’s forms and configuration had to be tuned to this idea to realize the idea, its parts proportionate in making this unity and joy. So I shall not go along with Kovach on the proposition that all material beauty is sensorily incognoscible. Some unities of proportionate parts of a beautiful scene or object might be recognized with automatic imagination and connection to prototypes, short of any schematic intellection. However, Kovach’s proposition can pass with me for all cases of artistic beauty, whether in literature, painting, sculpture, architecture, or music. Art in the intended sense is a making of embodied meaning that will require intellect to discern. The beholder may find some of the meaning beyond his ken, but should expect it right alongside his anticipation of beauty. Let Kovach now guide us further into the nature of the intellect’s portion of the esthetic experience itself. In beholding the beautiful object, the distinctive cognition is not the formation of the concept of beautiful object in general. It is not the cognition that is abstractive induction, and our cognition distinctive of the esthetic experience itself is not a coming to know how to define beauty. Rather, “by coming to know and enjoy the beauty of this object, . . . we recognize the object in its intelligibility, i.e., as a concrete unity in the concrete multitude or, simply, as a concrete” (PB 307). At the end of Part I, I contracted the Kovach view that unity or oneness of being is enough to constitute wholeness adequate for beautiful being (which for most of its occasions, we do not apprehend). The unity must be the sort constituted by proportionate parts, and there is no such thing as the proportionate in a world not faced by the organizations that are living beings. Kovach’s point that esthetic cognition is intellectual, though not abstractive, stands fine all the same. That is, it stands fine for those cases of esthetic experience that require intellect come into play, which is another contraction of Kovach’s scope, for I do not accede to the point that intellect must come into play in all cases of esthetic experience. The esthetic cognition enlisting intellect is not abstractive, neither does it consist in application of a concept to the singular case beheld. Such esthetic cognition does not consist in “this beauty.” That concept has its place in the later stage, in the judgment “This is beautiful,” a consequence of the esthetic cognition. Recognition of beauty in the esthetic experience by intellect is neither abstractive of concepts nor applicative of them. It is not conceptual, yet intellectual. Then too, the intellectual esthetic cognition is not a judgment (PB 307). In beholding the beautiful object, one is turned to contemplation of the object. In this contemplation, one’s mind “notices or discovers in its own light the integral parts with their relations to each other and the whole; and this contemplation . . . does nothing with the blissful vision of the beautiful object in a discursive manner” (PB 309). In this cognition, we know beauty. It is not speculative or scientific knowledge. It is not the esthetic knowledge of the art critic or the philosopher of beauty. It is not the technical knowledge of the artist. It is not knowing by faith or mystic reception. It is only our natural knowing of the beauty of the object, not our consequent knowing that the contemplated object is beautiful (309). The esthetic cognition enlisting intellect is “an immediate, yet full grasp by the intellect of the beauty of the contemplated object,” not a conclusion of logical inference (PB 309). That is to say, such esthetic cognition is intuitive and nondiscursive. Esthetic cognition of a graphic or plastic artwork may envelope across time as one is seeing more and more of the object. Literature and music require substantial duration of apprehension. All through such spans of apprehension, it remains that the dawn of beauty is coming immediately and not as conclusion of reasoning. One’s difficulty in giving complete reasons for the experienced beauty is not merely difficulty in verbalizing one’s reasoning. One had never adduced reasons to deliver the beauty. I hesitate to agree with Kovach on that point in the case of literature. Conceptual meanings are factors in the beauty of a poem. Here is the first verse of my poem Lifehold. No council, no say. All earth turn, night trail day. Unceasing sea tease land away to watery deep stage lay, dark, for none. It is not reasoning that delivers beauty from the meaning component. It is delivery of meaning that makes that beauty. I’ll stay with Kovach on nondiscursivity in the case of a poem and in the case of a novel as well. The beauty of fit between plot and theme or the beauty in the conclusion of a story, given what had gone before, are beauties of fitness in conceptual meaning, but it is not reasoning that has made that fitness into beauty. Hesitation ended. The intuitiveness of esthetic cognition enlisting intellect is like the intuitiveness in the grasp of first principles of being and of thought. The difference lies in the categories of object in the two kinds of intuition. Materially beautiful objects are concretes perceived or imagined. First principles are suprasensory objects of apprehension. “Sensory perception is an intuition with a sensory subject and object, . . . the grasp of self-evident principles is an intuition with suprasensory subject and object, [and] aesthetic cognition is an intuition sensory in its object and suprasensory in its subject” (PB 311). In that usage, intuition means only a natural, immediate, and non-discursive apprehension. Paul Crowther mentions that the content of art is experienced mainly in psychologically intuitive terms, without us being explicitly aware of the factors making the experience. “By ‘intuitive’ here, I do not mean anything strange or mysterious. Most of our perceptual knowledge has this character. . . . / Intuitions are explicable in principle, even though they may turn out to involve issues of great complexity which do not allow a definitive analysis” (Crowther 2007, 8). I would add that analysis without sufficient scientific information on the process is greatly impaired analysis. Esthetic knowing is per se delightful. It is delightful in itself, not on account of some further manifest end imputing the delight that is esthetic delight. The per se delightfulness of esthetic knowing is “delightful at the sensory level in terms of its object, the beautiful, but delightful at the suprasensory level in terms of its subject, the rational will as it rests in the mental possession of the intuited beauty” (PB 311). Among the cognitive consequences of the esthetic cognition and delight, is the esthetic judgment “This is beautiful.” Kovach rates this as a necessary consequence. I think it is not necessary during early childhood. For adults, it seems to be necessary at least in this way: the knowing of anything necessarily entails ability to know the correctness of the proposition “Such is so” or, in Rand’s words, “It is.” Kovach lists numerous contingent effects of esthetic experience, particularly experience of fine art, that have been claimed, combining lists of D. W. Gotshalk and Monroe Beardsley. It is among these contingent and more remote effects that one will find external purposes served by fine art, overarching purposes cognitive, appetitive, social, or moral (PB 316–17). As for the necessary appetitive effect of the esthetic experience, focally the experience of beautiful fine art, it is a desire flowing directly from the esthetic judgment and its keep in knowledge and flowing indirectly from the esthetic intuition and delight. For the moment the beholder intuits the beauty of an object, an esthetic love is born, one assuming the specific character of esthetic joy or delight possessed in that moment of beholding. The object of this desire is not only or firstly the enjoyment of the previously beheld beauty. Rather, it is the desire to face that particular beauty again (PB 315–16). So I long to again walk around Mercury in Firenze and to again stand gazing a long while into On the Terrace in Chicago. Face to face. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References Aquinas, T. c. 1265–73. Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas. A. C. Pegis, editor. 1997 [1945]. Hackett. Aristotle . c. 348–322 B.C. The Complete Works of Aristotle. J. Barnes, editor. 1984. Princeton. Binswanger, H. 1986. The Ayn Rand Lexicon. NAL. Boydstun, S. 2004. Universals and Measurement. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies (JARS) 5(2):271–305. Crowther, P. 2007. Defining Art, Creating the Canon. Oxford. Di Dio, C., Macaluso, E., and G. Rizzolatti 2007. The Golden Beauty: Brain Response to Classical and Renaissance Sculptures. PLoS ONE 2(11):e1201. Enright, J. 2001. Art: What a Concept. JARS 2(2):341–59. Hospers, J. 2001. Rand’s Aesthetics: A Personal View. JARS 2(2):311–34. Kovach, F. J. 2012 (1974). Philosophy of Beauty. Oklahoma. Rand, A. 1943. The Fountainhead. Bobbs-Merrill. ——. 1957. Atlas Shrugged. Random House. ——. 1963. The Goal of My Writing I. The Objectivist Newsletter (ON) 2(10):37–40. ——. 1965. The Psycho-Epistemology of Art. ON 4(4):15–16, 18. ——. 1966. Art and Sense of Life. The Objectivist (O) 5(Mar):33–40. ——. 1966–67. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. Expanded 2nd edition. 1990. Meridian. ——. 1971. Art and Cognition I. O 10(Apr):1009–17. Smith, A. M. 2001. Alhacen’s Theory of Vision. Two volumes. American Philosophical Society. Solso, R. L. 1994. Cognition and the Visual Arts. MIT. ——. 2003. The Psychology of Art and the Evolution of the Conscious Brain. MIT. Stein, B. E., and M. A. Meredith 1993. The Merging of the Senses. MIT. Torres, L., and M. M. Kamhi 1992. Ayn Rand’s Philosophy of Art V. Aristos 5(4):1–8.
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