Your thoughts on Hume's case against induction?

[Betsy]

I'm not sure what you (or Betsy) mean by "reducing it to an identity". Are you saying that you can't be certain that if you push a glass off a table that it won't crash to the floor unless you understand the physics of it?

No. You are looking for a cause -- something about the entity -- that accounts for what it is or does.

The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by entities.  The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act ...

So let's look at the nature of the entity in question -- your crashing glass. What characteristic(s) of the glass cause it to crash? If you dropped a rubber ball it would bounce, but glass is breakable when sufficient stress is applied. Dropping it on a hard surface from a height puts sufficient stress on the glass. Therefore, this glass, which is something which breaks when sufficiently stressed, breaks when sufficiently stressed. For sure!

[Betsy]

I have a trick question for you. Which do you think is more certain - that smoking causes cancer or that a cow can't jump over the moon?

Let's see. What is it about smoking that causes cancer? Cancer is caused when abnormal lung cells reproduce uncontrollably. The abnormality is caused by alteration of the genetic material in the lung cells. Experiments with smoke and lung cells show that cigarette smoke can cause alteration in the genetic material of cells. That's an unbroken causal (identity in action) chain which demonstrates, with certainty, that cigarette smoke can cause cancer. The nature of lung cells and smoke explains it.

Now apply that approach to the nature of cows and the nature and location of the moon. (Left as a exercise for the student.)

[DPW]

P.S.: One of the anti-Objectivist academics on hpo - I think it may have been Churl Beck - contended that "furniture" (and some other concepts) don't have any apparent CCD's (Conceptual Common Denominators) throwing AR's entire theory of concepts into question. Don, do I understand it that you think you have an answer to this challenge on your web page? I thought I saw what appeared to be a comment of yours which addresses this question. Am I correct?

Try as I might, I couldn't find anything to say regarding the rest of your post that Betsy and/or Dave didn't say first (and probably better), so I'll confine myself to this one (which Dave also tried to steal from me...debate thief! )

The essay you are referring to, I believe, concerns the nature of broken units: that is, how do we identify certain existents as units of a concept when they lack a characteristic(s) shared by the other units of the concept, including the distinguishing characteristic (e.g., a baby born without a brain, a dog without a sense of smell, a flat tire, etc.).

As for furniture, the most basic CCD is shape. The distinguishing characteristic of "table" is a range of measurements within the CCD "shape" and the distinguishing characteristic of "furniture" is simply a wider range of measurements within that same CCD. Now, granted, it gets a bit more complicated when we talk about an adult definition of "furniture" but that's a separate issue. I'll take a peak at the link Dave provided and comment further if necessary, but it may be a while. I'm off to spend a weekend at the beach with two dear friends (both Objectivists). The weather is supposed to be bad, but that simply means the philosophy will be real good!

P.S. I see that Peikoff is quoted as thanking you in the latest AR Bookstore catelogue. Congrats!

[DavidOdden]

The essay you are referring to, I believe, concerns the nature of broken units: that is, how do we identify certain existents as units of a concept when they lack a characteristic(s) shared by the other units of the concept, including the distinguishing characteristic (e.g., a baby born without a brain, a dog without a sense of smell, a flat tire, etc.).

So before you go off for a weekend of beach-frolicking, where is this essay?

[DPW]

So before you go off for a weekend of beach-frolicking, where is this essay?

http://angermanagement.mu.nu/archives/021378.html

[RadCap]

I have not yet read this entire thread, so forgive me if this has already been dealt with:

"And, that you could say of something, "I'm even more certain of it now than I was before". This would suggest that certainty is not necessarily a "singularity" and could allow for a continuum."

I believe you are stating that the accumulation of evidence or data to support a conclusion can accrue up to and BEYOND the point of where you are certain of that conclusion. In other words, more and more evidence can accumulate with also proves your conclusion. As such, as MORE evidence accrues, you are MORE certain.

If that is the case, I have to disagree.

I am certain of the axiom identity, on the basis that I perceive existents.

Through perception and experience, I am almost constantly provided with new existents. Am I MORE sure - more certain - of identity than I was before? No. I am JUST AS certain of it when I determined it was true - that it was real - as I am now. Additional existents do not change that truth - they do not make it MORE knowledge than it was before.

Once I am CERTAIN, the ONLY thing that NEW evidence can do to CHANGE that state of knowledge is provide some CONTRADICTION to it. Otherwise the epistemological state of that knowledge remains constant.

It is something akin to a fader light switch. The OFF position is the impossible. The ON position is full intensity - certainty. Between the two you are in the province of the uncertain - the light of knowledge released from the bulb is much dimmer, but gets increasingly brighter as you slide closert to certainty (from possible, to probable, etc with whatever other catagories in between). Once you have reached the point of certainty, the light of knowledge from that bulb is as bright as it will get. It does not get any brighter.

[Fred Weiss]

BTW I am frankly puzzled at the nature of my indecency and ingraciousness which you referred to -- it certainly was not my intent to snub you. 

I'll get to your - and Betsy's and Don's - more substantive comments later but in regard to this, I do hope you realize that I was just "pulling your string" and teasing you.

Fred Weiss

[F*ckCommunism]

The context is REAL.

The same way apples differ from nipples - they're completely different things.

i'm just looking for clarification and maybe i should post this in the basic questions, but how does contextual differ from subjective?

if something can be true in one context, yet not true in a new context, doesn't that mean that truth is subjective?

i'm not trying to debate, but trying to build a foundation of 'proper' definitions so i can understand..

[Betsy]

if something can be true in one context, yet not true in a new context, doesn't that mean that truth is subjective?

No. Remember, subjectivism is the view that conscousness creates reality. Context is completely different. Context simply means the PART of reality you are talking about.

So, when you say "knowledge is contextual" all it means is that the knowledge applies to a part of reality -- usually the part you know about -- and not necessarily to everything. An example would be a three year-old who knows that when you drop things, they fall down -- until he gets a helium baloon. His knowledge about dropping things doesn't apply in that context -- i.e., in that part of reality.

[Capitalism Forever]

Now apply that approach to the nature of cows and the nature and location of the moon.  (Left as a exercise for the student.)

The only way cows can jump is by using their leg muscles. The leg muscles of cows are such that they allow the cows to jump to heights of a couple of feet at most. The moon is tens of thousands of miles away from any cow. A couple of feet is less than tens of thousands of miles. Therefore, a cow's jump, which is to a height lower than the moon, is to a height lower than the moon.

Have I got that right?

[Betsy]

Therefore, a cow's jump, which is to a height lower than the moon, is to a height lower than the moon.

Have I got that right?

You catch on fast!

[F*ckCommunism]

No. Remember, subjectivism is the view that conscousness creates reality. Context is completely different. Context simply means the PART of reality you are talking about.

that totally clears it up...

thanks so much!!!

[Bearster]

After skimming through most of this thread, I have two points to offer.

First, if one denies absolute certainty then any attempt to use the concept of probability is guilty of concept-stealing. Think about it.

Second, I don't think it's valid to argue from the arbitrary. If man were infallible, then ... Man is fallible. Period. What evidence is there to suggest how things were be if this fact were non-fact? This is a minor point, but nevertheless I felt a need to pick this nit.

[nimble]

for what reason do people use the concept of certainty to mean infallible knowledge? If certainty is a characteristic only open to fallible, volitional beings like man, then why would one define it out of the possibility for mans use? Doesnt make sense to me.

[DavidOdden]

First, if one denies absolute certainty then any attempt to use the concept of probability is guilty of concept-stealing.  Think about it.

Having thought about it, I don't see the argument. Assuming that by "absolute certainty" you mean "certainty with no metaphysical possibility of error", then you can say that such a thing does not exist. And at the same time you can say that your confidence in a proposition can be very high, like 99.9999%, that confidence asymptotes to 100% but can never actually reach 100%. So what is your argument?

[nimble]

i think he was arguing that you wouldnt know what 100% is if it is an impossible thing to have. As for the validity of that statement, I am not CERTAIN (hahaha) that his claim works.

[Eddie]

Capitalism Forever: “The leg muscles of cows are such that they allow the cows to jump to heights of a couple of feet at most…Therefore, a cow's jump, which is to a height lower than the moon, is to a height lower than the moon.”

If this is intended to function as an inductive argument, it demonstrates why Hume rejected induction as a valid logical procedure. Hume wasn’t just arguing that we cannot be certain about events in the external world; he was making the far more radical proposal that what we call inductive reasoning is not reasoning at all.

His argument is that induction invariably begs the question, that the conclusion of any inductive argument has been smuggled into the premise. One of the premises of the above argument is that cows have limited jumping ability, which is in itself an inductive generalisation, based on another inductive generalisation that like things act alike.

The conclusion that a cow’s jump is less than the height of the moon is just another way of saying that cows have limited jumping ability. In that case, the conclusion forms part of the premise, therefore the argument is invalid.

The underlying issue to be addressed is how we can justify such inductive principles as “like things act alike”, or more generally “nature is uniform” without appealing to the principles themselves.

E

[Bearster]

...And at the same time you can say that your confidence in a proposition can be very high, like 99.9999%, that confidence asymptotes to 100%...

That confidence asymptotes to what? To a non-existent?!?

Probability is an expression of something you don't know in terms of something you do know. For example, a deck of playing cards is shuffled. What is the probability of the top card being the ace of clubs? 1:52

This is not possible to utter without admitting that one does know that "top card" certainly means 1 card, and that "deck" means 52 cards. If I said I will go to the store and buy some things, what is the probability of the top card being ace of clubs, the only response would be to stare at me blanky. I hadn't told you I had bough any cards, or even if I did, how many decks.

In such a case, "probability" is not applicable as a concept.

Back to our discussion of certainty, if absolute certainty is not possible, then it's meaningless and so the notion of "probability" steals the concept it is designed to deny.

There is another problem here also, for deniers of certainty. At best, one could utter "I don't know", and certainly not "it's not even possible for you to know." What is the probability that maybe others could know something with absolute certainty?

P.S. A great litmus test for certainty is: would you bet your life on it, without hesitation?

[Bearster]

In that case, the conclusion forms part of the premise, therefore the argument is invalid.

The key here is to recognize that induction is not deduction. This means you don't state it in the form of a syllogism, and don't even think of it as deduction.

Deduction cannot be used to desribe induction, nor to proove induction exists.

[Betsy]

Assuming that by "absolute certainty" you mean "certainty with no metaphysical possibility of error", then you can say that such a thing does not exist. And at the same time you can say that your confidence in a proposition can be very high, like 99.9999%, that confidence asymptotes to 100% but can never actually reach 100%. So what is your argument?

It looks like "certainty" is being used two mean two different things in this discussion, and it is important to make the distinction when using the term.

There's the epistemological state of certainty which is arrived at, according to my theory, by reducing a statement to an identity. If you do that, it is as 100% certain as "A is A" because it is "A is A."

Then there is the epistemological emotion of certainty -- a level of introspectively perceived confidence in one's own conclusions. Some people are such poor thinkers that they are not certain, in this sense, of anything -- even things they see with their own eyes.

[Betsy]

[Hume's] argument is that induction invariably begs the question, that the conclusion of any inductive argument has been smuggled into the premise.

That's not the case here. That cows can't jump very high is based on observation and knowledge concerning the physiology of cows, how they move, etc. All of that ultimately reduces to a tautology, but that it does and how it does is what is shown in an inductive proof.

One of the premises of the above argument is that cows have limited jumping ability, which is in itself an inductive generalisation, based on another inductive generalisation that like things act alike.

No, it's based on the Law of Identity: things are what they are. When you're dealing with generalizations, reducing the generalization to an identity consists of showing that the characteristic(s) which make something a member of a class are the same characteristic(s) which account for the characteristic(s) or actions stated in the generalization. Cows can't jump over the moon, because what makes something a cow -- being a certain kind of organism -- is the same think which makes it incapable of jumping very high.

The conclusion that a cow’s jump is less than the height of the moon is just another way of saying that cows have limited jumping ability. In that case, the conclusion forms part of the premise, therefore the argument is invalid.

A proper inductive proof shows what it is as about all cows that accounts for limited jumping ability and not just that it is limited.

The underlying issue to be addressed is how we can justify such inductive principles as “like things act alike”, or more generally “nature is uniform” without appealing to the principles themselves.

That's easy. Things act in accordance with their natures. Things with the same natures act the same.

[y_feldblum]

On a tangent, Betsy, do you mean that an epistemological emotion of certainty is a kind of metaphysical value-judgment? If not, I don't understand what you mean by the former well enough to identify the difference.

[DavidOdden]

That confidence asymptotes to what?  To a non-existent?!?

Probability is an expression of something you don't know in terms of something you do know.  For example, a deck of playing cards is shuffled.  What is the probability of the top card being the ace of clubs?  1:52

This is not possible to utter without admitting that one does know that "top card" certainly means 1 card, and that "deck" means 52 cards.  If I said I will go to the store and buy some things, what is the probability of the top card being ace of clubs, the only response would be to stare at me blanky.  I hadn't told you I had bough any cards, or even if I did, how many decks.

In such a case, "probability" is not applicable as a concept.

I didn't understand that you were speaking of combinatorics: I understood your claim to be about evidentiary weight. Of course with combinatorics, there is no issue of asymptoting -- the exact value can be computed, and notions of 99.9999% probability are nonsense.

Back to our discussion of certainty, if absolute certainty is not possible, then it's meaningless and so the notion of "probability" steals the concept it is designed to deny.

Are you now talking about "probability" in the sense of evidentiary weight?

To draw on your earlier question -- "asymptotes to what?" -- the what does not have to exist, except as a concept of method. Analogously, infinity does not exist but many mathematical functions continue on "to infinity", of course never reaching it.

P.S.  A great litmus test for certainty is: would you bet your life on it, without hesitation?

Yes, in the sense of "confidence", but that test does not require you to use only reason, so for example an irrational fear could prevent you from undertaking an action that a rational person would recognise as beneficial.

[DavidOdden]

It looks like "certainty" is being used two mean two different things in this discussion, and it is important to make the distinction when using the term.

Yes; I think that's the essence of Fred's objection to certainty as a singular state. The emotional and the epistemological integrate at the point of founding that feeling of confidence in rational analysis of the facts. And unfortunately, it is perfectly correct to use the term in both ways. Referring to the emotion with a word such as "confidence" may help keep the concepts separate.

[DPW]

P.S.: One of the anti-Objectivist academics on hpo - I think it may have been Churl Beck - contended that "furniture" (and some other concepts) don't have any apparent CCD's (Conceptual Common Denominators) throwing AR's entire theory of concepts into question. Don, do I understand it that you think you have an answer to this challenge on your web page? I thought I saw what appeared to be a comment of yours which addresses this question. Am I correct?

Here is the best summary of Churl's argument I could find:

I am saying that her definition is correct *and* it does not pick out a distinguishing set of characteristics that is common to all furniture.  In other words, some pieces of furniture have one distinguishing characteristic ("can support the weight of the human body") while others have another ("can store other, smaller objects").

He is right, and the proper response is: so what? Let's look at Rand had to say on this point (ITOE 22):

The distinguishing characteristic of the new concept is determined byt he nature of the objects from which its constituent units are being differentiated, i.e., by their "Conceptual Common Denominator," which, in this case, is: large objects inside a human habitation.  The adult definition of "furniture" would be: "Movable man-made objects intended to be used in a human habitation, which can support the weight of the human body or support and/or store other, smaller objects."  This differentiates "furniture" from architectural features, such as doors or windows, from ornamental objects, such as pictures or drapes, and from a variety of smaller objects that may be used inside a habitation, such as ashtrays, bric-a-brac, dishes, etc.

The first question is: what unites things you can sit on with storage devices? They share the same CCD - "large objects inside a human habitation." This is the genus of Rand's definition.

The big question is: what distinguishes them from all other large objects inside a human habitation? The answer is - lots of things! Chuck's complaint is that the definition doesn't name the distinguishing characteristics common to both "things you sit on" and "things that hold stuff." But no one said it had to.

What do "things you sit on" and "things that hold stuff" have in common that other large, movable objects inside a human habitation do not? The most obvious is, they are utilitarian objects that make a room suitable for living or working. They enable you to fulfill the function of a room.

The reason Rand didn't choose that common attribute as the DC was because that would be a definition by non-essentials - it is too generalized. By identifying the two basic functions served by furniture, she makes the concept useful. In other words, what's most important to us about the concept furniture is not the shared function all its units perform, but the more specific functions (sitting and holding) that result in the performance of the shared function (suitability for living or working).

Does that clear things up?