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How is knowledge obtained, according to O'ism?

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I haven't followed the specifics of this particular debate. I don't know who Woxor is. But I agree with the spirit of what Don is saying and my general impression is that the axe is given to opponents of Objectivism much too quickly here.

Don't diminish the power of Objectivism. It's critics can be answered but you need to develop the skills at doing it effectively. When you do it effectively, they tend to shut up quickly. But you are not going to develop those skills if you simply chase people away before they have been answered.

Fred Weiss

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Woxor was respectful, polite, on-topic, non-emotional, and non-disruptive.  In this regard, he was one of the better opponents we've seen on these pages - I was certainly learning a lot from debating him.  Yet he was run out of town by a poster who accused him, not simply of having a bad psycho-epistemology (which I think he did), but of being "dishonest" and a "troll."  Not only was there no evidence for either of those accusations, there was plenty of evidence to the contrary. 

As someone very active in the Objectivist movement, I am also very big on quality control.  When people who call themselves Objectivists act in a manner oppossed to Rand's philosophy, by judging before identifying, my patience runs very thin.  In this particular case, it was stretched past its limits.

I prefer straight talk. If you don't like RadCap's manners, say you don't like RadCap's manners.

For the record, I regard this as bordering on psychologizing and would put it in the realm of things I'd rather not see on the board (our wonderful host has the last word on the matter, of course).
How can something border on psychologizing? Did I psychologize or did I not? If I didn't, find another way to object to what I said. If I did, then say so. Talk straight, man! :blink:

As an aside, if someone isn't immoral and isn't virtuous, what the heck is his moral status?

He is not morally reprehensible, but not especially praiseworthy either. He's just an average Joe.

Since when was this board reserved for people who are students of Objectivism?  On the contrary, the rules are explicit:

Emphasis mine. A person who doesn't accept the axioms on which all of Objectivism rests hardly qualifies as a person interested in Ayn Rand's ideas.

When he made his first post, Woxor WAS interested in Ayn Rand's ideas, namely in Objectivist epistemology. We began to explain Objectivist epistemology to him by presenting the starting point of Objectivism: the axioms. Woxor found that the axioms did not satisfy his standards of what constitutes a logical argument, so he became UNinterested in Ayn Rand's ideas and left the forum.

The reason for this was not that we did not do a good enough job of explaining and validating the axioms; RadCap's "tautologies" were about the best and most convincing validation I have ever seen. Nor was it (necessarily) a moral flaw on the part of Woxor: he simply had the wrong standards for a logical argument.

As far as I can see, the only "hostile" statement made by RadCap before Woxor left is the following:

I have to say that your claim you are not a student of philosophy is dubious, to put it mildly. You know far to much about the subject, far too many specifically philosophic terms, and far too many very specific philosophic arguments and objections to never have studied the subject before.

Given your responses - especially the most recent ones, it appears you are a major troll.

Here, RadCap formulates a suspicion and gives his reasons for having the suspicion. Now, when a reasonable but false suspicion arises against an honest person, he will react by providing counter-evidence--which Woxor did in his next post:

I have been debating philosophy for years, but I have never taken a philosophy class in school. I am not a troll -- I study chemical engineering and pure mathematics at Texas A&M and find philosophy interesting at times.

Other than this, RadCap advised Woxor to read OPAR, again stating his reason for doing so: namely, that "The format of a forum is simply not equip[p]ed to teach you what you need to learn." Since Woxor had already stated his intention to read the books, he could have reacted by saying that he will do so and come back to the forum when he is done. But he didn't, because meanwhile he had lost his interest in Ayn Rand's ideas--and why did he lose them? "Because RadCap hasn't been nice to me" ? No,

I came here to attempt to reconcile my beliefs with the philosophy of Objectivism, but that seems impossible since the traditional logic which I am used to has been flatly rebuffed.

The reason Woxor has become uninterested in Ayn Rand's ideas is that the axioms of Objectivism are not proven using "the traditional logic" he expects from a philosophy. In other words, because he has been looking for rationalism and Objectivism is not a rationalist philosophy.

The accusations against RadCap that his manners have turned away a person who would otherwise have been interested in Objectivism are therefore false.

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How can something border on psychologizing? Did I psychologize or did I not? If I didn't, find another way to object to what I said. If I did, then say so. Talk straight, man! :blink:

Point taken.

A person who doesn't accept the axioms on which all of Objectivism rests hardly qualifies as a person interested in Ayn Rand's ideas.

That's true of someone who rejects the axioms, not necessarily of someone who doesn't accept them. You'll notice, in fact, that Woxor did accept them, only he thought they were arbitrary. As I tried to explain to him, that is a hierarchy error. Given that the hierarchical nature of knowledge is an idea unique to Objectivism, and given the confusions about axioms hammered into his head as a mathematician, it didn't surprise me that he had troulbe grasping my arguments.

More to the point, I don't think you can justify attempting to deduce whether Woxor was *really* interested in Rand's ideas based on the evidence we have to go on. I prefer to take someone at their word unless there is reason to believe otherwise. So long as someone can be on-topic, polite, and respectful of his opponents, I can't see any reason for running him off the boards.

When he made his first post, Woxor WAS interested in Ayn Rand's ideas, namely in Objectivist epistemology. We began to explain Objectivist epistemology to him by presenting the starting point of Objectivism: the axioms. Woxor found that the axioms did not satisfy his standards of what constitutes a logical argument, so he became UNinterested in Ayn Rand's ideas and left the forum.
That would be a great discription of what happened but for the fact it does not describe what took place.

The reason for this was not that we did not do a good enough job of explaining and validating the axioms; RadCap's "tautologies" were about the best and most convincing validation I have ever seen. Nor was it (necessarily) a moral flaw on the part of Woxor: he simply had the wrong standards for a logical argument.

And him having the wrong standards for what constitutes a logical argument justifies RadCap accussing him of dishonesty and of being a troll?

As far as I can see, the only "hostile" statement made by RadCap before Woxor left is the following:

Here, RadCap formulates a suspicion and gives his reasons for having the suspicion. Now, when a reasonable but false suspicion arises against an honest person, he will react by providing counter-evidence--which Woxor did in his next post:

If you think RadCap's comments were reasonable, then you and I have a far different view of what "reasonable" means in this context. Moreover, given the gravity of such a moral judgment, I think it irresponsible to voice whatever suspicions one happens to have on the grounds that, "If I'm wrong, my opponent will refute them." If RadCap was suspicious of Woxor's claim, he could easily have asked, "How is it you know so much about philosophy without having studied it?" He did not do that. That is unjust.

The accusations against RadCap that his manners have turned away a person who would otherwise have been interested in Objectivism are therefore false.

I didn't make that accusation. Whether Woxor was or wasn't interested in Objectivism is less important than how we treat those with whom we disagree. So long as a person is polite, on-topic, does not resort to emotionalism, and has given no evidence of intellectual dishonesty, I can see absolutely no grounds for running that person out of town.

In any case, let me say that I'm impressed by your arguments and manner of arguing. I look forward to future exchanges.

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That would be a great discription of what happened but for the fact it does not describe what took place.

I would agree 100% with what you say but for the fact that I see things differently. ;)

I'll grant that the evidence available is not enough to make a definitive judgment on Woxor. There is no certainty that he is a malicious poster, but one can observe patterns in his behavior--such as the one that Ash has pointed out--that raise the suspicion of him being so. It is this suspicion that RadCap voiced when he said "It appears [emphasis mine] you are a major troll."

One can argue about whether it was a good idea to express this suspicion when it was only a suspicion. I wouldn't have done it myself--I would have preferred to enlighten Woxor on the distinction between rationalism and a reality-oriented philosophy and see how he reacts--but I don't fault RadCap for doing it.

What we can be certain of, though, is that Woxor is a quintessential rationalist. And, since Objectivism is quintessentially UN-rationalistic, it is a fact that Objectivism is not the kind of philosophy he's been looking for. For this reason, I don't see his being "run out of town" as much of a loss.

And I should note that a novice who is looking for the kind of philosophy that Objectivism is--a guide to one's life--would certainly get a much more charitable treatment from RadCap, even if he appears hopelessly misguided. I know this from experience. The principle I use to establish my "friendliness quotient" towards a poster is that I require an acceptance of the basics--reason, reality, identity--but allow room for error in everything else, as long as there is a willingness to recognize and correct the errors. It has been my impression that RadCap has been using a similar principle.

In any case, let me say that I'm impressed by your arguments and manner of arguing.

One tries. :confused: Thanks for your kind words!

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  • 1 month later...

On the Wiki, knowledge is described as "a product of consciousness: it is the sum of one's identifications retained in some form. Or, in Ayn Rand's words, knowledge is 'a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation' (ITOE 35)." What, according to Objectivism, are the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge? For instance, one standard view posits that to know 'p', one must:

1. Believe 'p'

2. 'p' must be true

3. One's belief in 'p' must be justified

Would an Objectivist agree that these three are the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing 'p'?

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For instance, one standard view posits that to know 'p', one must:

1. Believe 'p'

2. 'p' must be true

3. One's belief in 'p' must be justified

Would an Objectivist agree that these three are the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing 'p'?

I wouldn't. You cannot fit Objectivism into the standard molds used by modern philosophers. Objectivism is a correspondence theory of truth but I would caution using that term if you have a background in modern epistemology.

Knowledge isn't just a set of conditions that obtain around some statement, that is, knowledge isn't just a matter of uttering some proposition under certain conditions; knowledge is identification which is a uniquely Objectivist idea.

As to what identification consists of I suggest that you read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology and Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand chapters 2, 3 and especially 4.

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1. Believe 'p'

2. 'p' must be true

3. One's belief in 'p' must be justified

If the above is too condensed, I’ll expand. These sorts of lists are common in modern epistemology but they are entirely off-base in that they avoid all of the important questions. Some of the questions that lists like this avoid are:

Regarding condition 1, is this person’s belief objective or subjective? How did they arrive at their conclusion? Was it a process of logic and reason that led them there or was it by whim? If 'p' is arbitrary then it certainly isn’t knowledge. This list tells us nothing.

Condition 2 is just the metaphysical component of knowledge.

Regarding condition 3, how is 'p' justified? Did it integrate without contradiction into the rest of his knowledge? Is 'p' grounded in observed fact? Is 'p' located properly in the hierarchy of knowledge? Is 'p' warranted by antecedent knowledge? Again, the list is silent.

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Regarding condition 1, is this person’s belief objective or subjective? How did they arrive at their conclusion? Was it a process of logic and reason that led them there or was it by whim? If 'p' is arbitrary then it certainly isn’t knowledge. This list tells us nothing.

These questions more properly apply to condition 3, which is the most ambiguous of the conditions for "justified true belief." Condition 1 merely states that one cannot claim knowledge of fact A if one believes not-A.

Condition 2 is just the metaphysical component of knowledge.
Yes.

Regarding condition 3, how is 'p' justified? Did it integrate without contradiction into the rest of his knowledge? Is 'p' grounded in observed fact? Is ‘p’ located properly in the hierarchy of knowledge? Is 'p' warranted by antecedent knowledge? Again, the list is silent.

This is the most useless of the three condidtions, for precisely the reasons you point out, in addition to those objections you raised to condition 1. Namely, what constitutes justification?

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1. Believe 'p'

2. 'p' must be true

3. One's belief in 'p' must be justified

The "Justified True Belief" view of knowledge smells seductive when you first sniff it, but after being around it long enough and poking it and prodding it, I think you'll come to conclude that it stinks. Bowzer sums it up well in his critique, so what I want to emphasize is how I think the JTB view reflects a fundamentally wrong epistemology, one that does not consider reason to be particularly important.

A "belief" is a statement of emotion, and criterion 1 focuses on having a particular emotional state. Objectivism sees knowledge as a grasping of reality -- it emphasizes a particular relationship between consciousness and reality. Belief does not do that. If a person is acting on the basis of known facts and reason, then those facts determine your evaluation, and "belief" is irrelevant. Invoking belief, which can be entirely irrational, implies that emotion can be a tool for gaining knowledge. It is not. A rational person who has the fully integrated system of observational knowledge that leads to "knowing P" cannot then cast aside this knowledge and application of reason, to conclude "But I don't believe it!". However, anybody is capable of letting emotion override reason and say "But I don't wanna believe it!" - the technical term for that is "evasion". With a fully rational person, the "belief" part comes for free, and should not be a defining criterion.

The claim that P must be true begs the question of what truth is. A widely held view is that truth is something that is "out there", that it is not mental (this is where the neo-Platonist correpondence people tend to get very confused, because they see truth as being neither something mental nor something metaphysical). Objectivists (tend to) use the term "fact" to refer to the metaphysical state of affairs, so we'd say that a proposition is true if it describes a fact. You could restate 2 as "P describes a fact" and not get grief.

And as you can tell, the "justification" clause really reeks because it trivializes the nature of "justification", making me wonder why this isn't expressed in terms of "rationalisation". A "justification" can be entirely emotional; I cannot imagine anything that cannot be called a "justification". The crux of the Objectivist position is that it involves perceptually-grounded knowledge and integration of that knowledge, which is pretty specific.

One of the most important questions to address is whether you can "know P" at some point in time, and then learn that you were wrong. But that's another thread, another channel.

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A "belief" is a statement of emotion, and criterion 1 focuses on having a particular emotional state.
No epistemologist I know of would categorize "belief" in any way like that, and if you argued against the traditional definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" in that fashion you would be arguing at cross-purposes.

To have a belief is simply to be disposed to assert or assent to a proposition that has truth-conditions.

And as you can tell, the "justification" clause really reeks because it trivializes the nature of "justification", making me wonder why this isn't expressed in terms of "rationalisation". A "justification" can be entirely emotional; I cannot imagine anything that cannot be called a "justification".

Again, no epistemologist would recognize this definition of justification. The justification relation has to do with the reliability of the cognitive processes involved in acquiring a belief and the strength of the evidence one has in support of it. Though different philosophers will gloss this in different ways (most contemporary epistemology is devoted to fleshing this out), I do not know of any serious philosopher who has argued that emotion or wish-fulfillment satisfies the justification condition. The examples of irrationally acquired beliefs that you mention are precisely what the justification condition rules out.

Also, who are the neo-platonic philosophers you have in mind?

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To have a belief is simply to be disposed to assert or assent to a proposition that has truth-conditions.

I think what David might have had in mind (forgive me if this isn't accurate) is that beliefs can be subjective, that they don't have to be formed by a process of rational inquiry based on observed facts. It is for this reason--as a recent discussion on HBL pointed out--that "belief" is not the genus of "knowledge." I should have brought this up in my first response.

On a related note, I would point out that people can be "disposed to assert or assent" to arbitrary propositions which have no "truth-conditions." "Belief" is really a very useless concept in discussions of knowledge.

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I think what David might have had in mind (forgive me if this isn't accurate) is that beliefs can be subjective, that they don't have to be formed by a process of rational inquiry based on observed facts.

That's absolutely correct. The standard meaning of "belief" carries with it unsavory connotations of possible irrationality and subjectivity. Epistemologists can make statements such as "For the purposes of this discussion, we will define 'belief' as...", but that's an improper use of language. (And to be "disposed to" assert the truth of a proposition is just another way of invoking whim). Pick a word that clearly identifies what you're referring to.

The JTB characterization is inaccurate as a statement of knowledge according to Objectivism because it leaves open these wrong interpretations, and by choice of words denigrates the method of acquiring knowledge. This holds for "justification" as well. The JTB position fails because it does not say what J and B are, and these are not just small details, these are the whole ball of wax, and using prejudicial words does not advance the cause of understanding knowledge.

To Philo: Kant; Pierce (cf. "types"); Jerrold Katz; Tarski. Gödel [nb: I just found out that "neo-platonist" also refers to post-Platonic Greek philosophy fathered by Plotinus, so I wasn't referring to them. How many neo's can you put on the adjective?]

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  • 10 months later...
Those who would be debating on the Objectivist side would not be debating on behalf of a belief system, but on behalf of a validated integrated system of truth.

I didn't realize that Objectivists had a different definition of knowledge. When I think of knowledge, I think of it as defined as "justified, true belief".

Objectivism rejects "justified, true belief" as a definition of knowledge. Knowledge is not a species of belief; in my view, it is a species of "awareness".

This issue arose again in another thread, so I decided to re-activate this one.

What is belief? I define belief as thinking and acting as if the believed idea were true. This says nothing about whether the idea is actually true or whether it is justified. It is also different from a person saying or being inclined to say "I believe [such and such].".

Frankly, I do not understand DPW's definition of knowledge as a form of awareness.

What is knowledge? I am inclined to define knowledge as true belief. Notice that I am not even requiring justification.

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Trying to define knowledge as "justified true beleif" doesnt even work within the academic philosophy framework due to, amongst other things, Gettier cases. The problem (and this is fairly widespread in academic philosophy) stems from the desire to define things by giving 'necessary and sufficient conditions', even though this is not how human knowledge and conception works in practice.

Edited by Hal
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Objectivism is a correspondence theory of truth

I realise Peikoff makes this claim in OPAR, but I think that the Objectivist postition would be better classified as a coherence theory of truth. The reason for this is the firm emphasis on context; Peikoff makes clear that knowlege is entirely contextual - 'knowing' a new statement does not involve comparing it to a transcendental model of reality only available to an omniscient being, but rather in seeing how it coheres with the knowledge you already have. This leads to the people being able to know something which later turn out to be wrong, just as long as it was correct within the context of their knowledge. Now, if truth was defined via correspondence, this would lead to the odd position that knowledge has nothing whatsoever to do with truth. But since AR defines truth as being the outcome of a process ("truth is a product of the idenitification of reality", from memory) rather than as something lurking about in reality waiting to be found, I doubt she would have been happy with this. So a coherence theory seems to be implied.

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I realise Peikoff makes this claim [that Objectivist epistemology is a type of correspondence theory] in OPAR, but I think that the Objectivist postition would be better classified as a coherence theory of truth. The reason for this is the firm emphasis on context [... But since AR defines truth as being the outcome of a process ("truth is a product of the idenitification of reality", from memory) [...] So a coherence theory seems to be implied.

[My comments added in square brackets.]

You have provided the ammunition that kills your own argument. Truth, which resides in the mind, is a product of a process of identifying reality. If that isn't correspondence (of ideas in the mind to facts of reality), what is?

Yes, except for axioms, context affects knowledge. But that context is itself knowledge -- all ultimately traceable to reality through a process of identification. Thus all knowledge corresponds to something in reality. Objectivist epistemology is a correspondence theory -- by your own evidence.

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[My comments added in square brackets.]

You have provided the ammunition that kills your own argument. Truth, which resides in the mind, is a product of a process of identifying reality. If that isn't correspondence (of ideas in the mind to facts of reality), what is?

Peikoff takes a holistic view of knowledge (OPAR 122-123, "Knowledge is not a juxtaposition of independent axioms... knowledge at each stage is a total, a sum, a single whole"). A new item of knowledge is not validated by comparing it with the fact of reality it 'corresponds' to, but by seeing how it integrates with the knowledge a person already has (OPAR 125). I wouldnt call this a correspondence theory - correspondence theories are generally atomistic, where isolated propositions are compared with the isolated 'facts' of reality they are meant to correspond to. Peikoff on the other hand takes knowledge to be a unified whole. I suppose you could say that the entire body of a person's knowledge is what corresponds (or doesnt correspond) to reality, rather than individual statements and beliefs.

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I agree with what BurgessLau has said, so let me address your most recent question.

A new item of knowledge is not validated by comparing it with the fact of reality it 'corresponds' to, but by seeing how it integrates with the knowledge a person already has (OPAR 125).

You are mis-reading OPAR. Re-read the section on hierarchy, specifically the part on reduction. He defines "proof" as the process of reducing an idea to perceptual data. (120) Also read the section on the arbitrary. His definition of truth: Truth is a type of relationship between a proposition and the facts. (164) I'm not sure which part of page 125 you are referring to. Peikoff does say that integration is important, but so is reduction.

I look at it this way: Since all knowledge is some type of awareness of reality, integrating a new identification with the rest of one's knowledge is another way of checking the new identification against all of our knowledge of reality, not just the immediate facts that led us to this new identification. Looked at from this angle, integration loses its coherentist overtones and becomes a new addition to our method of establishing correspondence. As Peikoff points out in more detail elsewhere, since reality is a total so must be our knowledge of it. (Unity in Epistemology and Ethics)

Does that make sense?

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I realise Peikoff makes this claim in OPAR, but I think that the Objectivist postition would be better classified as a coherence theory of truth. The reason for this is the firm emphasis on context;
Both coherence theory and correspondence theory are, as practiced, incompatible with Objectivist epistemology, but this characterisation of the essential difference between coherence theory and correspondence theory, from the Stanford encyclopedia, makes it clear that the Objectivist account of truth is closest to correspondence theory (as Peikoff recognises): "According to the coherence theory, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are not (in general) propositions, but rather objective features of the world."

Coherence theory is so far off the mark that I don't have much to say about it (i.e. it's like alchemy -- why should I bother?). Its only concern is mindless formalistic internal consistency, which is the refuge of small minds. They hide behind notions of "logical entailment" without concern for whether this is a substantive notion that can ever be disproven (hint: if not, it's not worth paying attention to). Any theory of truth that is divorced from existence is not only silly, but clearly unrelated to Objectivism. Feel free to think I'm being harsh about coherence theory, but unless you have in mind a specific, spiffy version of the theory, I can't imagine how anyone can think that Objectivist epistemology is in any sense a "kind" of coherence theory. [insert note about how one can't say that finding one characteristic shared between Objectivism and X makes Objectivism a "kind of X"].

Correspondence theory is at least worth talking about since it's about reality, but still, the questions of what a "proposition" is and what it means for a proposition to "correspond" in the typical neo-Platonist approach that is adopted by your average contemporary philosopher, are questions that are usually either ignored ("it doesn't matter") or given the wrong answer (propositions are "out there", correspondence is a magical relation that is "out there").

I agree with your observation that correspondence theorist usually take knowledge to be isolable and dis-integrated (indeed, dis-integration of knowledge is usually considerend to be a virtue by those correspondence guys), and that is the one point of similarity between coherentist and Objectivist theories of truth, that neither of these theories accepts that presumption. A simpler way to look at it is that Objectivist truth is correspondence theory which demands integrated knowledge, plus emphasis on the mental grasp aspect and not the detached Platonic orb aspect of propositions. You seem to take propositional isolation to be the essential characteristic of correspondence, whereas I take relationship to reality as being the essential. But I won't deny that most correspondologists are propositional isolations: which is why I'm not a correspondence theorist, or a coherentist.

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...  the concept "knowledge" is formed by retaining its distinguishing characteristics (a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation) and omitting the particular facts involved.
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Um, jrs, that's not a definition for knowledge, that's an explanation of the specific type of measurement-omission necessary for the formation of the concept "knowledge".

If I were to define "man" in such a way, I'd end up sitting here describing all the features of man that can be variable without ever telling you what a man actually IS.

Knowledge is simply an identification of some fact of reality. It is the end product of the process of thought. Reason, being the faculty that integrates the material of the senses and identifies them, is the means to gaining knowledge. It's process, or means of identification, is logic.

Not so hard to define knowledge, hmm?

I disagree with Don Watkins proposal that knowledge is a species of "awareness" though. Knowledge is a product of a specific process of consciousness, and awareness simply IS consciousness. (the terms are interchangeable) An analogous statement would be that "fur" is a species of "dog" because dogs produce fur. Knowledge isn't a delimited type of consciousness, so the term species doesn't apply.

Knowledge IS a species of "products of consciousness". Another species would be "emotions".

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Ayn Rand defines "knowledge" as "a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation."

As you can see, Peikoff bases his definition of knowledge on the passage in ITOE which I quoted in my previous post in this thread. It is also the only entry for "Knowledge" in the Ayn Rand Lexicon.

I was not saying that I necessarily agree with this. I just wanted to give notice that this is the official Objectivist definition.

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That's another way of saying what I said. When you grasp something through perceptual observation, your brain takes the dissociated sensations you experience, distinguishes them from one another, integrates them, and presents you with their identification; your perception of an entity. When you grasp something conceptually, you take the dissociated percepts you experience, distinguish them from one another, integrate them, and form an identification of their nature.

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  • 8 years later...

What are your thoughts on Robert Nozick's formulation of JTB. person X knows that p if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(i) p is true.
(ii) X believes that p.
(iii) If p were not true, X would not believe that p.
(iv) If p were true, X would believe that p.

 

I think the problems with subjectivism that David highlighted earlier still stand, no?

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