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Anomalous monism and Rand

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My interest in Ayn Rand brought me to considering her views on the mind/body dichotomy. Of course I know she rejected the distinction altogether and called the human being a single, integrated entity, yet was still what can be appropriately called a dualist. She made the the assertions that (a) conscious organisms have both mental attributes and physical attributes, and (B) both kinds of attributes may participate in determining the causal powers of the conscious organism. She then left the interaction mechanisms of mind and body to the sciences of psychology and neurobiology.

But this last part, according to my standards, does not address the problem. I am a physicalist, but recognize Rand as not a physicalist, simply because she recognized a difference between mind and matter. I think that a physicalist interpretation of her 'primacy of existence' would not be well-founded.

Anomalous monism, something I'm quite familiar with, can best be summarized as this: (a) mental events are identical with physical events and (B) that the mental is anomalous; that is, under their mental descriptions these mental events are not regulated by strict physical laws (see Anomalous Monism for additional information).

My question is whether or not Ayn Rand believed that the mental is not reducible to the physical (a key tenet of anomalous monism as a non-reduction form of physicalism) and whether the theory of anomalous monism would be consistent with her views of the mind and body, and offers an acceptable thesis that she "left to the sciences". Although Rand was a "dualist" and anomalous monism is monistic, I believe the two concepts can be reconciled in this case.

Reference: here

Edited by The_Rational_Animal
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As far as I know, her use of "physical" corresponds to the concept "material, being composed of matter". I don't know what "reduce to" means; but I imagine that a relationship (for example a spatial relationship) between two material objects is not material, but would certainly be important in characterizing mental action. Rand had no position, that I know of, as to whether mental events are regulated by physical laws.

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First, I don't understand how it is justified to think of Rand as a dualist.

If I can look at a diamond and appreciate that it is at the same time both a specific mass of carbon and a particular crystal structure of carbon, am I now a dualist?

If yes, then I don't think dualism means anything. I thought the whole point of dualism was to attach man to the supernatural. If there are now doctrines of dualism which are purely physical, what is the new point?

If no, then Rand was not a dualist either because the specific properties of life, consciousness and volition are to a man what the crystal structure is to a diamond.

Second, the mental is not reducible to the physical. Anomalous monism is definitely 'specific science' subject matter.

I think it has some merit. When engineers build neural nets and then train them up to accomplish some task, there is no prinicple of explanation for the values assigned to the simulated synapses on the internal layers of the network. Of course one can step through training process and trace each calculation but the results of such an exercise provide no insights. This seems analogous to the token-identity and no-strict-laws principles as explained at SEP reference.

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My question is whether or not Ayn Rand believed that the mental is not reducible to the physical (a key tenet of anomalous monism as a non-reduction form of physicalism) and whether the theory of anomalous monism would be consistent with her views of the mind and body, and offers an acceptable thesis that she "left to the sciences". Although Rand was a "dualist" and anomalous monism is monistic, I believe the two concepts can be reconciled in this case.

Reference: here

Ooh, juicy. I see you are familiar with the works of D. Davidson. I can't help but get involved in this one.

The short answer is that Rand certainly believed that the mental is not reducible to the physical. But that is a non-essential characteristic of anomalous monism, since the monism bit is the positive aspect of the position. I don't see why you think that monism and Rand's dualism can be reconciled.

The fact that she thought that the mind-body interaction question was to be left to the sciences does not indicate that she thought that mental states are token identical with physical ones. On the contrary, the very question of interaction presupposes that the two types of state are discernible.

My questions for physicalists are: First, what is it to be a physicalist? Second, what is it to be physical? Answers to this second question are usually revealing and point to the trouble with the monism part of anomalous monism. Leaving this aside, what argument do you rely on to support your physicalism?

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My questions for physicalists are: First, what is it to be a physicalist? Second, what is it to be physical? Answers to this second question are usually revealing and point to the trouble with the monism part of anomalous monism. Leaving this aside, what argument do you rely on to support your physicalism?

A physicalist would philosophically be a materialist in the tradition of Democritus, Hobbes and Marx, no?

I find this issue to be a weakness in Objectivism: if reason is altogether independent of existence, there is no way to explain how consciousness is related to existence at all. It is only if consciousness is primary in some sense that we have any hope of their being related at all.

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Although Rand was a "dualist" and anomalous monism is monistic, I believe the two concepts can be reconciled in this case.

I don't think Rand was a dualist. While she recognized material and spiritual existents, she never suggested (to my knowledge) that these are the only forms of existence possible; she didn't legislate what things can exist in reality.

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A physicalist would philosophically be a materialist in the tradition of Democritus, Hobbes and Marx, no?

Yeah, but that's virtually a circular definition. What is a materialist? Someone who believes everything is matter. Note that this is the old-fashioned definition. Physicalism is up-to-date because contemporary physics acknowledges that more than just matter exists. But then my question is, what is it to be physical?

I find this issue to be a weakness in Objectivism: if reason is altogether independent of existence, there is no way to explain how consciousness is related to existence at all. It is only if consciousness is primary in some sense that we have any hope of their being related at all.

Who says reason is independent of existence? What would that mean?

I don't think Rand was a dualist. While she recognized material and spiritual existents, she never suggested (to my knowledge) that these are the only forms of existence possible; she didn't legislate what things can exist in reality.

To say that she recognized both the material and the spiritual fits perfectly well the generic definition of dualism.

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I find this issue to be a weakness in Objectivism: if reason is altogether independent of existence, there is no way to explain how consciousness is related to existence at all. It is only if consciousness is primary in some sense that we have any hope of their being related at all.

We exist, our consciousness exists. It is the result of the function of a living human brain. I am, therefore, I think. Consciousness can't help but to be related to existance, to think otherwise would seem to belong to the realm of the mystic.

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She made the the assertions that (a) conscious organisms have both mental attributes and physical attributes, and (:P both kinds of attributes may participate in determining the causal powers of the conscious organism.

I'm pretty sure that Ayn Rand never wrote down the words "both kinds of attributes may participate in determining the causal powers of the conscious organism." Can you give exact quotes of her statements you consider to be examples of dualism?

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Who says reason is independent of existence? What would that mean?

Exactly; which is why existence cannot be ultimately altogether distinct from consciousness. Only if reality is fundamentally related to mind can anyone explain how what exists is intelligible to a faculty of reason.

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Exactly; which is why existence cannot be ultimately altogether distinct from consciousness. Only if reality is fundamentally related to mind can anyone explain how what exists is intelligible to a faculty of reason.

I asked a question, you responded with "exactly." That doesn't make sense. Let me be blunt, then.

Rand doesn't say that "reason is independent of existence." Far from it. The primacy of existence means precisely that existence has primacy over consciousness, which means that consciousness depends on existence. (Reason is just one form of consciousness.)

This is far from saying that consciousness is independent of existence. Consciousness cannot exist independently, with nothing to be conscious of. And there can be no faculty of consciousness without a physical organism that has that faculty.

All that Rand says that might qualify her as being a dualist is that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter, i.e., that matter and consciousness are two distinct types of existent. To say that this implies that consciousness is independent of existence assumes matter is the only kind of existent, which is question-begging. That is it presupposes an argument for physicalism, so I'd like to see that argument if you've got it!

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All that Rand says that might qualify her as being a dualist is that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter, i.e., that matter and consciousness are two distinct types of existent. To say that this implies that consciousness is independent of existence assumes matter is the only kind of existent, which is question-begging. That is it presupposes an argument for physicalism, so I'd like to see that argument if you've got it!

My point is that primacy of existence makes Rand a materialist. It is only if mind is in some sense primary that existence is rationally intelligible at all.

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My point is that primacy of existence makes Rand a materialist. It is only if mind is in some sense primary that existence is rationally intelligible at all.

Basically: says you.

I've had no problem understanding the primacy of existence, and reason's derivative role of identifying existence. It is consciousness that conforms to existence, it isn't a primary. Nor does it need to be primary to rationally understand it. In fact, I posit the exact opposite. The role and function of the mind would not be rationally intelligible if it were in some sense "primary."

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Interesting discussion so far. I appreciate the elaboration on Rand's position. But for now, I'd simply like to point to certain consistencies between the two thinkers Davidson (the creator of anomalous monism) and Rand.

Firstly, anomalous monism does not deny the existence of mental events; that is, it is not epiphenomenalism, which claims mental events are the direct result of bodily processes. Similarly, Rand (obviously) did not deny the existence of mental events, while (obviously) accepting matter as existential.

Secondly, Rand said that both kinds of events have causal interaction with the whole organism (mental and physical). This position can be read about in various parts of For the New Intellectual, namely from pages 135 to 142. Anomalous monism, by "the principle of causal interaction", says that there exist both mental-to-physical as well as physical-to-mental causal interactions.

Thirdly, Rand said that the mental events of consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical. Anomalous monism, by "the principle of the anomalism of the mental", says that there are no psycho-physical laws which relate the mental and the physical as just that, mental and physical. In this, anomalous monism is not your everyday reductionist physicalism; the two cannot be analyzed in terms of one another.

A major problem I find in bringing these two together is in both parties' conceptions of causation. Rand knows causation to be as "an 'action' is not an entity; rather, entities act. Therefore, an action cannot be properly regarded as the fundamental cause of another action, as actions do not exist apart from the entities that produce them."

On the other hand, Davidson feels that "all events are caused by and cause other events and this is the chief, defining characteristic of what an event is." Unless I am missing some vocabulary linkage here between "event" and "action", this seems to be a contradiction. Or could an "event" itself be an "entity", an these views be complementary? (see the next post)

Davidson's view of properties (which is similar to Rand's) can be put in this manner: "...properties are linguistic items, are ways of describing events. According to Davidson there is nothing "in" events that makes it true that they can be described using certain predicates as opposed to others. Thus, there are no recognition-transcendent facts about events that determine how they can be described. Since properties are not ontological parts of events, it makes no sense to say that events cause other events in virtue of certain properties."

The problem here is that the bolded part seems consistent with Objectivism, that properties are epistemological and not ontological. But the italicized part seems in consistent; that is, Objectivists say that properties of entities play a direct role in what actions occur and how it interacts with other things.

Edited by The_Rational_Animal
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The first three points of comparison you make between Rand and Davidson are genuine. I think his position (and several other contemporary nonreductive views) help demonstrate just how difficult it is to deny consciousness. Physicalists are still physicalists, but they desperately want to be compatibilist about our normal mental discourse--the consequences of incompatibilism are too obviously absurd and self-refuting.

But in the end, Davidson and other contemporary philosophers of mind still advocate physicalism. The biggest tension between Rand and these thinkers is not their views of causality (though that is a difference), but physicalism. I'm not sure why you don't want to discuss that difference, it is the fundamental. So I ask again, why do you find physicalism compelling? What are your reasons for accepting it? And when you conclude that everything is physical, what do you mean by "physical"?

Incidentally, regarding this linguistic view of properties, I would say it is definitely not the Objectivist view. It's true that Objectivism rejects intrinsicism. But it is also not subjectivism, which this view resembles. Property concepts, like all concepts, are in fact human concepts. But they are concepts based on real similarities and differences among entities.

So this helps explain the inconsistency you mention: Davidson rejects the possibility that entities cause events in virtue of their properties, because he is a subjectivist about properties. Rand affirms that entities cause actions in virtue of their nature (properties), because she thinks entities and their natures are real (though we come to grasp them by comparing and contrasting them with other entities).

Edited by noumenalself
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Unless I am missing some vocabulary linkage here between "event" and "action", this seems to be a contradiction. Or could an "event" itself be an "entity", an these views be complementary?

To be honest, I think the agreements between Rand and Anomalous Monism are quite apparent in their premises. I believe the real issue likes in their respective laws of causality. I decided to investigate the respective meanings of 'event', 'action', and 'entity'. I see it as such:

IF 'event' is an 'entity', THEN there is no contradiction

IF 'event' is an 'action', THEN there is no contradiction

IF 'event' is neither an 'action' nor an 'entity', THEN there is a contradiction

Definitions:

Event-- something that happens at a given place and time; a phenomenon located at a single point in space-time

Action -- something done

Entity -- something that has a distinct, separate existence

look them up--source: WordNet Search

Firstly, the obvious thing is that each definition begins with "something", which is some unspecified thing. According to the Objectivist, something which has a distinct existence (entity) is incompatible with "something that happens" or "something done". So thus, neither an action nor an event is an "entity".

Secondly, it should be apparent that from these given definitions, action and event are equivalent and synonymous insofar as "to do" and "to happen" are both used passively. That is, something can be done, it need not do (perform) some thing itself, actively. For instance, I could say "the laundry was done", when I could have equivalently said "I did the laundry". They are the same, just as "the laundry happened" where laundry is the "action of completing the laundry".

Thus, I believe there is no contradiction in both conceptions of causality because if we use the same term, either "action" or "entity", consistently in both cases, they will say the same thing.

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So I ask again, why do you find physicalism compelling? What are your reasons for accepting it? And when you conclude that everything is physical, what do you mean by "physical"?

Well, it is rational to be guided in one's metaphysical commitments by the methods of natural science. Metaphysics should not be approached in a way that is distinct from the sciences but should rather be thought of as continuous with it. The metaphysical picture of the world that one is led to by the methods of natural science is physicalism. The conclusion is that physicalism is true, or at least physicalism is the only rational conclusion from this.

You're right, there are no dominant, catch-all arguments in favor of physicalism. But I mostly advocate it because I find that it is impossible for there to only be non-material entities (idealism). I also find that dualism is an impossibility. A non-material entity, such as a consciousness or a soul, cannot have causal interaction with a physical entity such as the body. There cannot be energy continuation between a non-material mind and a material body as it violates the laws of physics. Occam's Razor says that it is more likely, with the simpler explanation, that there is simply a body.

Between materialism and physicalism, I choose physicalism because hard materialism goes against a belief in free will. It advocates a strict determinism, which I could argue against but being on an Objectivist forum, I don't feel such discussion is necessary.

Incidentally, regarding this linguistic view of properties, I would say it is definitely not the Objectivist view. It's true that Objectivism rejects intrinsicism. But it is also not subjectivism, which this view resembles. Property concepts, like all concepts, are in fact human concepts. But they are concepts based on real similarities and differences among entities.

So this helps explain the inconsistency you mention: Davidson rejects the possibility that entities cause events in virtue of their properties, because he is a subjectivist about properties. Rand affirms that entities cause actions in virtue of their nature (properties), because she thinks entities and their natures are real (though we come to grasp them by comparing and contrasting them with other entities).

Thanks for correcting me.

Edited by The_Rational_Animal
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Well, it is rational to be guided in one's metaphysical commitments by the methods of natural science. Metaphysics should not be approached in a way that is distinct from the sciences but should rather be thought of as continuous with it. The metaphysical picture of the world that one is led to by the methods of natural science is physicalism. The conclusion is that physicalism is true, or at least physicalism is the only rational conclusion from this.

Yes and no. Obviously the methods of natural science are quite rational. Does this mean that philosophical rationality is the same as natural scientific rationality, that the methods and assumptions are the same? No. For that you'd need to argue for Quinean naturalized epistemology, which is quite a task (one I've analyzed in some detail, and I don't think it works). Obviously in some sense science is continuous with philosophy, but in what regards? Yes, they're both informed by logic and observation. But the sciences deal with specialized subject matters, whereas philosophy is the most general field that integrates all of the disciplines. To say that science assumes physicalism is, I'm afraid, to beg the question. It's true that natural science (or at least the natural physical sciences) study only the physical world, but that doesn't mean that they assume that only the physical world exists. The sciences as such take no position on this topic, precisely because of their specialized subject matter.

You're right, there are no dominant, catch-all arguments in favor of physicalism. But I mostly advocate it because I find that it is impossible for there to only be non-material entities (idealism). I also find that dualism is an impossibility. A non-material entity, such as a consciousness or a soul, cannot have causal interaction with a physical entity such as the body. There cannot be energy continuation between a non-material mind and a material body as it violates the laws of physics. Occam's Razor says that it is more likely, with the simpler explanation, that there is simply a body.

Absent some special argument, it does not seem clear at all that there can be no causal interaction between the physical and the non-physical. Why can't two different types of existent interact? Which laws of physics do you think this violates? Yes, I've heard arguments about the conservation of energy, but I doubt that these hold up. See this paper by Barbara Montero, for example:

http://barbara.antinomies.org/papers/conservation/viewHTML

See also some useful remarks here:

http://maverickphilosopher.powerblogs.com/...131235741.shtml

Between materialism and physicalism, I choose physicalism because hard materialism goes against a belief in free will. It advocates a strict determinism, which I could argue against but being on an Objectivist forum, I don't feel such discussion is necessary.

Yeah, but most physicalists also deny that there is any free will worth having. Yes, there are compatibilists who say we can have the mental supervene on the physical, but still make "choices" that aren't coerced. But this is changing the subject and not what free will really is. If you argue for free will from Quantum Mechanics, at best this gives us indeterminism, which is not the kind of genuine agent-causality that a theory of genuine free will needs.

P.S.: You've still not told me what it is for something to be "physical." It's kind of a crucial concept to define, if you want to say everything is physical.

Edited by noumenalself
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Yes and no. Obviously the methods of natural science are quite rational. Does this mean that philosophical rationality is the same as natural scientific rationality, that the methods and assumptions are the same? No. For that you'd need to argue for Quinean naturalized epistemology, which is quite a task (one I've analyzed in some detail, and I don't think it works). Obviously in some sense science is continuous with philosophy, but in what regards? Yes, they're both informed by logic and observation. But the sciences deal with specialized subject matters, whereas philosophy is the most general field that integrates all of the disciplines. To say that science assumes physicalism is, I'm afraid, to beg the question. It's true that natural science (or at least the natural physical sciences) study only the physical world, but that doesn't mean that they assume that only the physical world exists. The sciences as such take no position on this topic, precisely because of their specialized subject matter.

The sciences study only science for a special reason: because science studies only that which is falsifiable and can be confirmed by rational examination. To suggest dualism without a theory of how such a mechanism would work is not falsifiable, it's a matter of asking an "if" question and not receiving an appropriate answer because it cannot be demonstrated to be false. Dualism is a place for philosophy because it is, as I say, not falsifiable. Physicalism is implied by science because the physical is all that is falsifiable.

Like Rand, we cannot deny the existence of consciousness. But what we can deny is that this consciousness is a separate entity, somehow controlling the physical body which everyone inhabits.

Absent some special argument, it does not seem clear at all that there can be no causal interaction between the physical and the non-physical. Why can't two different types of existent interact? Which laws of physics do you think this violates? Yes, I've heard arguments about the conservation of energy, but I doubt that these hold up.

It's not that nonphysical objects cannot interact at all with physical ones. This is too broad of an ontological claim that I want to get into. It's simply in this case, with the mind and body, that they do not. I'm sure you've heard all of the arguments, I can't drum up any new proofs against the possibility of dualism, but it's simply a matter of recognizing that machines do not run on mysterious non-material forces. They are driven by energy input. "Ghosts" in the machine cannot run without energy, there is no way to transfer energy to a "ghost" if it has no material being. The only reasonable conclusion is that this "ghost" is actually an erroneous categorization of what consciousness is.

No one should care about the relation of causation to energy (as the paper you cited addresses). The only care is about the necessity of energy needed to move such a "ghost", to keep it active. For example, say I stop eating. Why does my consciousness slowly deteriorate? Because my body is obviously intricately connected to my mind. My body sustains my consciousness, provides it with energy.

Yeah, but most physicalists also deny that there is any free will worth having. Yes, there are compatibilists who say we can have the mental supervene on the physical, but still make "choices" that aren't coerced. But this is changing the subject and not what free will really is. If you argue for free will from Quantum Mechanics, at best this gives us indeterminism, which is not the kind of genuine agent-causality that a theory of genuine free will needs.

Perhaps you would care to enlighten me on what free will is because right now, I'm not seeing your claim here as valid, that is, your conclusion doesn't follow the premises. What is the apparent defect of the "free will" which comes from physicalism and supervenience?

P.S.: You've still not told me what it is for something to be "physical." It's kind of a crucial concept to define, if you want to say everything is physical.

I don't care to get into this long discussion. Almost all physicalists can agree on what is 'physical' (or more appropriately, all human beings can agree on just what is 'physical'.) But I leave some reading to you: Understanding 'Physical'.

Edited by The_Rational_Animal
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My interest in Ayn Rand brought me to considering her views on the mind/body dichotomy. Of course I know she rejected the distinction altogether and called the human being a single, integrated entity, yet was still what can be appropriately called a dualist. She made the the assertions that (a) conscious organisms have both mental attributes and physical attributes, and (:dough: both kinds of attributes may participate in determining the causal powers of the conscious organism.

I don't really know anything about Anomalous Monism, aside from what you wrote, but I think the biggest problem with any of these types of theories is that they do not start with the self evident. They kind of come up with a theory, but it is not based on observation, and therefore is like a really big floating abstraction.

Starting with the self evident, it is clear that we have a body because we can see and feel it, but it is also clear that we have a mind or consciousness -- one observation is self-evident extrospection and the other is self-evident introspection. But, even though some Objectivist want to claim that Objectivism is a type of dualism, recognizing both body and mind, we are really only one entity -- and integrated being of both mind and body. So, I don't think a dualism is implied, at least not in the sense of the mind being one type of stuff and the body being another type of stuff. Personally, I observe that my consciousness is an ability -- the ability to be aware of existence, the ability to be aware of my awareness of existence, and my ability to be able to control my conscious awareness and my thoughts.That is, I am aware that I have free will.

Now, some people want to claim that if we are composed of matter -- and I see no evidence to the contrary -- then we cannot have free will; but in fact we do have free will; which leads some people to claim a sort of metaphysical dualism: the part made of matter does not have free will, but the other part made of who knows what does have consciousness and free will. I think there is a mistaken premise in both camps, and that is that it is obvious that we have free will and that we are composed of matter, so evidently it is possible for some things made of matter to have consciousness and free will. In other words, it is a fact of reality that ought not be tried to be explained away, and ought not to be used to appeal to ignorance in the sense that we don't know everything about ourselves and therefore there might be something else besides that matter that we are made of operating in there.

But, I don't think I would call this anomalous monism -- especially insofar as that might be smuggling in the idea that only one type of stuff -- i.e. matter -- exists. Because, as one person in this thread has asked several times, what does one mean by "physical"? For example, is an electric field physical? Certainly not in the same sense as a rock is physical. One can hold a rock in one's hands, but we can't do the same with a magnetic field. So, I do think one has to be careful of what one means by "physical." Having studied physics, I would certainly say that a magnetic field is physical, and so are electromagnetic waves, but by that I don't mean that they are lumps of matter.

Consciousness is real, and so is free will, but by the term "real" do I mean they are clumps of matter? No, that is not what I mean. But consciousness and free will most definitely come about because of the type of material entities that we are -- at least no one has been able to detect a disembodied consciousness or a disembodied free will. That's why I prefer to treat them as abilities that come about because of what we are -- like we have sight because we have eyes and the optic nerve and the visual cortex. Similarly, we have consciousness and free will because of something within our structure -- at this point, most likely due to having a frontal cortex.

The full biology or neurobiology of how that comes about is unknown, but one does not need omniscience to know something -- and it is obvious via introspection that we have consciousness and free will.

So, you say, "Well, what is it?"

It's our ability to be aware of existence, the ability to be aware of our awareness of existence, and our ability to control our consciousness in a self-directed manner.

I don't know, I've had this sort of discussion with others on this forum, and it is amazing to me that some people either never discovered their own consciousness and their free will, which is obvious from introspection, or they let some theory override their own awareness of their abilities.

The question of how these abilities came about is primarily a neurological question, not a philosophic one. Philosophically, we can say that we definitely have those abilities -- they are self-evident -- but what biological process leads to those abilities is not a province of philosophy, but rather the special sciences. The fact that we don't have the answer is no reason to deny those abilities, as some people are want to do, and it is no reason to postulate the existence of some type of stuff for which we have no evidence.

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P.S.: You've still not told me what it is for something to be "physical." It's kind of a crucial concept to define, if you want to say everything is physical.

I don't care to get into this long discussion.

Now isn't that cute, you come here to argue that X is true, but refuse to tell us what X is.

Almost all physicalists can agree on what is 'physical'

So almost all people who already believe that X is true can agree on what X is? Well, that's good for them, but don't expect that to make me a believer in X. I prefer to know what a proposition means before I believe it.

(or more appropriately, all human beings can agree on just what is 'physical'.)

So now you're telling us that we all ought to know what X is. If we are human beings, at least. I guess that makes me an extraterrestrial...

But I leave some reading to you: Understanding 'Physical'.

That essay is full of invalid concepts such as "analytical," "a priori," and "contingent." Here's some reading for you: The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy by Leonard Peikoff, in ITOE.

The essay in your link is quite clear on one thing, though: that physicalism is little more than a renaming of materialism to a more palatable-sounding name--sort of like the Left took to calling themselves "liberals" when "socialist" became a dirty word, and are now moving towards "progressive," since they've made "liberal" a dirty word too.

Edited by Capitalism Forever
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I wanted to add the point that Objectivism is against the idea of monism, if by that one means that ultimately everything that exists is composed of the same stuff. Objectivism takes a more inductive approach to what something is made of -- namely, one must investigate it and find out what it is made of. Postulating that everything that exists is made of the same stuff is a type of rationalism. At this point in time, going by the facts, we certainly have no evidence that everything is made of the same stuff.

Is an electron made of the same stuff as a magnetic field? Is a thought made of the same stuff as a can of soup? Is a baseball bat made of the same stuff as a gravitational field? Is an emotion made of the same stuff as a cigarette? Is a computer made of the same stuff as an electric field?

All, these are questions that can only be answered by observing what things are and what they are made of. One cannot or should not say, a priori -- that is before investigating scientifically -- that everything is ultimately made of the same stuff.

If one answered Yes to the above questions, then where is your evidence?

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Now isn't that cute, you come here to argue that X is true, but refuse to tell us what X is.

I'm sorry, when did I say I care about what you think? Firstly, I'm not here to argue for physicalism, for anomalous monism, for Rand's view of the dichotomy. I posted here looking for an answer as to whether the two views are in at least some ways compatible, and if there are ways that they are not, what they are. It's you who is shifting the discussion. Secondly, don't ask me to defend physicalism to you because its obvious that no matter what I can possibly say here within normal limits, it won't convince you because you probably memorized the Objectivist Epistemology cover to cover, probably not questioning if what you're reading is intuitively reasonable.

And if you have nothing more to say on the topic as indicated by the title of the thread, please go to your local university and ask any of the science faculty what physical is (if you're looking for a technical definition) and why everything must be physical.

Edited by The_Rational_Animal
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I'm sorry, when did I say I care about what you think? Firstly, I'm not here to argue for physicalism, for anomalous monism, for Rand's view of the dichotomy. I posted here looking for an answer as to whether the two views are in at least some ways compatible, and if there are ways that they are not, what they are. It's you who is shifting the discussion. Secondly, don't ask me to defend physicalism to you because its obvious that no matter what I can possibly say here within normal limits, it won't convince you because you probably memorized the Objectivist Epistemology cover to cover, probably not questioning if what you're reading is intuitively reasonable.

And if you have nothing more to say on the topic as indicated by the title of the thread, please go to your local university and ask any of the science faculty what physical is (if you're looking for a technical definition) and why everything must be physical.

That isn't fair, and it's also quite insulting to Capitalism Forever. While he was mistaken in believing you were arguing for a position, defining what you mean by physical is essential to answering your question, which I'll repost in a second. In a philosophical issue, it is ill-advised to enter a discussion without defining key terms, which includes "physical" in this particular case.

Here's was your original question:

My question is whether or not Ayn Rand believed that the mental is not reducible to the physical (a key tenet of anomalous monism as a non-reduction form of physicalism) and whether the theory of anomalous monism would be consistent with her views of the mind and body, and offers an acceptable thesis that she "left to the sciences".

While I believe Ayn Rand thought that the mental is not reducible to the physical, I still think it's too early to regard any current neurological theories as completely in-line with Objectivism's view on mental/physical relationships.

Sorry I can't be a little more helpful, but if you want an answer from these guys, you should be kind enough to clarify key terms which a proper answer depends on, such as "physical."

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