Clarification on Rand's Epistemology

[prosperity]

I was re-reading OPAR and started thinking about something that Rand had written (rather Peikoff) about the process of concept-formation.

Her approach was, and I am trying to capture the essential process, that a unit of measurement must exist in some quantity but may exist in any quantity. This was named as an essential process for concept formation. Still, within the same paragraph (I think, I don't have it right in front of me), there was a qualifying statement - something to the effect of "within an appropriate range" or something to that effect.

The example I can remember is that of forming the concept "table".

When forming the concept "table", as I understand it, we are differentiating it from other things that are not similar to it (similar in measurement), and integrating 2 or more instances of that "thing" and omitting the specific measurements...

BUT, we are told that this applies within an appropriate range...a table, for example (and I hope my example is accurate) that a table can be 4' high, but not 200' feet high.

My question is, what is meant by "appropriate"? Appropriate to whom? What makes it "appropriate" as vs. "inappropriate"?

I think this would have some relationship to "similar", which I understand as "similar in measurement". But, just how similar? At what point do objects become "dissimilar"?

For example, you can integrate "tables" that are 4', 5', and 8' tall into the same concept "table"...but what about a 10' tall "table"? What about a 2" tall table?

Perhaps what I am asking is "what makes "similar" or "appropriate" in this context objective as versus subjective?"

I hope my question makes sense.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

My question is, what is meant by "appropriate"[range]? Appropriate to whom? What makes it "appropriate" as vs. "inappropriate"?

I think this would have some relationship to "similar", which I understand as "similar in measurement". But, just how similar? At what point do objects become "dissimilar"?

The range covered by a concept is determined by the context. For example, for tables, the context is something that fits in a house and is useful for sitting at to have dinner. A 200 foot table wouldn't fit in a house, and a two foot table would not serve the same function as a table where one can pull a chair up to it and sit comfortably.

Similarly, the concept atom includes the context of something rather small that is the fundamental physical make-up of material things. The range in this case is the number of protons, neutrons, and electrons. However, if it turns out that, say, a black hole, or even a neutron star, is similar in some respects to an atom, one wouldn't call them an atom because their size is too large.

So, it is important not to just go by the definition, but the total context of the concept that gave rise for the need for that concept in the first place.

Edited November 29, 2008 by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.

[prosperity]

The range covered by a concept is determined by the context. For example, for tables, the context is something that fits in a house and is useful for sitting at to have dinner. A 200 foot table wouldn't fit in a house, and a two foot table would not serve the same function as a table where one can pull a chair up to it and sit comfortably.

Similarly, the concept atom includes the context of something rather small that is the fundamental physical make-up of material things. The range in this case is the number of protons, neutrons, and electrons. However, if it turns out that, say, a black hole, or even a neutron star, is similar in some respects to an atom, one wouldn't call them an atom because their size is too large.

So, it is important not to just go by the definition, but the total context of the concept that gave rise for the need for that concept in the first place.

Thank you for the clarification. You know, I have to admit that I feel a little silly asking this question now because that explanation seems vaguely familiar, but I do not recall where I read it last and I am in the middle of the chapter on Epistemology in OPAR (but I didn't want to forget that question in my mind so I left my book to turn on oo.net). It's been many years since I've read ITOE and OPAR.

...although, would the context be that of just having dinner? What about coffee tables? Or is that...that would be a classification, wouldn't it?

...so then, by that reasoning, I could assume that the concept "house" also exists within a specific context that would disallow a 3 mile high home (single family of course). This would be consistent with the idea that knowledge is contextual. In this case knowledge of the concept "table" and "home"?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

...although, would the context be that of just having dinner? What about coffee tables? Or is that...that would be a classification, wouldn't it?

...so then, by that reasoning, I could assume that the concept "house" also exists within a specific context that would disallow a 3 mile high home (single family of course). This would be consistent with the idea that knowledge is contextual. In this case knowledge of the concept "table" and "home"?

Well, you have to think it through and discover what the primary dividing line is regarding the concept table. Of course, one can have breakfast or lunch at a table, so they are included; you can write at a table, though often that is referred to as a desk. I would say the primary function of a table is to put things on to be at a convenient height for usage, so yes, a coffee table fits that range. Even a very short table, such as what some oriental people use that rests closer to the floor can be called a table, in that it is used to put things on as they sit on the floor in front of it, but that would be a sub-category based upon the Western standard of what a table is for.

Now before we get into a lot of marginal usages of the concept "table" I would recommend not getting stuck on borderline issues. The borderlines are not the important part of the concept, since there are many things that could marginally be in the range, but then it becomes optional if you are going to call them a table or a house. Is a shack a house if you are living in it; is a thirty-foot ceiling interior room a living room; is a mat on the floor a table? There is a certain point whereby you have have to make a judgment call based on your context of knowledge. However, the reliance on context -- even your specific context -- does not make it subjective, so long as your concepts are organized according to your total context of knowledge.

[trivas7]

My question is, what is meant by "appropriate"? Appropriate to whom? What makes it "appropriate" as vs. "inappropriate"?

I think this would have some relationship to "similar", which I understand as "similar in measurement". But, just how similar? At what point do objects become "dissimilar"?

You ask a vexed question of Objectivism; the problem of universals in never dealt w/ adequately IMO. If one reads closely one sees that Miss Rand offers an epistemology that is basically empiricist in outlook but arrived at and developed by relying on principles or premises that properly belong to rationalistic idealism.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

If one reads closely one sees that Miss Rand offers an epistemology that is basically empiricist in outlook but arrived at and developed by relying on principles or premises that properly belong to rationalistic idealism.

Can you explain what you mean by this statement? How does she not deal with epistemology adequately, and why do you think it is rationalistic idealism?

[aristotlejones]

You ask a vexed question of Objectivism; the problem of universals in never dealt w/ adequately IMO. If one reads closely one sees that Miss Rand offers an epistemology that is basically empiricist in outlook but arrived at and developed by relying on principles or premises that properly belong to rationalistic idealism.

Peikoff's Induction in Physics & Philosophy lectures teach one how to contextually delimit and validate the most basic concepts all the way up to the broadest universals. He does this by tracing how famous scientists did it in their researches. If you are seriously interested in this question, I highly recommend these lectures. They even helped me understand how to do better patent searches.

Stay Focused,

<*>aj

[trivas7]

Can you explain what you mean by this statement? How does she not deal with epistemology adequately, and why do you think it is rationalistic idealism?

Re Rand's conceptualism despite her explicit rejection see Carolyn Ray: http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/es...diss/index.html. On the problem of universals: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Re Rand's conceptualism despite her explicit rejection see Carolyn Ray: http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/es...diss/index.html. On the problem of universals: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals

I'm sorry, but you are going to have to explain what your position is and give some details as to why you hold that position.

The first reference is a very long paper, and the second Wikipedia article is wrong about the problem of universals. A universal is not an existent that exists either apart from particulars (Plato) or resides inside particulars (Aristotle). An abstraction or a universal is something done by the human mind to combine awareness of entities into a mental entity using measurement omission, called a concept. Particular entities do not partake in this universal nor does the universal (the product of the mind) influence entities at all.

What Miss Rand did was to show that the whole issue in philosophy was a confused (at best) attempt to answer how it is that we can conceive of things abstractly when they are particulars, and measurement omission answers that question.

So, please elaborate on what you think the problem is before we can continue to assess whether it is handled adequately by Objectivism or not.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

What Miss Rand did was to show that the whole issue in philosophy was a confused (at best) attempt to answer how it is that we can conceive of things abstractly when they are particulars, and measurement omission answers that question.

Let me elaborate on this further. The whole idea that there are universals existing in reality apart from man's mind is a philosophical myth -- these things do not exist. One reason why this aspect of philosophy was so confused throughout the ages is that the beginning philosophers assumed, for one reason or another, that the only way there could be one thing that covered or gave rise to many things, was that if this special something was something other than a particular. It had to be one thing that gave rise to the multitude before us (Plato) or it had to be one thing that took part in the particulars making them what they are (Aristotle). Neither one grasped that a universal was man's mind's ability to combine particulars in a special way; both saw it as man's mind grasping something about the particular, in a way, as if we have a kind of mind sense or sixth sense that just picked it up -- Plato from another realm and Aristotle from an insight into the being of the particular.

And I think they got off track because they had the question of why things seem similar to the senses, which is not the question of epistemology at all. The similarities are given in perception, and there is no philosophic reason to ask why are they similar or what gives rise to their similarity-- that is more of a special science question than a philosophy question. The proper philosophical question is: We observe particulars, and we observe that they are similar, but how do we come up with one term (the one in the many) that covers all of those particulars? That is the problem of universals properly understood.

And instead of focusing on what the human mind does via introspection, they asserted that the mind must directly perceive the universal by some means other than the senses, and thus came up with we are directly aware of the universal.

Ayn Rand says, no we are not directly aware of the universal, we create the universal with our minds after omitting the measurements in a given range based on observations. The universal or the abstraction is something done by the human mind, and neither that process (abstraction) nor its result (concepts) exist apart from the functioning of man's consciousness. But, these abstractions and concepts are based upon observation, and therefore are made objective by means of measurement omission.

[trivas7]

And I think they got off track because they had the question of why things seem similar to the senses, which is not the question of epistemology at all. The similarities are given in perception, and there is no philosophic reason to ask why are they similar or what gives rise to their similarity-- that is more of a special science question than a philosophy question. The proper philosophical question is: We observe particulars, and we observe that they are similar, but how do we come up with one term (the one in the many) that covers all of those particulars? That is the problem of universals properly understood.

And instead of focusing on what the human mind does via introspection, they asserted that the mind must directly perceive the universal by some means other than the senses, and thus came up with we are directly aware of the universal.

Ayn Rand says, no we are not directly aware of the universal, we create the universal with our minds after omitting the measurements in a given range based on observations. The universal or the abstraction is something done by the human mind, and neither that process (abstraction) nor its result (concepts) exist apart from the functioning of man's consciousness. But, these abstractions and concepts are based upon observation, and therefore are made objective by means of measurement omission.

While if pressed I would probably agree w/ you that universals don't exist, IMO similarities aren't perceived. One must use an act of judgment to decide whether or not (and within what range) two things or attributes are similar. Just as one doesn't perceive the triangularity of triangles or the circularity of circles, similarity isn't any kind of sensual object of perception.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

While if pressed I would probably agree w/ you that universals don't exist, IMO similarities aren't perceived. One must use an act of judgment to decide whether or not (and within what range) two things or attributes are similar. Just as one doesn't perceive the triangularity of triangles or the circularity of circles, similarity isn't any kind of sensual object of perception.

It is true that for higher level abstractions an act of mental judgment is involved in deciding if they are similar or not -- i.e. is fascism similar to capitalism. Both are similar in that they are economic-political systems, but that is not something that one is aware of by direct perception of entities; one has to think about it.

When it comes to the lowest level of getting similarities, I think that is available via direct perception of the objects under consideration. For example, is this similar to this THIS? One can perceive that they are similar on several levels, the actual letters and the colors, and that is given in perception. I wasn't claiming that the similarity is an object, but rather similarity is someone one notices about the entities on the perceptual level. On the margins, there is an act of judgment involved, is this similar to this and similar to this? To me, the first two look more blue, while the last one looks more green, but that is why one must have a context even on the perceptual level. Against the background used on this forum, they all look similar, but on some other background color they might not.

So, similarity on the perceptual level is given via perception and is the starting point for abstracting and conceptualizing. I do think sometimes that Kant has so screwed up the language that some people don't look or observe to see the similarity. They falsely think that everything the mind does is a conscious judgment, when it isn't on the perceptual level.

[prosperity]

It is true that for higher level abstractions an act of mental judgment is involved in deciding if they are similar or not -- i.e. is fascism similar to capitalism. Both are similar in that they are economic-political systems, but that is not something that one is aware of by direct perception of entities; one has to think about it.

When it comes to the lowest level of getting similarities, I think that is available via direct perception of the objects under consideration. For example, is this similar to this THIS? One can perceive that they are similar on several levels, the actual letters and the colors, and that is given in perception. I wasn't claiming that the similarity is an object, but rather similarity is someone one notices about the entities on the perceptual level. On the margins, there is an act of judgment involved, is this similar to this and similar to this? To me, the first two look more blue, while the last one looks more green, but that is why one must have a context even on the perceptual level. Against the background used on this forum, they all look similar, but on some other background color they might not.

So, similarity on the perceptual level is given via perception and is the starting point for abstracting and conceptualizing. I do think sometimes that Kant has so screwed up the language that some people don't look or observe to see the similarity. They falsely think that everything the mind does is a conscious judgment, when it isn't on the perceptual level.

...after going back over ITOE and re-reading and re-reading again certain passages, perhaps I may make a comment...

I think the "similarity" refers to measurement. That is how you perceive similarity in objects like, for example, "tables". You see these objects which are of similar measurement (and, like you referenced earlier within a certain range)...for example, length, or in the example you provided in this post, similarity in color (which we can know implicitly even without an understanding of the wavelengths or the electromagnetic spectrum).

I think the example used by ITOE was a match, a pencil, and a stick. The "similarity" as it were is in the length of the objects.

The relationship of similarity to measurement I think would also tie into making similarity objective as versus subjective.

Edit: for clarity, correct possible mistake

Edited December 4, 2008 by prosperity

[trivas7]

It is true that for higher level abstractions an act of mental judgment is involved in deciding if they are similar or not -- i.e. is fascism similar to capitalism. Both are similar in that they are economic-political systems, but that is not something that one is aware of by direct perception of entities; one has to think about it.

When it comes to the lowest level of getting similarities, I think that is available via direct perception of the objects under consideration. For example, is this similar to this THIS? One can perceive that they are similar on several levels, the actual letters and the colors, and that is given in perception. I wasn't claiming that the similarity is an object, but rather similarity is someone one notices about the entities on the perceptual level. On the margins, there is an act of judgment involved, is this similar to this and similar to this? To me, the first two look more blue, while the last one looks more green, but that is why one must have a context even on the perceptual level. Against the background used on this forum, they all look similar, but on some other background color they might not.

So, similarity on the perceptual level is given via perception and is the starting point for abstracting and conceptualizing. I do think sometimes that Kant has so screwed up the language that some people don't look or observe to see the similarity. They falsely think that everything the mind does is a conscious judgment, when it isn't on the perceptual level.

You seem to be saying that although similarity isn't a object of perception, the grounds for similarity are found on the perceptual level. But the grounds for any abstraction are found on the perceptual level. "imilarity is someone [some property?] one notices about the entities on the perceptual level" -- agreed, it is the entities one notices, a judgment is made as to whether or not they share similar properties. Your examples are similar in color, dissimilar in typeface. The context of the judgment is all your life's experience with classifying things in various ways. This doesn't make similarity non-objective, it makes similarity a conceptual judgment re things.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

The relationship of similarity to measurement I think would also tie into making similarity objective as versus subjective.

Yes, that is true, but often, at least when we are first developing our minds -- i.e. children and not so scientifically advanced civilizations -- there is not an explicit measurement we can make -- i.e. wavelength is a very advanced measurement that wasn't even possible until maybe a hundred years ago. There is such a thing as an ordinal measurement, whereby one thing is compared to another, which can be done without an explicit numerical measurement. This, this, and this are similar, this is different. And one does not need any explicit numerical measurements to see this directly (given ordinary sight).

What I was getting at also is that similarity and differences are obvious to perception on the perceptual level. For THIS it is obvious that the I stands out like a sore thumb (for ordinary vision), and in that context of that difference, it is obvious that the T, H, and S are similar. No explicit numerical measurements are needed because it is given in perception.

[trivas7]

Yes, that is true, but often, at least when we are first developing our minds -- i.e. children and not so scientifically advanced civilizations -- there is not an explicit measurement we can make [...]

This demonstrates that the mind isn't a tabla rasa; we are born w/ minds that are able to make implicit comparisons.

What I was getting at also is that similarity and differences are obvious to perception on the perceptual level.

Do you really believe that animals -- cats and dogs -- perceive similarity and differences?

Edited December 5, 2008 by trivas7

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

This demonstrates that the mind isn't a tabla rasa; we are born w/ minds that are able to make implicit comparisons.

Do you really believe that animals -- cats and dogs -- perceive similarity and differences?

You are trying to make the claim that man only perceives similarities and differences due to his conscious mind -- i.e. only after he has a few concepts.Or at least that is what I think you are claiming. But not, we observe the similarity between this and this without having to have the concepts smaller and bigger. We get the concepts smaller and bigger by comparing the two thises together, noticing that they are not the same size. But we see that they are similar with our sensory mechanism. It requires no volitional effort to see that they are similar and it requires no conceptualizations to see that they are similar.

And, yes, dogs and cats do notice similarities and differences, as this is given in perception. A dog can tell the difference between NO and GO, and can spot the similarities between meat and dog food in that they both smell like something edible. Cats, too, can tell the difference between emotional tones, and the similarities between things that smell palatable.

We humans are born tabula rasa and there is nothing in your claim that would lead one to believe otherwise,since perceptual similarities are given in perception without the need for prior conceptualization. And all you to do to verify that is to Look at this. One does not need the concept magenta or the concept green to see that the Look and the this are similar in color when compared to the at. It's perceptual, not conceptual.

One of the things that Kant did was to deliberately confuse people on that difference between what is observed and what is conceptualized. He claimed that both were products of the conceptual volitional mind, but they are not. The similarity given in the look and the this above (both magenta) are not the result of conceptualization; and similarly, the green observed is not brought about by conceptualization. In other words, it is not the concept of magenta that leads one to see magenta, nor is it the concept of green that leads one to see green.

[trivas7]

We humans are born tabula rasa and there is nothing in your claim that would lead one to believe otherwise [...]

Nonsense; how do the concepts get there in the first place? The mind cannot be a Blank Slate, b/c blank slates don't do anything. Since the cognitive revolution of the 1950's we have learned about what kind of computation enables a system to see, think, speak, and plan. Data will sit forever unless something notices patterns in them, combines them w/ patterns learned at other times, uses the combinations to scribble new thoughts on the slate. Locke recognized the problem and alluded to something called the understanding. Leibnitz repeated the empiricist motto: "There is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses," then added, "except the intellect itself." Something in the mind must be innate, if it is only the mechanisms that does the learning, the comparing, etc. Something has to see the world of objects rather than a whirl of shimmering pixels. Something has to infer the meaning of a sentence rather than hear mere sound; something has to decide that two properties are similar other than the objects themselves.

[Tenure]

A blank slate is not a void. When we say a blank slate, we mean that we are born with no concepts, but that we are born with (at least, a developing) capacity for conceptualising. Just because contents of the machine are empty, the machine does not cease to exist. Why do you think mental contents, and the process which creates mental contents are the same thing, with regards to blank-slates?

Edited December 5, 2008 by Tenure

[KendallJ]

And, yes, dogs and cats do notice similarities and differences, as this is given in perception.

Anyone whose ever seen a dog pick out the bits of say chicken mixed in with it's kibble would agree.

[DavidOdden]

This demonstrates that the mind isn't a tabla rasa

It's useful to be correct about what Objectivism actually says regarding the empty drum -- that the content of consciousness begins tabula rasa (ITOE 146).

[Tenure]

Yes, I must ask, Trivas, since I remember you never came to anything conclusive on a previous topic which you started on Epistemology, in which a recommendation was given many times to read ITOE: have you actually read ITOE?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Nonsense; how do the concepts get there in the first place?

It is not as if there are concepts floating around out there that enter your mind, so the idea that concepts "get in there" is the wrong approach. Concepts are created when a human mind grasps differences and similarities and then integrates the similarities into one mental unit. However, this type of processing does not occur on the perceptual level -- that is, it is not as if we have to learn how to see the world in an organized manner, it is not as if we start off with a pixelated string of inputs that we then have to write a program for that will give us vision. For computers that deal with, say images, someone had to write a program that would convert that string of zeros and ones into something that is presented onto a monitor in an organized manner; but we don't do that with our conscious mind when it comes to perception; that is automatic in the biological mechanism and we don't have to write a program for that operation. This is why Objectivism considers perception to be infallible, because it is neurological, not conceptual.

For higher level thinking, however, that is not merely biological and automatic. Each individual has to learn how to use his mind to function on the conceptual level taking the automatically organized evidence of the sense and do something with it conceptually. In other words, you see THIS -- and a dog would see it too -- but because you are human you can grasp what it means qua representative of a concept. Seeing the this as a certain shape and structure is automatic, understanding what it is referring to in the conceptual mind and in reality is not.

[trivas7]

It's useful to be correct about what Objectivism actually says regarding the empty drum -- that the content of consciousness begins tabula rasa (ITOE 146).

How can the outside world -- which is the content of consciousness -- begin w/o content? I don't know what you mean to say.

Yes, I must ask, Trivas, since I remember you never came to anything conclusive on a previous topic which you started on Epistemology, in which a recommendation was given many times to read ITOE: have you actually read ITOE?

I have.

Edited December 5, 2008 by trivas7

[Tenure]

How can the outside world -- which is the content of consciousness -- begin w/o content? I don't know what you mean to say.

Let me see if I understand your question correctly.

"How can the outside world" - you mean external reality, right?

"How can external reality -- which is the content of consciousness" - do you mean that a;; the content of consciousness is purely made of perceptions external reality, or that only some of it is, or that the outside world is the content of consciousness?

"begin w/ content".

I don't know what you mean to say. Are you sure you've read ITOE? Could you point me to the bit where she says the outside world is the 'content of consciousness', whatever that means?