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"One Problem With Objectivism"

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Prof. B: I see another confusion here. The concept as a mental entity is determinate. It's individual, it has identity, you can measure it in the way that you discuss in Chapter 4. The concept, if it is formed correctly, has a determinate reference, which means that it refers to a determinate aspect of reality. To say that the concept is less determinate than the concrete is to treat the concept as if it were a concrete in reality—<ioe2_156>

AR: Of a different kind, yes. That's right. That's the element that is somewhat Platonic here.

Prof. D: It was said that a concept is not a concrete, it is a determinate result with a determinate reference. Now we do have a concept of "concept," but I don't find any concretes that it is relating. Or if I do find concretes, they are things, existents.

AR: No, the referents of the concept "concept" are other concepts. For instance, let's say you form the concepts "table," "chair," "man," and a few other concepts of perceptually given concretes. Then at a certain level you can form the concept of "concept," the concretes of which are all your other specific, earlier-formed concepts.

Prof. D: But they aren't concretes, though.

AR: They are mental concretes. You are now discussing an integration of mental entities. "Concept" refers to mental entities. The referents of the concept of "concept" are all the concepts which you have learned [and will ever learn].

Prof. D: Then a mental entity is a concrete?

AR: As a mental entity, yes. It is a concrete in relation to the wider abstraction which is the concept of "concept." Take another, similar case: the concept of "emotion." What are its concretes? The various emotions which you observe introspectively, which you are able to conceptualize. And first you conceptualize them individually. You would form the concepts "love," "hate," "anger," "fear," and then you arrive at the concept "emotion," the units of which will be these various emotions that you have identified.

Prof. D: I misunderstood, then, something that Professor B said. I thought that he was maintaining that these weren't really concretes, not even concretes with holes in them, so to speak—not even vague concretes.

Prof. B: No, that was the content of the concept. The concept as a mental entity would have measurements; it would be a certain mental product.

AR: A mental entity standing for a certain number of concretes—a concept—is not the same as the concretes in vague form. Because some schools of philosophy did hold <ioe2_157> just that—that a concept is a memory of a concrete, only very vague. You see a concept is not a vague concrete, it is a mental entity—which means an entity of a different kind, bearing a certain specific relationship to the physical concretes.

Prof. D: But metaphysically, though, the concept is a concrete; it's a mental entity. You have a concept of "emotion." The referents are these various mental entities, this particular emotion and that particular one. And then the concept of "emotion" itself is a mental entity in actual being.

AR: Yes, you can call it that.

Prof. D: So metaphysically, not epistemologically, all we have here are concretes.

AR: If you mean: does such a thing as the concept of "emotion" in a mind really exist? Yes, it exists—mentally. And only mentally.

Prof. E: Would it be fair to say that a concept qua concept is not a concrete but an integration of concretes, but qua existent it is a concrete integration, a specific mental entity in a particular mind?

AR: That's right. But I kept saying, incidentally, that we can call them "mental entities" only metaphorically or for convenience. It is a "something." For instance, before you have a certain concept, that particular something doesn't exist in your mind. When you have formed the concept of "concept," that is a mental something; it isn't a nothing. But anything pertaining to the content of a mind always has to be treated metaphysically not as a separate existent, but only with this precondition, in effect: that it is a mental state, a mental concrete, a mental something. Actually, "mental something" is the nearest to an exact identification. Because "entity" does imply a physical thing. Nevertheless, since "something" is too vague a term, one can use the word "entity," but only to say that it is a mental something as distinguished from other mental somethings (or from nothing). But it isn't an entity in the primary, Aristotelian sense in which a primary substance exists.

We have to agree here on the terminology, because we <ioe2_158> are dealing with a very difficult subject for which no clear definitions have been established. I personally would like to have a new word for it, but I am against neologisms. Therefore I think the term "mental unit" or "mental entity" can be used, provided we understand by that: "a mental something."

Prof. A: I think I can give an analogy to clarify the two perspectives on "concept" that had been confused. Suppose you have a map of a city. In relation to that city, the map is generalized: it doesn't include the shape of specific houses, every little curve in the street, etc. But if you look at the map not insofar as it refers to the city, but just as a piece of paper with lines and colors on it, it is entirely specific. It doesn't have any little regions of vagueness or non-identity.

AR: That's a very good comparison. Yes, that is correct.

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"Redness",and "states of affairs" etc are existents. But they are attributes of entities which are primary . The only concession here is that she used "exist" inconsistently.

Can you explain what you mean by this?

I think the Maverick Philosopher is confusing mental entities, in the sense of the passage you quoted from ITOE, with entities (including their attributes) that you perceive. I personally have no trouble grasping that by "existence" Miss Rand means all of that which you are aware of when you sweep your arms around and look at reality. Are you saying she is being inconsistent because you think the term "existence" should also include mental entities, such as concepts? I don't think Miss Rand would disagree that concepts exist and are something real and therefore are included in the ostensively defined term "existence." What she would disagree with is the idea that there are real abstract things out there in reality, which is a problem the Maverick has. Granted, one cannot perceive concepts in that one is only aware of them introspectively, but introspection is a type of observation.

Existence in Objectivism most definitely includes all of the attributes that one can observe -- i.e. in his sweep of observation via perception, the Maverick wonders if the redness of wine is an aspect of existence, and Objectivism says yes it is. However, there is no "redness" as an existent that is common to the red wine. In other words, there is no abstract redness that partakes in the existences of the three wine glasses. Each one is what it is and is observed as being red. There are no abstractions in particulars, which is a problem with both Platonism and the naive realism of Aristotle. In other words, the redness of the wine in each of the three glasses does not somehow share in an abstract quality present in each of the three wine glasses. This one is red, this one is red, and this one is red -- and the concept "red" is developed by mentally integrating those cases of observing the red objects.

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Can you explain what you mean by this?

Sure,

And more than that; the fact that Aristotle is right and not Plato is very relevant here: abstractions, as such, do not exist. Only concretes exist

AR: If you mean: does such a thing as the concept of "emotion" in a mind really exist? Yes, it exists—mentally. And only mentally.

See what I mean? She absolutely says that "redness" as an attribute "exists" or is an "existent" but not separate from concrete entities, except as "mental entities". She qualifies this in the quote from ITOE

[Edit,just to clarify I think we are in agreement here]

Edited by Plasmatic
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Im posting these excerpts for the benefit of anyone following Bills assertions. This one is particularly relevant.

Existence, identity and consciousness are concepts in that they require identification in conceptual form. Their peculiarity lies in the fact that they are perceived or experienced directly, but grasped conceptually. They are implicit in every state of awareness, from the first sensation to the first percept to the sum of all concepts. After the first discriminated <ioe2_56> sensation (or percept), man's subsequent knowledge adds nothing to the basic facts designated by the terms "existence," "identity," "consciousness"—these facts are contained in any single state of awareness; but what is added by subsequent knowledge is the epistemological need to identify them consciously and self-consciously. The awareness of this need can be reached only at an advanced stage of conceptual development, when one has acquired a sufficient volume of knowledge—and the identification, the fully conscious grasp, can be achieved only by a process of abstraction.

It is not the abstraction of an attribute from a group of existents, but of a basic fact from all facts.Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents. Consciousness is an attribute of certain living entities, but it is not an attribute of a given state of awareness, it is that state. Epistemologically, the formation of axiomatic concepts is an act of abstraction, a selective focusing on and mental isolation of metaphysical fundamentals; but metaphysically, it is an act of integration—the widest integration possible to man: it unites and embraces the total of his experience.The units of the concepts "existence" and "identity" are every entity, attribute, action, event or phenomenon (including consciousness) that exists, has ever existed or will ever exist. The units of the concept "consciousness" are every state or process of awareness that one experiences, has ever experienced or will ever experience (as well as similar units, a similar faculty, which one infers in other living entities). The measurements omitted from axiomatic concepts are all the measurements of all the existents they subsume; what is retained, metaphysically, is only a fundamental fact; what is retained, epistemologically, is only one category of measurement, omitting its particulars: time—i.e., the fundamental fact is retained independent of any particular moment of awareness.

Axiomatic concepts are the constants of man's consciousness, the cognitive integrators that identify and thus protect its continuity. They identify explicitly the omission of psychological <ioe2_57> time measurements, which is implicit in all other concepts.

Edited by Plasmatic
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See what I mean? She absolutely says that "redness" as an attribute "exists" or is an "existent" but not separate from concrete entities, except as "mental entities". She qualifies this in the quote from ITOE

I think you are confusing an abstraction (which is a process) with a concept (which is a mental particular). The red of each wine glass exists as a particular attribute of a particular entity. By the process of abstraction, we can realize they are similar and can be integrated into a single mental unit -- i.e. "red". At no point, however, in either the process or the formation of the concept does an abstraction exist as a thing in reality that the red wine participates in. In other words, the red of the wine glasses do not come about because they are participating in or derived from a real abstraction that is somehow reflected in the wine. In other words, the abstraction red does not make the wine in the glasses red.

Abstractions only exist as a mental processing of information, and there are no abstractions existing out there in reality apart from those mental processes. Plato, and even Aristotle to some degree, thought that abstractions exist out there in reality and make things be what they are. Objectivism rejects this as confusing a mental processing with the facts of reality apart from human consciousness.

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I think you are confusing an abstraction (which is a process) with a concept (which is a mental particular). The red of each wine glass exists as a particular attribute of a particular entity. By the process of abstraction, we can realize they are similar and can be integrated into a single mental unit -- i.e. "red". At no point, however, in either the process or the formation of the concept does an abstraction exist as a thing in reality that the red wine participates in. In other words, the red of the wine glasses do not come about because they are participating in or derived from a real abstraction that is somehow reflected in the wine. In other words, the abstraction red does not make the wine in the glasses red.

Abstractions only exist as a mental processing of information, and there are no abstractions existing out there in reality apart from those mental processes. Plato, and even Aristotle to some degree, thought that abstractions exist out there in reality and make things be what they are. Objectivism rejects this as confusing a mental processing with the facts of reality apart from human consciousness.

Say Thomas you had me digging here for a minute. I thought for a second that I might be equivocating here but..

The issue of concepts (known as "the problem of universals") is philosophy's central issue. Since man's knowledge is gained and held in conceptual form, the validity of man's knowledge depends on the validity of concepts. But concepts are abstractions or universals, and everything that man perceives is particular, concrete. What is the relationship between abstractions and concretes? To what precisely do concepts refer in reality? Do they refer to something real, something that exists—or are they merely inventions of man's mind, arbitrary constructs or loose approximations that cannot claim to represent knowledge?

For the record though I was about to thank you with a glad heart for pointing this out. :lol: If Im still missing something please do point it out,I welcome your input!

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For the record though I was about to thank you with a glad heart for pointing this out. :lol: If I'm still missing something please do point it out,I welcome your input!

Well, the problem is that in the history of philosophy, an abstraction was thought to be something out there -- existing apart from human consciousness -- and that things were what they were due to that existing abstraction that somehow influenced material things and that the mind could perceive by some means. Ayn Rand corrects this view in showing that an abstraction is a mental process and is not something that exists out there in reality apart from human consciousness and it's ability to be aware of similarities and using measurement omission to form concepts. When we abstract something we are basically focusing on an observed similarity and isolating that observation mentally and then forming an abstraction due to that process.

To put it another way, abstractions per se do not exist, what exists is a mental processing -- a specific mental process -- that leads to the formation of a concept; and Ayn Rand identifies this process as the means of forming an abstraction. So, one can say that an abstraction exists in the same way that any other process exists, just don't confuse this with a real thing out there making things be what they are.

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So, one can say that an abstraction exists in the same way that any other process exists, just don't confuse this with a real thing out there making things be what they are.

Absolutely. You can see though how they indeed are "existents" which is why we can say " that an abstraction exists in the same way that any other process exists".

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Absolutely. You can see though how they indeed are "existents" which is why we can say " that an abstraction exists in the same way that any other process exists".

Also, keep in mind that Objectivism is a primacy of existence approach, meaning that which you observe with you senses is the primary, whereas content of consciousness comes after that. So, yes, consciousness exists, but existence aside from consciousness comes first -- as in existence, identity, and consciousness. I don't think the Maverick Philosopher grasps that at all, but given that he says that Ayn Rand is a primitive philosopher, I don't think it is worth engaging him at all. He rejects existence as being that which we observe with the senses, and considers content of consciousness to be a primary.

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Also, keep in mind that Objectivism is a primacy of existence approach, meaning that which you observe with you senses is the primary, whereas content of consciousness comes after that. So, yes, consciousness exists, but existence aside from consciousness comes first -- as in existence, identity, and consciousness. I don't think the Maverick Philosopher grasps that at all, but given that he says that Ayn Rand is a primitive philosopher, I don't think it is worth engaging him at all. He rejects existence as being that which we observe with the senses, and considers content of consciousness to be a primary.

I think from my post its clear I understand that existence is primary.

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Here's the latest comment, by Bill Vallicella, in reply to a defense of Rand's ostensive definition of "Existence" by Michael Smith.

"The preceding comment is another excellent illustration of the primitive level of the members of the Rand cult. Note that no attempt was made to engage anything that I actually said in my carefully crafted post. Instead, in the manner of the true believer and full-dress dogmatist, the Rand apologist repeats the Party Line, citing the Canonical Writings.

Why, after all, respond to arguments when one has The Truth? He who possesses The Truth knows in advance of all inquiry that no argument can prevail against such a Solid Rock.

>>It is false to assert that to know the concept “existence” one must know everything that exists. That’s the equivalent of claiming that I cannot know the concept “man” unless I know everything about every man on the planet.<<

This sort of intellectual obtuseness, this failure to take in the plain sense of what the critic is saying, is characteristic of the Rand cultists who have shown up here. (There have been a few exceptions.) Once again we see that 'Objectivism' is amateur stuff for amateurs."

Thinking about Mr. Vallicella's views on logic, would it be proper, on his view, to say that the following syllogism is valid?

All jacks are asses

Bill Vallicella is a jack

Therefore Bill Vallicella is a jackass, a pseudo-intellectual, rationalistic destroyer of civilization!

Is that a valid argument? (Just trying to hone my logic skills.)

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