What is the self of a person, does it exist, and if so, then how?

[Questioner]

Apologies first. I am unfamiliar with Objectivism, but I am nonetheless writing due to my perception that Objectivism advocates "rational self-interest" as a guiding component of its philosophy. If this is so, it leads me to step back a little and question what the 1) definition of and the 2) understanding of the Objectivist "self" is. To me, the phrase "rational self-interest," plus other pro-Objectivist discussions here and elsewhere, suggests that Objectivists believe in a truly-existent self - meaning that for them, their individual self is perceivable, findable, isolatable, etc.

This leads me to a series of questions.

1. What is the Objectivist definition of the self of a person?

2. What is meant to be understood by the Objectivist definition of the self of a person?

- e.g. what criteria must be met in order for a person to qualify as representing the Objectivist self of a person?

3. Is this Objectivist self of a person a truly-existent self (i.e. - perceivable, findable, isolatable, etc.) or is this Objectivist self of a person merely a useful fiction?

- e.g. - realism vs. nominalism of the Objectivist self of a person.

4. A - Is the Objectivist self of a person the same as its parts (e.g. - memories, thoughts, feelings, body parts, etc.)?

B - Or, is Objectivist self of a person different from its parts (e.g. - perceivable/findable in total isolation from all of its parts)?

C - Or, is the Objectivist self of a person simultaneously the same as and different from its parts?

D - Or, is the Objectivist self of a person neither the same as nor different from its parts?

My interest primarily lies in Question #1 and #4.

Thank you for your interest, time, and input in this post.

[Zip]

Objectivists believe in a truly-existent self - meaning that for them, their individual self is perceivable, findable, isolatable, etc.

If you don't believe this, who/what do you believe thought of, composed and posted your questions?

[FeatherFall]

There is a lot of philosophical ground to cover before it's appropriate to discuss the conceptual validity of a self. It would help to understand what your background is, if only to understand how you use some of the terms involved. But to start, the "self" is a valid concept from an Objectivist perspective. It is meaningful to say that each individual is distinct from the rest of reality even while being a part of it. This includes an individual's physical characteristics, mind and past behavior.

[DavidOdden]

The answer to your first two questions is that, it is obvious what "self" is. That obviates the need for a "definition". For Q3, yes to the first disjunct. The answer to Q4 follows from the foregoing. The problem is that you're actually asking the wrong questions. "Self" is an axiomatic concept. You might want to start with ITOE in the appendix on axiomatic concepts for "Self". The one fact that might put thing in focus for you is that it you accidentally slice off the tip of your finger and throw it away, you haven't thrown yourself away. Most of your questions are really not about the concept "self", they are about othre things that sometimes people confuse with questions about "self".

[Grames]

This leads me to a series of questions.

1. That the self exists is axiomatic in that there is no way to question its existence without assuming its existence; after all, who is asking the question? This axiom, like all axioms, is validated by reference to reality, and its definition is ostensive.
   
2. Much can be said about self but the essentialized version of self from the Lexicon is "A man’s self is his mind—the faculty that perceives reality, forms judgments, chooses values." This is in no way to be understood as a denial or even a neglect of the body. Objectivism rejects the Mind-Body dichotomy. There is no special criteria for having a self other than existing, i.e. being alive.
   
3. The self exists objectively. Realism vs. Nominalism are posed as the only two positions to take on the Problem of Universals but Objectivism rejects both. An entire book (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology) exists about the Objectivist theory of concept formation, but this entry in the Lexicon gives some idea of it.
   
4. Answers to questions about the relationship of an entity to its parts must avoid the fallacy of composition and any materialist reductionism which denies the reality of an entity simply because it has parts. A man is an integrated being of mind and body and wholly destroying the mind or the body destroys the man. D is the only alternative that isn't immediately ruled out, but that doesn't say much.
   

I hope that was helpful.

[Questioner]

If you don't believe this, who/what do you believe thought of, composed and posted your questions?

That is a very good question. I would say, who did post my question? and, Who is this "I" to which I refer and what is the nature of that "I"?

[Questioner]

There is a lot of philosophical ground to cover before it's appropriate to discuss the conceptual validity of a self. It would help to understand what your background is, if only to understand how you use some of the terms involved. But to start, the "self" is a valid concept from an Objectivist perspective. It is meaningful to say that each individual is distinct from the rest of reality even while being a part of it. This includes an individual's physical characteristics, mind and past behavior.

I think that I am understanding a few things from your comments, but I am somewhat unclear as to exactly what you are saying. I will try not to bore all of you, but I think that it is worthwhile to go step by step and get everything as clear, precise, and ordered as possible. I will attempt to reiterate what I think that you have said and then respond a little.

What I think you said:

1. "the 'self' is a valid concept"

2.1 "self" and "individual" are mutually inclusive?

2.2 an individual exists as a distinct entity in dependence upon possessing a body, mind, and history

My response:

1. Is the "self" to which you refer merely a valid concept or is it truly existent? It seems to be that you are saying that - the subject, in your person, a valid concept of a human self exists because a human individual truly exists.

2.1 I don't know how you are really using "self" vs. "individual." I am thinking that you are suggesting that each individual person possesses a self (this would change response #1) - I am not sure of your exact meaning.

2.2 What is the relationship between the individual and its parts? Are they the same or different or is there some other explanation that validly establishes their relationship?

I am trying my best here, but I am sure that I have made some mistakes.

[Questioner]

The answer to your first two questions is that, it is obvious what "self" is. That obviates the need for a "definition". For Q3, yes to the first disjunct. The answer to Q4 follows from the foregoing. The problem is that you're actually asking the wrong questions. "Self" is an axiomatic concept. You might want to start with ITOE in the appendix on axiomatic concepts for "Self". The one fact that might put thing in focus for you is that it you accidentally slice off the tip of your finger and throw it away, you haven't thrown yourself away. Most of your questions are really not about the concept "self", they are about othre things that sometimes people confuse with questions about "self".

I disagree that it is obvious what the self is and that it is an axiomatic concept, this is why I was asking for a definition and explanations. If you are saying that the Objectivist self truly exists, then I would be interested in a definition of that self and the reasoning that you use to establish that it truly exists.

You said that if, "you accidentally slice off the tip of your finger and throw it away, you haven't thrown yourself away." I agree that you probably would not say that you had thrown yourself away, but one might say something like, "I cut myself." Where is this self that has been cut and what is its relation to its parts? If one says, "I cut myself," it would suggest that this self somehow pervades ones whole body, in which case the self would seem to be the same as its parts. You may disagree that the self is the same as its parts, but I am still curious as to what the Objectivist self is and how it truly exists.

You also said, "Most of your questions are really not about the concept 'self,' they are about othre things that sometimes people confuse with questions about 'self.'" I don't understand what this means. I am interested in understanding what the Objectivist self is on the experiential level in order to see if that validates it on the conceptual level.

I am really interested in the relationship between the self and its parts. If the self truly exists then we must be able to identify it and find it.

[Phoroneus]

I disagree that it is obvious what the self is and that it is an axiomatic concept, this is why I was asking for a definition and explanations. If you are saying that the Objectivist self truly exists, then I would be interested in a definition of that self and the reasoning that you use to establish that it truly exists.

I think I can handle this one. You don't provide a definition for self anymore than you provide a definition for a rock. What you provide for an existent is a description. If someone fails to define rock, you can hardly claim it doesn't exist until a definition satisfies you. That "you" are typing and "your" actions are "self" directed with your "consciousness" should provide you with an understanding that such a referent does exist. If it doesn't, I know of no evidence I or anyone else can use to satisfy you.

[Questioner]

1. That the self exists is axiomatic in that there is no way to question its existence without assuming its existence; after all, who is asking the question? This axiom, like all axioms, is validated by reference to reality, and its definition is ostensive.
   
2. Much can be said about self but the essentialized version of self from the Lexicon is "A man’s self is his mind—the faculty that perceives reality, forms judgments, chooses values." This is in no way to be understood as a denial or even a neglect of the body. Objectivism rejects the Mind-Body dichotomy. There is no special criteria for having a self other than existing, i.e. being alive.
   
3. The self exists objectively. Realism vs. Nominalism are posed as the only two positions to take on the Problem of Universals but Objectivism rejects both. An entire book (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology) exists about the Objectivist theory of concept formation, but this entry in the Lexicon gives some idea of it.
   
4. Answers to questions about the relationship of an entity to its parts must avoid the fallacy of composition and any materialist reductionism which denies the reality of an entity simply because it has parts. A man is an integrated being of mind and body and wholly destroying the mind or the body destroys the man. D is the only alternative that isn't immediately ruled out, but that doesn't say much.
   

I hope that was helpful.

Your post was extremely helpful. Thank you very much for you thoughtful response and the links - they are great. Let me respond to your posts in similar numerical order, please don't feel obligated to respond to each of mine in turn.

1. I disagree with you when you say, "That the self exists is axiomatic in that there is no way to question its existence without assuming its existence."

1.1 I do not agree that the existence of the self is axiomatic or that I somehow assume or take on its existence by questioning it.

1.2 I will then ask you who/what/where is this truly existent self which I presume is also somehow stable in time and reality?

1.3 Is the self partless? If so, then what does that mean?

2. Thank you for a definition or working definition of the Objectivist self from Rand herself! (i.e. - "A man’s self is his mind—the faculty that perceives reality, forms judgments, chooses values.") I would also like to add from the same webpage a secondary definition of the Objectivist self, also from Rand.

Objectivist self - 2. "The ego you seek, that essential “you” which you cannot express or define, is not your emotions or inarticulate dreams, but your intellect, that judge of your supreme tribunal"

2.1 Also, thanks for saying that the criteria for having a self is being alive - that is clarifying.

2.2 It seems to me that, based on Rand's definitions/descriptions of the self that the Objectivist self is understood as an observer/perceiver/controller/possessor and/or "judge" of the mind/body and its experiences.

3. Perhaps I was off track or missed the mark when I brought up realism vs. nominalism, although I would contend that they do have some indirect (or perhaps direct) relevancy to the discussion - however, maybe this is not the place for them. As a sidenote, is Rand some kind of a moderate realist - meaning that she considers universals to be quasi-real entities that are neither fully real nor fully unreal.

4. I am unclear as to why questions, "about the relationship of an entity to its parts must avoid the fallacy of composition and any materialist reductionism which denies the reality of an entity simply because it has parts." What is the reasoning that establishes this as valid? I have a hard time accepting that entire statement just because you said it, specifically with respect to materialist reductionism (I do understand the fallacy of composition, at least partially - if it applies to the problem at hand or in something that I have said, then please let me know). I know that may sound stupid to you, but it does not sound stupid to me especially when we are discussing the reality of the self. If the Objectivist self truly exists, then we should be able to find it in reality and say that this is it.

4.1 I am not saying that entities utterly do not exist, i am suggesting that they exist in a way that is slightly different from the way in which we are accustomed to viewing them - phenomena appear to be stable discrete objects when perhaps this is not the case in reality. I am seriously questioning what I believe* (apologies again) is the Objectivist position that all phenomena have stable reified identities (perhaps I am misinformed here). If phenomena do not have stable reified truly existent identities, then I do not understand how Objectivists can assert that the self exists.

4.1 If you are suggesting that the self is neither the same as its parts nor different from its parts, then where/what is it? It sounds like you are saying that you can't find the self anywhere. I am asking you to explain your position - you are saying that the self exists in reality, but I don't understand how it can exist if it has no relation to its parts.

Let's break this down further.

- You are saying that the self exists in reality.

- If the self exists in reality then it is necessarily different from some other phenomenon that exists in reality. For example, one might say that the subject, the self (or my self or your self, etc.), is different from a rock because of being a phenomenon which is not exactly the same in name and meaning and identity as a rock.

- Thus, if the self exists in reality and is not non-existent as you suggest, and the same also goes for its parts, then the self must necessarily either be the same as its parts or different from its parts or both the same as and different from its parts.

- If you are saying that the self is neither the same as nor different from its parts, then I can only conclude that either you think that the self does not truly inherently exist or that its parts do not truly inherently exist. The other possibility is of course that you are suggesting that there is some other way in which the self exists - I am very interested in learning about this other possibility.

4.2 Mind you, I am questioning the reality of the self, not the reality of a person which I consider to be imputed on the basis of certain specific collections.

On a final note, I would add that on a conceptual and communicative level we can all agree to identify certain phenomena in certain ways; however, if we try to step out of conceptuality and get down to bare bones reality those formerly distinct entities become a little slipperier.

Thanks again for your response and your time!

Edited April 13, 2009 by Questioner

[Questioner]

I think I can handle this one. You don't provide a definition for self anymore than you provide a definition for a rock. What you provide for an existent is a description. If someone fails to define rock, you can hardly claim it doesn't exist until a definition satisfies you. That "you" are typing and "your" actions are "self" directed with your "consciousness" should provide you with an understanding that such a referent does exist. If it doesn't, I know of no evidence I or anyone else can use to satisfy you.

On a conventional level I can say that sure, I am here typing away, considering this and that; however, when I deeply consider does this self truly inherently exist or not, I then begin to question? Is there some self that truly inherently exists or is this merely an appearance? If we are looking at reality, all of it, in its entire entirety, then we must allow all things that are real into this purview, question what their actual ultimate nature is, follow it until the highest point, and not draw the line too early.

Can we find a car?

What is the relationship between the car and its parts?

- are they the same, different, both, or neither?

- if none of those, then how do we find the car?

- is it merely a perceptual and/or conceptual convention?

- if its a mere convention, then how do we say that the car truly inherently exists?

[Grames]

Your post was extremely helpful. Thank you very much for you thoughtful response and the links - they are great. Let me respond to your posts in similar numerical order, please don't feel obligated to respond to each of mine in turn.

...

Thanks again for your response and your time!

Glad you found it helpful, but there are limits to what can be accomplished here.

1. It would be futile and stupid of me to try to argue against your statements of disagreement. First because it would be pointless to deny facts, second because I don't think you are literal-minded enough to exchange extensive correspondence with without me shortly giving up in exasperation. You come here with knowledge derived from prior study, perhaps years of study. There is no prospect of me arguing you into submission with a few sentences or paragraphs. If you wish to gain insight into Objectivism, follow the hard road that the rest of us here are traveling and grapple with the original texts. An internet discussion forum is a good place to thrash out one point at a time, it is no substitute for a long form presentation such as a book.

I'm guessing you could handle plunging directly into Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology 2nd ed.. The weakness of that work is that it skips the metaphysics, but you can get the gist of that short subject here and in its links. You won't find ITOE immediately persuasive, but at least after reading it you could participate in a forum discussion without imposing the burden upon your correspondents of recapitulating the entire philosophy a few paragraphs at a time.

2 & 3. Without understanding the Objectivist account of what a concept is, the function of a definition, and the role of the chosen word that names a concept, I doubt you can come to any understanding of self, or any other conclusion in Objectivism. As a philosophy, Objectivism is a method, which results in a system and not just a collection of positions. We could go round and round and eventually reach some agreement, but then we would have to do it again on the next subject to come up. I have no interest in traversing the miles of the philosophy an inch at a time.

And if you perceive Rand to be any kind of moderate-realist, you have not truly seen her.

4. The Law of Identity. A thing is whatever it is, but if you tear it into parts you no longer have the original thing.

4.1 Whatever the ultimate constituents of matter may be and their physical laws, they combine en masse obeying the remainder of the physical laws to produce the perceivably stable discrete objects of everyday life. "Reified"? I presume this is an attack on the validity of man's senses on the basis that he cannot perceive the true reality? Sounds Kantian.

4.1 (the 2nd) The combination of its parts, which is not a simple sum. The atoms of a rock or the pebbles in a heap are a simple sum. The material parts of a living body are related together in a specific structure and in motion. If you chop a man up into his constituent atoms you will not find a self or even a trace of life. If then you conclude the man was never alive to begin with, or never had a self, your materialist reductionism has led you to commit a logical fallacy and a murder.

4.2 I find this distinction incomprehensible.

Happy reading.

[DavidOdden]

I assume you've read the discussion of "Self" in ITOE p. 251; given that, I have a hard time understanding how you could deny that the nature of "self" is clear. You are clearly aware of your own consciousness, and you have no awareness of any other consciousness -- assuming that you aren't going to claim for some reason that you are aware of my consciousness or that you are not in fact aware of your own consciousness. Consciousness is never "floating", it is consciousness of something, and the first thing that a consciousness is and can be aware of is that it exists. Any act of being aware entails that the subject -- I -- be aware. You cannot deny "self" while affirming "consciousness".

The philosophical concept of "self" is not the same thing as the linguistic reflexive pronoun, but of course the similarity (and indeed some element of conceptual overlap) can be confusing. A simple illustration of the difference is the fact that it is a philosophical truth that "You cannot be aware of my self", but it is grammatically impossible to say *"You cannot be aware of myself". I suggest we not get sidetracked into a tangent on reflexive pronouns.

The philosophical notion is extremely simple -- its foundation is "me", i.e. self-awareness, then generalized to others. Also, higher-level philosophizing about the concept "self" is (obviously) not self-evident, but the subject matter, "self", is. Objectivist epistemology ties its philosophical discussions to the actual stuff, so since "self" is very simple, an Objectivist theory of "self" is also simple.

A definition is relatively unimportant, because there isn't a real debate over what things in reality constitute "self". In contrast, there could be such a debate over the notion of "rights". Definitions are necessary in philosophical discussions only when there is probable confusion over the existents being referred to, and I'm trying to give you notice that there can't be any such confusion. (Ultimately, I'm trying to get you to reconsider your questions in terms of the actual existents that you are interested in -- set aside any interest in the word).

No proper concepts are "useful fictions" -- concepts unify existents, which means that they exist and therefore there is an object of interest. This is true for concepts, period, and is not limited to "self". The implication that there could be a "useful fiction" grants illegitimate power to words (and this is really the heart of my objection to your questions), that it could be tolerable to have meaningless sounds which had meaning in a philosophy. Hopefully you can see why that could not possibly be the case.

Since A is A, we know that A is not Not-A; therefore it could never be the case that something is simultaneously identical and non-identical (and "identical" is simply the opposite of "different"). The concept "self" is a concept of consciousness; as Grames said, we reject the mind-body dichotomy, so it follows that attempts to distinguish mind and body must fail. However, as you recognise, not all aspects of the body are essential to consciousness.

The question "Who is this 'I'?" cannot be taken seriously, although I recognise that it is an automatic form of philosophical investigation. A serious question has to procede from the position that there exists an actual reason to deny the evident answer. At an introductory level, there could easily be serious questions about e.g. "rights", because the concept is very complex and depends on a lot of observation about the nature of man and the nature of society. Because you have axiomatic awareness of sensations, the existence of "I" or "self" is not in doubt. You might not happen to understand every fact about your nature, but that is a far cry from doubting that there is such a thing as "I". If you can point to some evidence that casts the notion of "self" in disrepute, then you will have made the question become at least somewhat serious (assuming the evidence is real, not just a linguistic trick).

[themadkat]

4.1 Whatever the ultimate constituents of matter may be and their physical laws, they combine en masse obeying the remainder of the physical laws to produce the perceivably stable discrete objects of everyday life. "Reified"? I presume this is an attack on the validity of man's senses on the basis that he cannot perceive the true reality? Sounds Kantian.

Happy reading.

I have no interest in jumping into this whole discussion, but being as I just talked about this the other day in class it is fresh in my mind. Reified simply means that when we give a name to something, we assume it exists in reality by virtue of having a name. It sounds like a dumb mistake, but it's actually pretty insidious and many smart people do it without really meaning to. A perfect example of this is "God". Simply because we can imagine this concept of "God" and put a name to it, reifying the word "God" would mean we then proceed in discussing it and using it as if the word "God" had actual referents in reality, which of course it doesn't. The specific example we were talking about in class was the concept of "ecological niche" which may or may not actually describe real divisions in nature, depending on how it is constructed. You can assign a given animal to a given ecological niche, say for example "bone-crushing scavenger", but then when you see a spotted hyena go out there and take down a fresh animal you don't say, "Hey, hyena, you can't feed that way because I said you were a bone-crushing scavenger, now go back to your ecological niche before I put the biologist beatdown on you." The hyena, if it could respond, would probably just look at you like "idiot" and go right on feeding how it wanted to. "Ecological niches" are not necessarily real just because they have a name.

Basically reification is a rationalistic fallacy which does not adequately take into account actual reality. The way to avoid it is just to be very clear in your own head what the actual referents of your proposed concept are and be prepared to revise your thoughts rather than ignore reality if the facts say otherwise.

[Questioner]

Perhaps it is useful to step back a little further. I will explain myself a little more, although I am more interested in responses to the questions that I will later pose rather than in responses to my personal perspective - these questions will be of a similar, if not the same nature as the ones that I have proposed earlier.

I think that a compelling case can be made for at least two operative levels of reality ascertainable for a human consciousness. Let us call the first - [ultimate, bare bones reality], which can be validly and directly perceived via consciousnesses which are non-conceptual (e.g. - eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, etc.) and which is in a constant state of flux, never able to be pinned down. Let us call the second - [conventional reality], which can be validly ascertained via inference and the use of thought consciousness and which appears to contain concrete, self-sufficient, truly and inherently existing, reified and discrete phenomena. There is certainly a relationship between these two "realities," but the exact nature of this relationship can be highly contentious. From one perspective, I contend that there is a wall between these two, meaning that concepts never actually touch or get at this ultimate bare-bones reality, they merely describe this ultimate bare-bones reality, while also being a part of it. To me, this is a very important distinction to at least consider. It seems that these two "realities" are oftentimes conflated or that one chooses one "reality" over the other "reality;" to me, they seem to be two sides of the same coin. Thus, phenomena may be appearances which are neither truly existent nor truly non-existent. Also, I agree that [A is A], but what is the ultimate nature of [A] from the start?

Onto the "new" questions. Let us focus on whether or not phenomena, which are not humans, are concrete, self-sufficient, truly and inherently existing, reified and discrete phenomena.

Can we ultimately find a specific truly inherently existent self-sufficient car, flower, or bird's nest?

- I think that we can all agree that a car, a flower, and a bird's nest all have parts. Thus, in order for those things to ultimately truly inherently exist, they must have some kind of relationship with their parts. If they do not have a relationship with their parts, then it cannot be stated unequivocally that they truly inherently self-sufficiently exist, although we may still validly contend that they have some kind of appearance as a conventional reality.

- here we go. The four questions:

• Is a car, a flower, or a bird's nest the same as their respective parts?
  
• Is a car, a flower, or a bird's nest the different from their respective parts?
  
• Is a car, a flower, or a bird's nest simultaneously the same as and different from their respective parts?
  
• Is a car, a flower, or a bird's nest neither the same as nor different from their respective parts?
  

- Here are a subset of the previous questions, which are also worth consideration.

• Is a car, a flower, or a bird's nest dependent upon their respective parts?
  
• Is a car, a flower, or a bird's nest the substratum upon which their respective parts depend?
  
• Is a car, a flower, or a bird's nest the possessors' of their respective parts?
  
• Is a car, a flower, or a bird's nest the mere collection of their respective parts?
  
• Is a car, a flower, or a bird's nest the shape of their respective parts?
  

[Questioner]

I assume you've read the discussion of "Self" in ITOE p. 251; given that, I have a hard time understanding how you could deny that the nature of "self" is clear. You are clearly aware of your own consciousness, and you have no awareness of any other consciousness -- assuming that you aren't going to claim for some reason that you are aware of my consciousness or that you are not in fact aware of your own consciousness. Consciousness is never "floating", it is consciousness of something, and the first thing that a consciousness is and can be aware of is that it exists. Any act of being aware entails that the subject -- I -- be aware. You cannot deny "self" while affirming "consciousness".

...

Because you have axiomatic awareness of sensations, the existence of "I" or "self" is not in doubt.

You said a great deal that is worthy of response and thank you for your interest. Instead of responding to everything I will attempt to only respond to what you said in the above quotes.

Let me first enter this discussion by saying something about your second quote, "...axiomatic awareness of sensations...," etc. Axiomatic awareness of sensations may occur, but just because they occur does not necessarily prove that the "I" or the "self" exists, unless of course you are using the "self" and "awareness" as mutually inclusive terms, which I don't think that you are. The way that you seem to be discussing the "self," as in when you say such things as, "you have axiomatic awareness," or, "your own consciousness," etc., is in a manner that suggests that you consider the "self" to be the possessor of the mind/body like a lion in the forest or a person in their own house - this would most likely be a case of the "self" being different from its parts - this would mean that we could observe the self in the absence of its parts. I am suggesting that the house exists on a conventional level and may ultimately be perceived, but that the person in the house is merely a convention which cannot be ultimately perceived and is not ultimately findable, self-sufficient, truly and inherently and discernibly existent.

It does not follow that the "I" ultimately exists just because awareness or consciousness exists. If that were the case, then the "I" would necessarily be something contained within awareness that was also truly different from or the same as the other content of that awareness (this of course incurs several unwanted consequences). I agree that a concept of the "I" does exist and that it appears to be something different from the other content of awareness, while also being contained within that awareness, but I do not agree that the concept of the "I" refers to anything that is ultimately real and truly existent. I think that it is a pure fiction, otherwise you are attempting to affix some sort of stable, singular, unchanging entity and identity and observer to a collection of constantly changing phenomena.

I can validly perceive a tree and gain knowledge about it (conventional/conceptual knowledge). However, I question whether this "observer" can observe itself. Can the "observer" split itself into two pieces, wherein this singular truly existent observer is simultaneously the observer and the observed, its own subject and object? If it can do that, then it is simultaneously the same as and different from itself, this is very puzzling.

Where is the observer in deep sleep or in a coma, where is the subject that is aware of some object?

I truly think that the nature of phenomena and the "self" are fundamental questions worthy of deep consideration and that should not be cast aside in an easy manner, for the implications can be quite deep and profound - philosophies may stand or fall based on the legitimacy of the self. Nonetheless, perhaps we are at an impasse, as I cannot seem to come up with strong enough responses to refute your position and I am not totally convinced of yours and also because we are perhaps using two irreconcilable approaches to interpreting what is real and what is not real.

One last thing, if we are in the desert and I say look, there is water over there and you say no, that is not water, those are heat waves rising from the earth and they appear to your perception as water. I don't think that I would be able to convince you that the water really existed by saying something like, "I have awareness of and can perceive the water, therefore the water does exist and I am going to drink it." Perhaps then I would wander around endlessly looking for the water, always getting closer, but never arriving.

Also, thank you so much for your interest and responses. It has caused me to question my own assertions more deeply and in new ways, so thank you for that.

Edited April 13, 2009 by Questioner

[Grames]

I have no interest in jumping into this whole discussion, ...

Then don't. I know perfectly well what reification is. By asserting that the products of the senses are reified products of eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, our new poster is following the Kantian script to the "T". You don't really see things, because you see them.

[DavidOdden]

Axiomatic awareness of sensations may occur, but just because they occur does not necessarily prove that the "I" or the "self" exists, unless of course you are using the "self" and "awareness" as mutually inclusive terms, which I don't think that you are.

Not exactly, but not exactly not. You cannot form a concept of "awareness" without any instances of "awareness" to generalize over. The only awareness that can be the basis for such a generalization is one that you yourself have. Hence "awareness" implies "I". When the concept "awareness" is formed, and once you fully grasp the distinction between "self" and "others", then you can -- at an abstract level -- apply the concept "awareness" to others. But unlike the relationship between "I" and "awareness", that's an extension of the concept which cannot be experienced.

The way that you seem to be discussing the "self," as in when you say such things as, "you have axiomatic awareness," or, "your own consciousness," etc., is in a manner that suggests that you consider the "self" to be the possessor of the mind/body like a lion in the forest or a person in their own house - this would most likely be a case of the "self" being different from its parts - this would mean that we could observe the self in the absence of its parts.

That's the wrong conclusion, which I think is based simply on linguistic form. The difference between "self" and "body" is one of focus, where "self" focuses more on consciousness and "body" focuses more on the tangible, mass-having aspects of you. You cannot separate "self" and "body", although a (dead) body can exist without there being any "self" it.

It does not follow that the "I" ultimately exists just because awareness or consciousness exists. If that were the case, then the "I" would necessarily be something contained within awareness that was also truly different from or the same as the other content of that awareness (this of course incurs several unwanted consequences).

Awareness has two parts, the object of awareness (which could be you, or an external object), but also crucially the experiencer, and the latter is where "I" am always involved (at least in the axiomatic instances of awareness, that is, those that are actually experienced).

However, I question whether this "observer" can observe itself.

I don't think I even need to. It is sufficient that I observe. Being the experiencer of "awareness" is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of "I". Of course you can also, later, learn of "I" from the fact that you can introspect and be aware of yourself.

Can the "observer" split itself into two pieces, wherein this singular truly existent observer is simultaneously the observer and the observed, its own subject and object?

I can't see why not. From the start, we clearly experience pain, and understand that we are experiencing it and that it is a fact about us. I just don't see how that would be puzzling.

Where is the observer in deep sleep or in a coma, where is the subject that is aware of some object?

I think it's questionable to be applying the concept "awareness" to such a case.

I truly think that the nature of phenomena and the "self" are fundamental questions worthy of deep consideration and that should not be cast aside in an easy manner, for the implications can be quite deep and profound - philosophies may stand or fall based on the legitimacy of the self.

I suggest that the most productive approach is to focus on that which is unquestionable, and avoid presupposition-laden terminology. For example, take the basic questions that you believe are important, and try to express them using ordinary words while avoiding "self". Once you understand that you exist, and that you have consciousness, then it seems to me that you've jumped the hardest hurdles, and then getting at the fact that there are others, which also have consciousness, is fairly minor.

One last thing, if we are in the desert and I say look, there is water over there and you say no, that is not water, those are heat waves rising from the earth and they appear to your perception as water. I don't think that I would be able to convince you that the water really existed by saying something like, "I have awareness of and can perceive the water, therefore the water does exist and I am going to drink it." Perhaps then I would wander around endlessly looking for the water, always getting closer, but never arriving.

Actually, that is not an instance of perception, that is conceptual inference. That's a pretty important difference. An analogy in the "self" domain might be having a particular sensation of pain and concluding that you just stepped on a nail. But actually it was just a misfiring nerve. The mistaken conclusion about a nail was an inference, not an axiomatic perception.

[themadkat]

Then don't. I know perfectly well what reification is. By asserting that the products of the senses are reified products of eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, our new poster is following the Kantian script to the "T". You don't really see things, because you see them.

If you know what reification is then why are you still using it wrongly? It doesn't not have to mean what you say it means. Lots of people can and do form invalid concepts that either don't have referents in reality or do not contain the set of referents they assume it does. Reification is a rationalistic error and it is not Kantian to point out that it is a pitfall. I have no idea whether or not the poster is making a Kantian argument and I don't care, the point is that reification is a legitimate thing to question and it isn't proper to just shrug it off because you think it's "Kantian". Concepts themselves are not the products of perceptual data alone. Concepts are perceptual data + integration through reason. Reification occurs because of incorrect integration of sensory data, not because the perceptions themselves are faulty or don't accurately construe reality.

[Grames]

If you know what reification is then why are you still using it wrongly? It doesn't not have to mean what you say it means. Lots of people can and do form invalid concepts that either don't have referents in reality or do not contain the set of referents they assume it does. Reification is a rationalistic error and it is not Kantian to point out that it is a pitfall. I have no idea whether or not the poster is making a Kantian argument and I don't care, the point is that reification is a legitimate thing to question and it isn't proper to just shrug it off because you think it's "Kantian". Concepts themselves are not the products of perceptual data alone. Concepts are perceptual data + integration through reason. Reification occurs because of incorrect integration of sensory data, not because the perceptions themselves are faulty or don't accurately construe reality.

WTF?

I have no idea whether or not the poster is making a Kantian argument and I don't care,

Then butt out.

reification is a legitimate thing to question

Reification is a type of fallacy. Our guest poster is asserting that sense data and perceptions are fallacies. Do you see the issue here yet?

[RationalBiker]

Who is this "I" to which I refer and what is the nature of that "I"?

I don't see how you can understand the answer to the question if (as you query) you don't understand the referent you use in asking the question. You have even had to use the referent "I" in your 'question-answer' to his question. You've also refered to yourself as 'myself' several times in your posts. How can you keep using these concepts in asking questions and in making statements if you don't have no understanding as to their meaning or reference?

[Questioner]

I don't see how you can understand the answer to the question if (as you query) you don't understand the referent you use in asking the question. You have even had to use the referent "I" in your 'question-answer' to his question. You've also refered to yourself as 'myself' several times in your posts. How can you keep using these concepts in asking questions and in making statements if you don't have no understanding as to their meaning or reference?

I would say that I use these terms because it is our common linguistic convention to speak in such ways. However, you are right to point out that I have been sloppy in my use of "I" and "myself," etc. Nonetheless, I maintain that while persons and consciousness do exist on a certain level, the self of a person (a truly and inherently existent self) does not exist and that it therefore cannot refer to any existent.

[Questioner]

Not exactly, but not exactly not. You cannot form a concept of "awareness" without any instances of "awareness" to generalize over. The only awareness that can be the basis for such a generalization is one that you yourself have. Hence "awareness" implies "I". When the concept "awareness" is formed, and once you fully grasp the distinction between "self" and "others", then you can -- at an abstract level -- apply the concept "awareness" to others. But unlike the relationship between "I" and "awareness", that's an extension of the concept which cannot be experienced.

1. I agree that in order for "awareness" to be a generality, there must be instances of "awareness."

2.1 I also agree that only an awareness can ascertain a generality of "awareness."

2.2 If I am understanding you correctly, I also agree that the valid ascertainment of multiple instances of one's own awareness can form the basis from which a generality of "awareness" is formed. Non-conceptual consciousnesses (e.g. - eye, ear, etc.) validly ascertain instances and from that, thought consciousnesses generate these conceptual generalities.

2.3 I am using different words, but perhaps the meaning is the same - I agree that if this person (me) is ascertained as different from that person (you), then it is possible to apply the generality of "awareness" to a certain quality that each person has in common.

3. I still do not understand what you mean when you use "I" and "self" or "I" and "awareness." Rand seems to suggest that the "self" is a kind of "judge" that exists as a part of consciousness, like a marble in a bowl of water. I am not playing dumb here, I just want to understand exactly what it is that you are talking about. I do not understand how "awareness" implies "I," unless you mean it in a purely conventional linguistic manner. Are "awareness" and "I" mutually inclusive terms and/or existents? Are "self" and "I" mutually inclusive? If "awareness" and "self" are not mutually inclusive, then are you using "self" as mutually inclusive with the "mind/body"? There are only so many ways that a phenomena can exist in relation to other phenomena.

3.1 I might better understand your position if you identified phenomena which the self was mutually inclusive with and mutually exclusive with (and also, all selves are [X], but not all [X]s are a self, etc).

3.2 When you say, "the relationship between 'I' and 'awareness,'" this suggests to me that you consider them to be different, yet related existents, like an instance and a generality, as in gold cup and cup.

Edited April 14, 2009 by Questioner

[Questioner]

davidoddin -

excellent responses. lots of information to work with, however i must respond more later (maybe). Also, this is a very serious topic and I have reservations about pursuing it further. Perhaps it would have been better if I had not created this discussion as my comprehension of the topic does not qualify me to enter into this tremendous territory, nonetheless I appreciate the many thoughtful responses and I believe that I now understand that the Objectivist self is mutually inclusive with what is understood as the perceiver/observer/judge, etc., this is extremely clarifying. Thank you all.

[RationalBiker]

Nonetheless, I maintain that while persons and consciousness do exist on a certain level, the self of a person (a truly and inherently existent self) does not exist and that it therefore cannot refer to any existent.

I do not think that you can legitimately make that claim as yet since you have indicated you don't even understand what those terms mean or to what they refer. How do YOU define the 'self' that you do not believe inherently exists? When you say existent do you mean a physical / material existent, or do you mean something that exists conceptually?