A disagreement over the ability to define "Art"

[softwareNerd]

... what would happen if you made it personal in a negative way or you interpreted the world around you or the human spirit as dark or weak or otherwise repugnant? Would that still be art in an objectivist sense?

Absolutely. There's no question that Objectivism would still consider it as art. It may or may not be "Romantic" art, in the sense that Rand used the term, but it would still be art. As I said in a previous post, it may also be good art, judging it aesthetically and technically.

In fact, the way you describe it, I would not even rule it out as being "romantic" art. For instance, do not conclude that the portrayal of evil makes art non-romantic, in the Objectivist sense. Are you familiar with Rand's fiction? If so, consider some of Rand's main villains, and you will see art that she considers romantic, and yet says "men can be this depraved". As a better illustration of this, Rand classified Dostoyevsky as a "romantic" writer.

Though it makes me wonder if Rand's definition of naturalism is different than your "traditional" definition of naturalism.

Perhaps it does; but, what you say below makes me think it is not that different after all...

Didn't naturalism have a Darwinian perspective of life and a view of the futility of man against the forces of nature?

The "futility" aspect is key. An artist might implement this in various ways. One way could be the nitty-gritty journalistic, "all things are equal in the artist's eye" style, or boring, plot-less "stories" about ordinary folk doing nothing special. However, it can also be done with plot and with characters making decisions, but done in a way to leave the overall view that it was all in vain, and that the best laid plans of mice and men amount to futile self-delusion in the end. The key aspect then is this: human volition -- its presence and its efficacy (vs. its absence or inefficacy).

I wasn't able to find how that view of naturalism cohered with objectivism.

Well, the metaphysical, ethical or political messages may not cohere; however, that does not imply that it is not art. In fact, if it is just the ethical and political messages that do not cohere, it can well be "romantic" art, the way Rand uses the term. So, someone like Victor Hugo might write about altruistic heroes, and still be writing romantic literature. Or, one can paint the workers of the world overthrowing the Capitalist "oppressors" and still have a romantic painting.

[KendallJ]

Why, if a painting (in the modernist style) is skillfully executed and elicits postive emotion from its audience that in some manner elevates their spirits, would that painting be considered "invalid" art?

OK, you've done this a couple of times. Let me ask you. Would you consider then something man made that was a) skillfully executed and eliciting positive emotions as art? This seems to be too broad a definition, as it would include many things which are functional such as machinery and the like. While those things have some esthetic or design component, it seems to really miss this sort of "for it's own sake" property of the things that one would consider art, such as sculpture, and painting.

I believe in the Romantic Manifesto, Rand differentiates from those things which have a function from those things she chategorizes as art. She does this specifically with respect to the "decorative arts" which are used to accessorize a piece of architecture for example.

Then eliciting positive emotions seems problematic as well since it could include things like sunsets, and fuzzy bunnies which in and of themselves are not art. Also, I'm not sure that the emotions need be positive. Rand was a huge fan of Dostoyevsky, whom she considered to have a decidedly horrific sense of life. His work she considered masterful but it was not inspirational in the least.

I'm not suggesting that things that elicit positive responses are not nor shoudl they not be a value in your life. However, is this necessary and sufficient to consider something art? Objectivism doesn't negate those responses. It just classifies them differently. If blue makes you warm and happy, great! Paint your rooms blue. When I discussed the mechanism of response you'll see that I mentioned that the sense of life mechanism was only partially responsible, but it is the causal element that is responsible for something being art, it is a subconscious response to conceptual ideas. As such the object of its repsonse would have to be something that is representational. One can certainly claim that a panel on the wall of the color yellow would elicit an emotional response, but I would assert that this response cannot be through the "sense of life" mechanism.

Rand suggests the same thing. This of course makes all sorts of art, that you think don't qualify (such as impressionism, and even some forms of modernism a la Dali) qualify as art. However, Rand does draw a distinction at non-representationalism as non-art. Here is some discussion of this aspect.

What are the valid forms of art—and why these? . . . The proper forms of art present a selective re-creation of reality in terms needed by man’s cognitive faculty, which includes his entity-perceiving senses, and thus assist the integration of the various elements of a conceptual consciousness. Literature deals with concepts, the visual arts with sight and touch, music with hearing. Each art fulfills the function of bringing man’s concepts to the perceptual level of his consciousness and allowing him to grasp them directly, as if they were percepts. (The performing arts are a means of further concretization.) The different branches of art serve to unify man’s consciousness and offer him a coherent view of existence. Whether that view is true or false is not an esthetic matter. The crucially esthetic matter is psycho-epistemological: the integration of a conceptual consciousness.

As a re-creation of reality, a work of art has to be representational; its freedom of stylization is limited by the requirement of intelligibility; if it does not present an intelligible subject, it ceases to be art.

Whether the value judgements are true or false, uplifting or horrifying is not the test. The key is can you have a "sense of life" emotional response to it (vs just any emotional response) and is that response the sole end of the man-made work. She limits art to "selective recreations of reality" because those are the only ones that you can have a sense of life response to.

If the fundamental causal mechanism of artistic response is through this "sense of life", i.e. response through a subconscious but decidedly conceptual evaluation, then the object being evaluated has to be conceptual in someway. It has to be recognizable as something. What is a conceptual evaluation of yellow?

While a yellow panel might elicit a response, it's not through this mechanism, and Rand says that this is the crucial mechanism that distinguishes art. Certainly, something that elicits a happy response. That's fine. There's nothing wrong with that. However, on a wall, it's decoration, not art.

I think that abstract modernism fails even on your other test. For what is the standard by which one can deduce the idea of "skillfully rendered"? How does one judge a skillfully rendered blob of paint (a la Jackson Pollack) vs a poorly rendered blob? One can't, because there is no standard of skill in rendering things that are not recognizable as something. What is good "stream of consciousness" literature vs. bad "stream of consciousness" literature? To the extent that it can be judged as being better than something else will relate not to its "stream of consciousness"-ness but rather to the extent that it retains some recognizability as a story about something and someone.

Edited June 30, 2009 by KendallJ

[shadesofgrey]

As was mentioned before, naturalism is art, but by an Objectivist's standards, it is bad art. Same with impressionism. Photography is not art by the Objectivist definition. Modernism is a little too vague or broad. This was part of the reason why I made the "bad art vs not art thread", because it isn't always an easy thing to distinguish. It requires thought about a particular piece of work, which is why judging something by its genre alone is not always effective.

I'm not exactly sure what the modernist style is. There is enough "modern art" out there that some pieces could be art, but most of it is not. It would be better to look at a specific piece of work and judge that rather than just judge broad genres. A good photograph requires skill to take. A good photograph can elicit positive emotion. A photograph is not art. Does a photograph not being art diminish its value? No. How a work is created often determines whether or not something is art.

If this is what you're thinking is modern art: http://unraveled.com/archives/assets/image..._modern_art.jpg (google searched modern art)

It would not fit the Objectivist definition of art. Where is any recreation of reality? Was there even an artist, or did somebody grab several cans of paint and throw it at a canvas? How can the metaphysical value judgments be represented in a style based on random drops of paint rolling down the canvas? Of course, a person who thinks reality is an illusion may see value in it because it represents the truth of reality: an incoherent mess. But the piece of work is still not art.

ohhhh-kay. That makes sense.

Absolutely. There's no question that Objectivism would still consider it as art. It may or may not be "Romantic" art, in the sense that Rand used the term, but it would still be art. As I said in a previous post, it may also be good art, judging it aesthetically and technically.

In fact, the way you describe it, I would not even rule it out as being "romantic" art. For instance, do not conclude that the portrayal of evil makes art non-romantic, in the Objectivist sense. Are you familiar with Rand's fiction? If so, consider some of Rand's main villains, and you will see art that she considers romantic, and yet says "men can be this depraved". As a better illustration of this, Rand classified Dostoyevsky as a "romantic" writer.

Perhaps it does; but, what you say below makes me think it is not that different after all...

The "futility" aspect is key. An artist might implement this in various ways. One way could be the nitty-gritty journalistic, "all things are equal in the artist's eye" style, or boring, plot-less "stories" about ordinary folk doing nothing special. However, it can also be done with plot and with characters making decisions, but done in a way to leave the overall view that it was all in vain, and that the best laid plans of mice and men amount to futile self-delusion in the end. The key aspect then is this: human volition -- its presence and its efficacy (vs. its absence or inefficacy).

Well, the metaphysical, ethical or political messages may not cohere; however, that does not imply that it is not art. In fact, if it is just the ethical and political messages that do not cohere, it can well be "romantic" art, the way Rand uses the term. So, someone like Victor Hugo might write about altruistic heroes, and still be writing romantic literature. Or, one can paint the workers of the world overthrowing the Capitalist "oppressors" and still have a romantic painting.

Gotcha. That clarifies things.

[KendallJ]

By the way, here was an interesting discussion on surrealism. Obviously when it comes to somewhat borderline areas, even objectivists can disagree.

http://forum.ObjectivismOnline.com/index.p...=11871&st=0

[shadesofgrey]

Whether the value judgements are true or false, uplifting or horrifying is not the test. The key is can you have a "sense of life" emotional response to it (vs just any emotional response) and is that response the sole end of the man-made work. She limits art to "selective recreations of reality" because those are the only ones that you can have a sense of life response to.

While a yellow panel might elicit a response, it's not through this mechanism, and Rand says that this is the crucial mechanism that distinguishes art. Certainly, something that elicits a happy response. That's fine. There's nothing wrong with that. However, on a wall, it's decoration, not art.

I think that abstract modernism fails even on your other test. For what is the standard by which one can deduce the idea of "skillfully rendered"? How does one judge a skillfully rendered blob of paint (a la Jackson Pollack) vs a poorly rendered blob? One can't, because there is no standard of skill in rendering things that are not recognizable as something. What is good "stream of consciousness" literature vs. bad "stream of consciousness" literature? To the extent that it can be judged as being better than something else will relate not to its "stream of consciousness"-ness but rather to the extent that it retains some recognizability as a story about something and someone.

OK these points really clarify it. This is pretty much what I was looking for. I'll have to go back and read the "decorative arts" part, I think that's where the conflict arose for me. This quote: "no standard of skill in rendering things that are not recognizable as something" helps because it explains the conflict I saw regarding impressionism. There were several stylistic questions that softwareNerd helped answer in that objectively, you could see a piece of art as bad art but STILL ART. That way, her rationale makes much more sense to me.

Thanks everybody! Signing off this thread.

[Boydstun]

What Art Is – The Esthetic Theory of Ayn Rand (2000), by L. Torres and M. Kamhi, defends Rand’s definition of art as “a selective re-creation of reality according to the artist’s metaphysical value judgments.” One of the authors Kamhi argues it is better to replace “according to the artist’s metaphysical value judgments” in that definition of art with “according to the artist’s fundamental view of life, which includes his deepest values.” In either case, much not obvious has to be packed into both the genus and species of those definitions to actually corral only the artifacts the definers mean by art.

 

My own definition of art, as I have it so far, leaves less for unpacking and is more inclusive in its target art: “selective re-creation of reality showing concretely the notable and meaningful (sometimes metaphysical value-standings) through craft of parts integrated into a unified whole conducive to contemplation for its own sake” (4/13).

 

One neat challenge for my definition would be to determine whether it includes Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box. Arthur Danto has a photo of a contemporary fabrication alluding to Brillo Box as image on the cover of his new book What Art Is (2013). Torres and Kamhi had argued the defectiveness of various definitions of art in the latter half of the twentieth century. They quoted Danto saying against all possible definitions of art, and they displayed some of his praise for Warhol. I find no citation for the Danto remark against defining art, but anyway it is evidently not his considered view. In his new book, he argues for the definition that art is embodied meaning connecting to cognizance of what is possible (154–55).

 

Dagny’s solitary meditation alongside the diesel electric power plant of the locomotive would seem to qualify the machine as art under that definition, but of course, there is unpacking to be done in Danto’s definition that can narrow the class included under the definition. “The embodiment of ideas or, I would say, of meanings is perhaps all we require as a philosophical theory of what art is. But doing the criticism that consists in finding the way the idea is embodied varies from work to work” (128).

 

Danto intends his definition to capture all of and only what is common and distinctive of art from the primitive to Leonardo to Warhol. Danto argues an idea and its way of embodiment for Brillo Box that stand it up as art. I worry there are other stories that can be told of the artifact Brillo Box, according with what it presents, perhaps stories too different to stand it under a single definite embodied idea or under a single idea-family. But perhaps such looseness or instability, if demonstrated, would elevate rather than dissolve its standing as art in the view of Danto.

 

Torres and Kamhi appeal to Warhol’s own reports about his creations and his mindset concerning those creations. They appeal to those reports as a trump over any stories formulated merely consistent with the product before the viewer. In my view, the visual artist’s reports of his or her intention is only one story to be considered for match with the product, and this is concordant with my definition of art.

[softwareNerd]

My own definition of art, as I have it so far, leaves less for unpacking and is more inclusive in its target art: “selective re-creation of reality showing concretely the notable and meaningful (sometimes metaphysical value-standings) through craft of parts integrated into a unified whole conducive to contemplation for its own sake”

 

I don't understand the "for its own sake" part. I can see that you are trying to cut away aspects that are traditionally-utilitarian, or pedagogical, etc. and get to the core, but is the art "core" an end in itself? If not, what does "for its own sake" mean?

 

A bit unrelated, but I've seen close-enough approximations to Rand's notion on art being an expression of "metaphysical value-judgement" or "world-view" or "fundamental view of life" to make me think her this aspect of her views on art is not particularly unique. Do you agree, or do you think it is very different from other views?

 

For instance, in the introduction to "Ender's Game" (1991 hardcover edition),  Orson Scott Card writes:

...most of us,..., read these stories that we know are not 'true' because we're hungry for another kind of truth.: The mythic truth about human nature in general, the particular truth about those life-communities that define our own identity, and the most specific truth of all: our own self-story.

Isn't that pretty close, within its context -- of literature?

[Boydstun]

sN,

 

The conduciveness of the artwork to contemplation of the work for its own sake refers to a characteristic of the work in episodes of esthetic experience. The esthetic experience of art can have various wider functions in life, which is to say that art and our experience of it is not a final end in itself in the way that lives are ends in themselves. This character of experience of art and the ability of an artwork to effect that sort of experience is not very controversial on its face and is left unstated in other definitions of art. I think that aspect needs to be explicit. I think it is one criterion of success or failure that can be put to work in appraising creations as art.

 

One way in which that criterion comes up is in connection with subjects in an artwork. Rand takes that criterion to be more restrictive on subject than I take it, so the application of the criterion, hence its exact full sense, is controversial, even though there is surface agreement.

 

Rand wrote:

Misery, disease, disaster, evil, all the negatives of human existence, . . . are not proper subjects of contemplation for contemplation’s sake. In art, and in literature, these negatives are worth re-creation only in relation to some positive, as a foil, as a contrast, as a means of stressing the positive—but not as an end in themselves. (1963, “The Goal of My Writing”)

 

 

In The Ways and Means of Painting, Joan Mitchell Blumenthal takes a less restrictive view of choice of subject and its suitability for artistic content in a painting (7–13). Rand’s thought on what is or is not suitable for the end-in-itself contemplation belonging to esthetic experience is contoured to her view of what are the functions of art in the human psyche and life. Those are true functions of art, I say, but not the only ones (IB, IC, IIIA).

 

The thought from Orson Scott Card has a cousin in Steinbeck’s East of Eden.

Adam said, “You two have studied this. I only got it through my skin and not much of it stuck. Then Cain was driven out for murder?”

 

“That’s right—for murder.”

 

“And God branded him?”

 

“Did you listen? Cain bore the mark not to destroy him but to save him. And there’s a curse called down on any man who shall kill him. It was a preserving mark.”

 

Adam said, “I can’t get over a feeling that Cain got the dirty end of the stick.”

 

“Maybe he did,” said Samuel. “But Cain lived and had children, and Abel lives only in the story. We are Cain’s children. And isn’t it strange that three grown men, here in a century so many thousands of years away, discuss this crime as though it happened in King City yesterday and hadn’t yet come up for trial?”

 

One of the twins awakened and yawned and looked at Lee and went to sleep again.

 

Lee said, “Remember, Mr. Hamilton, I told you I was trying to translate some old Chinese poetry into English? No, don’t worry. I won’t read it. Doing it, I found some of the old things as fresh and clear as this morning. And I wondered why. And, of course, people are interested only in themselves. If a story is not about the hearer he will not listen. And I here make a rule—a great and lasting story is about everyone or it will not last. The strange and foreign is not interesting—only the deeply personal and familiar.”

 

Samuel said, “Apply that to the Cain-Abel story.”

. . .

“I think I can,” Lee answered Samuel. “I think this is the best-known story in the world because it is everybody’s story. I think it is the symbol story of the human soul. . . . I think that if rejection could be amputated, the human would not be what he is. . . . Therefore I think this old and terrible story is important because it is a chart of the soul—the secret, rejected, guilty soul. . . .

 

Adam started. He sighed deeply. “Isn’t it too simple?” he asked. “I’m always afraid of simple things.”

 

“It isn’t simple at all,” said Lee. “It’s desperately complicated. But at the end there’s light.” [Remember this at the final moment of the novel.]

 

“There’s not going to be light long,” Samuel said. “We’ve sat and let the evening come. I drove over to help name the twins and they’re not named. We’ve swung ourselves on a pole. Lee, you better keep your complications out of the machinery of the set-up churches or there might be a Chinese with nails in his hands and feet. They like complications but they like their own. I’ll have to be driving home.”

 

Adam said desperately, “Name me some names.”

 

“From the Bible?”

 

“From anyplace.”

 

“Well, let’s see. Of all the people who started out of Egypt only two came to the Promised Land. Would you like them for a symbol?”

 

“Who?”

 

“Caleb and Joshua.”

 

“Joshua was a soldier—a general. I don’t like soldiering.”

 

“Well, Caleb was a captain.”

 

“But not a general. I kind of like Caleb—Caleb Trask.”

 

One of the twins woke up and without interval began to wail.

 

“You called his name,” said Samuel. “You don’t like Joshua, and Caleb’s named. He’s the smart one—the dark one. See, the other one is awake too. Well, Aaron I’ve always liked, but he didn’t make it to the Promised Land.”

 

The second boy almost joyfully began to cry.

 

“That’s good enough,” said Adam.

 

Suddenly Samuel laughed. “In two minutes,” he said, “and after a waterfall of words. Caleb and Aaron—now you are people and you have joined the fraternity and you have the right to be damned.”

 

It is Steinbeck’s novel, of course, not the simple Bible story it uses, that is the great work of art.

 

Rand could be comfortable with some of these excerpts from Card and from Steinbeck. They all overlap each other. She called art “the technology of the soul.”

 

However, Rand’s definition of art is a theoretical explanatory definition (cf.). What she means by “selective re-creation of reality,” the genus in her definition, is more narrow, as shown in her applications, than one might guess merely from those words. It turned out that unless a drawing or painting were figural, she did not count it as what she meant by a selective re-creation of reality. As art, such an artifact fails by not satisfying the genus.

 

Likewise it goes with the species factor “metaphysical value-judgments.” One could say “I know those English words, so I know what the phrase means.” No. One has to read further to ascertain Rand’s meaning for this phrase she adopts as a theoretical technical phrase in her esthetics. She spells out what she means by the phrase. I have argued that that cluster of value-concerns can be broadened modestly and still fall within her ambit. But her conception meant by metaphysical value-judgment remains narrow enough, even with that broadening, for one to argue, as I do, that the conception is not inclusive enough to capture all art, not even all representational art, within its scope. I think Rand’s metaphysical-value-judgments try at what is fundamentally at work in art is somewhat original in the history of esthetics and that it should be included within any valid species in a right definition of art.

Edited December 11, 2013 by Boydstun

[theestevearnold]

Well to be more specific, I'll use the actual words "valid" and "invalid" when describing styles of art. So the styles that I was talking about being "excluded" (impressionism, naturalism, modernism, photography, etc.)

 

shadesofgrey, you've misrepresented Objectivism. The above quote is one of your few lines that had a valid--no pun intended--issue to clarify......  

 

AR defined art as "a selective re-creation of reality according to the artists metaphysical value judgements." 

 

Modern art such as Jackson Pollock's paint splatters do not qualify as art,  though it could be classified as the lesser, decorative art.

 

 

Photography does not qualify as art either, though if a person re-created reality into a scene to be photographed, he could be considered an artist.

 

Impressionism is art.

 

Naturalism is art.