"In any given set of circumstances, there is only one action poss

[itsjames]

In the Causality section of OPAR, Peikoff says that in a given set of circumstances there is only one way in which an entity (excluding man) can act. My question is: Does one use induction to arrive at this fact or does it follow directly from the concept of identity?

I don't see how it could follow from the concept identity. But it seems like a perfectly valid inductive conclusion to make in the context of everyday life. For instance if we throw a baseball once, and then throw it again in the same way, we can predict that it will have the same trajectory as it did the first time, and we will probably be right. (Assuming you have a good arm of course, and that it's not terribly windy.) It also makes sense to me why man would be excluded from this, since we cannot predict what another man will do in some set of circumstances no matter how many variables we try to control. So the context under which this induction would take place would be the set of all inanimate objects with which we deal in our daily lives.

So it would follow that, just as we can't include man in this statement, we also can't include the phenomena which occur at the subatomic level, since we can't predict these phenomena with a significant accuracy.

I have other questions, but I'll stop here since I'm pretty sure not everyone will agree with this.

Thanks.

[organon1973]

Perhaps it would be best to begin with a clear definition of causation. I would offer:

An entity will act in accordance with its nature, given the context of the forces acting upon it.

[Dante]

In the Causality section of OPAR, Peikoff says that in a given set of circumstances there is only one way in which an entity (excluding man) can act. My question is: Does one use induction to arrive at this fact or does it follow directly from the concept of identity?

I don't see how it could follow from the concept identity. But it seems like a perfectly valid inductive conclusion to make in the context of everyday life. For instance if we throw a baseball once, and then throw it again in the same way, we can predict that it will have the same trajectory as it did the first time, and we will probably be right. (Assuming you have a good arm of course, and that it's not terribly windy.) It also makes sense to me why man would be excluded from this, since we cannot predict what another man will do in some set of circumstances no matter how many variables we try to control. So the context under which this induction would take place would be the set of all inanimate objects with which we deal in our daily lives.

So it would follow that, just as we can't include man in this statement, we also can't include the phenomena which occur at the subatomic level, since we can't predict these phenomena with a significant accuracy.

I have other questions, but I'll stop here since I'm pretty sure not everyone will agree with this.

Thanks.

This fact does not follow directly from the concept of identity. The axiom of identity simply states that any object that can be said to exist has a definite form (to my understanding). We cannot know from the axiom whether particular identities are restricted to a single action. For instance, the only way that we would know that man is exempt is by incorporating more information than simply the axiom; information specific to man and his ability to choose whether or not to focus his mind. With only the axiom, we would not be able to say that about man.

In other words, we can know every object has an identity from the axiom, but we cannot know if any particular identity is determinant or not without studying it.

Edited March 18, 2010 by Dante

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Even for man, he will only do one thing in response to the circumstances, but the circumstance don't determine what he will do. For man, because he has free will and has to keep the context internally in his own mind before acting rationally, his context of knowledge is what will lead him to act a certain way. But notice that you cannot walk left and walk right at the same time, and you cannot think and not-think at the same time, and you cannot type and do much else at the same time. So, even for man, the actions that take place in a certain circumstances are limited and non-contradictory within a scope of both the circumstance and his context of knowledge of the conditions. Man is not exempt from the law of causality, he is a specific example of the law of identity and the law of causality, it's just a different form than it is for inanimate matter.

[itsjames]

Dante, I agree.

Thomas, I agree that in any set of circumstance man will do only one thing and cannot act in two incompatible ways at the same time. This is also true for all other entities. But then you said,

For man, because he has free will and has to keep the context internally in his own mind before acting rationally, his context of knowledge is what will lead him to act a certain way.

I don't know what you mean by the word "lead." Do you mean "determine"? If so, then you are merely saying man's actions are determined by his identity (and the set of circumstances he is in), meaning there is only one action possible to him given any set of circumstances. How can you conclude that? If you didn't mean "determine", then we aren't in disagreement.

Edited March 19, 2010 by itsjames

[Capitalism Forever]

The validation rests on two points: the fact that action is action of an entity; and the law of identity, A is A. Every entity has a nature; it is specific, noncontradictory, limited; it has certain attributes and no others. Such an entity must act in accordance with its nature.

The only alternatives would be for an entity to act apart from its nature or against it; both of these are impossible.

[...]

Causality is best classified as a corollary of identity. A "corollary" is a self-evident implication of already established knowledge. [...] it does not permit or require a process of proof[.]

[itsjames]

Capitalism Forever,

I agree that an entity must act in accordance with it's nature. I don't see how it follows that there is only one action possible to an entity in any given set of circumstances.

Perhaps the word "possible" is causing some confusion. Let me restate what I mean to say.

If I throw a baseball in a certain way, I know the baseball will soar through the air with only one particular trajectory. I know that it cannot and will not take on two different trajectories at once. My question is: Is there only one trajectory which is consistent with the identity of the baseball and the air temperature, windiness, etc? My answer would be yes, but only after performing an experiment and throwing the ball in the same way several different times and observing that the trajectory was the same each time.

Edited March 19, 2010 by itsjames

[Capitalism Forever]

My question is: Is there only one trajectory which is consistent with the identity of the baseball and the air temperature, windiness, etc? My answer would be yes, but only after performing an experiment and throwing the ball in the same way several different times and observing that the trajectory was the same each time.

You mean, perform the experiment several times in the exact same circumstances? But you cannot have the exact same circumstances more than once. If the sun is at an angle of 46.78 degrees the first time you do the experiment, it is going to be at an angle of 46.74 degrees the second time you do it--ergo, different set of circumstances! And how many times would you have to perform the experiment in order to accept causality as true? 4 times? 5 times? 6 times? 5000 times? Why not more, and why not less? And once you've accepted the law of causality for your baseball, will you also accept it for my tennis ball, or will you have to perform the same kind of experiments with it as well?

The law of causality does not say, "Similar circumstances, similar action." What is says is: "Place an entity into a given set of circumstances; the action it will take in these circumstances is then up to the entity's nature." Even if the circumstances leave more than one action possible, the entity can only take one action, so it somehow has to "pick" one among the actions open to it--and this is precisely the role played by what we call the entity's nature. The action the entity "picks" depends on what kind of entity it is, i.e. on its attributes--i.e., on its nature. To exist is to exist as something (this is what the law of identity says) and to exist as something means to act in these and these ways when faced with these and these circumstances (this is what the law of causality says). The latter is a corollary of the former.

[itsjames]

Thanks for the replies. After a lot of deliberation, I agree now the statement does follow from the law of identity. Here's my thought process if anyone is interested:

Say you have two entities A and B. The identities of each of these entities consists of all their attributes, including their current actions and locations. If you then consider the entity "A together with B", this conglomerate entity must also have particular attributes, and a specific action. It can have only one action, since the entity is what it is, and that's just one thing. And it is this action which describes how A and B interact. So all else being equal, this interaction must always be the same. Hence, in any given set of circumstances, there is only one action possible to an entity.

[JMeganSnow]

In the Causality section of OPAR, Peikoff says that in a given set of circumstances there is only one way in which an entity (excluding man) can act. My question is: Does one use induction to arrive at this fact or does it follow directly from the concept of identity?

Both. You cannot form a concept of causalty without first having a concept (if only an implicit one) of identity--causality is a corrolary of the axiom of identity. But the route by which you, as a person, determine that things are what they are and contradictions cannot exist is an inductive one that begins with the first moment you open your eyes after birth. When you begin making observations of objects, you will eventually come to the (implicit, usually) realization that they are what they are and do what they do regardless of what you would prefer or any other mystical or imaginary force that could somehow interrupt this situation. But organizing this implicit knowledge into explicit, logically-stated laws of metaphysics is rather a complex task.

So it would follow that, just as we can't include man in this statement, we also can't include the phenomena which occur at the subatomic level, since we can't predict these phenomena with a significant accuracy.

The fact that we lack sufficient knowledge to predict something perfectly (or the means to obtain that knowledge, which is supposedly the case in terms of whatever existed prior to the big bang or inside the nucleus of atoms) does NOT mean that it is exempt from the law of causalty or identity. You are making one of the main mistakes of the Primacy of Consciousness view where perception and knowledge somehow determine reality. "I don't know how to predict the outcome" is NOT THE SAME THING as saying "the outcome is totally random and divorced from causalty". Dr. Peikoff even discusses this in OPAR to some extent when he talks about volition, saying approx. that "the opposite of determinism is not random chance, but causality" or some such.

A man's behavior is neither random nor determined--it is often very easy to predict a man's choice in advance if you know the man. Volition is a matter of a different type of causality (chosen) rather than the mechanicially determined billiard-ball sort of causality that physicists study. How it operates, I have no clue, but I can observe that it operates just as I can observe the billiard-ball type of causality in operation even though I don't have much of a clue about that, either.

[itsjames]

The fact that we lack sufficient knowledge to predict something perfectly (or the means to obtain that knowledge, which is supposedly the case in terms of whatever existed prior to the big bang or inside the nucleus of atoms) does NOT mean that it is exempt from the law of causalty or identity. You are making one of the main mistakes of the Primacy of Consciousness view where perception and knowledge somehow determine reality. "I don't know how to predict the outcome" is NOT THE SAME THING as saying "the outcome is totally random and divorced from causalty". Dr. Peikoff even discusses this in OPAR to some extent when he talks about volition, saying approx. that "the opposite of determinism is not random chance, but causality" or some such.

In order to apply the law of causality to subatomic phenomena, you have to have first grasped why it is a consequence of identity. If you have only induced the law of causality, then the law is only applicable under the context in which the concept was formed, which wouldn't include subatomic phenomena.

To apply causality to subatomic phenomena, you have to first observe that the everyday entities with which you deal obey causality (however you wouldn't yet know the concept "causality", so you wouldn't be able to grasp it explicitly in those words). After making these observations, and after you've explicitly grasped the concept of identity and shown that causality follows from the law of identity, you can then deduce that causality must apply to all other entities as well.