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Problem of Universals and Measurement

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I came upon this critique of Oism, specifically epistemology:

"In fact she left the problem of universals right where she found it. We can't even begin to apply her process of "measurement-omission" unless we can _already_ recognize lengths _as_ lengths, colors _as_ colors, shapes _as_ shapes. (In nature there is no such thing as a generic length, color, or shape. So how do we come by such universals? Blank out. The universals are here. How did they get here? _Somehow_.)"

How would you respond to the point that measurement-omission requires an already-formed concept of measurement? How do we conceptualize "measurement"?

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I came upon this critique of Oism, specifically epistemology:

"In fact she left the problem of universals right where she found it. We can't even begin to apply her process of "measurement-omission" unless we can _already_ recognize lengths _as_ lengths, colors _as_ colors, shapes _as_ shapes. (In nature there is no such thing as a generic length, color, or shape. So how do we come by such universals? Blank out. The universals are here. How did they get here? _Somehow_.)"

How would you respond to the point that measurement-omission requires an already-formed concept of measurement? How do we conceptualize "measurement"?

Measurement omission is part of the process of forming concepts, so there is no need to have it conceptualized before you perform the process. Identification of the process requires introspection and it provides an objective examination of concepts that have already been formed. Recognizing "lengths as lengths" does not tell us how we recognize "length" in the first place. Are concepts innate, metaphysical essences, or hallucinations? Such a critique is Kantian in nature: that we perceive and conceive by a particular process invalidates the percept or concept in relation to reality. Such a critique means that we perceive reality by no method. Conceptualization of a process of concept formation requires data, and the data is other concepts. The criticism you offer is a non-sequitor.

Would you say that food is already digested before we eat it because we recognize it as food, and how would we know it's food unless it's been digested?

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Ok i got it; measures from "blue" to "meter-long" or any kind of attribute/adjective aren't concepts in and of themselves. I was mistaken that one could just point to "blue" or "meter" as and entity, which it isn't, as you've shown. Thanks, that point just through me for an unexpected loop.

I'm not sure I understand your meaning. What does "concepts in and of themselves" refer to in my response and in your original question? We certainly do perceive colors, lengths, and shapes. And we can point to particular instances of them but we always point at entities with those particular attributes.

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I came upon this critique of Oism, specifically epistemology:

"In fact she left the problem of universals right where she found it. We can't even begin to apply her process of "measurement-omission" unless we can _already_ recognize lengths _as_ lengths, colors _as_ colors, shapes _as_ shapes. (In nature there is no such thing as a generic length, color, or shape. So how do we come by such universals? Blank out. The universals are here. How did they get here? _Somehow_.)"

How would you respond to the point that measurement-omission requires an already-formed concept of measurement? How do we conceptualize "measurement"?

The canonical example of this kind of problem is the shape of a strawberry bush. It is easy to learn to recognize what a strawberry bush looks like, nearly impossible to describe in words. It simply is not true that explicitly held concepts are necessary to perceive and judge similarities and differences at the perceptual level. You do not need to have a concept of color to see color, or a concept of length for length, or every human and every animal would be blind.

Colors, lengths and shapes are epistemological givens provided to us by the automatic operation of the senses, and in the form they are given they are not and need not be universals. The description of measurement omission must be conceptual and use universals because words are employed, but the performance of the process need not be for first level concepts.

This critique is a manifestation of the assumed premise that all justification is linguistic, or propositional, that words come first, or in other words, the primacy of consciousness.

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For the record this is wrong according to Rand and I will be rejoining our previous debate as soon as wrestling season is over...

For the record, it is right and you and your pet theory have already been refuted multiple times.

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