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Any O'ist writings on philosophy of language?

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Hal

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Universals are universals. Concepts of universals are concepts of universals - again, you're confusing the idea of a thing with the thing itself. In order to form the concept of 'red', I must first encounter red things. The concept that I form is a concept of a universal. The red things themselves are universals. Rand's theory explains how we form these concepts - it does not explain what the things itself actually are or whether they exist.

I need clarification on your position:

1. Ontologically, what is a universal, as you are using the term? (I am asking for a definition.)

Is a universal (speaking ontologically) any characteristic of an entity, when the characteristic is shared by some other entities? For example, would animality (as in man is a rational animal) be an example ontological universal?

2. Do you believe that a figment of imagination -- such as a centaur -- is an existent, even if only in the mind rather than outside the mind?

3. Do you believe an eclectic approach to developing one's own philosophy is a valid approach? Can one pick and choose elements from various philosophies and bolt them together?

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I need clarification on your position:

1. Ontologically, what is a universal, as you are using the term? (I am asking for a definition.)

I'm not sure whether you're asking for my beliefs on universals, or simply how I am defining the term. Assuming the latter, a universal is a property that can be predicated of multiple particulars. For instance 'red' or 'being five foot tall'.

Is a universal (speaking ontologically) any characteristic of an entity, when the characteristic is shared by some other entities? For example, would animality (as in man is a rational animal) be an example ontological universal?
Yes.

2. Do you believe that a figment of imagination -- such as a centaur -- is an existent, even if only in the mind rather than outside the mind?
I think that statements such as "centaurs exist in the mind" are nonsense. The concept of a centuar is a mental existent, but not centaurs themselves. If I have a picture of the Eiffel Tower on my kitchen wall, I cannot say 'the Eiffel Tower exists in my house' (or 'the Eiffel Tower exists in the picture'). The picture of the Eiffel Tower exists. The picture contains a representation of the Eiffel Tower.

3. Do you believe an eclectic approach to developing one's own philosophy is a valid approach? Can one pick and choose elements from various philosophies and bolt them together?
A philosophical system should be internally consistent. If someone believes that the existing systems he encounters are correct in some places but wrong in others, then it is his task to change the parts he thinks are wrong and to integrate the parts he thinks correct. The phrase 'pick and choose' is misleading since it implies simply picking the parts which strike your fancy, while paying no consideration to coherence or truth - in other words, it presupposes disintegration.

I'm not sure why this last question is relevant, since I'm not questioning Rand's theory of concepts in this thread. I'm saying that it is not an answer to the traditional problem of universals.

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Again, mental representations of things are not the things themselves. The idea of unicorns does not have horns, nor does the idea of Santa Claus bring presents to children on Christmas day. When I say "all horses have 4 legs" I am not talking about the idea of horses, I am talking about horses themselves. When I say 'unicorns have horns', this sentence is identical in form to the preceding one, and deserves to be treated in the same way.

Your first statement is correct, but you do not follow that in the following sentences. The mistake you are making is that "unicorn" exists in your head in two forms: first, you have an image of a unicorn (or several different unicorns), all with four legs, a horn, and probably shimmery skin (at least that's how I picture them). Second, you have the concept of a unicorn, which sums them all up into the notion of "a horse with a horn". So the idea (meaning "concept") of a unicorn does not have horns, any more than the idea of horses has legs. But the horses themselves do have legs, and the unicorns themselves--though they exist only in paintings and stories--have horns.

Consider the statement "unicorns do not exist". What does the phrase 'unicorns' in this sentence refer to? If it refers to the idea of unicorns then the statement is false - the idea of unicorns certainly does exist (I have it in my mind). If it refers to unicorns themselves then you will need to explain how a term can refer to something that does not exist.
"Unicorns do not exist" assumes a context that you are ignoring. That context is "apart from man-made fiction," which is what people mean when they say something doesn't exist. However, unicorns most certainly do exist--as fictional creatures. As contrast, "berofleeps" do not exist in any way--I just made up that word, and have supplied no existents, whether man-made or existing in nature, to indicate what it refers to. Therefore that is nothing but a sound.

Universals are universals. Concepts of universals are concepts of universals - again, you're confusing the idea of a thing with the thing itself.

Gadfly is correct: the "universal" is the concept. Thus your first statement is equivalent to "concepts are concepts. Concepts of concepts are concepts of concepts." Your statement is true, but does not alter gadfly's point. The "question of universals" is really a question of "what are concepts, are they valid, and where do they come from?"

Throughout history, philosophers have given quite different answers to these questions, but all the ones I am familiar with have agreed that the concept is the universal. Plato, for instance, said concepts/universals exist as Forms in another realm, and enter our mind when we (poorly) perceive this realm (this is his cave analogy). Aristotle said that concepts/universals exist in reality, but enter our mind via direct perception (via some special human faculty). Kant said that concepts/universals are in our mind due to our mind's structure, and that that is what shapes noumenal reality. Rand said that concepts/universals are based on specific concretes, but are the end result of integration based on "measurement omission" of the distinguishing characteristic(s).

In order to form the concept of 'red', I must first encounter red things. The concept that I form is a concept of a universal. The red things themselves are universals. Rand's theory explains how we form these concepts - it does not explain what the things itself actually are or whether they exist.
This is unclear. You say that "the red things themselves are universals" but the red things are concrete. I believe you meant to say "are NOT universals," but I am not sure. Therefore I don't know what "things" in your last sentence refers to.

A tree exists whether or not I experience it. If all humans died tomorrow, trees would still exist. If all humans died tomorrow, would 'redness' still exist? By redness I do not mean the lightwaves which are assumed to produce the experience of 'red' in the human subject - I mean redness itself.

This is like asking "would sound exist?" (assuming we say all living creatures died tomorrow). In one sense, no: there's no one around hearing anything, nor is there anyone around forming/using the concept "red." In another sense, yes, sound waves are still being formed, and light is still being emitted/reflected with varying wavelengths. Beings can still arise and perceive the fact of varying wavelength and abstract away "redness" from it.

Part of Rand's answer was that concepts are objective because they are neither solely intrinsic ("out there") nor solely subjective ("in here"). Instead, they are a relation between object and observer. Thus if you take away the observer, you have taken away half the relation, but that doesn't mean you have taken away everything. All the facts of reality that give rise to "redness" still exist. Your question ("does redness still exist?") is assuming the subjective/intrinsic dichotomy, and therefore does not have a simple yes/no answer.

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I was wondering if anyone could tell me whether there are any Objectivist writings that address issues within the philosophy of language. ...

I just want to inject the following comment in case someone was interested in the philosophy of language, and started reading this thread because of the subject line. Some aspects of the philosophy of language are discussed in Dr. Peikoff's lecture series Principles of Grammar. (It covers the philosophical aspects of grammar; it is not a remedial course in grammar itself.)

On the other hand, it is clear from Hal's post:

Im particularly interested in the Objectivist theory of names if there is such a thing, eg what do proper names (and names for universals) refer to. ...

that he really needs to study ITOE. I think it's the first page of the introduction (2nd ed) that specifically discusses the problem of universals and Rand's solution. More generally, her theory of concept formation is the subject of the entire book.

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I'm not sure what you mean by 'exist within the fiction', can you clarify? A fictional book might present a description of a character, which may cause the readers to form an idea of said character. But the character itself does not exist. An idea of a thing is not the thing.

An idea is not something? What do you mean by "exist"?

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I was wondering if anyone could tell me whether there are any Objectivist writings that address issues within the philosophy of language. It's one area of philosophy that particularly interests me but I there wasnt much about it in OPAR, and Ayn Rand didn't list it under her subdivisions of philosophy, hence I'm assuming she didnt write anything on this topic?, If I'm correct, have any other Objectivist writers done so? (I couldnt find anything at the aynrandbookstore),

Im particularly interested in the Objectivist theory of names if there is such a thing, eg what do proper names (and names for universals) refer to. I think I remember Peikoff saying that concepts 'mean' the concrete they subsume, so are there any writings that develop this idea further, and address the standard problems associated with reference theories of meaning?

She stated somewhere-can't remember where-something about English being the most precise language. If ginkgo serves.

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Your first statement is correct, but you do not follow that in the following sentences.  The mistake you are making is that "unicorn" exists in your head in two forms: first, you have an image of a unicorn (or several different unicorns), all with four legs, a horn, and probably shimmery skin (at least that's how I picture them).  Second, you have the concept of a unicorn, which sums them all up into the notion of "a horse with a horn".  So the idea (meaning "concept") of a unicorn does not have horns, any more than the idea of horses has legs.  But the horses themselves do have legs, and the unicorns themselves--though they exist only in paintings and stories--have horns.
I agree that we represent unicorns in various ways (both as pictures and concepts, as you mention). However, there are no unicorns themselves. Pictures depict unicorns - unicorns do not exist in pictures. If the Eiffel Tower were to be destroyed tomorrow, then it would not continue to exist in pictures and in people's minds, although pictures and concepts of the Eiffel Tower would certianly still exist Think how strange your phrasing sounds in other contexts: "your wife exists in your head", "santa claus exists in local supermarket", "God exists on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel". If you said that to someone in the street they'd think you were crazy.

"Unicorns do not exist" assumes a context that you are ignoring.  That context is "apart from man-made fiction," which is what people mean when they say something doesn't exist.  However, unicorns most certainly do exist--as fictional creatures.
What does it mean to exist as a fictional creature? Where do fictional creatures exist?

I know what it means to say that a physical object exists, and I know what it means to say that a mental object (such a concept or image) exists. I have no idea what it means to say that fictional entities exist. Take a specific example - a character such as Howard Roark in the Fountainhead. Ayn Rand had the image for a character, which she decided to call Howard Roark (the idea of Howard Roark existed in her head as a mental object). She then wrote a book about this character. These books (which exist as physical objects) contains words which, when read by an English speaker, cause him to also form an idea in his head, which he labels as 'Howard Roark' (ie the words 'create' a mental object - an idea - in his head). So, our existing objects here are physical books, and mental images. Howard Roark himself does not exist. To quote Ockham, do not multiply your entities unnecessarily.

Gadfly is correct: the "universal" is the concept.  Thus your first statement is equivalent to "concepts are concepts.  Concepts of concepts are concepts of concepts."  Your statement is true, but does not alter gadfly's point.  The "question of universals" is really a question of "what are concepts, are they valid, and where do they come from?" 
No. This is the question which a nominalist will ask after he has ascertained that universals, in the sense I described, do not exist. If you think that the universal is the concept, and has no existence in itself, then you are a nominalist.

This is unclear.  You say that "the red things themselves are universals" but the red things are concrete.
That was my mistake. The red things are particulars, and the 'redness', which is common to them both, is the universal.

Regarding Ayn Rand's theory of universals/concepts, I'm going to leave this one for now until I've read some parts of IOE again. Part of the reason I joined here was to ask some questions about Rand's approach to universals, but it wasnt my intention to do so in this thread and I haven't read the work closely enough to post a seperate thread yet.

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Again, mental representations of things are not the things themselves. The idea of unicorns does not have horns, nor does the idea of Santa Claus bring presents to children on Christmas day. When I say "all horses have 4 legs" I am not talking about the idea of horses, I am talking about horses themselves. When I say 'unicorns have horns', this sentence is identical in form to the preceding one, and deserves to be treated in the same way.

Consider the statement "unicorns do not exist". What does the phrase 'unicorns' in this sentence refer to? If it refers to the idea of unicorns then the statement is false - the idea of unicorns certainly does exist (I have it in my mind). If it refers to unicorns themselves then you will need to explain how a term can refer to something that does not exist.

Universals are universals. Concepts of universals are concepts of universals - again, you're confusing the idea of a thing with the thing itself. In order to form the concept of 'red', I must first encounter red things. The concept that I form is a concept of a universal. The red things themselves are universals. Rand's theory explains how we form these concepts - it does not explain what the things itself actually are or whether they exist.

A tree exists whether or not I experience it. If all humans died tomorrow, trees would still exist. If all humans died tomorrow, would 'redness' still exist? By redness I do not mean the lightwaves which are assumed to produce the experience of 'red' in the human subject - I mean redness itself. This, essentially, is the problem of universals. Where, specifically in IOE, (and I would like a page cite, rather than being told I "have not read the work"), does Rand answer this question and give arguments for her answer.

I can see that as a reading of Heidegger.

Heidegger definitely has a feeling that modern society as gone astray and needs to return to its spiritual/philosophical roots. Under a reading like yours that would mean that modern society has created people who live vicariously through other people and things. So people dont love but they read books and watch movies about love, and when they think they are loving someone they are really trying to impose the book or movie on the situation. People have lost touch with experience and have substituted mere learned facts for experience. People dont react to the world they play the role of someone reacting to the world as they believe the role should be played.

I've typically read Heidegger as being more airy and metaphysical than that. That people have to go from some abstract airy metaphysical view of the world to a better abstract airy metaphysical view of the world.

This seems more correct though.

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The issue of concepts (known as "the problem of universals") is philosophy's central issue. Since man's knowledge is gained and held in conceptual form, the validity of man's knowledge depends on the validity of concepts. But concepts are abstractions or universals, and everything that man perceives is particular, concrete. What is the relationship between abstractions and concretes? To what precisely do concepts refer in reality? Do they refer to something real, something that exists—or are they merely inventions of man's mind, arbitrary constructs or loose approximations that cannot claim to represent knowledge?

Then she summarizes 4 theories of universals from the history of Philosophy ("extreme realists", "moderate realists", "nominalists", and "conceptualists" -- and an "extreme nominalist" position).

Most philosophers did not intend to invalidate conceptual knowledge, but its defenders did more to destroy it than did its enemies. They were unable to offer a solution to the 'problem of universals,' that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions, to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual data—and to prove the validity of scientific induction.

Thus to solve the problem of universals, you must:

* define the nature and source of abstractions

* determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual data

and

* prove the validity of scientific induction

She presents the first two in ItOE. Dr. Peikoff discusses the third point in his lecture series Induction in Physics and Philosophy, which I also highly recommend.

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No. This is the question which a nominalist will ask after he has ascertained that universals, in the sense I described, do not exist. If you think that the universal is the concept, and has no existence in itself, then you are a nominalist.

I did a quick search on "nominalism", and I found this site: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism (granted it is wikipedia and thus not an authority on philosophy). It presents the same false dichotomy you do: universals exist (a la Plato), or universals "are no more than words we use to describe specific objects; they do not name identify anything real, and have no real existence beyond our imaginations." Neither of these is true, as I said in my previous post. Universals do not exist in a Platonic realm, but neither are they "no more than words". Their existence is more than just our "imagination": there really are concrete horses, and they really do all share certain characteristics that makes the concept real. Abstractions (oh, I'm sorry, I mean "words") are not subjective.

Or, to take your form: the universal is the concept, but I don't think this makes me a nominalist.

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I did a quick search on "nominalism", and I found this site: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominalism (granted it is wikipedia and thus not an authority on philosophy).  It presents the same false dichotomy you do: universals exist (a la Plato), or universals "are no more than words we use to describe specific objects; they do not name identify anything real, and have no real existence beyond our imaginations."
That would be a very extreme version of nominalism. Read the whole page you cited, particularly the part about resemblence nominalism.

  Neither of these is true, as I said in my previous post.  Universals do not exist in a Platonic realm, but neither are they "no more than words".  Their existence is more than just our "imagination": there really are concrete horses, and they really do all share certain characteristics that makes the concept real. Abstractions (oh, I'm sorry, I mean "words") are not subjective.
Ok, this sounds like moderate realism (read the same page you cited). In any case the point is that THIS is your answer to the problem of universals, ie that they exist outside the imagination. Once you have decided upon what universals are, THEN you can go on to talk about concepts of universals. However the theory of concepts is not an answer to the problem of universals as such - it is an explanation of how we come to acquire knowledge of universal concepts, ie an epistemological account rather than a metaphysical one. You have already gave your answer to the strict problem of universals, namely by saying they exist outside the mind (or are formed in a relation between the mind and reality).

On a sidenote I think the claim that all horses share certain characteristics is false, and I don't think that its one that Ayn Rand made anywhere in IOE. For instance, although Ayn Rand held that the definition of man was 'rational animal', it is clear that not all men are rational animals, and not all rational animals would have to be men. "Rational animal" would be the essence (in a non-metaphysical sense) of the concept man, not something which has to be possessed by every single man.

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Actually, I think we might be talking at cross purposes here.

One of my objections to the traditional problems of universals is that it confuses 2 very different kinds of universals. I think that the cases of universals like 'redness' or 'length' are very different from things like "manness" or "catness". On my reading of IOE (which as I pointed out, I'm going to reread), Rand gave an account of where we derive our concepts of things like 'man'/'manness', namely by noting similarites between objects and omitting measurements. In a sense, I think Rand would be classed as a nominalist with regard to these (although she thought the concept of man was formed by reference to objectively existing data of experience, I doubt she'd have said that 'manness' itself exists). However I dont think she gave an account of what something like 'redness' or 'triangle' is - she tried to explain how our concept of red was derived from experience, but again, that is a different question to whether 'red' itself exists (and if so where).

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Actually ignore my above 2 posts, I'm not entirely sure what I'm trying to say. I've never been totally happy with universals (mainly the way the problem is phrased), and I think I'm tripping over my language just now. I'm going to think about this a bit more.

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Or, to take your form: the universal is the concept, but I don't think this makes me a nominalist.

(Edited to add: I mean here to elaborate the distinction between Objectist epistemology and conceptualist theories; I do not disagree with Doug's point.)

The problem with conceptualist theories of universals is that they do not explicitly require concepts to conform to reality. At best they do not discuss the relationship between concepts and reality. Worse, they may admit arbitrary concepts with no basis in experience -- no referents, no inductive basis. At very worst, they may deny any

There exists an objective fact in reality: for example, that there exists a set of entities that are objectively similar in a certain respect. If concept has been formed by amethod which adheres to the facts of reality (by induction), then I am justified in saying that my concept has identified a universal. Facts of reality are the metaphysical basis of universals. Concepts are universals when they correspond to the facts.

(aside-- I agree with dougclayton that some who write on this topic present the false alternative: either some 'real' universals exist [what, as metaphysical entities? epistemological identifications?] OR no universals exist and we have only arbitrary names.)

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...On my reading of IOE (which as I pointed out, I'm going to reread)...

In addition to re-reading IOE I would definitely recommend listening to the lecture series Induction in Physics and Philosophy. It's great "cross training" on this issue -- examining similar issues from a slightly different perspective, and in a way that elaborates & enhances the material in IOE.

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On a sidenote I think the claim that all horses share certain characteristics is false, and I don't think that its one that Ayn Rand made anywhere in IOE. For instance, although Ayn Rand held that the definition of man was 'rational animal', it is clear that not all men are rational animals, and not all rational animals would have to be men. "Rational animal" would be the essence (in a non-metaphysical sense) of the concept man, not something which has to be possessed by every single man.

You're equivocating with "rational" in the definition "rational animal". All men are, by definition, rational animals. All have the faculty reason; otherwise, they would not be men. Quote from ITOE:

"("Rational", in this context, does not mean "acting invariably in accordance with reason"; it means "possessing the faculty of reason"...)"

Some men's faculty of reason may be underdeveloped, still developing, or even permanently impaired (mentally retarded), but they are nevertheless RATIONAL ANIMALS.

And yes, ALL horses share certain characteristics; else, how could we possibly form the concept "horse"?

I suggest you read ITOE, especially the chapter on DEFINITIONS.

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You're equivocating with "rational" in the definition "rational animal".  All men are, by definition, rational animals.  All have the faculty reason; otherwise, they would not be men.  Quote from ITOE:

"("Rational", in this context, does not mean "acting invariably in accordance with reason"; it means "possessing the faculty of reason"...)"

Some men's faculty of reason may be underdeveloped, still developing, or even permanently impaired (mentally retarded), but they are nevertheless RATIONAL ANIMALS.

I agree with your intention here, but I think it might not be correct to say that all men have a rational faculty. Conceivably a baby could be born with no more than a spinal cord (and therefore no rational faculty); while it would certainly be called "vegetative," it would still be a human baby, not a literal plant.

I highly recommend Don Watkins' article on "broken units" (http://angermanagement.mu.nu/archives/021378.html). He addresses exactly this issue in a novel manner.

[Edit: my recommendation is not pointed at Tom or anyone else on this thread. I just think it's a good article worth reading.]

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If you read the section of ITOE where AR mentions prepositions, adjectives, etc., you will see some of her ideas on the philosophy of language. Had she decided to write a book on Objectivism, she would most likely have gone into it further.

The philosophy of language has to do with picking up where concept formation leaves off. Once concepts are formed, how are they combined? That's the philosophy of language.

As for concepts of fantasy like "unicorns" or what have you, those are high-level concepts of consciousness. Read ITOE to learn more about concepts of consciousness. Men have the capacity to fantasize, so the referent of "unicorn" would be an idea. It's an idea about ideas.

Since ideas are aspects of existence, as they exist in the minds of individuals, "unicorn" does have a real-world referent, just as the concept "concept" does, which is also a concept of consciousness.

That doesn't mean that unicorns exist as some type of horse with a pointy thing on its head, but the concept "unicorn" does indeed have a referent. But it would not have a referent if men did not exist. "Unicorn" presupposes the existence of men and presupposes the ability of men to fantasize. Such fantasies have a purpose and a context.

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If you read the section of ITOE where AR mentions prepositions, adjectives, etc., you will see some of her ideas on the philosophy of language.  Had she decided to write a book on Objectivism, she would most likely have gone into it further.[...]

As for concepts of fantasy like "unicorns" or what have you, those are high-level concepts of consciousness.[...]

Once concepts are formed, how are they combined? That's the philosophy of language.[...]

If Ayn Rand had written a single-volume, systematic exposition of Objectivism as a whole, why would she have expanded her discussion of any aspect of her epistemology? Surely, wouldn't such an exposition have required a condensation of ITOE, not an expansion, especially not in details such as philosophy of language?

Also, why do you consider "unicorn" to be a high-level concept? Would it not be at the same low (near-the-referent-enties) level as "table"? In other words, doesn't "unicorn" refer directly to (imaginatively) sense-perceptible entities? Whether the referent entities of an idea are "out there" or "in here" is irrelevant for ranking the abstractness of the ideas that subsume them.

Lastly, I disagree that philosophy of language, if there objectively is such a discipline, is the study of how concepts are combined. What you are referring to is theory of propositions. There is a hierarchy: theory of concepts (which Ayn Rand offered in an introductory form), theory of propositions, and theory of theories. She did not offer either of the last two. Her theory of the nature and formation of concepts is both revolutionary and radical -- that is, new and addressing the most important problem in epistemology.

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Also, why do you consider "unicorn" to be a high-level concept? Would it not be at the same low (near-the-referent-enties) level as "table"? In other words, doesn't "unicorn" refer directly to (imaginatively) sense-perceptible entities? Whether the referent entities of an idea are "out there" or "in here" is irrelevant for ranking the abstractness of the ideas that subsume them.

A table is something that we can perceive via our sense organs, which makes it different from a unicorn. Actual perception via sense organs cannot be equated with memory or imagination. The concept "table" is, at least usually, grounded in actual experiences with tables, making it a relatively low-order concept, that is, one most directly related to perception. Concepts like "unicorn" on the other hand lack an analogous perceptual basis. "Unicorn" can be constructed from lower-level concepts like "horse", "horn" and "airplane", so that a mental image of a unicorn can be constructed, but it has to procede on the basis of existing concepts (thus making it a higher-level concept). Whether or not the referent of an concept is an entity or a mental construction is quite relevant to the abstractness of a concept. An abstract concept is one that is removed from concrete existence -- attributes such as color for instance are abstract becuse they do not exist separate from the entities that exhibit them. Or, furniture is more abstract than table because it is further removed from perception. Unicorn is this relatively abstract (a higher order concept) because unicorns are not perceived.

Lastly, I disagree that philosophy of language, if there objectively is such a discipline...

I'm not really clear on the distinction between philosophy and science (especially from an Objectivist perspective). For example, is there such a thing as a philosophy of physics, which is distinct from the science of physics?

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Unicorn is this relatively abstract (a higher order concept) because unicorns are not perceived.

I think I see the point of disagreement. I hold that unicorns are perceived, in two ways.

The referents of my concept unicorn are the images of unicorns which I "see" (imagine) in my mind or have perceived in illustrations outside my mind. Thus the concept unicorn refers directly to entities (in this case "perceivable" images inside or outside my mind), and is therefore a lowest-level concept just as the concept table is.

Yes, I must "construct" the images (assuming I haven't seen them in books of fantasy). But constructing the images is prior to and different from forming a concept of the fantastic images.

One pitfall is confusing the construction of a fantastic image with formation of a concept, which is a mental entity that integrates two or more units (instances) of a thing. In the case of the concept unicorn those units (instances) are merely images.

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Actual perception via sense organs cannot be equated with memory or imagination.

Introspection is just as valid a process as is extrospection. Each provides the data with which we subsequently make our inferences. Just as we need to discover that the stick in the water is not itself bent, or that the image in the mirror is not an independent person, so we must discover what inferences can be validly gleaned from the data provided by memory or imagination. In a real sense the image of unicorn by introspection is much the same as an image of a table by extrospection; the difference being that the table exists in the physical world, whereas the unicorn exists in our mental world.

I'm not really clear on the distinction between philosophy and science (especially from an Objectivist perspective). For example, is there such a thing as a philosophy of physics, which is distinct from the science of physics?

Certainly, just as the philosophy of law is different from law-making. The philosophy aspect of physics deals with the general philosophical principles, metaphysical and epistemological, that provide the basis and the structure wherein practicing the detailed physics takes place. A philosophy of physics based on the recognition of objective reality and the validity of the human mind to grasp it, will inevitably lead to a different physics than a philosophy for which the nature of things are fluid and are unknowable (assuming that each of these basic different philosophies are used to establish the principles by which the physics is actually done). In other words, the philosophy of physics codifies the means by which we judge and practice the science of physics.

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In the case of the concept unicorn those units (instances) are merely images.

I just want to take exception to the use of "merely" here. As I mentioned in my just prior post, the process of introspection is just as valid a process as is extrospection, and a mental concrete is just as significant as a physical concrete in concept formation,

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I've been tracking my weight loss with an online journal: http://groups.msn.com/EdsOnlineJournal/

I've been taking photos of myself in ten-pound loss increments, scribbling my musings as I go.

Also, a novel little link is the sandow museum http://www.sandowmuseum.com/ideal.html which has a Greek Ideal calculator. Enter your wrist diameter and get your Greek-Statue proportions.

I can be quite obtuse. But, what does your weight loss have to do with concepts and linguistics?

BTW My cat's breath smells like cat food.

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