Kant and Aesthetics

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

What is Kant's concept of the Sublime (quote from Kant please), and what were his examples of his supposed concept? What specific facts of reality did he indicate gave rise to this supposed concept, and what are his referents to this supposed concept?

(Answering my own question)

Kant on the Sublime [**emphasis added**]:

1790

THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT

by Immanuel Kant

translated by James Creed Meredith

http://philosophy.es...of-judgment.txt

“There are, however, also important and striking differences

between the two. The beautiful in nature is a question of the form

of object, and this consists in limitation, **whereas the sublime is

to be found in an object even devoid of form**, so far as it immediately

involves, or else by its presence provokes a representation of

limitlessness, yet with a superadded thought of its totality.

Accordingly, the beautiful seems to be regarded as a presentation of

an indeterminate concept of understanding, **the sublime as a

presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason**. Hence the

delight is in the former case coupled with the representation of

quality, but in this case with that of quantity. Moreover, the

former delight is very different from the latter in kind. For the

beautiful is directly attended with a feeling of the furtherance of

life, and is thus compatible with charms and a playful imagination. On

the other hand, the feeling of the sublime is a pleasure that only

arises indirectly, being brought about by the feeling of a momentary

check to the vital forces followed at once by a discharge all the more

powerful, and so it is an emotion that seems to be no sport, but

dead earnest in the affairs of the imagination. Hence charms are

repugnant to it; and, since the mind is not simply attracted by the

object, but is also alternately repelled thereby, the delight in the

sublime does not so much involve positive pleasure as admiration or

respect, i. e., merits the name of a negative pleasure.

But the most important and vital distinction between the sublime and

the beautiful is certainly this: that if, as is allowable, we here

confine our attention in the first instance to the sublime in

objects of nature (that of art being always restricted by the

conditions of an agreement with nature), we observe that whereas

natural beauty (such as is self-subsisting) conveys a finality in

its form making the object appear, as it were, preadapted to our power

of judgement, so that it thus forms of itself an object of our

delight, that which, without our indulging in any refinements of

thought, but, simply in our apprehension of it, excites the feeling of

the sublime, may appear, indeed, in point of form to contravene the

ends of our power of judgement, to be ill-adapted to our faculty of

presentation, and to be, as it were, **an outrage on the imagination,

and yet it is judged all the more sublime on that account.**”

In other words, it is only the totally formless that can bring about the emotional reaction of the sublime, and the more formless the more sublime. The whole issue of form or not form and an issue of identity or not identity, because that which exists is something specific (i.e it has a form), and would be available to the rational mind to understand and to evaluate, according to rational standards as to what it *is* and what it means to human life. But since Kant rejects the whole idea of objectivity, of pointing to a specific fact of reality and making a determination of its value to man based on what it *is*, then anything goes so long as it is formless and brings about a strong negative emotion of repulsion that then turns to pleasure; though, since he gives no specific references to reality in his whole treatment of the sublime, it can refer to anything, so long as it strives to achieve formlessness – i.e. modern art.

Mod note: Split from checking premises thread - Eiuol

Edited February 18, 2012 by Eiuol

[Grames]

(Answering my own question) Kant on the Sublime [**emphasis added**]: 1790 THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT by Immanuel Kant translated by James Creed Meredith http://philosophy.es...of-judgment.txt

“There are, however, also important and striking differences

between the two. The beautiful in nature is a question of the form

of object, and this consists in limitation, **whereas the sublime is

to be found in an object even devoid of form**, so far as it immediately

involves, or else by its presence provokes a representation of

limitlessness, yet with a superadded thought of its totality.

Accordingly, the beautiful seems to be regarded as a presentation of

an indeterminate concept of understanding, **the sublime as a

presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason**. Hence the

delight is in the former case coupled with the representation of

quality, but in this case with that of quantity. Moreover, the

former delight is very different from the latter in kind. For the

beautiful is directly attended with a feeling of the furtherance of

life, and is thus compatible with charms and a playful imagination. On

the other hand, the feeling of the sublime is a pleasure that only

arises indirectly, being brought about by the feeling of a momentary

check to the vital forces followed at once by a discharge all the more

powerful, and so it is an emotion that seems to be no sport, but

dead earnest in the affairs of the imagination. Hence charms are

repugnant to it; and, since the mind is not simply attracted by the

object, but is also alternately repelled thereby, the delight in the

sublime does not so much involve positive pleasure as admiration or

respect, i. e., merits the name of a negative pleasure.

But the most important and vital distinction between the sublime and

the beautiful is certainly this: that if, as is allowable, we here

confine our attention in the first instance to the sublime in

objects of nature (that of art being always restricted by the

conditions of an agreement with nature), we observe that whereas

natural beauty (such as is self-subsisting) conveys a finality in

its form making the object appear, as it were, preadapted to our power

of judgement, so that it thus forms of itself an object of our

delight, that which, without our indulging in any refinements of

thought, but, simply in our apprehension of it, excites the feeling of

the sublime, may appear, indeed, in point of form to contravene the

ends of our power of judgement, to be ill-adapted to our faculty of

presentation, and to be, as it were, **an outrage on the imagination,

and yet it is judged all the more sublime on that account.**”

Speaking of near incomprehensible gibberish, here it is. Anyway, the idea of the sublime was not original to Kant and several other thinkers made a go at defining the distinctive quality they wanted to name sublime. Wikipedia has what is effectively a history of the idea on its entry for the sublime. The term can be used and applied without committing to the Kantian version which simply tries to fit it to his account of judgment, the a priori categories.

[Jonathan13]

What is Kant's concept of the Sublime (quote from Kant please), and what were his examples of his supposed concept? What specific facts of reality did he indicate gave rise to this supposed concept, and what are his referents to this supposed concept?

I've already provided quotes from Kant, and Ninth and I have already reminded you that I provided them. Here they are once again:

"Every affection of the strenuous type (such, that is, as excites the consciousness of our power of overcoming every resistance [animus strenuus]) is aesthetically sublime, e.g., anger, even desperation (the rage of forlorn hope but not faint-hearted despair)...

"Everything that provokes this feeling in us, including the might of nature which challenges our strength, is then called sublime, and it is only under presupposition of this idea within us, and in relation to it, that we are capable of attaining to the idea of the sublimity of that being which inspires deep respect in us, not by the mere display of its might in nature, but more by the faculty which is planted in us of estimating that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted above it."

And I provide my own, condensed, Objectivist-style definition:

"The Sublime is the aesthetic experience of feeling the pleasure of exhilaration or exaltation through something which stimulates a sense of fear through its horror and/or immensity of magnitude."

Ninth provided examples from Kant of phenomena which stimulate the sense of Sublimity (our superior capacity to reason, our power of resistance, our courage to measure ourselves against seeming omnipotence, to adhere to our highest principles, and to regard our estate as exalted above the phenomena):

"Bold, overhanging, and, as it were, threatening rocks, thunderclouds piled up the vault of heaven, borne along with flashes and peals, volcanos in all their violence of destruction, hurricanes leaving desolation in their track, the boundless ocean rising with rebellious force, the high waterfall of some mighty river, and the like..."

I'll add, from Kant:

"...mountains ascending to heaven, deep ravines and torrents raging there...war...tempest...storm...earthquake..."

Let me stress that these phenomena themselves are not what Kant calls Sublime, nor are they what he values. The Sublimity, to Kant, is to be found in our reaction to the phenomena: The exaltation of feeling the power of our capacity to reason, resist, adhere to our highest principles, regard our estate as exalted, etc.

More to come...

[Jonathan13]

Thomas has arrived at the standard Objectivish misinterpretation of Kant's concept of the Sublime, which I've seen a zillion times before:

"In other words, it is only the totally formless that can bring about the emotional reaction of the sublime, and the more formless the more sublime...anything goes so long as it is formless...it can refer to anything, so long as it strives to achieve formlessness... i.e. modern art."

No. It is not "only the totally formless" that can bring about the reaction of the Sublime. When someone says that the Sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, it does not logically follow that he means that it is found only in that which is devoid of form.

By "formlessness," Kant merely means that which instills in us the concept or "representation of limitlessness." Examples of Kantian "formlessness" are the political tyranny in Rand's novels (as well as her non-fiction), the collective against the individual, as well as what she described as the gray shapelessness of mass-ineptitude, mass-envy and hatred of the good for being good, the second-handedness and collectivism which was "everywhere and nowhere," and the threat of a culture dominated by bad ideas (ideas do not have a physical "form").

Conversely, what Rand meant by "modern art" would not be examples of "formlessness." Abstract painters were quite specifically concerned the Beauty (as opposed to Sublimity) of the forms on their canvases. Despite the fact that you, personally, find their work to be meaningless and incomprehensible, they were aiming for meaningful expressiveness through abstract forms, just as musical composers and architects do, and they succeeded in deeply aesthetically affecting millions of people other than you.

...since he gives no specific references to reality in his whole treatment of the sublime...

What are you talking about? Kant gives lots of references to reality in his treatment of the Sublime. We've posted examples.

J

[Jonathan13]

Speaking of near incomprehensible gibberish, here it is.

Is something "gibberish" just because you don't understand it?

Anyway, the idea of the sublime was not original to Kant and several other thinkers made a go at defining the distinctive quality they wanted to name sublime.

Right, in previous posts I've identified some of the other thinkers who addressed the concept of Sublimity prior to Kant.

Wikipedia has what is effectively a history of the idea on its entry for the sublime. The term can be used and applied without committing to the Kantian version which simply tries to fit it to his account of judgment, the a priori categories.

No, what Kant succeeded in doing, where his predecessors failed, was in identifying the moral nature of our response to phenomena which his predecessors had called Sublime. He brought the idea that the phenomena challenge us, stimulate and excite our superior capacity to reason, resist and overcome. That's what makes Rand's art examples of Kantian Sublimity: she doesn't merely confront the reader with fearful forces and magnitudes, but consummates the Sublimity by creating characters which achieve their exaltation above the phenomena. That and Rand's fictional phenomena which confront her characters are not just dynamically and mathematically sublime, but that are also formless: they are not merely Shaftesburian or Burkean phenomena from nature, but moral and political ideas.

J

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

That's what makes Rand's art examples of Kantian Sublimity: she doesn't merely confront the reader with fearful forces and magnitudes, but consummates the Sublimity by creating characters which achieve their exaltation above the phenomena. That and Rand's fictional phenomena which confront her characters are not just dynamically and mathematically sublime, but that are also formless: they are not merely Shaftesburian or Burkean phenomena from nature, but moral and political ideas.

I don't really care to discuss this further with you, give your stance, especially the idea that Atlas Shrugged or any other novel or work written by Ayn Rand is "formless." She was always quite specific,especially in her characterizations and dramatizations in her art.

[Grames]

Following up here from that other thread with the one aspect that interests me,...

I understand that Rand was critical of many aspects of the Romantic Movement while admiring and being inspired by the art that it produced. The point is that she did not reject the element that Kant brought to Romaticism, but embraced it as her signature style (perhaps unknowingly). Her novels do not present Greek Sublimity, or Shaftesburian Sublimity, or even Burkean Sublimity. They present Kantian Sublimity.

I disagree. One theme of Rand's work is the smallness of the enemy. Cheryl Taggart was overwhelmed by her sense of the scale of evil at large in the world, but James Taggart is not a terrifying figure. Cheryl was wrong. The reader is equally wrong if he identifies and agrees with Cheryl's conclusion. The character of John Galt is Rand's presentation of the ideal and he bears no trace of Kantian sublimity. "A trace of Kantian sublimity" would be if Galt let the scale of what he was trying to do with the strike intimidate him into inaction or hesitation. Galt may inspire Kantian sublimity in James Taggart but I don't think that supports the point you were trying to make.

In Atlas Shrugged the issue of "the sanction of the victim" makes clear that the real problem is an internal conflict. Is it even valid to talk about Kantian sublimity in the context of fucking yourself over? I know Ayn Rand advocated egoism, but is it possible to be that impressed with yourself that your errors inspire Kantian sublimity in yourself? I think that answer is no.

There is a case to made for the appearance of Kantian sublimity in The Wizard of Oz, but Ayn Rand did not author that.

edit: The Lord of the Rings might also be an example of Kantian sublimity.

Edited February 18, 2012 by Grames

[Jonathan13]

I don't really care to discuss this further with you...

Then don't. But if you do continue, please stop distorting my views and claiming that I've said things which I haven't.

...give[n] your stance, especially the idea that Atlas Shrugged or any other novel or work written by Ayn Rand is "formless."

I did NOT say that Atlas Shrugged, or any of Rand's other novels, was formless!!! What I identified as being formless within Rand's novels, as well as in her non-fiction, was the threatening phenomena which she present as confronting her fictional characters and people in reality!!!!

She was always quite specific,especially in her characterizations and dramatizations in her art.

Indeed. And she quite specifically states that the threatening phenomena is "shapeless" and "everywhere and nowhere," which is why I quoted her!!!! She portrays communism, collectivism, altruism, etc., as a formless mass!!!

J

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I wasn't trying to distort your views, but you did explicitly state that they "are also formless: they are not merely Shaftesburian or Burkean phenomena from nature, but moral and political ideas" as if ideas are formless, whereas Ayn Rand always identified that such destructive ideas come from specific philosophies that have a specific meaning and influence. If you want to make the case that so and so's ideas are formless, then take a closer look at Kant who never clearly identified what the hell he was talking about. Ayn Rand clearly identified, and for the first time since Kant's influence, that it is philosophy that motivates the world, and that insofar as certain philosophers are evasive of reality by never pointing at it to clarify their thoughts (Kant), they are doubly destructive in that they erase thoughts by confusing the reader, and make way for the con-men of the world to take over -- i.e. modern art and the rest of post modernism.

Edited February 19, 2012 by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.

[softwareNerd]

This earlier thread had some discussion of the Kant-to-Romanticism-to-Modern Art connection.

[Jonathan13]

I disagree. One theme of Rand's work is the smallness of the enemy. Cheryl Taggart was overwhelmed by her sense of the scale of evil at large in the world, but James Taggart is not a terrifying figure. Cheryl was wrong. The reader is equally wrong if he identifies and agrees with Cheryl's conclusion.

The reader is not wrong to recognize that the threatening phenomena presented in Rand's novels -- communist tyranny, collectivism, altruism, envy, etc. -- are a dangerous threat, and are therefore something to inspire both fear and the will to resist. The fact that the characters and readers are eventually led to see the "smallness of the enemy" does not cancel the fact that enemy was seen as threatening and immense.

I agree with you that the reader should not be overwhelmed as Cheryl was, but do you understand that her being overwhelmed is not an example of Kantian Sublimity? Kantian Sublimity resides in the attitude of facing the challenge at hand rather than being overwhelmed, and of feeling one's estate as exalted above it.

I agree with you that James Taggart alone is not a terrifying figure, and is not capable of stimulating a sense of the Sublime. Only when he and others like him join forces do they become a powerful threat on a massive scale -- to the economy, to creative productivity, to liberty, etc.

Perhaps you're missing the point that Rand's novels contain Kantian Sublimity as the core aesthetic element, but that doesn't mean that every single character and event in the novels are examples of Sublimity.

The character of John Galt is Rand's presentation of the ideal and he bears no trace of Kantian sublimity.

Actually, he does. He rises to the challenge of the threat at hand and asserts "his estate as exalted above it."

"A trace of Kantian sublimity" would be if Galt let the scale of what he was trying to do with the strike intimidate him into inaction or hesitation.

Apparently you're not fully grasping the concept of Kantian Sublimity. You seem to be falsely assuming that Galt must be the cause/stimulus of the Sublimity. He's not. The society around him is. Galt is the embodiment of the Sublimity -- he is the exalted reaction to the threat.

Anyway, even if Galt were to experience a sense of fear from the scale of what he was trying to do, his then being intimidated into inaction or hesitation would not be an example of Sublimity. Sublimity is about the feeling of rising to the challenge, of feeling larger than the threat, not being intimidated into inaction.

Galt may inspire Kantian sublimity in James Taggart but I don't think that supports the point you were trying to make.

If Taggart saw Galt's talents and/or actions as having immense magnitude and/or power, and Taggart felt his capacity to resist it, he could indeed derive a sense of the Sublime from it. A reader could also experience the same through Galt, but only if he identified with the "looters" and was hoping for Galt to fail in his mission. But that would be an unintended example of the Sublime in the same way that it would be an unintended portrayal of beauty if a reader believed that the communist society presented in We The Living was beautiful.

In Atlas Shrugged the issue of "the sanction of the victim" makes clear that the real problem is an internal conflict. Is it even valid to talk about Kantian sublimity in the context of fucking yourself over? I know Ayn Rand advocated egoism, but is it possible to be that impressed with yourself that your errors inspire Kantian sublimity in yourself? I think that answer is no.

You lost me there. I have no idea who or what you're referring to in saying that someone is fucking himself over and inspiring Sublimity in himself. I don't think you're grasping the concept of Sublimity.

There is a case to made for the appearance of Kantian sublimity in The Wizard of Oz, but Ayn Rand did not author that.

Are you somehow under the impression that I think that Rand was the only author to have ever created a work of art which contained Kantian Sublimity?

J

[Jonathan13]

I wasn't trying to distort your views...

Okay. I'm glad that you weren't trying to distort my views, but you did distort them.

...but you did explicitly state that they "are also formless: they are not merely Shaftesburian or Burkean phenomena from nature, but moral and political ideas"...

Why did you snip off the beginning of my sentence? Here's what I wrote [with bold now added]:

"That and Rand's fictional phenomena which confront her characters are not just dynamically and mathematically sublime, but that are also formless: they are not merely Shaftesburian or Burkean phenomena from nature, but moral and political ideas."

Clearly I was referring to "Rand's fictional phenomena which confront her characters" as being formless, and not Atlas Shugged in its entirety.

...as if ideas are formless...

Ideas are formless. They do not have a physical form. They are ideas. You know? In our minds?

J

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Ideas are formless. They do not have a physical form. They are ideas. You know? In our minds?

Ideas are only "formless" if one does not use the objective method of having ideas that are an integration of the facts of reality. No, that doesn't make them physical, but it does make them something specific; and Miss Rand even referred to ideas as being "mental entities" in the second edition of ITOE. It is Kant and his followers who claim that ideas per se are formless, as in having no specific reference to reality as we know it through perception.To them, every idea is a floating abstraction not tied to anything and not meaning anything specific. And it was Kant who unleashed this formlessness onto the world via his philosophy. So, yes, in a sense the heroes of Ayn Rand's novels had to fight a sort of formlessness -- only ideas, such as communism and collectivism, *are* something specific and lead to specific actions to be taken against those who disagree with it (such as throwing them in gulags or outright killing dissenters). The mental habit of connecting ideas to the facts of reality removes the formlessness, which is the process of objectivity. For example, Howard Roark in The Fountainhead is the embodiment of the concepts "integrity" and "independence"; John Galt in Atlas Shrugged is the embodiment of "rationality" and Hank Rearden is the embodiment of "production." Kant's esthetics, even insofar as you have explained it re sublimity, do not have that specificity to it; and besides, it implies that the only way to reach sublimity is to be confronted by something that is a total disaster to one's life and to overcome it (i.e. disaster movies); whereas Ayn Rand does not have that view of the total reverence for the total height -- i.e. one can have a complete reverence for the total height by understanding the power of reason (based on the facts) without ever having to have had a personal disaster in one's life.

[Ninth Doctor]

Speaking of near incomprehensible gibberish, here it is.

Maybe if one started by quoting from the section: Definition of the Sublime (SS 25), it would help. Kant is tough enough to study without trying to attack his ideas in media res. The quoted passage comes from the middle of a section in the middle of the book, is concerned with distinguishing the “beautiful” from the “sublime”, and assumes you already know what he means by these terms, or at least by the first.

In principle, when someone doesn’t provide a quote that is reasonably self-contained and reflective of the author’s intent, does it reflect badly on the original writer, or on the person doing the quoting? Don’t make me start quoting from the Rand Journals to demonstrate what I mean…

[Grames]

Because I don't consider Kant's epistemology well integrated with his conclusions in politics or aesthetics I am open to examining his idea of sublimity and whether it applies to Rand's works.

The reader is not wrong to recognize that the threatening phenomena presented in Rand's novels -- communist tyranny, collectivism, altruism, envy, etc. -- are a dangerous threat, and are therefore something to inspire both fear and the will to resist. The fact that the characters and readers are eventually led to see the "smallness of the enemy" does not cancel the fact that enemy was seen as threatening and immense.

I agree with you that the reader should not be overwhelmed as Cheryl was, but do you understand that her being overwhelmed is not an example of Kantian Sublimity? Kantian Sublimity resides in the attitude of facing the challenge at hand rather than being overwhelmed, and of feeling one's estate as exalted above it.

I agree with you that James Taggart alone is not a terrifying figure, and is not capable of stimulating a sense of the Sublime. Only when he and others like him join forces do they become a powerful threat on a massive scale -- to the economy, to creative productivity, to liberty, etc.

Perhaps you're missing the point that Rand's novels contain Kantian Sublimity as the core aesthetic element, but that doesn't mean that every single character and event in the novels are examples of Sublimity.

Actually, he does. He rises to the challenge of the threat at hand and asserts "his estate as exalted above it."

I'll take your point that Kantian sublimity requires and refers to two parts, the perception (of what inspired alarm) and the reaction (asserts "his estate as exalted above it.")

Does Cherryl fail as an example of Kantian sublimity because she is not inspired to resist or because she does not overcome? As Rand writes Cherryl's suicide it is resistance and paradoxically even describes it as an act of self preservation.

"No! No! Not your kind of world!"

Then she ran, ran by the sudden propulsion of a burst of power, the power of a creature running for its life, she ran straight down the street that ended at the river—and in a single streak of speed, with no break, no moment of doubt, with full consciousness of acting in self-preservation, she kept running till the parapet barred her way and, not stopping, went over into space.

This removal of herself from "that kind of world" is a victory for Cherryl, but perhaps is not the happy ending that qualifies for Kantian sublimity. She does not assert her estate as exalted above "that kind of world" but instead turns away from it. (edit: Does Kantian sublimity require a happy ending?)

The situation of Dagny in "that kind of world" parallels Cherryl's and Rand even brings them together on Cheryl's last night to establish that association.

Dagny allowed herself the first touch of a smile, no more than in the look of her eyes, as she said, "Cherryl, my name is Dagny."

Cherryl's answer was no more than a faint, tremulous crease of her mouth, as if together, they had completed a single smile. "I ... I didn't know whether I should—"

"We're sisters, aren't we?"

"No! Not through Jim!" It was an involuntary cry.

"No, through our own choice. Sit down, Cherryl." The girl obeyed, struggling not to show the eagerness of her acceptance, not to grasp for support, not to break. "You've had a terrible time, haven't you?"

"Yes … but that doesn't matter … that's my own problem … and my own fault."

"I don't think it was your own fault."

Dagny has also had a terrible time but what she has yet to learn to accept when this scene occurred is that it was her fault. When she eventually accepts that then her solution (and all the other strikers) is a parallel to Cherryl's solution, the turning away from "that kind of world" in self preservation. Either this turning away from "that kind of world" qualifies as an assertion of estate as exalted above that world or it does not, and it applies in the same way for Cherryl, Dagny and all the strikers equally.

Key to this argument I'm advancing is the classification of Cherryl as a striker. The difference between her and the other strikers is that she is a wildcatter with no contact with the union (Galt) and no escape route other than the one that appeared to her.

This Zen-like situation of the strike, that the only way to win is not to play, does not fit easily into the Kantian concept of the sublime if conflict and overcoming opposition are essentials of that concept.

Edited February 19, 2012 by Grames

[Jonathan13]

Ideas are only "formless" if one does not use the objective method of having ideas that are an integration of the facts of reality. No, that doesn't make them physical, but it does make them something specific; and Miss Rand even referred to ideas as being "mental entities" in the second edition of ITOE.

It sounds as if you believe that "formless" can mean whatever you want it to mean, whenever you want it to mean it. In the above you equate "form" with a thing being "something specific." Okay, then, let's apply that same meaning to the forms in abstract paintings. Are the forms "something specific"? Why, golly, they are "something specific"! The blue squares, red triangles, golden circles and black swirls are specifically blue squares, red triangles, golden circles and black swirls! They have specific identities! They have specific forms! Yet you falsely assert that they are "formless."

So, apparently in your mind the concept "formless" has no specific identity and no reference to reality, and therefore you are exactly what you falsely accuse Kant of being.

It is Kant and his followers who claim that ideas per se are formless, as in having no specific reference to reality as we know it through perception.

That is false. Kant and his followers do not claim that ideas have no specific reference to reality.

To them, every idea is a floating abstraction not tied to anything and not meaning anything specific.

False again.

And it was Kant who unleashed this formlessness onto the world via his philosophy. So, yes, in a sense the heroes of Ayn Rand's novels had to fight a sort of formlessness...

Huh? Just seconds ago you were claiming that ideas are not formless, but now they can be "sort of" formless? But wait...

-- only ideas, such as communism and collectivism, *are* something specific and lead to specific actions to be taken against those who disagree with it (such as throwing them in gulags or outright killing dissenters).

Now ideas are not formless again!

The mental habit of connecting ideas to the facts of reality removes the formlessness, which is the process of objectivity.

Oops, and now one can remove formlessness from something which can't be formless!

Is it somehow Kant's fault that you think in this manner?

J

Edited February 19, 2012 by Jonathan13

[Grames]

Maybe if one started by quoting from the section: Definition of the Sublime (SS 25), it would help. Kant is tough enough to study without trying to attack his ideas in media res. The quoted passage comes from the middle of a section in the middle of the book, is concerned with distinguishing the “beautiful” from the “sublime”, and assumes you already know what he means by these terms, or at least by the first.

In principle, when someone doesn’t provide a quote that is reasonably self-contained and reflective of the author’s intent, does it reflect badly on the original writer, or on the person doing the quoting? Don’t make me start quoting from the Rand Journals to demonstrate what I mean…

Unfamiliarity with his conceptual framework is not my objection to Kant's writing, but his sentence structure. The only way I can understand him is to make the effort of diagramming each sentence in my head and discarding all the irrelevant clauses, hacking through the underbrush with a machete until I find candidates for the subject, verb and predicate. It would be masochistic to read an entire book of that.

Edited February 19, 2012 by Grames

[Ninth Doctor]

Unfamiliarity with his conceptual framework is not my objection to Kant's writing, but his sentence structure. The only way I can understand him is to make the effort of diagramming each sentence in my head and discarding all the irrelevant clauses, hacking through the underbrush with a machete until I find candidates for the subject, verb and predicate. It would be masochistic to read an entire book of that.

Indeed, German sentence structure is different from English. The verb is often at the end, therefore sound like Yoda, it can. That translation is also over 100 years old (hence it being in the public domain). Umberto Eco's History of Beauty was helpful to me, he has a chapter on the Sublime from Pseudo-Longinus on, with well done illustrations. Makes a great coffee table book.

http://www.amazon.co...&pf_rd_i=507846

BTW, here's a really good book on Kant:

http://www.amazon.co...29673648&sr=1-1

Instead of "Sublime is the name given to what is absolutely great", Kuehn renders it as "Kant defines the sublime as that which 'is great per se.'" (p. 347). It means the same thing, but is so much easier on the eyes.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

The *striving* for formlessness evident in modern art and post modern philosophy comes directly from Kant, who held that real reality (the noumena) would be completely incomprehensible to the human mind, since the human mind requires specifics and facts in order to operate correctly. Keep in mind that Kant wrote his treatises during the height of The Enlightenment, when science and reason (based on the facts) was held in its highest esteem since Ancient Greece (Aristotle). As such, his philosophy is a rebellion against the law of identity and the idea that we observe existence directly via the senses. If one is going to throw out the senses and the facts as a grounds for rationality, then, yes, indeed, one's ideas will be formless; however, insofar as there is a need to present your ideas to others, there must be some formation to them, or else it is just random letters or grunts (which Kant comes closest to in philosophy, though some post modern philosopher try to beat him at his own game). So the idea of collectivism is not based upon the facts observed via the senses (no grounds for claiming an actual collective exists or that the human mind is collective) but they have to convey that with words (disconnected from the facts as it is) does give some form to them, otherwise they are not saying a damned thing but just grunting.

Regarding modern art, sure, they must put *something* down on canvas and must make their modern sculptures have *some* shape (since we are talking about a physical medium), but it is the *striving* towards formlessness that they embody. I even think Kant would disagree with the idea that the modern artists, insofar as they strive for incomprehensible shapes, embodies his ideas about the noumena; precisely because they still retain *some* specificity. To Kant, there is no way the noumena can be conveyed to the human mind in the form of anything that is graspable via the senses.

[Jonathan13]

Thomas, may I make a friendly suggestion? And I sincerely offer it in goodwill. You might want to consider focusing your efforts on what you know -- Objectivism -- versus that which you don't -- Kantianism. I think you'd do better to concentrate on your positive, rationally-based passions rather than on your negative, irrationally-based ones. It's quite evident that your opinions of Kant and his ideas bear no resemblance whatsoever to reality, and, frankly, your tirades against him just make you look silly. Not only that, but your insistence on vilifying Kant appears to be done in the name of defending Objectivism, and I think that that feeds the unfortunate image of Objectivism as being cult-like. So, please consider avoiding repeating Rand's mistakes and adding to them. It doesn't help her, and it doesn't help you. It makes you appear to be worse than the things that you make up about Kant. It's quite repellent.

The same goes for your views on the topic of aesthetics. Oy! Maybe take a moment to review our recent discussions, and notice all of my questions about Rand's and Objectivism's aesthetic contradictions and inconsistencies that you've avoided addressing.

J

Edited February 19, 2012 by Jonathan13

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

It makes you appear to be worse than the things that you make up about Kant. It's quite repellent.

Really? Well, now, you have the possibility of experiencing Kantian Sublimity first-hand when your repulsiveness over my views about Kant turn into the delight that you have caught me in an (apparent) contradiction.

[Ninth Doctor]

Thomas, may I make a friendly suggestion? And I sincerely offer it in goodwill. You might want to consider focusing your efforts on what you know -- Objectivism -- versus that which you don't -- Kantianism.

I second this.

If I wanted to take the time to answer the charges he's made here, I wouldn't even know where to begin. But one thing I do want to get across is that Kant's "beautiful" is not "formless". To explain what that means is just beyond my remaining level of patience for this exchange.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

A few more thoughts on Kantian Sublimity: Since, according to him, one must experience the rebellion of the outright formlessness, and feel the revulsion and the disgust at the formless, and then overcome it with reason; then going to a modern classical concert that plays some atonal piece of shit, followed by Tchaikovsky's "Sleeping Beauty" is to experience Kantian Sublimity; going into a modern art museum and being horrified and fearful and disgusted at what is called art these days, and then fleeing the building and seeing a poster of a beautiful model, then one has experienced Kantian Sublimity; going to a modern play that has no describable characters who make random actions not connected to anything and feeling overwhelming disgust that you have wasted your money, but then go watch "The Fountainhead", one has experienced Kantian Sublimity. I could go on, but I think I've made my point. His esthetic position is totally anti-man and anti-mind. There is absolutely no need to experience the disgusting, the revulsion, or the non-sense in order to be rational and to experience the total reverence for the total height of rationality and man's achievements.

[Jonathan13]

Really? Well, now, you have the possibility of experiencing Kantian Sublimity first-hand when your repulsiveness over my views about Kant turn into the delight that you have caught me in an (apparent) contradiction.

No. Trust me, your errors and distortions don't reach the level of awe. In fact, as I've mentioned, they are quite common in Objectivist circles and rather tiresome. They evoke in me something more like pity and boredom than anything approaching Sublimity. Forgive me for being blunt, but what I feel for your approach to ideas is embarrassment.

J

Edited February 20, 2012 by Jonathan13

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Something I posted to FaceBook:

I used to have a policy of never getting into an argument with a Kantian, because you can never pin them down as to how Kant's supposed ideas are based on the facts of reality. Had the same problem with Platonists in college. They always claim Kant / Plato are true to reality, but never explain anything, just tell you you have to come to understand what they are saying. And then when you do come to understand what they are saying, they refuse to talk with you any more -- which is a good thing