Kant and Aesthetics

[Ninth Doctor]

This is total bullshit when I have been referring to Kant's explicit philosophy with specific quotes. If you want to present the facts about Kant, since you seem hell-bent on defending him, here is the link to his Critique of Judgement. You can find the passages to support your claims by doing a text search via your browser. Until and unless you are willing to be factual, and making outrageous claims about my motivations re the above, then I won't be discussing to topic you further until you point to specific quotes from Kant to make your case.

Why should I bother? What’s the use? Jonathan has taken the time to provide links to thoroughgoing explanations geared to Objectivists, I earlier linked to George Walsh’s article, I have also provided quotes and examples, and you just keep repeating propaganda. And your interpretations of the quotes you’re providing continues to be utterly wrong-headed.

[Spiral Architect]

This thread has been a fascinating read. It is a shame it's broken down - Understandable but still a shame. I suspect I'm not the only one who hasn't read Kant's other material simply because his material is a tough slog even on a good day.

Critique of Judgement will have to go on my read pile, a sublime stack of books that is imposing since it sadly grows faster than it is conquered these days.

[Ninth Doctor]

Critique of Judgement will have to go on my read pile, a sublime stack of books that is imposing since it sadly grows faster than it is conquered these days.

I suggest the biography I mentioned earlier. The author explains Kant’s ideas, provides quotes that are in readable translations, and does a great job of showing where his ideas stood in relation to comtemporary thinkers. The best aspect of it, however, is the clear prose. Here’s a sample:

The

Critique of Judgement

is divided into two parts, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and the Critique of Teleological Judgment…The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment deals with the problem of the validity of aesthetic judgments. This problem arises from a peculiarity of the claims we make about aesthetic matters. When we claim, for instance, that “this painting by Rembrandt is beautiful" or that "the Grand Canyon is sublime," we express our feelings and do not make claims to objective knowledge. At the same time, such claims, which may be called judgments of taste, are meant to be more than mere reports of what we feel. We are convinced that there is more to such judgments, that they state something of universal significance. What justifies such convictions? p.346

http://www.amazon.co...30188642&sr=8-1

Someone earlier linked to a book on Kant that Rand apparently read. It might be interesting to study it and see if it has inaccuracies or biases that could have been the source of her views on Kant. There's a historical figure I'm studying now, of whom the main biographical source was written by a Nazi professor. That means lots of critical reading, separating fact from interpretation, and reference to original documents (a project killer in this case, since there's little else in English).

[Plasmatic]

Ok,so I find the claim that Kants noumena-phenomenal distinction amounts to the form-object distinction so much more interesting a claim that I'm retiring again to epistemic persuits and leaving aesthetics to a later time.....

[Spiral Architect]

I suggest the biography I mentioned earlier. The author explains Kant’s ideas, provides quotes that are in readable translations, and does a great job of showing where his ideas stood in relation to comtemporary thinkers. The best aspect of it, however, is the clear prose. Here’s a sample:

The

Critique of Judgement

is divided into two parts, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and the Critique of Teleological Judgment…The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment deals with the problem of the validity of aesthetic judgments. This problem arises from a peculiarity of the claims we make about aesthetic matters. When we claim, for instance, that “this painting by Rembrandt is beautiful" or that "the Grand Canyon is sublime," we express our feelings and do not make claims to objective knowledge. At the same time, such claims, which may be called judgments of taste, are meant to be more than mere reports of what we feel. We are convinced that there is more to such judgments, that they state something of universal significance. What justifies such convictions? p.346

http://www.amazon.co...30188642&sr=8-1

Someone earlier linked to a book on Kant that Rand apparently read. It might be interesting to study it and see if it has inaccuracies or biases that could have been the source of her views on Kant. There's a historical figure I'm studying now, of whom the main biographical source was written by a Nazi professor. That means lots of critical reading, separating fact from interpretation, and reference to original documents (a project killer in this case, since there's little else in English).

Thanks! That is exactly what the doctor ordered.

And yea, your project is exacly the kind of thing that kept me from getting to some books. Time to spend doing it right...

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Why should I bother? What’s the use? Jonathan has taken the time to provide links to thoroughgoing explanations geared to Objectivists, I earlier linked to George Walsh’s article, I have also provided quotes and examples, and you just keep repeating propaganda. And your interpretations of the quotes you’re providing continues to be utterly wrong-headed.

Why should I consider George Walsh's understanding of Kant to be better than Ayn Rand's understanding of Kant -- or even my own, for that matter? I did look over some of his essay, and he likes to quote short snippets from either to try to show that they were saying the same thing, which they are not in full context.

By the way, I looked over this entire thread and there are very few quotes from Kant on the order of the quotes that I have provided. 13 provided some on sublime, and someone else provided a quote which I cannot confirm came from Critique of Judegment:

Kant observes "the natural need of all human beings to demand for even the highest concepts and grounds of reason something that the senses can hold on to, some confirmation from experience or the like."

It seems to come from "Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason" and not his "Critique of Judgement."

As to looking over that range of about 10 other threads that was pointed to, I'd have to go back and read more of each of those threads in order to have the context of the positions of those involved, and that would take a hell of a lot of time. I'm more concerned with this thread remaining objective with specific references to Kant and what he actually said in the Critique so one can grasp what he was talking about.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Ok,so I find the claim that Kants noumena-phenomenal distinction amounts to the form-object distinction so much more interesting a claim that I'm retiring again to epistemic persuits and leaving aesthetics to a later time.....

You might be leaving a bit early, as the form-object distinction is very important to Kant's aesthetics. "But I have already stated that an aesthetic judgement is quite unique, and affords absolutely no (not even a confused) knowledge of the object. It is only through a logical judgement that we get knowledge."

Keep in mind that to Kant, the apple we observe is not the real thing in reality, the real thing in reality (the noumena) interacts with the human mind and via the sensory manifold projects the image / form of the apple, which has no resemblance to the apple-in-itself (the real noumenal apple). In fact, because we have not thoroughly analyzed how this all works, we cannot even be sure there is a apple-in-itself leading to the projection, it might be a mental burp of some sort. So, a painting of an apple (the formal apple) is not a painting of the apple (the noumenal apple, the object).

Edited February 25, 2012 by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Here is George Walsh's essay on the similarities and differences between Kant and Rand (Ayn Rand and the Metaphysics of Kant). Notice he gives no full-scale quotes from Kant and few from Rand. He is stating his interpretation of either without giving enough quotes for one to draw their own conclusion about either. Short snippets from Kant make him seem reasonable (like he upholds reason), but Kant's whole projection of "pure reason" (disassociated from observable evidence) is totally opposite to that a Miss Rand's rationality and reason (logic applied to that which one observes). And Kant held that the data available to the senses was not the world out there independent of human thought, but rather was a projection of the mind; whereas Ayn Rand held that the information given to the senses is direct information of the world out there independent of human mental functioning and human thought. So, it is not true at all that they would have any agreement on metaphysics.

[Mikee]

In this scholarly collection of essays on Kant’s philosophy, Eva Shaper writes that Kant is “the father of modern aesthetics” (“Taste, Sublimity, and Genius: the Aesthetics of Nature and Art,” in Paul Guyer, ed.,The Cambridge Companion to Kant, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 368).

Harold Osborne, longtime editor of the scholarly British Journal of Aesthetics, writes of “Kant, who is rightly regarded as the founder of modern aesthetics” (Aesthetics and Art Theory: An Historical Introduction, E. P. Dutton, 1970, p. 153). And further Osborne claims of Kant’s analysis: “This theory is the most important anticipation of the modern aesthetic outlook in any philosopher before the twentieth century” (p.191).

Without the first part of Critique of Judgment, writes philosopher Roger Scruton, “aesthetics would not exist in its modern form” (Kant, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 79).

Philosopher Arthur Danto agrees with influential modernist art critic Clement Greenburg on the centrality of Kant’s work to the modernist project:

‘“The essence of Modernism,” [Clement Greenberg in “Modernist Painting” (1960)] wrote, “lies, as I see it, in the use of the characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence.” Interestingly, Greenberg took as his model of modernist thought the philosopher Immanuel Kant: “Because he was the first to criticize the means itself of criticism, I conceive of Kant as the first real Modernist.” […] I suppose the corresponding view of painting would have been not to represent the appearances of things so much as answering the question of how painting was possible”’ (After the End of Art, Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 7).

Kant scholars Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer note that in the Critique of Judgment Kant “is entrenching the assumption of the subjective character of aesthetic judgment so strongly that by our own time it has become virtually an (unargued) commonplace” (Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics, University of Chicago Press, 1985, p. 11).

Denis Dutton, philosopher and author ofThe Art Instinct, writes that Kant’s Critique of Judgment is “the greatest work of philosophical aesthetics ever written” (Dutton’s website).

Scholar Roger Kimball makes a point of connecting Kant and modernist art in an essay on Schiller.

Edited February 26, 2012 by Mikee

[Avila]

Mikee,

Thanks for the quotes. However, I believe that Kant's affect on modernist aesthetics is simply given too much weight, regardless of what those quotes assert. It might be true that in academic circles his views may have shaped some intellectuals in his day, but the ascent of modern art (speaking here only of the visual arts)on the purely practical level -- what painters actaully produce -- has far more to do with the prevailing attitudes of the late Impressionist painters on the "academic" approach to painting; the subsequent destruction of teaching methods; and the rise of the art critic as an arbiter of taste. The best work on the subject is "Twilight of Painting" by R.H. Ives Gammell. He was an accomplished painter -- most of the opinions on this subject are made by non-artists.

[Jonathan13]

In this scholarly collection of essays on Kant’s philosophy, Eva Shaper writes that Kant is “the father of modern aesthetics” (“Taste, Sublimity, and Genius: the Aesthetics of Nature and Art,” in Paul Guyer, ed.,The Cambridge Companion to Kant, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 368).

Harold Osborne, longtime editor of the scholarly British Journal of Aesthetics, writes of “Kant, who is rightly regarded as the founder of modern aesthetics” (Aesthetics and Art Theory: An Historical Introduction, E. P. Dutton, 1970, p. 153). And further Osborne claims of Kant’s analysis: “This theory is the most important anticipation of the modern aesthetic outlook in any philosopher before the twentieth century” (p.191).

Without the first part of Critique of Judgment, writes philosopher Roger Scruton, “aesthetics would not exist in its modern form” (Kant, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 79).

Philosopher Arthur Danto agrees with influential modernist art critic Clement Greenburg on the centrality of Kant’s work to the modernist project:

‘“The essence of Modernism,” [Clement Greenberg in “Modernist Painting” (1960)] wrote, “lies, as I see it, in the use of the characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence.” Interestingly, Greenberg took as his model of modernist thought the philosopher Immanuel Kant: “Because he was the first to criticize the means itself of criticism, I conceive of Kant as the first real Modernist.” […] I suppose the corresponding view of painting would have been not to represent the appearances of things so much as answering the question of how painting was possible”’ (After the End of Art, Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 7).

Kant scholars Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer note that in the Critique of Judgment Kant “is entrenching the assumption of the subjective character of aesthetic judgment so strongly that by our own time it has become virtually an (unargued) commonplace” (Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics, University of Chicago Press, 1985, p. 11).

Denis Dutton, philosopher and author ofThe Art Instinct, writes that Kant’s Critique of Judgment is “the greatest work of philosophical aesthetics ever written” (Dutton’s website).

Scholar Roger Kimball makes a point of connecting Kant and modernist art in an essay on Schiller.

Hey, Mikee, have you seen the film Good Will Hunting? One of my favorite scenes from the film is the one in which Will confronts first-year grad student Clark for regurgitating others' thought on economics. He says, "Yeah, I read that too. Were you gonna plagiarize the whole thing for us? Do you have any thoughts of your own on this matter? Or do you, is that your thing, you come into a bar, read some obscure passage and then pretend - you pawn it off as your own, as your own idea just to impress some girls, embarrass my friend?"

The really sad thing is that I've already posted a link on this thread to the comments that you've plagiarized above, and to my criticism of them.

For those who can't be bothered to follow the link, here's what I wrote in response to Hicks' comments:

I hope that Hicks is not so unfamiliar with art history that he doesn't yet realize that there's a difference between what he means by "modern art" (as well as what Rand meant by it) and what others can mean by "modern aesthetics." Does Hicks not know that the terms "the modern world" in the arts, "The Age of Revolution," and "modern aesthetics" generally refer to the time period beginning with Romanticism, and that the people he quotes above may be talking about that period?

In saying that without Kant, aesthetics would not exist in its modern form, they might also mean that Rand's aesthetics would not exist as she presented them -- she would not have been influenced by the brand of Romanticism and the approach to aesthetic thinking that Kant influenced.

In the above, Greenberg is not crediting the content of Kant's ideas on aesthetics as influencing him, but is taking Kant's method of approaching all of philosophy as being the model that he, personally, took as his model of thought.

If one is going to use Greenberg's comment to support the claim that Kant was the father of Modern art, one could use a similar means to declare that Rand was the mother of Postmodern art: Rand's approach to philosophy was to question the premises of everything, and to challenge cherished beliefs and traditions. Postmodernist artists also take the approach of questioning the premises of everything, and to challenge cherished beliefs and traditions. Therefore I conceive of Rand as the first real Postmodernist. QED.

And, again, I saw nothing about the Kantian idea of the Sublime in the Greenberg quote.

And what role did that "assumption of the subjective character of aesthetic judgment" play in the emotionalism of Romanticism?

Great, Dutton has a very positive view of the CoJ. Are we supposed to take his valuing it as evidence that Kant's ideas on the Sublime are the foundation of Postmonderist art and not of Romanticism?

Again, a "connection" is not a "foundation," and Kimball's "connection" involves Kant's views on Beauty, not the Sublime.

I hope that when the blanks are finally filled in, Kant's influence over Romanticism isn't conveniently ignored because its inclusion wouldn't support the goal of vindicating Rand. Beginning with the conclusion that Kant caused Christo because Rand made an unsupported assertion about Kant and "modern art," and then seeking to "fill in the blanks," is a very odd approach to history and ideas.

How do you like them apples?

J

[Jonathan13]

Kant observes "the natural need of all human beings to demand for even the highest concepts and grounds of reason something that the senses can hold on to, some confirmation from experience or the like."

It seems to come from "Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason" and not his "Critique of Judgement."

Yes, the quote that I provided came from Kant's further elaboration on his aesthetics in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.

J

[Jonathan13]

Here is George Walsh's essay on the similarities and differences between Kant and Rand (Ayn Rand and the Metaphysics of Kant). Notice he gives no full-scale quotes from Kant and few from Rand. He is stating his interpretation of either without giving enough quotes for one to draw their own conclusion about either. Short snippets from Kant make him seem reasonable (like he upholds reason), but Kant's whole projection of "pure reason" (disassociated from observable evidence) is totally opposite to that a Miss Rand's rationality and reason (logic applied to that which one observes). And Kant held that the data available to the senses was not the world out there independent of human thought, but rather was a projection of the mind; whereas Ayn Rand held that the information given to the senses is direct information of the world out there independent of human mental functioning and human thought. So, it is not true at all that they would have any agreement on metaphysics.

You really should consider reading the links that I provided to George Smith's comments. You know, why not? It won't take that much time, and you might learn something. Avoiding knowledge isn't going to make your life any better.

J

[Jonathan13]

Art, in Objectivism, is about concretizing an abstraction -- of using physical means to convey an abstraction. Music does this via melody, which can be considered an object (one thing in reality) in the sense that a string of notes played the right way does convey a sense of life response in the listener.

The same is true of abstract art.

"Music gives man’s consciousness the same experience as the other arts: a concretization of his sense of life. But the abstraction being concretized is primarily epistemological, rather than metaphysical; the abstraction is man’s consciousness, i.e., his method of cognitive functioning, which he experiences in the concrete form of hearing a specific piece of music. A man’s acceptance or rejection of that music depends on whether it calls upon or clashes with, confirms or contradicts, his mind’s way of working. The metaphysical aspect of the experience is the sense of a world which he is able to grasp, to which his mind’s working is appropriate."

The problem, as I keep stating over and over again, but which you refuse to address, is that music, by Rand's own admission, does not present objectively intelligible subjects and meanings. As Rand said, it does not have a "conceptual vocabulary" and must be treated as a subjective matter. As she said, a listener cannot tell, and cannot prove, which of the effects he experiences are in the music and which are contributed by his own conciousness. The same is true of abstract paintings and of architecture, but Objectivism arbitrarily and contradictorily rejects abstract painting while it accepts music and architecture, despite the fact that they are equally non-objective, and despite the fact that they "do not re-create reality" or present objectively intelligible subjects or meanings. And I'll remind you that just because you have an emotional response to music doens't mean that it has communicated or re-created anything. In other words, the grounds on which you attempt to reject my emotional responses to abstract painting apply equally to your emotional responses to music.

Architecture does the same thing but via an arrangement of physical attributes of a building. For example, the wide open spaces of the interior of a cathedral and of Grand Central Station conveys spectacular grandness and man's dominion over the physical.

The same could be said of any man-made object. The sleekness of an automobile, or the powerful thrust of a jet engine convey spectacular grandness of man's dominion over the physical, and therefore all man-made ulititarian objects qualify as art by your criteria -- like architecture, they're in a special "class by themselves" of objects which qualify as art despite contradicting your definitiona and criteria.

There is not necessarily a specific practical functionality to such grand open spaces (a roof over one's head would keep the rain out), but the grandeur of man is concretized by such large rooms. A more personal example is the difference between my parent's entryway versus my sister's entryway. Both houses require a set of stairs to get to the second floor. However, at my parent's house, the stairs are right at the front entrance with a closet just off to the left -- one walks in and the house feels small (maybe cozy to some). At my sister's house, the stairs are on the back side of the living room, giving one much more a sense that the house is big and spacious. Now, as far as practicality is concerned, both stairways perform the function of making it possible to get upstairs, but their arrangement and the rooms convey different abstractions as one walks in.

Again, every man-made object can have different styles which evoke different abstractions in people, and, therefore they should also qualify as art by your critieria. Duchamp's urinal, for example, feels more old-fashioned and "cozy" than tall, square, contemporary urinals. It conveys more character, and isn't cold and impersonal like modern urinals. It therefore conveys different abstractions exactly in the same way that you've described utilitarian objects like stairs as doing. It is therefore art by your criteria, as is every other man-made object.

J

Edited February 26, 2012 by Jonathan13

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Images courtesy Art.com

[Jonathan13]

Images courtesy Art.com

And yet you're the one who is accepting contradictions! You accept Rand's contradiction that something which "does not re-create reality" can qualify as something which "re-creates reality."

J

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I've gathered together my essays and notes regarding Kant and modern art on my website:

This is your mind.

I may add more later, but I grow tired of arguing gibberish.

Not sure how much more work I will be doing to demonstrate or prove that Kant was the founder of modern art. I've written a few essays and notes and have posted them onto my website. It becomes nauseating reading him in context of Critique of Pure Reason when analyzing Critique of Judgement.

Edited February 28, 2012 by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.

[Jonathan13]

I may add more later, but I grow tired of arguing gibberish.

I can understand that. I grow tired just reading your gibberish, so I can't imagine how tiresome it must be for you to constantly argue it!

J

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

From my introduction to essays regarding Kant and modern art:

One has to read The Critique of Judgement in the full context of Kant's philosophy, especially his Critique of Pure Reason, to fully understand how he made modern art possible. To Kant, the world we observe with our senses is not an independent reality that interacts with our means of awareness, thus giving us the awareness of objects out there. Instead, he came up with what he called his "Copernican Revolution" * whereby he reversed this process. To Kant, there may be a real world out there (the noumena), but we are not directly aware of it with our senses. He claimed that somehow the noumena interacts with our mind and that which we observe is a subjective projection (the phenomena) not directly dependent on the means of awareness (our senses). Thus, the world we observe does not resemble the real world at all -- it is just a projection of our mind.

Keep in mind that to Kant, the apple we observe is not the real thing in reality, the real thing in reality (the noumena) interacts with the human mind and via the sensory manifold projects the image / form of the apple, which has no resemblance to the apple-in-itself (the real noumenal apple). In fact, because we have not thoroughly analyzed how this all works, we cannot even be sure there is a apple-in-itself leading to the projection -- it might be a mental burp of some sort. So, a painting of an apple (the formal apple, what we observe) is not a painting of the apple (the noumenal apple, the object). In effect, this means that anything goes, so long as one does not make art in the image of that which we observe, since this isn't reality in the first place; and who is to say that someone else's subjective projection is not radically different from our own? Maybe those empty smears on canvas is how they experience reality as they seek to get closer to the truth by not focusing on those projections of the mind.

* [From Kant's introduction to his Critique of Pure Reason]

"Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given. We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics, as regards the intuition of objects."

Edited February 28, 2012 by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.

[Hairnet]

I don't know if Kant would argue that. After all why would anyone care about what the truth was when it was inaccessable? That is basically mysticism in a kantian's eyes, and studying phenomenology would be a much better use of time right?

I can imagine other post-kant philosophers arguing that a smear might be closer to reality because it has no concepts placed upon it or something, but don't see any indication that Kant himself thought this was worth mentioning.

The implication and logical break down of Kant might be irrationalism, but Kant =/= irrationalism. Proof of this is in modern Kant based/inspired philosophers arguing against irationalism.

One such man is MIses, whose philosophical ideas are very close to Kants, and he has written many arguements against irrationalism.

Edited February 28, 2012 by Hairnet

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Whether von Mises was a Kantian or just doing the best he could with Kantian verbiage may be an open question. I did find the following statement on mises.org that might confirm that position (followed by an explanation):

"Mises was a neo-Kantian in the sense that he presented human action as a category of knowledge, rooted in the synthetic a priori. His methodology relies on the analytic/synthetic distinction, because (according to Mises) the fact that men act purposefully is analyticly true."

Regardless, it is still true that economics is a special science requiring the studying of facts in order to get things right (true to reality), and von Mises certainly did that. The curious thing about Kantian philosophy is that it does leave room for studying phenomena, under certain conditions, but the a prior part does lead to a lot of rationalism (arguments not based upon facts). And if one realizes that Kant's philosophy is alive and well in Germany, yet they have some of the best engineers and make a damned good car, the Mercedes Benz, then I think one can understand this particular dichotomy that stems from Kant -- i.e. one can study the phenomena, so long as one does not attribute such knowledge to be knowledge of reality. I don't think Kantianism led to the same thing in the arts because of the obvious subjectivism of his aesthetic views; or conversely, there may well be good artist claiming they are Kantians (in the same sense von Mises did), but consider their art to be nothing more than technique rather than the concretization of a mental abstraction (as it is in Objectivism).

[Hairnet]

Well people call Kant's system "Indirect Realism" right? The point is that you say "So what we see isn't actually real, but it can still be studied according to the rules of the human mind"

This is essenitally what philosophers like Mises, and to some degree Wittgenstein (If I read him correctly) try to do, they argue that the mind has a certain structure, and talking about anything outside that structure, is pointless.

The famous Wittgenstein quote "That which we can not speak of, must be passed over in silence".

So a true Kantian would look at the smear and say "I don't know what that is", and at the apple as "I recognize that, it may not be "truly real", but I recognize that".

Objectivists talk about Kants irrationalist descendents (like all of Hegel and his crowd), but tend to ignore his rationalist descendents, like Schopenhauer, who made fun of Hegel for the very same reasons any Objectivist would.

Edited February 28, 2012 by Hairnet

[Jonathan13]

Thus, the world we observe does not resemble the real world at all -- it is just a projection of our mind.

I think the funniest thing about this discussion is that your interpretation of Kant is what doesn't resemble reality at all and is just a projection in your mind. In your attempt to vilify Kant, you practice what you falsely accuse him of advocating.

J

[DonAthos]

Thomas? (Or anyone game, actually.) As I'd said previously, I've been trying to keep up with this thread, and one thing that I'd really like to see happen is for someone to take the apparent contradiction in Rand's Esthetics that Jonathan has highlighted, head on. He's raised it a time or two before elsewhere, I believe, and... I dunno, but I'd really like to see someone address it clearly.

I believe that the contention is... that Rand's definition of "art" as typically applied to "abstract art," leading to abstract art's dismissal, similarly (and of logical necessity) excludes such disciplines as architecture and music. (We only subsequently salvage architecture and music through special pleading.) And since we know that architecture and music are certainly "art," then there must be either some flaw in Rand's definition of art, or in our application of it. Perhaps the conclusion is: abstract art is as much art as music is.

Is this the gist of the argument?

[Grames]

Thomas? (Or anyone game, actually.) As I'd said previously, I've been trying to keep up with this thread, and one thing that I'd really like to see happen is for someone to take the apparent contradiction in Rand's Esthetics that Jonathan has highlighted, head on. He's raised it a time or two before elsewhere, I believe, and... I dunno, but I'd really like to see someone address it clearly.

I believe that the contention is... that Rand's definition of "art" as typically applied to "abstract art," leading to abstract art's dismissal, similarly (and of logical necessity) excludes such disciplines as architecture and music. (We only subsequently salvage architecture and music through special pleading.) And since we know that architecture and music are certainly "art," then there must be either some flaw in Rand's definition of art, or in our application of it. Perhaps the conclusion is: abstract art is as much art as music is.

Is this the gist of the argument?

Jonathon and I have gone around on this before. He is correct that the definition Rand gave for art would exclude some things which she elsewhere identified as art.

This is an issue addressed in What Art Is: The Esthetic Theory of Ayn Rand by Torres and Kahmi. Torres and Kahmi put forward the theory that Rand's definition can work for the traditional "fine arts" of painting, sculpture, literature, music, dance and drama. They get over "the problem of music" for Rand's definition by identifying that the concretizations that artists produce can belong to the class existents rather than entities. Entities are distinct intelligible units whereas existents includes events and relationships and attributes. Music is composed of notes, sequences of notes and timing and tone relationships, many of which are highly correlated to predictable emotional responses in listeners. Music need not present us with fully formed entities as a visual art or a passage of text is able to do in order to qualify as a 'recreation of reality' because existents are real.

Ayn Rand would deny that some representative samples of the Modernist or Abstract schools of art were art at all, but that can only be justified on her normative theory of what art should do rather than an objective application of her definition.