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The DIM Hypothesis - by Leonard Peikoff

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Likely an important help in the follow-up work indicated in #13:

Kant’s Elliptical Path

Karl Ameriks (2012 Oxford)

From the publisher:

Kant's Elliptical Path explores the main stages and key concepts in the development of Kant's Critical philosophy, from the early 1760’s to the 1790’s. Karl Ameriks provides a detailed and concise account of the main ways in which the later Critical works provide a plausible defence of the conception of humanity's fundamental end that Kant turned to after reading Rousseau in the 1760’s. Separate essays are devoted to each of the three Critiques, as well as to earlier notes and lectures and several of Kant's later writings on history and religion. A final section devotes three chapters to post-Kantian developments in German Romanticism, accounts of tragedy up through Nietzsche, and contemporary philosophy. The theme of an elliptical path is shown to be relevant to these writers as well as to many aspects of Kant's own life and work.

. . . Kant's Elliptical Path will be of value to historians of modern philosophy and Kant scholars, while its treatment of several literary figures and issues in aesthetics, politics, history, and theology make it relevant to readers outside of philosophy.

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.

Chapter 5 of DIM is on literature. Finally read it. It is splendid.

 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

On Kant and integration, note.

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This work The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change (Harvard 1998), by Randall Collins, might well repay study and comparison with Peikoff's DIM.

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.

 

In post #38, I quoted Dr. Peikoff’s characterization of skepticism in his effort paint Kant’s philosophy as more intellectually corrupt than skepticism: “The skeptic seeks to gain knowledge of reality, then bewails the failure of his quest . . . . The skeptic prizes the awareness of facts, but they elude him . . . . The skeptic would welcome the discovery of connections among things, but cannot find any . . .” (DIM 39).

 

I replied: “No. Scratch a skeptic and you’ll find a mystic. He wants the connections to be what he wants and must undermine reason and the senses to get that comfort. Because mysticism has never been vanquished by philosophy, skepticism stays, . . . .”

 

I see a good source on the employment of skepticism for fideism:

 

God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism

Terrence Penelhum (1983)

 

Library

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.

 

In post #38, I quoted Dr. Peikoff’s characterization of skepticism in his effort paint Kant’s philosophy as more intellectually corrupt than skepticism: “The skeptic seeks to gain knowledge of reality, then bewails the failure of his quest . . . . The skeptic prizes the awareness of facts, but they elude him . . . . The skeptic would welcome the discovery of connections among things, but cannot find any . . .” (DIM 39).

 

I replied: “No. Scratch a skeptic and you’ll find a mystic. He wants the connections to be what he wants and must undermine reason and the senses to get that comfort. Because mysticism has never been vanquished by philosophy, skepticism stays, . . . .”

 

I see a good source on the employment of skepticism for fideism:

 

God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism

Terrence Penelhum (1983)

 

Library

 

Is there a distinction to be made between a mystic/intrinsicist who fundamentally believes in the mystical/intrinsic basis of knowledge, certainty, and morality and someone who after repudiating mysticism and intrinsicism, honestly seeks knowledge, certainty, and morality, but because he only holds conceptions/definitions of them which are based on or at least tainted by mysticism/intrinsicism. he is "forced" to reject knowledge certainty and morality? 

 

The former is a mystic/intrinsicist, the latter suffers from a kind of conceptual deficiency because he has borrowed them (unknowingly?), taint included, from the very kinds of schools he rejects.  I think it is in this way the skeptic is not a mystic... honestly rejecting mysticism, but failing to escape wholly from the poisoned concepts of mysticism.

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SL,

 

Peikoff and I are talking about the specific history of philosophic skepticism, the specific skeptics of the senses or reason. The philosophic skeptics I had in mind were eminent ones like Montaigne and Bayle in modern philosophy or Nicholas of Autrecourt in the fourteenth century. Today I’ve been learning more about skeptics in the history of philosophy, reading The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle by Richard Popkin. The use of skepticism to save faith in God and immortality is a major pattern. The second kind you describe does seem a plausible ripple effect of inherited false setups from religious roots in philosophy. I haven’t come to any characters like that in Popkin’s book so far, but I’ll keep it in mind. One great thing about this book, which you might enjoy having, is the story of how skepticism came to be so important in modern philosophy.

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That is an intriguing thought. "Scratch a skeptic and you'll find a mystic."

Kind of an unwavering faith that doubting everything will ultimately lead to the truth, though the path hasn't revealed any for certain yet.

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That is an intriguing thought. "Scratch a skeptic and you'll find a mystic."

Kind of an unwavering faith that doubting everything will ultimately lead to the truth, though the path hasn't revealed any for certain yet.

In Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin makes the point that doubting everything is an impossible, internal contradiction.

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On 12.09.2012 at 6:37 PM, Boydstun said:

...the first tier of thinkers who loomed large for Kant, thinkers whom Kant confronted and partly appropriated, were Euclid, Newton, Leibniz, and Hume. Second-tier in Kant’s confrontation and appropriation, in his original construction of theoretical philosophy, would be Plato, Aristotle, Luther, Descartes, Wolff, Berkeley, and Reid.

To understand Kant, one needs to put him in context with other philosophers, like you did. I have to read up on Euclid, Wolff, and Reid in order to evaluate your context for Kant. In my own opinion, Hume and Descartes had the greatest influence on him, but his philosophy belongs to neither tradition, as my Diagram shows. Instead, his philosophy has been unknown for over 2000 years, throughout which all works of Democritus have been lost. By his 'philosophy,' of course, I do not mean his theology, which is, perhaps, what made his (non-)idealism be called transcendental.

On 13.09.2012 at 11:48 PM, Dennis Hardin said:

Peikoff predicts religious totalitarianism in America within 50 years.

Peikoff wonders what Ayn Rand would have thought of his theory. On that basis alone—his dire, miserably depressing prediction for the future of the world--I think I know.

His prediction is like the predictions of global warming (and I also believe that, philosophically, our history goes in cycles). In truth, Peikoff is as optimistic about Objectivism and Objectivist politics as Ayn Rand ever was, and this means Peikoff is still an optimist. You might ask this of him yourself, and I predict that his answer will be affirmative. You only need to hurry because Peikoff is pretty old, and it would be worse to perpetuate such false claims about him after he would have passed away. Nicky's reply has been spot on.

On 14.09.2012 at 1:29 AM, Dennis Hardin said:

“Why the Lights of the West are Going Out—And What You Can Do To Stop it.”

He obviously regards that last part as comparable to pissing into the wind.

His 'pissing into the wind,' as you call it, is following Objectivism in opposition to mis (conservatives like Trump) and dis (liberals, like Hillary?--Hillary is an amoeba whose philosophy I don't pretend to understand).

On 14.09.2012 at 1:32 AM, Dennis Hardin said:

My use of the word malevolent had strictly to do with Peikoff’s dark and overwhelming pessimism, not any intentional destructiveness on his part. He may be a prophet of doom...

Maybe you are seeing your own pessimism in Peikoff? I allow that Peikoff has a pessimistic underbelly, but his optimism is the prevalent crown. dream_weaver's reply is excellent: Peikoff shows what majority believes (and enacts in reality), but the minority -- like Objectivists -- are certainly the better path on which the enlightened few need to continue (intellectually, rhetorically) fighting to prevail even after 'probable' setbacks and even while minority itself is seemingly fractured by interpretations of Peikoff's genius hypothesis. Like I've implied above, Peikoff's 'predictions' are not as important as his contextualizations of the most important and archetypal philosophies. That, as far as I know, has never been done before to such an extent.

On 15.09.2012 at 1:25 AM, Dennis Hardin said:

I stated very clearly what I am arguing for: Fighting for the future instead of passively resigning oneself to the dialectical progression of the Hegelian “zeitgeist,” as if there’s little or nothing we can do to prevent it from happening

You seem to be cutting off Peikoff's overarching vision by reducing it to your own blind fight. Peikoff is certainly close to Hegel in his evaluations (e.g., of Kant) and idealizations of their own philosophies, but Peikoff very clearly presents his evaluations with the major implication of Objectivism being 'the better path' (in dream_weaver's words), even though he is not so explicit about this in this book. Rhetorically, though, it's a brilliant move, since the obvious absence formidably invites attention and pulls at our focus.

On 20.09.2012 at 3:14 PM, Boydstun said:

His [Peikoff's] conclusion that SR and GR are cases of misintegration is false. Quite the contrary.

Actually, your criticism is not correct. Peikoff is totally right in evaluating Einstein as a MIS (Platonic idealist in my book, connected through Berkeley -- also thanks to Leibniz -- to Plato). The reason Einstein is a MIS is that he idealized ('beautified' and overgeneralized--like Harriman is trying to do now with his physics/philosophy applied to other MIS like Copernicus and Kepler) only an interpretation or a specific instance of Lorentz's transformation, whose mathematics is so extensive that it allows space for an aetheric (Newtonian) physics, which Lorentz himself supported but for which couldn't make a case. However, the case for this kind of INT physics could be attributed to an ignored genius physicist by the name of Hannes Alfvén, who, like Lorentz before him, was discarded in favor of another Einstein: a popular Einstenian and bigbanger darling -- Hawking. Now, however, all this is ancient history. The physics debate progresses on the quantum level, such as Copenhagen vs. quantum decoherence and consistent histories and string many-worlds interpretations. In contrast to what many of you believe, philosophical debates are indeed currently taking place in contemporary physics, but Rand and Peikoff would never understand them because of being restricted to an obsolete, classical view of atomic structure.

On 28.09.2012 at 6:21 PM, Boydstun said:

it had not been clear to Peikoff “that materialists, just as much as idealists, are not secular at all, but rather are supernaturalists and thus essentially akin to religionists”

This is indeed very interesting and salient. While considering that I take all materialists as DIS and all idealists as MIS, you may find that the whole traditions of non-atheistic materialists and atheistic idealists had started with Kant. Kudos to Kant, wouldn't you say? You may also now thank him for confusing the hell out of idealists. (Poor Rand, she had no idea what she got herself into, but at least her intense hate for Kant opens her up to deep criticism.)

On 02.10.2012 at 5:12 PM, Boydstun said:

...he [Peikoff] does not mean Kant is in league with Georgias, who held that nothing exists.

God, indeed I hope not. At least Gorgias understood (while most reduce his understanding to mere sophistry) that nothing exists everywhere and nowhere at the same time because that is the 'nature' of nothing. Kant, on the other hand, wrote that nothing can be proved about the existence of Noumenon, which logically means one and only one thing: Noumenon doesn't exist physically for the sole reason of it being Nonexistence (I swapped the terms, but essentially you get the same thing). Hence Peikoff was right in his criticisms of Kant, as Kant opposed things for having the nature of things, i.e. being those things. Kant's 'nature' (which he swaps for 'matter') is only found through mental categories, which leads, on the inward path through the metaphysical brain/mind to his highly cherished Nonexistence (yes, it is found inside mind; and yes, that's how his theoretical and practical reasons connect, see Crit#3). To a point, I agree with Kant, but only to a point -- I think his subjective theology is (and was) revolutionary. Mostly, what Peikoff misunderstands about him is Peikoff's own psychological inadequacies projected on Kant. Other than that, Peikoff is nearly perfect (haha).

In addition, Boydstun, you may disagree that 'rational foundation' is as overrated as the concept of 'God.' I'd rather stick to reality than be fooled by anyone to illusively get unstuck from it because everything is learned only in relation to a context (reality). Kant was merely critiquing knowledge but not learning anything new or integrating anything with it.

On 02.10.2012 at 5:12 PM, Boydstun said:

Kant puts God in the noumenal.

Actually God is not only within Noumenon but also as if shimmering within it because His sight cannot be continuously grasped. See Remark to §86 of Crit#3. This means not only that God is not the only one within Noumenon but also that he is, in a way so conceived, 'beyond' it as if behind its veil. This can be confused with mysticism, but... well, I am not sure what exactly this is other than the term I use: "subjective theology." This concept of God, in Kant, had nothing to do with philosophy as a whole, and this was Kant's great revolution: he separated philosophy from God as the US founding fathers separated state from church. Did Peikoff grasp that? I don't think so. But don't blame Peikoff. Many philosophers today perhaps understand neither Kant's philosophy nor its true accomplishment.

On 02.10.2012 at 5:12 PM, Boydstun said:

That such a thing [as God] be devoid of substantial identity is ancient hat.

Yes, but you need to remember that ancient theists wrapped their philosophy around God in a very different way than Kant did. You earlier stated more properly Kant's negative way concerning God. Pythagoras, Parmenides, Plato, and others (Plotinus too, but I haven't yet studied Pseudo-Dionysus or Alcinous, even though if the latter were a true Platonist, his negativity would be made-believe as much as his positivity) were quite positive about this concept (even while they gave it other names). Kant's break from conceiving of God in this ancient way is thus quite profound. In fact, it's unprecedented because it's not atheistic. Now, what you wrote about those who described God by what God is not seems to be an implicit proof from absence (kind of like Objectivism in Peikoff's DIM) -- not evidence of absence or argument from ignorance. Kant never claimed that any proof of God is possible, only that we should praise reason that leads us to God (means he enjoyed proofs of God but never defended any himself). Thus, Kant differentiated himself from such objective theologists, i.e. theists, who would like to find a proof of God (even in Kant).

On 02.10.2012 at 5:12 PM, Boydstun said:

...served to protect faith (of a watered-down sort)

I would say reduced, inversively. Kant followed this inversive reductionist formula: make the outer world into both the non-world (noumenon) and the inner world (phenomenon) by reducing it through categories of thought. Only the non-world is basically a deeper 'inner world', like an unconscious level several subconscious levels deep. So, basically, the reason we cannot phenomenally sense Noumenon is that it is too far and deep in us from our conscious mind.

On 04.10.2012 at 0:50 AM, dream_weaver said:

One of the lecture from ARI that I have makes the analogy of integration to a puzzle. As the various pieces are put together, a picture begins to emerge. If random pieces from another puzzle are present, it doesn't really matter because on[c]e you have the puzzle fully assembled, the errant pieces are easily discarded as irrelevant to the completion of the now completed puzzle.

If I were to extrapolate that analogy to DIM, the example given would be applicable to the (I) method or approach.

Thank you for sharing the analogy, dream_weaver. In a way it reflects the process in the movie 21 Grams -- what I consider to be an integrative piece of art. On the other hand, this is not the process employed by David Harriman in The Logical Leap. Instead, Harriman overgeneralizes, waves hands, and thinks that all pieces are used in an integration without being able to prove this (understandably, as this cannot be so).

On 17.11.2013 at 7:45 PM, Boydstun said:

This work The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change (Harvard 1998), by Randall Collins, might well repay study and comparison with Peikoff's DIM.

Have you read it? I will need to check it out.

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Posted (edited)

.

Hi Ilya, thank you for all the thinking comments. No, I haven’t yet gotten to read Collin’s book.

On Reid and Kant, the great help is Manfred Kuehn’s Scottish Commonsense in Germany 1768–1800.

I wondered in what ways you think of Descartes as having a great influence on Kant. Is it because of Kant’s attraction to the a priori? But wouldn’t that be a long inheritance starting back at Plato, not at Descartes?

Kant did not buy Descartes’ metaphysical scheme of extension and thought. And Kant did not seem to take the Cartesian form of skepticism seriously, unlike his seriousness with Humean skepticism. Leibniz had earlier shredded Descartes’ skeptical-doubting way to sure knowledge; perhaps that had an effect on Kant.

I do recall some striking concord with Descartes' concept of motion (and significant deviations from Newton's dynamics) in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.

I’ve lately been studying Alcinous’ The Handbook of Platonism (c. 150). He’s got Aristotle and the Stoics as articulators of implicit systematic doctrine in the Dialogues of the perfect master Plato. Even the syllogistic, invented by Aristotle, is credited to Plato. Yes, Alcinous was a go for the negative way, among other ways more positive. From the negative spiel:

“God is ineffable and graspable only by the intellect [intuitive intellect, I think], as we have said, since he is neither genus, nor species, nor differentia, nor does he possess any attributes, neither bad (for it is improper to utter such a thought), nor good (for he would be thus by participation in something, to wit, goodness), nor indifferent (for neither is this in accordance with the concept we have of him), nor yet qualified (for he is not endowed with quality, nor is his peculiar perfection due to qualification) nor unqualified (for he is not deprived of any quality which might accrue to him). Further, he is not a part of anything, nor is he in the position of being a whole which has parts, nor is he the same as anything or different from any thing; for no attribute is proper to him, in virtue of which he could be distinguished from other things. Also he neither moves anything, nor is he himself moved.” (165, 5–17)

Translation of John Dillon (1993).

Edited by Boydstun

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Boydstun,

Plato started with mind/body dichotomy (I believe he mentioned it in Timaeus) and Descartes developed and extended it, while Kant took the mind part and cut off the rest. This is of course a simplification of Plato and Descartes, and the only thing Kant seems to have inherited from Plato is terminology. As you well understand, essential Plato has more to do with Berkeley than Kant, which is to say his philosophy has little to nothing to do with Kant.

What Kant rejected in Descartes is exactly his Platonism, the idea of mind coming from an analytic a priori noumenal realm. The materialist side of Descartes, which is also reflected in Peter Ramus, Kant gladly accepted. Evidently, Descartean and Kantian metaphysics are not the same, since Descartes is coming from a kind of Augustinian-Platonic realm, a God-head rationalization for mind's existence. Yet surely you must understand that Descartes is more complex than that, as he was delving into mental and bodily mechanics - the ways our minds and bodies work. That's what I meant above when I said that Kant took the mental (not metaphysical per se) part of Descartes and cut everything above mind (body and Platonic et al. metaphysics), reducing it to mind alone (really, metaphysical brain, which is today reduced by neuroscientists and psychologists to brain alone - not a major difference, in my book).

Oh yes, Hume was a huge influence on Kant in terms of skepticism, but Kant at least transcended Hume's agnosticism as well as Hume's criticisms of metaphysics and ethics. So, in a way, I agree with you that Hume is a first-tier influence on Kant, and Descartes is a second-tier, but you understand that Descartes came before both, and he had built the foundation that Kant, arguably more than Hume, required for his philosophy.

Everything I write comes through the lens of metaphilosophy I borrowed from Peikoff's DIM and developed on my own. So your comment of "Leibniz had earlier shredded Descartes’ skeptical-doubting way to sure knowledge" does not come through my lens, since Leibniz was essentially a Descartean, that is they had the same philosophy, as the boundaries of philosophies are concerned in my metaphilosophical framework. Even if Leibniz criticized Descartes so unfairly (from his own necessitated by the same metaphysics view, and not your evaluation of Leibniz), the nature of his criticism could only be compared to that of Francis Bacon's criticism of Aristotle, which wasn't a criticism of essential parts of philosophy but merely some new ideas trying to replace the old, forgotten, misunderstood ones. As we know, ideas change historically, but people's minds don't change. With that, you may and should, of course, attempt at providing counter-evidence to my claims. To start, you would need to show with quotes how (better from both sides) Leibniz contradicted Descartes in essential parts of his philosophy. This way you may finally be the one to contradict my hypothesis and make it collapse like a house of cards.

Yes, so continuing with following results of my hypothesis, since Descartes and Leibniz are essentially following Descartean idealism, influence on Kant from Leibniz is essentially the same as when I said that Descartean foundation had provided the grounds for Kant. The specification of these grounds had the face of monadology, which reflects Democritus and, therefore, Kant (a major result of my hypothesis is that Kant is essentially a DIS because he is following in the footsteps of Democritus, even though he formalized and specified the philosophy to such an extent as to cause us to call this philosophy not merely Democritean but Kantian). Now, if you are unable to contradict me in regard to essential differences between Descartes and Leibniz, your contradiction in regard to essential similarities between Democritus and Kant would not only shut down my blog but would also shut me up, possibly forever. For that, of course, we would need to contentially compare the surviving fragments of Democritus from secondary sources to the bulky corpus of Kant.

15 hours ago, Boydstun said:

I do recall some striking concord with Descartes' concept of motion (and significant deviations from Newton's dynamics) in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.

There you go. But this way you are not contradicting the results of my hypothesis. Instead, you are only supporting them because Descartes, as Ramus before and Leibniz later, contradicted Aristotle and later Newton, and the essentially same kind of contradiction against Aristotle and Newton was at the core of Kant's philosophy. So you know, my INTs are, among many others, Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, and Newton. MIS (idealD) are Descartes, Ramus, Leibniz; related to MIS (idealP) to Plato and Berkeley. DIS (mat7) are Democritus and Kant; related to DIS (mat8) Epicurus and Hume. Here you can find all their essential conflicts or similarities, based on who they are categorically. But the best way to see what I mean is through the visualization my Diagram provides, a major improvement, I think, upon Peikoff's hypothesis, even though it required some changes to Peikoff's five categories.

I could see from my side why Aristotle's syllogistic would be credited to Plato (and no, not merely from the side of Socrates's appearance in it). Aristotle developed logic not to describe his own philosophy, but to understand the end of his philosophy, which he saw in Plato. Aristotle's whole philosophy can be described as potentials actualizing. That actualization part is logic and Plato - hence the non-essential similarity in terms of Aristotle's direction toward Plato's position (their directions are pointed toward each other - quite a stable bond, as we've seen through history). Yet, it would be wrong to take this similarity anywhere further because direction and position aren't the same, and many people reduce directions to positions - such is, perhaps, a conclusion of Alcinous.

Notice what Alcinous starts with in your quote: God. And Kant ended with God in his Critique of Judgment. This similarity of 'negative' theology thus may be non-essential. The differences in Alcinous and Kant are becoming much stronger as we continue reading the quote. Kant would contradict Alcinous, in that we cannot intellectually grasp God. Hereby, Alcinous's theology seems as objective as any other, except Kant's. If Alcinous was a Platonist, as you say, then his intuitive intellect would be vastly different from Kant's. Platonic 'intuition', as is their intellect, is basically analytical and not synthetic. In fact, the result of my hypothesis can be said to be that all genuine idealists (like Plato and Descartes; i.e. MISes) use analytic a priori. We need to thank Kant for revealing this, as he himself was NOT an idealist if we follow his analytic vs. synthetic distinction. He would be as much an idealist as transhumanists be humanists today. The 'trans' part was Kant's essential invention, and many people who only look on the surface then write that (I paraphrase) idealism is a kind of philosophy that is based on mind (sorry I cannot find the source where I saw this definition). The reason such 'definitions' are ludicrous is that materialism is also a kind of philosophy that can be based on mind. See Democritus, for the sake of an example! Or any of our eliminative materialists, if a need arises. Mind is basically brain - the essence of brain. Hence true idealists must make claims that stretch metacosmically and thus BEYOND mind. If someone cannot understand this clear description of idealists, then they must be materialists because only materialists cannot grasp this!

15 hours ago, Boydstun said:

...neither bad (for it is improper to utter such a thought)

Seems to be a superstition - a darling to idealists, like "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain". All his other 'negative' descriptions of God are so specific as to be intended as descriptions of Him in general. Kant realized this, so he never uttered any claim or description of God until the end of his last Critique and even then he qualified it by calling it subjective (see Remark to § 86).

15 hours ago, Boydstun said:

neither is this in accordance with the concept we have of him

Oh, Alcinous, you have a 'concept' of Him!? And you are trying to prove it to us through a seeming absence of words that can be applied to describe it? But even whenever we say there is NO God, psychologically we are thinking of God. And so when we say we cannot describe God, you are still thinking of God as so many objective theologists do, like Muhammad, for example. In Islam, Allah is also ineffable and hidden beneath a veil. Actually many veils, so many that I've lost count.

Put in other words, all these qualifications and unqualifications when negated result in Hegel's absolute idea. Still sounds idealist, whichever way you turn it. And idealism whether it's negative or positive theologically is still idealism. Even theology, whether it's negative or positive in idealism, most probably is objective. Hence I like to use objective vs. subjective distinctions in theology rather than negative vs. positive. The latter is deceiving, whereas the former reflects exactly the kind of content these theologies possess.

16 hours ago, Boydstun said:

he is not deprived of any quality which might accrue to him...

This, for example, sounds like a very objective statement about God. Latter statements about God's ontology from the quote merely show God's transcendental nature (which Kant knowingly flipped or inverted), as with all transcendental, metacosmic realms, be they Platonic or idealist in general (but obviously not Kantian!). This kind of pure transcendentalism (both not Kant's original terms) was later modified in a very distinctive and essential manner by pantheists like Spinoza, as in thinking of God not being essentially 'different from any thing'. Nevertheless, Spinoza, through such modifications, didn't become an atheist; instead, he became a different kind of objective theologist. Kant, however, called Spinoza an atheist (e.g., § 87 in Crit#3). Why? I think because Kant himself wasn't an objective theologist, so he had to oppose any theologies that claimed to be 'objective', and especially those that were in direct conflict with his own 'subjective' kind, as Spinoza was not an idealist but an INT - the direct enemy of DIS.

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