Objectivist and Popperian Epistemology

[curi]

Ayn Rand has the best moral philosophy ever invented. Karl Popper has the most important breakthrough in epistemology. Most Objectivists seem to think that Popper and Rand are incompatible, and Popper is an enemy of reason. They have not understood him. These lists are intended to help explain my motivation for integrating Rand and Popper, and also to help highlight many similarities they already have.

 

Points Popperian epistemology and Objectivist epistemology have in common. In Popperian epistemology I include additions and improvements by David Deutsch and myself:

 

- opposition to subjectivism and relativism

- fallibilism

- says that objective knowledge is attainable (in practice by fallible humans)

- realism: says reality is objective

- connected to reality: we have to observe reality, keep our ideas connected to reality

- asserts there is objective truth

- attention to context ("problem situation" or sometimes "problem" is the common Popperian term meaning context. E.g. a Popperian will ask "What is the problem this is addressing?" and be asking about context.)

- pro-science

- opposition to positivism

- opposition to the language analysis school of philosophy

- say that most professional philosophers are rather crap

- opposition to both skeptical and authoritarian schools of epistemology

- keeps our concepts "open-end[ed]" (ITOE). That means: possible to improve in the future as we learn more.

- says that there are objective moral truths

- does not seek a "frozen, arrested state of knowledge" (ITOE)

- written clearly and understandably, unlike much philosophy

- says epistemology is useful and valuable to real people; it matters to life; it's practical

- you can't force an idea on someone. they can choose to accept it or not

- you can't implant an idea in someone. you can't pour it in, stick it in with surgery, make them absorb it, etc. they get to think, interpret, choose.

- free will

- people are not born with some unchangeable nature and innate ideas. we can be self-made men. we can learn, change, improve, progress

- emphasis on active use of one's mind, active learning

- no inherent conflicts due to objective truth

- understanding of unconscious and inexplicit ideas

- if two ideas contradict, at least one is false

- integration of epistemology with morality, politics, and more

- rejection of authority

- full rejection of idealism, solipsism

- strong emphasis on clarity

- rejection of limits on human minds

- reject probabilistic approaches to epistemology

- looks at man as rational and capable

- value of critical thinking including self-criticism

 

 

Strengths of Objectivist epistemology:

- stolen concept

- package deal

- check your premises

- ideas about integrating all one's knowledge and removing all contradictions

- measurement omission and concept formation ideas both worthwhile, though flawed

- good criticisms of many opponents of reason

- good understanding of essentials vs non-essentials, e.g. for definitions

- idea about automating some thinking

- good explanation of what objectivity is

- Judge, and be prepared to be judged

 

 

Strengths of Popperian epistemology:

- evolution creates knowledge

- conjectures and refutations method

- piecemeal, incremental method. value of every little improvement

- identification of, and solution to, justificationism

- addresses induction

- conjectural, fallible, objective knowledge

- idea that we progress from misconception to better misconception

- myth of the framework

- value of culture clash

- emphasis on bold highly-criticizable claims, sticking your neck out to learn more

- no shame in mistakes

- value of criticism. criticism is a gift

- understanding of rationality as being about error correction

- unimportance of starting points. you can start anywhere, improve from there

- criticism of definitions

- criticism of foundations, bases

- criticism of essentialism

- criticism of manifest truth (and self-evidence, obviousness, etc)

- static and dynamic memes

- structural epistemology

- coercion and common preferences

- understanding of conflict and symmetry

- applications to parenting, education, relationships

- understanding of tradition

- explanation of value of external criticism (if everyone has some blind spots, but some people have different blind spots then each other, then it's productive to share criticism with each other. a little like comparative advantage)

- emphasis on critical method, criticism (ideas stand unless refuted)

- let our ideas die in our stead

 

 

Some of you are now wondering about details. I know. But it's so much! Let's do it like this: if you are interested in one of the topics, ask about it and I can elaborate. If you would preference a reference to existing material on the topic, that's fine too.

[Eiuol]

"emphasis on critical method, criticism (ideas stand unless refuted)"

Isn't this one the most problematic? I read it as you can come up with *any* idea you want on *any* grounds and it is true until proven otherwise. 9/11 Truthers, or any conspiracy theorists cannot be totally proven because the basis of a conspiracy is what cannot be known now. They are testable theories, and I know Popper rejected untestable or unprovable theories. I believe that this makes Popper's ideas of science to be about a negative process of looking for holes in a theory by a typically piecemeal process, while Rand's ideas are a positive process on developing theories by making connections.

Edited July 3, 2013 by Eiuol

[curi]

If there already exists a criticism of a category of ideas, and an idea in that category is thought of, and it doesn't address the pre-existing criticism, then it's already refuted. For example:

 

 

All conspiracy theories can be refuted by criticism of conspiracy theories in general. The whole category is flawed. (Any individual conspiracy theory can try to explain why the general problems don't apply to it. Good luck with that... If it has no such defense, then it's no good.) Criticism need not be empirical. Here is criticism of conspiracy theories as a category: http://www.settingtheworldtorights.com/node/202

 

Yes, Popper's process is negative in some senses. However it allows for developing ideas, making connections, etc... There is nothing wrong with that. It's a good way to work out ideas. Yes, it's also piecemeal or incremental: you improve your ideas and you keep improving them and most improvements will be small and they add up. It's possible to sometimes have a big breakthrough all at once, but the common case is gradual progress (like evolution).

 

The difference is in whether creating an idea using certain positive methods is thought to make that idea true or probably true, justified, give it authority, etc... None of that works.

 

If we have a criticism of an idea -- if we find a hole in it -- then it doesn't really matter that we created the idea with some super amazing positive process. We shouldn't ignore the criticism. On the other hand, if we create the idea in a silly way, but we can't find any holes in it, then that idea is pretty good, as far as we know.

 

No Popper did not reject all untestable ideas. He said they are not scientific. They may still be good philosophy. Popper also said we should try to make our ideas as easy to criticize as possible, so we can best discover errors in them.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Unfortunately, I know little about Popper; I intend to do some research and come back to this afterwards. 

However:

 

 

- measurement omission and concept formation ideas both worthwhile, though flawed

What's wrong with measurement omission?

 

Granted, the Objectivist theory of concept-formation is incomplete, but I really can't think of any problems with what is does describe.  Which ones struck you?

 

 

- criticism of definitions

- criticism of foundations, bases

- criticism of essentialism

- criticism of manifest truth (and self-evidence, obviousness, etc)

 What were these criticisms?

 

Without definitions, all of our concepts would be left unspecified and unreliable; without the self-evident testimony of the senses, how could we ever know anything?

[Harrison Danneskjold]

The difference between Popper's epistemology and Rand's is induction.

Popper rejected induction as unreliable; Rand embraced it as man's only method of gaining knowledge.

 

This approach Popper came up with- expose your theory to falsification and, if it survives, then accept it as true-for-the-moment, seems to be a horribly tedious alternative to simply accepting that induction can only provide conditional truth.

 

And at first glance, yeah, his ideas do seem to have some merit.  But the whole thing could be circumvented outright by accepting that truth is conditional because we aren't omniscient.

[curi]

What's wrong with measurement omission, IMO, is that it's not as universal as Rand said. It's a good technique to do sometimes, it's worth knowing about, but I think she overrated it. I also think it overemphasizes measurement. It's a specific type of generalizing, but we can also omit things when generalizing for other reasons besides it being a measurement, such as omitting things due to irrelevance.

 

For concept formation, it has some induction mixed in which isn't right. Again I think it's a pretty good idea. The idea of integrating lots of ideas into some more general purpose ideas is a good way to think about it.

 

 

The criticism of manifest truth, in short, is that the truth is not manifest. It's always pretty easy to make mistakes or not think of some truth. We have to work at it to find truths, and that effort is fallible, and should always be potentially open to criticism.

 

What does it mean to regard sense observation as "self-evident"? Does it mean it is infallible? It is not. People often make mistaken observations. Does it mean it's not open to critical thinking, interpretation, etc? That would be bad.

 

 

For definitions, Popper does not reject definitions entirely. Rather, they are overrated, misused, and fallible. Here is an explanation I sent to an Objectivist a while back:

 

Karl Popper wrote about definitions. He pointed out that it's impossible to have 100% precise definitions. A definition always uses other words. Those words either have their own definitions or they are undefined. If they have their own definitions, then there are more words which need defining too. It is an infinite regress to try to define everything, you have use words which need to be defined, and when you try to define them you use more words, and so on. The only way out is to make a circular argument where you use A to define B, B to define C, C to define D, and D to define A again. Or you just don't define all the words you use.

It's usually not a great idea to start discussions by defining your terms. You don't know really know what terms you'll have misunderstandings about until after you start talking and run into some problem to address by clarifying.

Unlimited precision in one's discussion isn't a virtue. It's important to figure out what isn't being understood and clarify that. if something is understood then it doesn't need more precision yet.

 

Here are some other things I wrote about definitions, with additional points:

 

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Fabric-of-Reality/message/15183

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/CriticalRationalism/message/14306 (requires joining the group to view, not so important, but available if you want. the link above is fully public)

 

I think that's enough for now. If you appreciate these, we could do essentialism and foundations later.

[curi]

The difference between Popper's epistemology and Rand's is induction.

Popper rejected induction as unreliable; Rand embraced it as man's only method of gaining knowledge.

 

This approach Popper came up with- expose your theory to falsification and, if it survives, then accept it as true-for-the-moment, seems to be a horribly tedious alternative to simply accepting that induction can only provide conditional truth.

 

And at first glance, yeah, his ideas do seem to have some merit.  But the whole thing could be circumvented outright by accepting that truth is conditional because we aren't omniscient.

 

The problem with accepting fallible induction is that induction doesn't work at all. It doesn't fallibly work; it's a myth; it's impossible to do. There is no method of induction, it's never been used and could not be used.

 

Why? Because the only way to get general ideas using observations is to think about explanations and use criticism to improve them (the Popperian method). All other methods, like induction, involve a non sequitur between observations and general theories. You are told to "induce" to "generalize" but never told how. Without being told how, you cannot follow that instruction. (So what ends up happening is people use the Popperian method. But many are confused and think they used induction.)

 

Put another way: given some data set, which general theory should be induced? There are infinitely many compatible with the data set. What are the rules or method to follow to decide what to induce? And why is the result any good? And what difference does it make that it was induced rather than guessed? This is a problem induction has never been able to deal with.

 

(There are quite a few other arguments refuting induction as well. Not refuting it's infallibility, but it's possibility.)

[Harrison Danneskjold]

What's wrong with measurement omission, IMO, is that it's not as universal as Rand said. It's a good technique to do sometimes, it's worth knowing about, but I think she overrated it. I also think it overemphasizes measurement. It's a specific type of generalizing, but we can also omit things when generalizing for other reasons besides it being a measurement, such as omitting things due to irrelevance.

 How much-less universal?  How often is it a good technique?  Overrated by how much?  Overemphasized by how much?  How often do we generalize in other ways?

 

I don't need any of those questions to be clarified; I just wanted to point out that in your first paragraph alone, you omitted five different measurements (Frequency twice, quantity three times).

 

 

What does it mean to regard sense observation as "self-evident"? Does it mean it is infallible? It is not. People often make mistaken observations. Does it mean it's not open to critical thinking, interpretation, etc? That would be bad.

 It means that when I declare that the sky above me is blue, that's self-evident.  It doesn't need any proof; it simply is.

 

Now, one might quibble over my use of the concept 'sky' (perhaps it's actually a blue ceiling) and a colorblind person might dispute whether it's really blue (although I doubt it; his idea of blue would match all of the things that I call "blue") but to question whether the statement, itself, is true or false, is meaningless; it simply is.

You can question all sorts of conclusions about, or conclusions drawn from sensory evidence.  You cannot question whether the world you see actually exists or whether you can truly see it; those questions carry their own built-in evidence as answers.

 

 

Karl Popper wrote about definitions. He pointed out that it's impossible to have 100% precise definitions. A definition always uses other words. Those words either have their own definitions or they are undefined. If they have their own definitions, then there are more words which need defining too.

 Here I actually agree with you; it is impossible to define 100% of your concepts because sensations (such as the color blue) cannot be accurately defined except by simply pointing at them.  But while 100% definition is impossible to achieve, I think it's a worthwhile goal to pursue.

 

 

The problem with accepting fallible induction is that induction doesn't work at all. It doesn't fallibly work; it's a myth; it's impossible to do. There is no method of induction, it's never been used and could not be used.

 

Why? Because the only way to get general ideas using observations is to think about explanations and use criticism to improve them (the Popperian method).

 Ummmm. . . Would you be so kind as to define 'induction' for me?  Specifically, what is involved after observation but before criticism; the section labeled "think about explanations"?

 

By the way, you never specified any measurements for how long to spend observing, thinking or criticizing.  =P

[Eiuol]

You are told to "induce" to "generalize" but never told how.

One person's failure at explaining how to induce doesn't mean no method exists. Also, how is it true  that the *only* way to induce, or make any kind of generalization, or even abstract information, is by using criticism and existing explanations? To me that indicates a problem with the Popperian method, if all you have is explanation and criticism; where does the explanation and criticism come from? (I'm asking, those questions aren't rhetorical.)

 

It's a specific type of generalizing, but we can also omit things when generalizing for other reasons besides it being a measurement, such as omitting things due to irrelevance.

Omitting things due to irrelevance *is* measurement omission. Rand didn't necessarily mean measurable as always and only quantifiable, just that there is some type of measurement to consider. "Greater than" would qualify as a kind of measurement, even if not a precise number. Then that measurement (and any number of other measurements) is left out when forming a concept with some uniting measurement(s). I don't think measurement omission is as specific as you think Rand meant. So, in what way do you think that Rand overemphasizes?

Edited July 3, 2013 by Eiuol

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Having now done some research on Popper I do think there are some similarities between his philosophy and Rand's.  They were definitely both trying to go in the same direction; he simply accepted the standard doctrines that she completely overturned.

It does seem like both philosophies could be integrated relatively painlessly, provided at least two rather massive caveats:

 

1- Induction is not the enemy; it is the basis of all reason and rather axiomatic.  Induction consists of organizing concrete perceptions into groups (through measurement-omission) and then generalizing from them.

Nobody can refute induction without using inductive inference; there's no other way to formulate any theories, explanations or refutations.  Try it for yourself.  And since nobody can refute induction without induction-based reasoning it really has yet to actually be attacked.

 

2-  Reason is an individual act; not social.

Discussion, debate and enthusiastic argument can all be very helpful towards finding the truth.  However, at the end of the day, only you can put all of the connections together; Robinson Crusoe is just as capable of understanding the world around him as you or I.

 

If these two premises which directly contradict Popper are accepted, the rest should integrate nicely (I think).

[curi]

Eiuol,

 

One person's failure at explaining how to induce doesn't mean no method exists.

 

What "one person"? I've talked to many people and am familiar with the literature.

 

where does the explanation and criticism come from?

 

Creative thinking. The power of the human mind, which is our glory.

 

Omitting things due to irrelevance *is* measurement omission.

 

What is the measurement involved when I don't mention God or altruism? I'm omitting irrelevant topics, not particular measurements of the things I'm talking about.

 

If what she really meant is omitting anything, then it's fine, if maybe not named very well. Thinking conceptually involves being selective about what's important. Popper said something like that too. But I don't think that's quite what Rand meant about "measurement omission".

[softwareNerd]

There are some earlier discussions about Popper. This is one, but a search should find others too.

Edited July 4, 2013 by softwareNerd

[curi]

Harrison Danneskjold,

 

in your first paragraph alone, you omitted five different measurements

 

I omitted infinitely many things. Measurements are a common type of thing. Sure I omitted a lot of measurements. Also other things, like God and altruism.

 

I'm not sure we actually disagree that much here, and wasn't really looking to argue about this.

 

Ummmm. . . Would you be so kind as to define 'induction' for me?

 

You are the one who says it works, so I think it would make more sense if you defined what thing you wish to defend. There are actually many different definitions of induction, with some common themes but also some variation.

 

Here is David Deutsch's (a Popperian) definition from his book The Beginning of Infinity:

 

Inductivism   The misconception that scientific theories are obtained by generalizing or extrapolating repeated experiences, and that the more often a theory is confirmed by observation the more likely it becomes.

Induction   The non-existent process of ‘obtaining’ referred to above.

 

But I don't think this is quite what you wanted to defend.

 

Typical elements of induction include:

 

* A non sequitur from some data set (multiple observations) to some particular theory (infinitely many theories are logically consistent with the data set. why is this particular one chosen? blank out. or several answers have been attempted, like a version of Occam's razor, but they don't work)

 

* A claim that the resulting theory is supported and has high status (authority). (What difference that authority actually makes is typically left vague.)

 

 

This actually comes up a lot that people defend induction but don't seem to know quite what it is. If you don't know what it is, why defend it? I don't think you should be defending induction unless you can define it and explain how the entire thing works, start to finish. If you don't have firsthand knowledge of the full idea, and its correctness, then why defend it?

 

By the way, don't feel too bad about being unable to fully defend induction. Rand couldn't either (nor anyone else). From ITOE 2nd edition:

 

Prof. M: The question is: when does one stop? When does one decide that enough confirming evidence exists? Is that in the province of the issue of induction?

AR: Yes. That’s the big question of induction. Which I couldn’t begin to discuss—because (a) I haven’t worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it, and ( it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process in that field.

 

I believe Rand assumed induction would work, even though she didn't have a full understanding of how it could work, because she didn't know any alternatives to reach the same goals and conclusions she was after. Those goals are things like knowledge being possible to man. I think she figured that since man does acquire knowledge, then induction must work, and some day someone would figure out the details.

 

That's OK as far as it goes. But Popper did figure out the details. And the details are: we can get the same stuff (e.g. that knowledge is possible to man), but by a different method that turned out not to be induction. So what?

[curi]

Having now done some research on Popper I do think there are some similarities between his philosophy and Rand's.  They were definitely both trying to go in the same direction; he simply accepted the standard doctrines that she completely overturned.

It does seem like both philosophies could be integrated relatively painlessly, provided at least two rather massive caveats:

 

1- Induction is not the enemy; it is the basis of all reason and rather axiomatic.  Induction consists of organizing concrete perceptions into groups (through measurement-omission) and then generalizing from them.

Nobody can refute induction without using inductive inference; there's no other way to formulate any theories, explanations or refutations.  Try it for yourself.  And since nobody can refute induction without induction-based reasoning it really has yet to actually be attacked.

 

2-  Reason is an individual act; not social.

Discussion, debate and enthusiastic argument can all be very helpful towards finding the truth.  However, at the end of the day, only you can put all of the connections together; Robinson Crusoe is just as capable of understanding the world around him as you or I.

 

If these two premises which directly contradict Popper are accepted, the rest should integrate nicely (I think).

 

Number two is easy. I agree. Popper agrees. Popper gives some reasons that discussion and so on are helpful (like you say). But he never says they are necessary. They aren't.

 

One reason they are particular important is a sort of comparative advantage argument applied to the intellect. Suppose each person makes a thousand mistakes. But you and I make 500 of the same mistakes, and we also make 500 mistakes of our own. Then we each have 500 things we're right about, which the other guy is wrong about, so we could teach each other a lot.

 

A similar comparative advantage argument could work with specialties. Maybe Bob is better at epistemology, and Sue is better at morality, so they can profit from discussion. (And it's even possible to profit from discussion if Bob is better at both, but the ratios of his skill at each are different than Sue's ratios.)

 

Another way to look at it is that each person has some blind spots. They have some mistakes they are making that they are particularly blind to and have a really hard time identifying. Some of these mistakes are shared by over 99% of the population, so that's hard no matter what you do. But some are only shared by 90% of the population and some by 33% of the population. So in those cases if you talk to a variety of people, you may encounter someone who doesn't share that particular blind spot. Even if he has ten times as many blind spots as you in total, he could still help you on that particular issue.

 

But despite all this value in discussion, you can think however you like. Popper offers no strict rules about it, only some optional suggestions and advice. This is not to say all ways of thinking are equally good. They are not. But you're welcome to try whatever you want, and be judged on the merits of the ideas you come up with, not on your methods of coming up with them. Thinking alone is a method and Popperians do not judge ideas by methods, only by content. (We may criticize methods. A method may be bad and waste a lot of your time and come up with a succession of bad ideas. However even if a method is very bad, this does not prove any particular idea created with that method is false.)

 

 

As to number one, Popper overturned more standard doctrines than Rand did. He overturned induction! Induction is a standard doctrine which Rand accepted, but Popper went further. And Popperian epistemology cannot compromise on this. If it accepted induction, it would immediately have to throw out 80% of its content (not all directly, but there'd be many implications and ramifications). You could still learn some things here and there, but, big picture, Popper would be wrong.

 

However, let's be careful about what induction is. Your statement is ambiguous and could be read as an incomplete version of Popper's epistemology. (A common thing I've run into in debates, btw, is that people trying to rescue induction from criticism change it to the point that they are advocating some subset of Popperian epistemology, without contradicting him, except they still want to call it "induction". You haven't done that yet but it's something to watch out for.)

 

A big issue is how we generalize ideas. Induction traditionally says we generalize data sets to theories. It's trying to get knowledge directly from observation data. That does not work. What you talk about is different because the raw observation data gets mentally processed. The input to the generalizing is not raw anymore, it's been considered, interpreted, improved, etc... So far this is actually disagreeing with a lot of thinking about induction.

 

Also, Popper has nothing against general concepts. General principles or theories are great. We should try to get them. The issue is how we get them. Not directly from data! And also not by "generalizing" which is too vague. Rather, the way to get general concepts is to guess them (using creative, imaginative thinking), not to infer them from anything. If "generalizing" refers to any kind of inferring general theories from less general theories, then that would be along inductive lines and Popper-incompatible, and refuted by Popper (because, among other things, whatever your are inferring from, it's always logical compatible with infinitely many more general conclusions. so there is a big problem of how to select a conclusion. to begin with that would have to be specified). (And I think that this is the kind of thing you meant, though it didn't specify it, so I'm not sure.)

 

OK Back to Popper's approach: we can guess ideas that are more general than we have now. That's unproblematic as far as it goes (it's possible to do). The standard objection is that the guesses will be arbitrary, not knowledge. The solution to that is to use criticism to refute all arbitrary guesses, or any other kind of bad guess.

 

That might sound inconvenient but, like Rand says, you can automate a lot of your thinking so it becomes lightning fast to deal with many cases. (And if someone disagrees, and you want to have a critical discussion, then you can slow down and consider it more carefully. But most of the time there is no problem, and no need to slow down.)

 

So these Popperian guesses get a status of "not refuted, so far". They are fallible, conjectural knowledge. This raises many potential questions: is that good enough? is better possible? if we could do better, how exactly would it work and what would it be like? (Another standard claim of induction is that ideas created by induction have a high status. They are better than conjectural knowledge. I don't think claims like this hold up under scrutiny.) But I'll stop here for now.

 

 

(As a minor note, I normally prefer the term "idea" over "theory". It doesn't especially matter, except that sometimes people attach some special status or authority to the term "theory" as opposed to merely an "idea". I do not intend that.)

[Mikee]

as I understand Popper, he only criticizes enumerative induction, but doesn't appear to know or consider the theories of induction upheld by the likes of Bacon, Herschel, or Whewell. Those three employed not only enumerative inference, but also analogical and eliminative reasoning as part and parcel of the method of induction, and therefore of discovering causes. Popper didn't even think forming concepts was a logical process: he believed it was fine and well when by the concept "dog," we meant dogs in the relation of some spatial-temporal relationship, such as the dogs in Battery Park, and ultimately on the earth (an "individual concept"), but we could not form a concept that applied to *any* such thing with the characteristics specified, with no space or time related limitations (this, he called a "universal concept"). There are also the Kantian and Humean influences to contend with.


 

Edited July 4, 2013 by Mikee

[curi]

Mikee,

 

as I understand Popper, he only criticizes enumerative induction, but doesn't appear to know or consider the theories of induction upheld by the likes of Bacon, Herschel, or Whewell.

 

I think you should study Popper a bit more before making claims like this. For example, if you look in the Name Index in Conjectures and Refutations, you could find out that Popper does know about, consider, and answer Bacon.

 

Also, if this is the standard of argument, where did Rand appear to know about or consider Popper's theories? But actually, serious question, if Popper is mistaken and Objectivism is better, then why are there no Objectivist refutations of Popper with reasonable quality? (I've read several attempts (like Dykes and Locke), but none of the authors actually understood Popper's positions. They kept attributing non-Popperian ideas to Popper and then arguing with those.)

[curi]

There are some earlier discussions about Popper. This is one, but a search should find others too.

 

I'm not sure what value this offers. Popper didn't advocate abduction. (And if he had, I would simply advocate neo-Popperism with the abduction removed, and want to discuss neo-Popperism.) The guy also says

 

Claiming that he [Popper] says that "induction is a myth" is taking a word out of context, I believe.

 

No, it's really not out of context. He said it clearly. He meant it.

 

The thread goes on to talk about some of Popper's students. (Feyerabend, Lakatos). Let's not smear Popper with the ideas of others. It's like bringing up and attacking Branden in a discussion about Objectivism.

[Mikee]

Popper believed that there was no logic to concept-formation, and that such a logical reason would be a myth, for the same reasons as induction formation is. He saw the tie between concepts and induction, and denied that there was any logical sense to it. He also didn't understand nor accept higher levels of inductive theory like Baconian Induction or even Arsistotle and so he thinks he's left with conjectures which are tentative and shaky. Interestingly enough, Francis Bacon never took up the essentials out there vs no essentials debate.

Edited July 4, 2013 by Mikee

[curi]

 It means that when I declare that the sky above me is blue, that's self-evident.  It doesn't need any proof; it simply is.

 

Now, one might quibble over my use of the concept 'sky' (perhaps it's actually a blue ceiling) and a colorblind person might dispute whether it's really blue (although I doubt it; his idea of blue would match all of the things that I call "blue") but to question whether the statement, itself, is true or false, is meaningless; it simply is.

You can question all sorts of conclusions about, or conclusions drawn from sensory evidence.  You cannot question whether the world you see actually exists or whether you can truly see it; those questions carry their own built-in evidence as answers.

 

This is closed minded. Many things have been thought self-evident and turned out to be mistaken. In Objective Knowledge, page 10, Popper discusses three examples:

(a) that the sun will rise and set once in 24 hours (or approximately 90,000 pulse beats),

( that all men are mortal,

© that bread nourishes.

 

(I'm not sure how to disable that copyright symbol from showing up. It should be like [c] with parenthesis.)

 

Each of these seemingly self-evident truths is false (at least in the sense it was originally intended and believed incontrovertible).

 

The example of the sky is similar. Only recently have we had much idea of what a sky actually is, or what we were seeing that looked blue. That's a very error-prone, not self-evident, topic. (It seems to me a bit like claiming stars are self-evident. I can understand how someone might think that today, in the context of their complex scientific knowledge. But it's not really self-evident.)

 

Your understanding of the sky relies on some of your modern scientific understanding. And that modern scientific understanding is complex and fallible!

 

There is no harm in leaving things open to critical questioning (if it's really true, no critical questioning will succeed). And there is a lot of potential harm if we close our minds.

Edited July 4, 2013 by curi

[Mikee]

I don't see how conjectures and refutations are a strength of his epistemology or criticizing enumerative induction and then telling us that induction is a myth is supposed to be a strength. That second one is a serious shortcoming of his epistemology.

Edited July 4, 2013 by Mikee

[Eiuol]

"What "one person"? I've talked to many people and am familiar with the literature."

Even if every person in the world fails to understand induction or lacks a valid theory of induction does not mean there is no valid theory of induction that could be discovered. You basically said "I don't know anyone who has given a good explanation of how to induce, therefore, induction is impossible". This is called failure of imagination, saying that because you can't come up with a theory of induction, there is no valid theory of induction. Plenty of people thought DNA was a completely ridiculous idea because no one had a good explanation of what life is based on.

 

"Creative thinking. The power of the human mind, which is our glory."

So... Some sort of elan vital not based on anything? This is vague. To make my point clearer, elan vital is the "thing" that some people used to think makes life what it is. But it's actually something almost *unimaginably* complex that leads to life as we know it - DNA! Induction could easily be just as complex, it's just that most likely, no one knows how to do it in whole yet.

 

"But I don't think that's quite what Rand meant about "measurement omission"."

What do you think she meant?

 

Anyway, this is getting a bit disorienting. I'd rather stick to the measurement omission question.

Edited July 4, 2013 by Eiuol

[curi]

We can't rule out the possibility that one day someone will figure out how to save induction. So what? If that ever happens I'll change my mind then.

 

We all know humans can think of ideas, guesses. That isn't problematic and requires no special theory.

[Plasmatic]

Poppers entire philosophy is a stolen concept. His rejection of induction and essentialism makes it more like "conceptual grand larceny". D Stove has many good criticisms of Popper. My favorite is how he pointed out the rediculous fact that Popper, like anyone who tries to evade REAL objectivity, has to put words that indicate successful cognition in quotes. ( "Objective" Knowledge,..pointing at Stove. ) Rediculous concepts like "verisimilitude" are the natural result of this incorrect view of objectivity.

Edit: In the view of induction understood by Prof. McCaskey, Popper's criticism of essentialism is in fact criticism of induction of the non enumerative type!

Edited July 4, 2013 by Plasmatic

[Plasmatic]

Curi,( an apt name for a Popperian), Most of your misunderstandings of Oist epistemology are dealt with in the book Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge.

[curi]

Curi,( an apt name for a Popperian), Most of your misunderstandings of Oist epistemology are dealt with in the book Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge.

 

Popper isn't even in the index of that book. If you're going to give me a reference, please tell me where is the quality Objectivist answer to Popper? (E.g. to his criticisms of induction and justificationism)?

 

Above you try to say Popper is scared of the word "Objective" before knowledge. I don't know why you say that. He titled a book "Objective Knowledge". The word "Objective" in the title is not in quotes.

 

You mention David Stove. According to this review,

 

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract;jsessionid=D7A009A76B468E4AECF5BFAAD9FF861E.journals?fromPage=online&aid=7222460

 

Stove says that Popper would deny, "there has been a great accumulation of knowledge or growth of knowledge in the past four hundred years". Since that is not Popper's position (he'd take the opposite position), I'm concerned about the quality of Stove's position.

 

On Amazon, Rafe writes:

 

http://www.amazon.com/review/R31UWOS7LKZBHH/ref=cm_cr_pr_perm?ie=UTF8&ASIN=0765800632&linkCode=&nodeID=&tag=

 

Stove and his claque have completely missed the point of Popper's philosophy and the way that it has sidelined the long-running and pointless academic obsession with knowledge as "justified true belief".

 

I've known Rafe for a long time and I've never seen him be significantly mistaken about this kind of issue. I would expect that if I read the book, I would reach a similar conclusion. But I am not interested in reading an attack on Popper which hasn't understood Popper. If you think it's good, please provide a little bit of evidence that this book (or you) has understood Popper's actual positions and critically addresses them. Or provide some other source, if there is one.