Sensations and memory

[Questioner]

For instance, it would be rather strange to say that after you bake bread, the dough is still there. The dough is actually in a completely different form. Perceptions aren't in the same form as sensations, even if you need sensations to make a percept.

 

 

Let’s try this out, using Rand’s statements, and see if what you are saying is what Rand says. Here, let’s replace {[Percept] with [bread]} and {[sensation] with [Dough]}: 

 

A piece of [bread] is “two or more pieces of” [Dough] automatically retained and integrated "by the baker."

 

Just as Rand’s statement about [Percepts] indicates, this statement indicates that two or more pieces of [Dough] are both retained and integrated - the [Dough] hasn’t been cooked at all, there is just one big, blended lump of uncooked [Dough] that we are now strangely calling [bread]. Her statement in no way suggests that multiple pieces of [Dough] are first integrated/blended, then undergo transformation during the baking process, then become something totally different, like [bread], which is then finally retained.

 

I should also note that we are also not even supposed to be able to retain [Dough] in the first place and that retention is the explicit focus of one of my arguments. 

 

 

 

Contradiction with Regard to [Experience of Sensations]

I see this erroneous and rather strange of Rand to say music is experienced as a pure sensation. It's more like an erroneous scientific claim I think. Really it only applies to music nor is Rand claiming even these sensations are retained in memory for developing concepts later. It's an issue for aesthetics to be sure, but you are not focused on aesthetics.

 

I agree that this is a problematic statement from Rand. However, I refuse to discount her statement that an adult can experience “single musical tones [which] are not percepts, but pure sensations” just because it is from an essay about aesthetics. It is clear from the original quote that she is definitely writing from her own epistemological perspective. I am however willing to accept that she changed her mind at some point from one position to another. As an interesting side not, it might be worth noting that both The Romantic Manifesto and the IOE were both written and published over roughly the same period of time (i.e. - early 60s - early 70s). At the very least, her remarks about “single musical tones” either indicates a blatant contradiction of the IOE or it indicates a shift in positions. In either case, it is intriguing.

 

 

 

Contradiction with Regard to [Memory of Sensations]

Key word, integrated. See what I said above regarding bread and dough.

Contradiction with Regard to [Memory of Sensations] - my original section wasn't very strong, but my basic point (which wasn't really expressed in that section) is that if sensations can be retained during the percept process, then this retention is necessarily some type of memory.

I am not sure what you mean by “a split second.” If you mean retention longer than the immediate moment, then this indicates some type of memory.

Edited August 5, 2013 by Questioner

[Questioner]

What is the  brain of the living organism automatically retaining and integrating? A group of sensations.

 

 

Even if there is a group of 10 sensations, not a single one can be retained beyond the immediate moment. Why? It is because, according to

Rand, sensations cannot be retained beyond the immediate moment and are merely an awareness of the present. If sensations do exist after the present, then they are 1) being retained and 2) being retained in some type of memory as mental retention necessarily implies some type of memory. In either case, Rand has contradicted herself.

 

 

Hydrogen and oxygen have quite different properties from one another.

 

H₂O, an integration of hydrogen and water after the chemical bonding takes place we identify as water, has different properties from either hydrogen or oxygen

 

Think of a percept as an integration of sensations, a "chemical bonding", if you will, of sound, sound, touch, smell and taste bound into a percept "molecule".

 

dream_weaver, I really like your molecular explanation and I agree that Rand probably had something exactly like that in mind when she talked about percepts.

 

For me, you are also implicitly drawing out an important point about sensation integration - 

 

After a group of sensations are integrated, all of the sensations within a group remain distinct from one another while also all being “bonded” to one another in some fashion. If they did not remain distinct, then we would never be able to tell them apart.

 

Thus, just as in your example where water is a group of distinct, bonded hydrogen and oxygen atoms, so too can we say that a percept is a group of distinct, bonded sensations. 

 

Based on this and Rand’s other assertions and contrary to her officially stated position, I can only conclude that sensations can be retained in some type of human memory because:

1. a percept can be retained in a person’s memory
2. a percept is a group of distinct, bonded sensations
3. bonded sensations are a type of sensation 

[A is A]

Questioner, you are getting confused between "retained by the brain" and "retained in memory".  These are two different things.  When you look at, let's say, a book, the light is striking your eyes revealing its color and shape and size.  Yet what your perceive and retain is the percept: the book as an object distinct from its background.  Your brain is automatically doing the integration.  If you walk away, what you remember seeing is the book; you don't remember perceiving that your brain integrated sensations.  There is no contradiction here.  

 

That you have experienced sensations, and that sensations are part of the process of perception, is a discovery that is made by abstraction well after you have conceptual knowledge of percepts, bodily sense organs, etc.

Edited August 5, 2013 by A is A

[Questioner]

FACT: Atoms are not alive

FACT: Human beings are a group of atoms

CLAIM: Human beings are alive

CONTRADICTION: A group of non-living things cannot be alive

 

Do you see a problem with this logic?

 

Hell Yeah!!!

 

You misstated the syllogism and tried to insert some extra language (i.e. - atoms vs. groups of atoms). Your syllogism should read like this:

 

Major Premise: all atoms are not alive

Minor Premise: all human beings are atoms

Conclusion: all human being are not alive

 

If presented correctly in the first place, then your Minor Premise would be a totally absurd premise - it is obvious that people are not atoms.

 

OR, it should read like this:

 

 

Major Premise: all groups of atoms are not alive

Minor Premise: all human beings are groups of atoms

Conclusion: all human beings are not alive

 

If presented correctly in this manner, then your Major Premise would be false - for example, a human being is a group of atoms, but they are actually alive.

 

Now, if your saying that I said something like this or that I said something syllogistically illogical or rediculous, then I would be happy to address it if you point it out, put my words into a correct syllogism, and refrain from adding extra verbiage.

[Questioner]

Questioner, you are getting confused between "retained by the brain" and "retained in memory."

 

Unless you can point me to where Rand explains the distinction between the two, which I don't think that she does, at least not in the IOE, then I totally disagree. This is not to say that I wouldn't be eager to see how she makes the distinction. I would be happy to see anything where Rand explains these positions more in depth.

 

Consequently, I must say that on one level, retention very definitely indicates and implicates memory. In fact, one of merriam-webster's definitions of "retain" is "to keep in mind or memory: remember."

 

Besides this, if a group of sensations is retained by the brain after the present moment, then I would not hesitate to call that a type of memory, possibly an automatic memory or a muscle memory, etc. 

 

Also, I completely understand the point that you, Rand, and many other members are trying to make. All that I am saying is that what Rand actually says contradicts itself and kind of neutralizes her account of sensations and percepts to a degree.

 

Let me reiterate again, it might be true that I retain and/or remember something like a percept, but I am not interested in whether or not that is true for me. I am only interested in what Rand actually says about the process.

 

So, on the one hand, Rand says that sensations cannot be retained beyond the immediate moment and that they are merely an awareness of the present; on the other hand, she says that a group of "bonded-sensations" can be retained, remembered, etc. "Bonded-Sensations" or "Integrated-Sensations" are still sensations, just like a bonded-atom in a molecule is still an atom. Also, I have yet to see anyone put forth a convincing argument, utilizing textual evidence, that indicates that integration happens first and then retention — its just simply not what Rand actually says. What she does say is that, "a percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain." This statement and others like it provide no evidence for any kind chronological sequence or cause and effect relationship with regard to the integration and retention of groups of sensations in percept formation.  

Edited August 5, 2013 by Questioner

[Questioner]

"Although, chronologically, man’s consciousness develops in three stages: the stage of sensations, the perceptual, the conceptual—epistemologically, the base of all of man’s knowledge is the perceptual stage."

 

That's from PWNI, but I'm sure the equivalent is in ITOE.

 

Plus it's clear she's saying that 1) sensations aren't retained, 2) perception is integration of sensations, so 3) a percept cannot be created after it is already stored. Perception is automatic, so it's no problem that you cannot remember/recall/make use of sensations consciously. Understand that there is a separation between peception and the integration of sensations, Rand is making a notable distinction in terms of stages, not that sensation is continuous all the way up to perception or even conception. Hume, for example, said that there is sensation, and conception. 

 Thanks for the response! Much appreciated.

 

However, the quote that you identified in no way refutes what Rand actually says about percepts.

 

What she does say is that "a percept is a group of sensations is retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism."

• If sensations cannot be retained, then a group of sensations cannot be retained. 
• She never says that a group of sensations are integrated before they are retained. She only says that they are "retained and integrated."
• Even if we allow that integration only occurs in the mere immediate present moment, that still only leaves us with a group of bonded sensations - how are we supposed to retain a group of bonded sensations beyond the mere immediate present moment?
  • Just as a bonded-atom in a molecule is still an atom, so too is a bonded sensation in a group of sensations still a sensation...and, like all sensations, it cannot be retained beyond the mere immediate present moment.
  • Thus, when Rand says that a group of sensations is retained, she contradicts herself!

[Questioner]

Plus it's clear she's saying that 1) sensations aren't retained, 2) perception is integration of sensations, so 3) a percept cannot be created after it is already stored.

 

Perception is automatic, so it's no problem that you cannot remember/recall/make use of sensations consciously. Understand that there is a separation between peception and the integration of sensations, Rand is making a notable distinction in terms of stages, not that sensation is continuous all the way up to perception or even conception. Hume, for example, said that there is sensation, and conception. 

 

1) sensations aren't retained — TRUE according to Rand

2) perception is integration of sensations — FALSE according to Rand

• Rand says that the faculty of perception is the faculty of retaining sensations and that a perception is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism
  • SEE Rand, where she says, "The higher organisms possess a much more potent form of consciousness: they possess the faculty of retaining sensations, which is the faculty of perception. A 'perception' is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism" (The Virtue of Selfishness, pg. 19).
• You also don't make any sense when you say in #2 that "perception is integration of sensations" and then later say, "there is a separation between peception and the integration of sensations." I just don't understand what you are actually trying to say.
  • To me, it seems like you're trying to have your cake and eat it too by trying to get away with saying that whatever is the integration of sensations is necessarily a perception, but whatever is a perception is not necessarily the integration of sensations. Of course, please correct me if I am wrong here.
    • If this is in fact the case, please provide an example of something that is a perception, but is not the integration of sensations.

​​​3) a percept cannot be created after it is already stored — ? 

• Sorry for the confusion, but I am just not sure where this fits in.

Edited August 5, 2013 by Questioner

[Questioner]

 

• You also don't make any sense when you say in #2 that "perception is integration of sensations" and then later say, "there is a separation between peception and the integration of sensations." I just don't understand what you are actually trying to say.
  • To me, it seems like you're trying to have your cake and eat it too by trying to get away with saying that whatever is the integration of sensations is necessarily a perception, but whatever is a perception is not necessarily the integration of sensations. Of course, please correct me if I am wrong here.
    • If this is in fact the case, please provide an example of something that is a perception, but is not the integration of sensations.

 

Or, are you saying that whatever is a perception is necessarily the integration of sensations, but whatever is a perception is not necessarily the integration of sensations? If this is the case, it makes absolutely no sense.

 

Or, are you saying that whatever is a perception and whatever is the integration of sensations are mutually exclusive because of there being a separation between the two?

 

As far as I can tell, your three Major premises seem to be:

 

All perception is the integration of sensations

-OR-

Some perception is the integration of sensations (meaning some perception is not the integration of sensations)

-OR-

No perception is the integration of sensations

 

 

I am just not sure what your position is.

Edited August 5, 2013 by Questioner

[Grames]

This is futile.  Unsubscribing thread.

[Eiuol]

• Rand says that the faculty of perception is the faculty of retaining sensations and that a perception is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism

Something integrated is an integration. So, perception is the integration of sensations. Something is a percept if and only if it is an integration of sensations.

 

By saying separation, I only mean that a process of integrating sensations is distinct from a percept. The process is not something you are aware of. There is the process of perception, and then there is memory of a percept.

 

I have a larger post written up, I'll post it another time.

[Questioner]

Understand that there is a separation between peception and the integration of sensations... 

 

What kind a of "separation"?

 

Are you saying that the integration of sensations is not a perception or that the integration of sensations is different from a perception or that the integration of sensations happens before a perception?

 

In any of these cases, this is definitely not what Rand says.

 

• My guess is that you mean something like the notion that perception is different from the integration of sensations.
  • If this is the case, I think that you have contradicted yourself. 
  • While it is true that [the integration of sensations] & [perception] are not exactly the same in terms of "words," looking at your own statement ("perception is the integration of sensations), they appear to be the exactly the same in terms of what they mean.
  • If you accept that they are exactly the same in terms of what they mean, then they are not actually different from each other
  • If you are interested in proving that they are different from one another, then you should define each one separately and not use one to define the other if that is what you are doing.

[Plasmatic]

Questioner, I am sympathetic to the desire to be precise with words. I often say that many Oist use the requirements of context keeping as a liscense to equivocate and use words interchangably. This is an annoying practice for me, particularly in technical philosophy

However, I want to add that, for Ms. Rand, "as such" seems to have been a special type of qualifier.

"Abstractions, as such, do not exist", "concepts are abstractions", "concepts are mental existents", "abstractions are real".

Again, in the above we see that she makes a statement that seems to contradict the rest of her statements technically and it contains "as such".

Like the statement here being contended:

" Sensations, as such, are not retained in mans memory"

I contend that Ms. Rand saw, "as such", as an indication that she was aware of the fuller context of her statements and was intending others to see that she was qualifying that usage.

"Sensations, as such", to be differentiated from a "group of sensations", which to her was a percept. The practice of "being charitable" in criticism is an established practice of interpretation.

Edited August 5, 2013 by Plasmatic

[Questioner]

Something integrated is an integration. So, perception is the integration of sensations. Something is a percept if and only if it is an integration of sensations.

 

By saying separation, I only mean that a process of integrating sensations is distinct from a percept. The process is not something you are aware of. There is the process of perception, and then there is memory of a percept.

 

 

Again, this doesn't make any sense and it is also not what Rand says.

 

• You said, "Something is a percept if and only if it is an integration of sensations."

 

◦ Here, I assume that the word "Something" also means "[percept] — correct me if I am wrong.

 

▪ If so, we can all agree that you are saying that "[A percept] is a percept if and only if it is an integration of sensations."

▪ fine. If you accept that that is what you are saying, then so do I.

 

• [integration] - Let's discuss:

 

◦ Rand says, "Consciousness, as a state of awareness, is not a passive state, but an active process that consists of two essentials: differentiation and integration" (IOE, pg. 5).

 

▪ Here, I think that we can agree that she identifies [integration] as [an active process].

 

◦ The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines [integration] as [the act or process or instance of integrating]

 

• Your Contradiction: 

 

◦ Let's substitute a [Randian/Merriam-Websterian definition of Integration] for the word [integration] in the definition that you provided for a [Percept]

 

▪ [A percept] is a percept if and only if it is an [active process of integrating] sensations

 

◦ Then you say, "that a process of integrating sensations is distinct from a percept."

 

 

So, which is it?

 

Is a process of integrating sensations distinct from a percept?

-OR-

Is an [active process of integrating] sensations what a percept is?

-OR-

 

Is a process of integrating sensations distinct from an [active process of integrating] sensations?

[Questioner]

Plasmatic.

 

Best response so far! Thank you for being thoughtful and thorough!

[Questioner]

PLASMATIC.

 

What say you with regard to Rand's statement that:

 

"Sensations are merely an awareness of the present and cannot be retained beyond the immediate moment" (IOE, pg. 57). 

 

This statement definitely dispenses with the "as such," but sheds no light on how a group of sensations is automatically retained when sensations cannot be retained beyond the immediate moment.

______________________________________________

 

As far as being charitable, are you suggesting that I take an altruistic stance with regard to Rand and her account of sensation?

Rand is a "philosopher" and an "epistemologist" is she not?

Can she not stand on her own two feet, is she not strong enough to make it on her own, or does she need some help?

 

What I am saying is that she definitely seems to contradict herself and does not provide a very good account of sensation and perception when building the base of her epistemological architecture.

 

Part of looking at an epistemological account is acknowledging and dealing with its inconsistencies; otherwise, what's the point?

 

Also, if you wish to depart from a strict account of what Rand says about sensation and percepts, then I am all ears?

Let's hear what you've got.

[Questioner]

I often say that many Oist use the requirements of context keeping as a liscense to equivocate and use words interchangably. This is an annoying practice for me, particularly in technical philosophy

 

Plasmatic,

 

I almost forgot to say...BOO HOO SWEETIE.

 

 

[Questioner]

By saying separation, I only mean that a process of integrating sensations is distinct from a percept. The process is not something you are aware of. There is the process of perception, and then there is memory of a percept.

 

Are you proposing separate definitions for perception and percept?

 

• If we look at your proposed definition of [percept] and my substitution of your word [integration] for a [Randian/Merriam-Websterian definition of Integration], then it appears that you have gotten mixed up again.
  • Let's look at this definition:
    • [A percept] is a percept if and only if it is an [active process of integrating] sensations
• Then you say, "The process is not something you are aware of. There is the process of perception, and then there is memory of a percept."
  • From this, I would conclude that you are saying that I am not aware of the process on the one hand and that you are also saying that there is a memory of an [active process of integrating] sensations on the other hand.
  • This is very confusing.

Edited August 5, 2013 by Questioner

[Eiuol]

Percept is a noun. I used it to be clearer when we're talking about memory. Perception could be a process or like a verb. I use percept to mean the form of which you are aware of entities. I could say "a perception" but then that's worse. Substituting definitions for concepts doesn't help either, a concept is not just its definition. I am saying the process of integrating sensations is not something you are aware of, but you're aware of the outcome.

"Here, I think that we can agree that she identifies [integration] as [an active process]."

No. It says  consciousness is an active state which includes integration. That means consciousness requires integration, not that all kinds of integration are active processes. It says nothing about whether there are non-volitional processes of integration. You committed the fallacy of composition again. Just because consciousness is active doesn't mean everything that leads to consciousness is active. Well, not exactly the fallacy, since we're talking about processes here. If consciousness is an active process, and consists of two essentials, then grammar alone suggests that the two essentials are being qualified by "an active process". I almost feel like I am diagramming sentences now...

[dream_weaver]

 

dream_weaver, I really like your molecular explanation and I agree that Rand probably had something exactly like that in mind when she talked about percepts.

 

For me, you are also implicitly drawing out an important point about sensation integration - 

 

After a group of sensations are integrated, all of the sensations within a group remain distinct from one another while also all being “bonded” to one another in some fashion. If they did not remain distinct, then we would never be able to tell them apart.

 

Thus, just as in your example where water is a group of distinct, bonded hydrogen and oxygen atoms, so too can we say that a percept is a group of distinct, bonded sensations. 

 

Based on this and Rand’s other assertions and contrary to her officially stated position, I can only conclude that sensations can be retained in some type of human memory because:

1. a percept can be retained in a person’s memory
2. a percept is a group of distinct, bonded sensations
3. bonded sensations are a type of sensation 

 

Consider another analogy then.

A letter is fed into a fax machine.

The fax machine illuminates the surface of the letter under sensors which detect dark and light patches creating a series of 1's and 0's.

The phone dials another fax machine, the 1's and 0's are transmitted as sounds down an analog line to another machine which converts the tones into 1's and 0's based on the pitch.

 

Are the 1's and 0's a different form of the letter? Are the transmitted tones yet another form of the letter?

 

Sensations from the world impinge on our senses. The energy interacting with the senses cause the senses to produce a nerve impulse which is sent the brain. The brain processes these nerve impluses automatically, integrating them into percepts.

 

Without giving a fully detailed biological/physiological breakdown of every step, would it be fair to say that a percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism?

 

The sensations are integrated by the brain into percepts, but the brain is not literally taking sensations and using them qua sensations to build a percept, which can then be taken apart and put back together like they were akin to legos.

[Questioner]

Eiuol and dream_weaver, thanks for your thoughtful responses. I need some time to review them.

[Questioner]

Percept is a noun. I used it to be clearer when we're talking about memory. Perception could be a process or like a verb. I use percept to mean the form of which you are aware of entities. I could say "a perception" but then that's worse. Substituting definitions for concepts doesn't help either, a concept is not just its definition. I am saying the process of integrating sensations is not something you are aware of, but you're aware of the outcome.

 

 

Not trying to be rude, but I am having a hard time understanding the ways that you are trying to use percept and perception. For what its worth, I don’t think that Rand tries to parse them in the same ways that you do. She also sometimes explains both of them in exactly the same way. 

 

Percept is a noun. Perception is also a noun. Perceive is a verb.

Maybe you could just say the [Process of Perception]. That seems clearer to me than trying to turn a noun into a verb.

 

• you said, "I use percept to mean the form of which you are aware of entities."
  • just not sure what this means...
• you said, "a concept is not just its definition."
  • I agree that a concept is not just its definition
    • I think that maybe there is some confusion between: 
      • [statements of Pervasion] - Whatever is a [P] is [necessarily]/[not necessarily]/[necessarily not] a [Q]
      • [statements of Being] - [P] is [Q]
      • [statements of Existence] - If [P] exists, then [Q] exists
    • As a totally non-controversial example, let’s look at the definition of [boulder] in order to understand some of what I was saying earlier:
      • [boulder] - [a large rock, typically one that has been worn smooth by erosion]
        • With regard to the relationship between the definiendum - [boulder], and its definition - [a large rock, typically one that has been worn smooth by erosion], I am saying (in quick shorthand) that:
          • Whatever is a [boulder] is necessarily [a large rock, typically one that has been worn smooth by erosion] and whatever is [a large rock, typically one that has been worn smooth by erosion] is necessarily a [boulder]
          • If a [boulder] exists, then [a large rock, typically one that has been worn smooth by erosion] exists and if [a large rock, typically one that has been worn smooth by erosion], then a [boulder] exists
        • This relationship between a definiendum and its definition means that you can always exchange a definiendum for its definition when making an “is” statement (i.e. - a [statement of Being]), but doing so can change the validity of that “is” statement.
        • for example, I can say that:
          • The subject, a [boulder], is always big
            • [always big] is obviously not the definition of [boulder]
            • But, in this case, I can substitute the definition of [boulder] for the definiendum [boulder] and still make a true “is” statement about a [boulder]
          • (Thus,) The subject, [a large rock, typically one that has been worn smooth by erosion], is always big 
            • this statement is just as true as the first one
          • (However, I can’t say) The subject, [boulder], is a definition
            • [boulder] is not a definition, its a definiendum
          • (But I can say) The subject, [a large rock, typically one that has been worn smooth by erosion], is a definition
            • its the definition of [boulder]
  • Just to make one point clear, the relationship between a definiendum and its definition is always one of mutual inclusion - they both always equally pervade each other. 
    • e.g. - Whatever is a [boulder] is necessarily [a large rock, typically one that has been worn smooth by erosion] and whatever is [a large rock, typically one that has been worn smooth by erosion] is necessarily a [boulder]
  • Thus, it is always possible to exchange a definiendum for its definition, but doing so can change the validity of [statements of Being]

Edited August 6, 2013 by Questioner

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Now, if your saying that I said something like this or that I said something syllogistically illogical or rediculous, then I would be happy to address it if you point it out, put my words into a correct syllogism, and refrain from adding extra verbiage.

 

P:  Men cannot retain sensations

p:  Sensations are percepts

C:  Men cannot retain percepts

 

This is the form and function of everything you have buried this thread beneath.  I invite you to examine the minor premise because sensations are NOT percepts- a fact which Louie, Dream Weaver and A=A have been attempting to explain this entire time.

But here's that information for you, once more:

 

A "pure" sensation, in isolation, conveys no information whatsoever about the external world.

To see the color red would give no indication of what you're looking at, in its identity, because virtually anything can appear "red" under the proper lighting conditions.  To hear a sound in isolation gives no indication of the sound's source (if you concentrate on any noise you hear, by itself, for several-second intervals, you'll realize that many diverse noises actually sound identical).

The sound of crickets in the distance is identical to certain sorts of squeaky shopping-cart wheels, is identical to a washboard.

 

So consider a basketball.

You can directly sense its various shades of orange (predominantly) and black, its round shape, its coarse texture and the distinctive sound created when it bounces off of the floor (et cetera, et cetera, et cetera).  But none of these sensations has the slightest meaning, in and of itself.

They can only provide insight into the world around you when integrated into a single, comprehensive identity, which includes and subsumes all of its components- a percept.

So sensations can inform you about all of the attributes of a basketball, but only a perception can inform you of what they all amount to; that they mean something and that thing IS a basketball.

 

Now, what would it mean to remember a sensation in isolation?

 

In my example, I asked you to imagine numerous different sensations which are subsumed under "basketball"; now ask yourself something.  Did your mind jump to those sensations themselves?

Or did you remember them (perhaps in isolation) only AFTER remembering a basketball, in full, as one cohesive unit?

---

 

Perceptions are groups of sensations and, in THAT form, sensations absolutely can be retained and remembered far beyond the immediate moment.  But no sensation can be retained on its own; they can only be remembered in connection with other coinciding sensations.

 

You can talk all day about the hue of a certain sunset you once saw, the taste of a certain drink or the texture of your first lover's skin; none of it changes the fact that those sensations cannot and do not exist in a mental vacuum, but in a unified framework amongst countless other sensations- all organized into percepts.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Postscript:

My explanation might differ from what Rand had in mind; I think it's essentially the same as every other one mentioned in this thread.  But that's irrelevant.

I think that my description of sensation and perception (which I can elaborate on, if you'd like) is true.  Full stop.  So if you actually disagree with what I've said then we can proceed from there; otherwise it's tangential.

Now, as far as Rand's conception of it goes, I think it's the same one that I (and Louie and Dream Weaver and A=A) have laid out.  I see no reason why it should conflict with what Rand said; even the quote here, which was the source of this whole quagmire, seems right in line with myself.

 

If you agree with my conception of sensation/perception, but want to dispute whether or not it's actually what Rand thought, then that's a valid line of inquiry.  But if that's your intention then I would like you to show me, logically, how the two contradict each other.

It'll take slightly more than semantic conjecture to convince me that she held a contradiction as true, much less published one.

 

Let's look at the content of her ideas, instead of the specific words used to convey them.

[Questioner]

Postscript:

My explanation might differ from what Rand had in mind; I think it's essentially the same as every other one mentioned in this thread.  But that's irrelevant.

I think that my description of sensation and perception (which I can elaborate on, if you'd like) is true.  Full stop.  So if you actually disagree with what I've said then we can proceed from there; otherwise it's tangential.

Now, as far as Rand's conception of it goes, I think it's the same one that I (and Louie and Dream Weaver and A=A) have laid out.  I see no reason why it should conflict with what Rand said; even the quote here, which was the source of this whole quagmire, seems right in line with myself.

 

If you agree with my conception of sensation/perception, but want to dispute whether or not it's actually what Rand thought, then that's a valid line of inquiry.  But if that's your intention then I would like you to show me, logically, how the two contradict each other.

It'll take slightly more than semantic conjecture to convince me that she held a contradiction as true, much less published one.

 

Let's look at the content of her ideas, instead of the specific words used to convey them.

Fair enough. I hear you. I will have to consider it more in terms of what you and others have presented, as opposed to just looking at the semantics based contradiction. 

[Eiuol]

 

Not trying to be rude, but I am having a hard time understanding the ways that you are trying to use percept and perception. For what its worth, I don’t think that Rand tries to parse them in the same ways that you do. She also sometimes explains both of them in exactly the same way. 

 

Percept is a noun. Perception is also a noun. Perceive is a verb.

Maybe you could just say the [Process of Perception]. That seems clearer to me than trying to turn a noun into a verb.

When you look at an apple, you are aware of it in a certain *way*. The red color, round-like shape, shine, etc, those are all part of the form in which you are aware of the apple when integrated automatically. The form itself varies depending on sense organs of a particular species of creature, but its a form in which one is aware nonetheless. Percept is not an invention of mine, although what I label it  doesn't really matter. I'll stick to "perception" (as the noun) and "process of perception" though for our discussion.

As for definitions, they are necessary but not sufficient parts of a concept to which a word refers. Insofar as your perception of X is an integration sensations, it says nothing of the nature an integration of sensations. Sure, it's entirely true therefore that sensation and perception are related, but that alone won't say to you that the integration requires that a person can consciously access the all the components of perception. And breaking down perceptions into sensations doesn't happen anyway, the nature of concepts indicates that any "breakdown" of perceptions is a mental process that's cognitive / conceptual. You actually described an "if and only if" statement, and is what I meant by "something is a perception if and only if it is a an integration of sensations". (Just to add, what you mean by definiendum is what I mean by a referent, i.e. the "thing" which we're talking about).

Edited August 13, 2013 by Eiuol