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Scientific anti-realism and Objectivism

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The bird can't possibly accept something as concrete until it IS concrete to him and that's all im saying.

 

Maybe I presented the argument too quickly.

 

Surely, after observing the trees, the bird would not only believe that they are concrete, but that they were concrete in the past, even before it observed them.

So, in the case that the bird observes the trees, it will definitely find its past beliefs to be wrong.

This is independent of any particular aspects the bird observes, only that something is observed.

 

The bird, while still flying overhead, believes the trees to be not unknown concrete things, but "abstract things".

(Aside: No evidence gives rise to the bird's belief in abstract things, only a lack of evidence, so it can't be considered objective anyway.)

But the bird knows that it will definitely change its views upon going down.

I am saying that it is irrational for the bird to believe something that it knows it will certainly disbelieve in the future.

 

"Electrons almost certainly exist but don't reify them" - Sorry, to me this translates as "a: they're real; b: disbelieve a".

I'm doubt there is a special category even epistemologically of "seeing something for oneself" - as stated in the post above (not to agree with all of it), even objects you hold in your hand must be grasped as abstractions integrating the senses.

 

I may make a separate thread for discussions of context; in the case of a limited number of objects it shouldn't be a problem.

Edited by rowsdower
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But that's what im saying; "the activity we attribute to electrons".

You can't directly sense an electron; their existence is inferred.

They aren't perceptual concretes like a phone or a car or a house. In a way they're conceptual concretes which must be discovered through abstract thought; derivative of electricity and magnetism.

And i just think they should stay derivative rather than taken out of context and reified.

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HD: Is it reifying an electron for chemistry to identify that there are 8 of them contained in an atom of oxygen?

Reifying an abstraction is taking an abstraction that cannot exist apart from the entity it is abstracted from. Treating "length" as if it were a separate entity rather than an attribute of an object which possesses length would be a reification. You cannot cut "length" from an entity, separate it by electrolysis. Electrons, while derived knowledge of science, have properties distictive from the atoms that are comprised in part with them.

Edited by dream_weaver
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Alright; "reify" was the wrong word then. Thank you dreamweaver.

Im trying to say that while electrons exist they do so conditionally, dependent on the observations which allowed us to realize them. Accordingly we should remember what conditions made their existence the logical conclusion because they may not always remain so.

Context changes and so can electrons. And to be crystal clear, i don't expect this to ever actually happen; it's more a technical point.

Entire lifetimes have been wasted and physical absurdities concocted when people have failed to remember why they originally reached a certain conclusion.

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For example: psychics.

If people applied this context keeping to any number of superstitions they'd drop them all overnight.

A gambler who attempts to replicate his past success by replicating various coinciding conditions, specifically, has forgotten how he formed various beliefs.

So there's a broader point here Im driving at.

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  • 2 months later...

Let's get some things straight!

 

Reality: The body of phenomena consistently experienced by sentient beings.

{If more is needed on completeness or consistency Google 'Kurt Göedel'}

 

Hypothesis: An Idea or consistent set of Ideas based in; 

Opinions, Hunches,  Suspicions or Gut Feelings 

 

An hypothesis a tentative statement about reality. But for it to become a theory, it must lead to deductions that can be tested. As deductions are verified, the probability that the hypothesis is correct increases. When deductions are shown to be incorrect, the original hypothesis must be either abandoned or modified to accommodate the accumulated evidence. Hypotheses can be used to build more complex inferences and explanations of observed phenomena or hypothetical relationships.

 

Scientific Theory: Organized FACTS in EVIDENCE

 

A scientific theory is a well substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural world. 

Theories are based on the body of relevant facts that have been repeatedly confirmed through observation and experiment. An Hypothesis becomes a Theory when a substantial body of it's deductions are tested and shown by the resulting evidence to be true, while NONE of them are shown to be false or incorrect.

 

FACT: Experimentally verified statement about reality, accepted as true.

 

In Science, an Observation that has been repeatedly confirmed by experiment is accepted, for all practical purposes, as true. In Science, however, -truth is never final.- When new observations or new experiments disprove any of the deductions supporting a theory or fact, like an hypothesis, all science, is subject to review. None of this begs the questions about wave-particle duality or any other esoteric quantum concept. It simply states reality is real, we are trying to describe reality, and reality is the final arbiter. Kurt Göedel proved we will never have a complete description, but the one we already have is incredibly useful and we all know we can do better. The EPR paradox is alive and well in the results of the dual slit experiments, but it does not matter, reality is real, A is A.

 

 IF YOU DO NOT GET IT, READ IT AGAIN

or avoid science discussions.

 

IF YOU DO GET IT, BUT REFUSE TO ACCEPT IT,

I seriously doubt you accept Objectivism either.

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In a recent course on the metaphysics of science, I encountered the theories of realism vs anti-realism in regard to scientific theories. I've considered myself an Objectivist for a while, but I found myself agreeing with the anti-realists. Now, of course, "anti-realism" sounds very un-Objectivist, but I'm specifically referring to anti-realism concerning scientific theories (and more particularly, my interpretation of anti-realism regarding scientific theories.)

 

As I understand it, scientific anti-realism is the view that scientific theories should be viewed as 'models' of reality and not as representing 'actual' reality. An anti-realist would say that the questions of whether electrons exist or not is beside the point, but that by modeling atoms as though electrons exist, we are able to make accurate predictions. A realist would say that electrons 'actually' exist.

 

An anti-realist would say that modeling water as a fluid and applying fluid dynamics is no more or less 'truthful' (or closer to reality) as modeling water as a series of small H2O molecules, but it is more 'useful' when talking about fluids and less useful when discussing Brownian motion. A realist would say that water is 'really' bursts of quantum fluctuations (or energy vibrations), and so modeling it as small particles is a more accurate representation than fluid dynamics, but that the most truthful of all is thinking of water as quantum energy (i.e. it's closer to reality).

 

If, somehow, we developed an infallible model of physics (one that always gave accurate results) an anti-realist would claim it was a very good model, but that we couldn't really claim it was true or false, only that it gave very good predictions. A realist would say it was a true model.

 

Some of my reasons for believing in anti-realism come from my chemistry background. We model light as a particle in some situations and a wave in others. When, in reality, it seems light is something else, and it's really hard to comprehend exactly what. Quantum mechanics often comes up with theories that seem to predict reality better than we can measure it, but I've never heard a Quantum chemist say that what they're doing is actually meant to be reality, it just models it really well.

 

For the sake of intellectual honesty (of calling myself an Objectivist), I was wondering whether Objectivist views are compatible with (my understanding of and belief in) scientific anti-realism. 

 

P.S. I searched for this topic before starting a thread, but couldn't find it. "Anti-Realism" shows up a lot on the search engine. I apologize if this has been covered already. Sorry if I rambled too long.

 

Hello Mushroom:

 

I would suggest reading OPAR and "understanding objectivism".... and possibly listening to the history of philosophy by LP.

 

Primarily I think there is a problem of "rationality" (or perhaps skepticism) sneaking into the dialogue.

 

If a scientific theory or better an explanation of observations of reality is aimed at knowledge of the nature of reality then it is proceeding correctly.  As each explanation which should be the minimal one given any unexplained phenomenon is tested, science is verified.  In some cases an explanation will exceed its purpose and other experiments to elicit heretofore unobserved behaviour will be carried out.  The nature of reality are thus revealed.  If science does not overstate knowledge of reality many of the distinctions based on rationality disappear.   

 

Recall knowledge of reality is contextual... human observation.

 

IF science is done correctly, there should be no confusion.  A representation is a representation, a model is a model.  What a person SAYS about reality:  X behaves according to this formula, or this representation, or this model.  IS either correct or not.  The map and the territory are not the same, but the claims regarding what one (the map) has to say about the other (the territory) must and can be validated or not.  Thus the map gains a status of knowledge or garbage.

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Hi Strictly Logical,

 

I've read OPAR and quite a few peices of Objectivist literature (although I haven't listened to LP's History of Philosophy.)

 

I'm not sure if there's a problem of rationality or skepticism sneaking into the dialogue. I don't call myself a skeptic, nor do I think the term applies much to my views.

 

If a scientific theory or better an explanation of observations of reality is aimed at knowledge of the nature of reality then it is proceeding correctly.

Absolutely! However, both realists and anti-realists agree with this statement. The difference of opinion is what this 'knowledge' encompasses. A realist would say that theories are either true or false, while an anti-realist would say that they are useful or not. Both would claim that Newton offered a theory/ explanation of observations aimed at the knowledge of the nature of reality. The realist would say that Newton's theory was false, that Einstein's theories are less false, and that a final "theory of everything" (if one is possible) would be the least false of all. The anti-realist would say that truth and falsity doesn't really apply to Newton's theory (or any theory which can predict something accuratly). All that counts is context and Newtonian mechanics' usefulness. Newton's theories are very useful at describing a ball in flight near the earth's surface. Einstein's theories would give you the same numbers, but would require more work. Since Einstein's theories are more complex, they are less useful to simple thrown ball calculations. Neither theory is more "true," but Einsteins allows a greater number of accurate predictions near large gravitational feilds or at high speeds, so there it is more useful.

 

As each explanation which should be the minimal one given any unexplained phenomenon is tested, science is verified.

Eh, I am remembering the joke about the engineer, physicist, and mathematician onboard a train travelling through Scotland. The engineer looks out the window, sees a solitary black sheep, and says, "Ah, I see the sheep in Scotland are black!" The physicist looks out and says, "No, you cannot make that inference. We can only see one sheep, so all we can deduce is that that one sheep is black." The mathematician turns, looks, and says, "Wrong, we can only see half a sheep, so all we can deduce is that there is half a sheep in Scotland and that that half a sheep is black."

 

Sometimes what the "minimal" explanation is is a tricky thing to decide. In broad stroaks, I agree we shouldn't overstate what we know.

 

 If science does not overstate knowledge of reality many of the distinctions based on rationality disappear.

I guess I don't really understand what you mean by "distinctions based on rationality." Are you saying that if science confined itself to specific contextual statements, the distinction between realist and anti-realist would disappear?

 

 IF science is done correctly, there should be no confusion.  A representation is a representation, a model is a model.  What a person SAYS about reality:  X behaves according to this formula, or this representation, or this model.  IS either correct or not.  The map and the territory are not the same, but the claims regarding what one (the map) has to say about the other (the territory) must and can be validated or not.  Thus the map gains a status of knowledge or garbage.

I completely agree with this, but I'm not exactly sure whether it answers the realist/anti-realist question. Imagine one has two maps. The first is something like the cliche'd Muppet Treasure Island treasure map. A few poorly sketched landmarks, a compass rose, and a big red "X." The other is a Google style map, with high enough resolution to read bubblegum wrappers littered on the ground.

 

Someone tells you to find the "X." In this case, the Muppet Treasure Island treasure map would be WAY more useful (since the other map doesn't show the big "X") however, in almost every other way, the Google style map would be more useful. Both contain truth, but one is far, far more limited. Both contain approximations/limited data (the Google map couldn't tell you how many bacteria lived on those gum wrappers.) And a more in-depth map might be able to do better than either put together.

 

What a realist would say, as I understand it, is that the Google-style map would be more "true" than the Muppet Treasure Island map, as it is a better representation of reality. But, an anti-realist would say that the Muppet Island map is more useful for finding the "X," but less useful in every other way, though it is just as "truthful" as the Google style one. The maps both gain status as "Knowledge" for finding a landmark, but it would seem that the Google-style map would be garbage in finding the "X" and the Muppet Island map would be garbage in finding any non-marked object/landmark.

 

Maybe a good way of summarizing the debate is: Should a model be classified as "True or False" or should it be classified as "Useful or Not Useful." - The third option, a pragmatist one, is that saying "True or False" is the same as "Useful or Not Useful."

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MAPS

 

Insofar as the Muppet map is not misleading, it is as true AND as useful as the Google map in respect of finding the X.  The NUMBER of facts contained in the Google map differ from the Muppet Treasure map, many real facts (where exposed bubblegum wrappers visible to satellites are located) are present in the Google map which are not present in the Muppet Treasure Map, and the location of the X, is at least one fact contained in both maps.

 

The reality the maps refer to is an identity, a single reality spanning the size represented by the maps.  Each map says a great many things about the reality, each of this things claimed by the maps is either true or is false.  Whether or not the truth of any of the facts revealed by either map is useful is not something residing in the map but in the relationship between the fact and man.  If the fact is useful to man, insofar as each map stated the truth regarding the fact the map is useful.

 

 

Knowable? (false limits)

 

Perhaps this is really not a debate over models or theories but the extent of knowledge to be sought.  AS IF there were some sort of limit to what Man can or should seek to know.  Man should seek to know EVERYTHING, even knowing that omniscience is impossible.   Knowledge of an entity is precisely to know the nature of the thing,, what it IS, what it does, including all the properties, qualities, attributes, interactions etc. 

 

It may be that "anti-realism" is imposing a false barrier on knowledge, i.e. not to seek the nature of things but only their effects, whereas realism may be attempting to find the "true" nature of things "in themselves"  beyond their effects.  It may be in some sense this is a false dichotomy, similar to all the others arising from the analytic synthetic dichotomy.

 

 

Entities and their Effects

 

Since ALL of our knowledge of reality is based on perception i.e. effects on our sense apparatus, we must be happy with not having a "mystically direct" knowledge of things "in themselves" independent of effects, and so in a sense entities we discover and come to know must be defined based on effects they cause.   Equally, since effects are effects of something and cannot exist independently of their existent causes, we must be comfortable with effects not being primary metaphysically speaking.  In reality entities and their effects must be looked at as having the same footing, they simply ARE, and the choice of realism versus anti-realism is a false dichotomy.

 

When we get to the most fundamental aspects of nature, it is very possible we will define the most basic of things based on the most basic effects they cause which we can observe (perhaps through a long chain of causation and a multitude of instruments).  But this is not an empty definition of these basic things.  To want more, i.e. to want to know, and "see" more than the effects they cause would be to look for something mystical, something we could know independent of perception by means of our senses.  AT the most fundamental level (and we must not misidentify it too early) there is no further reason WHY X causes Y, or X effects or exhibits Y.  Once the fundamental level of reality is reached, X simply causes, effects, or exhibits Y, for no other more explanatory or more fundamental reason than X is simply X and that happens to be its nature.

 

 

Summary

 

In summary I think there is a false distinction/dichotomy here.  Truth (knowledge) is the goal of science and utility of any particular knowledge is only dependent on the particular fact it reveals not the manner by which it was discovered.  Things and their effects are inexorably related as part of the nature and identity of reality, either what we say about reality is consistent with the totality of our knowledge of reality or it is not. [bTW I tend to avoid the P word, as it is associated with a very unethical short range view some adopt in ethics and politics...]

 

 

PS

 

It may be that in some sense BOTH realism and anti-realism are flawed... leaving...

 

 

Objectivism?

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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I apologize Strictly Logical, but your posts seem to belie your monicker. I am really not in the mood tonight to track down and regurgitate the epistemological underpinnings of Objectivism, and I will freely admit Rand did not seem to be motivated to do so a logically comprehensive treatment. LP however, filled in many needful gray areas, so I usually refer folks to him. 

 

However, I must object to this prattle "in some sense BOTH realism and anti-realism are flawed...". Please stop bastardizing the language. Existence or non-existence is a binary condition. Objectivism, by definition, by the definition of it's author, IS a realist philosophy. If you do not understand the difference between reality and thinking about reality go back to the epistemology. If you are having trouble coping with the truism that man and mankind will forever be incomplete in their knowledge of reality, I would suggest you pick one or more favorite religion(s). Consistency however, we can strive for, and suggesting there is some middle ground between is and is not, between realism and anti-realism, is NOT StrictlyLogical. Contradictions do not exist. If you think you have found one, what you have found is one or more of the following: an erroneous premise, a bogus constraint, a logical fallacy, or the limits of your own mind. 

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However, I must object to this prattle "in some sense BOTH realism and anti-realism are flawed...". Please stop bastardizing the language. Existence or non-existence is a binary condition. Objectivism, by definition, by the definition of it's author, IS a realist philosophy.

 

"Realism" doesn't simply mean "existence exists" here; both it and anti-realism agree on that.

 

Anyway, I'd like to express my complete agreement with StrictlyLogical's post.

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Skylab:

 

It would be more effective for you to focus on statements of fact rather than people/personalities when having philosophical discussions.  Emotionalism and insults are just not effective to engender an atmosphere conducive to a mutually beneficial dialogue which is illuminating and thought provoking, that is, if such is your sincere and genuine wish and intention and reason for visiting this forum.

 

 

I know how to think logically, and the law of "excluded middle" is as obvious as (and in a sense equivalent to) the law of identity.

 

Realism and anti-realism are schools of thought regarding science, and like other schools of thought,  subjectively labelled/named by their authors, do not necessarily form a logically exhaustive and mutually exclusive pairing.  Recall other false dichotomies for which philosophers have claim there is an exhaustive and mutually exclusive pairing (and no alternative) thereby in fact, leaving out the truth. 

 

E.g.  Are virtues "intrinsic" or "subjective"? 

Which school of philosophy is correct, "Rationalism" or "Empiricism"? 

Is proposition "A" a synthetic or an analytic truth?

 

None of these pairs are of the same nature as A and non-A, and are in fact more like subjective Cs and Ds.

 

 

So, calm down.  We are not your enemy.  Let's have a rational discussion if you think it is of value to you.

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Bad start, I wish I did not have to start two posts with both an apology and a wish-had-more-time disclaimer, but…

 

StrictlyLogical, again sincerely I apologize for not having/taking time to be more clear. Allow me to try to avoid that now, and again proclaim that subsequent posts are going to be subject to 'holiday delay'.

 

My objection is to the corruption of concept by allowing an admittedly imprecise language to lead a conversation, to accept concepts as not identity related, when they are (or should be for the sake of consistency.) 

 

For example 'Are virtues "intrinsic" or "subjective"?', you ask.

In a consistent and complete reality they are intrinsic. Any entity occupying that reality has a real nature and their best interest is always, from their point of view, the virtuous approach. From the point of view of the finite inconsistent entity, virtue will quickly become subjective due to the inherent inconsistencies of a finite system.

 

Your next example is is from my point of view the best example yet of the corruption of which I speak. You ask, 'Which school of philosophy is correct, "Rationalism" or "Empiricism"?'. My immediate unfiltered reaction is 'how can you even ask that?' The empiricists assert that sense experience is the ultimate source of all our concepts and knowledge. Why would one think that, when daily we discover knowledge imbedded and encoded in the very reality we study? Giving empiricism equal billing (asserting the delta is subjective) with Realism is a slippery slope leading straight to the brain in a vat bullshit. I would suggest Gödel's completeness theorem covers this rather well with a very solid mathematical footing.

 

Simply for completeness the decision whether or not a proposition is analytical rests completely in the whether the supporting intellectual infrastructure of that proposition is based in an analytic chain with rationalism in every link. May I express some puzzlement, without meaning any insult as to why you embrace such a Kantian dichotomy. 

 

All these pairs have a bearing on whether or not one sliding toward a position that denies reality. For me that is part and parcel of any valid definition of anti-realism.  

 

I'm calm, just adamant. An infinite, complete, consistent Reality exists and is always the final arbitrator. 

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Skylab72

 

1.  Many of the concepts borne of philosophy have been labelled misleadingly.  You are approaching concepts such as Empiricism or Rationalism as though the proponents of the these schools of philosophical thought had in mind something which actually makes sense objectively.  They DID not.  You would be surprised where "empiricists" end up (mostly skeptics) and where rationalists end up (mostly mystics).  If you read my post carefully you will see I introduce these as examples of false dichotomies. 

 

I should probably have said "values" not "virtues", but I included that example because you stated you were familiar with LP (possibly OPAR?)

 

 

2.  I  do not embrace the Kantian dichotomy... I state clearly it is a false dichotomy.

 

 

 

I think here, and we need Mushroom to verify this, the "Realist" camp and the "Anti-realist" camp represent such a false dichotomy that misses the truth.  Again I am assuming the name "Realist" is not being used in the sense an Objectivist would use it.

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  • 2 months later...

In a recent course on the metaphysics of science, I encountered the theories of realism vs anti-realism in regard to scientific theories. I've considered myself an Objectivist for a while, but I found myself agreeing with the anti-realists. Now, of course, "anti-realism" sounds very un-Objectivist, but I'm specifically referring to anti-realism concerning scientific theories (and more particularly, my interpretation of anti-realism regarding scientific theories.)

 

Mushroom, I have similar concerns, but I hope sharing a computer science view-point, might clarify some of the issues.

 

In computer science there is a concept named meta. The idea is 'about'. For example with the idea that 'keys' on a keyboard invoke either a symbol, such as the letter 'A', or the execution of a 'function', such as 'un-do what I just did'. People use this concept daily without specifically thinking about it. But there are other keys on the keyboard that do nothing. Nothing that is, until they are pressed before or in conjunction with, one of the regular keys. At which time, this next class of keys modify the result from the depression of the regular key. The function invocation might become the 'do it again' function instead of the undo, while perhaps the transmission of the symbol 'A' becomes the execution of an 'Action' presented on the screen. Those keys then are keys whose use is 'about' other keys, or meta-keys.

 

Similarly, assume I have a database that contains the names, addresses, and purchases of my business's customers. Those names and addresses are data. The fact, also recorded in the database, that there are 10,000 name, and 11,000 address records in this database, is meta-data. Or data about the data.

 

In this paradigm Physics is meta-reality, not reality. Metaphysics is a discussion about the nature and extent of what we can know. One might say meta-meta-reality.

 

From this perspective, I object to the intellectuals naming the distinction between information and the subject of the information, anti-subject. Anti-realism should be a negation of realism NOT the gathering of useful models ABOUT that which is real.

 

…for all the good it will do me. Ever since Maxwell Planck discussed uncertainty, I think I see a deterioration in the rigor of naming of concepts in theoretical physics. But they are canon now, I get no say.  

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You guys don't need Mushroom to look up a topic that is central to much of the philosophy of science literature. There are two aspects to this debate. One is how to use language abstracted from perceptual context to refer successfully to hypothetical imperceptibles. The second is just a further development of the problem of universals. "Do universals exist?" becomes "do theoretical entities exist" or "do theoretical concepts refer?" When you realize this, its easy to see the Oist answer to the question. "If the concepts are abstracted in the proper way they refer" etc...

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Sorry, I'm not very good at keeping up - I was at a mine for three months and didn't have reliable internet access.

 

I like Plasmatic's answer / rephrasing of the question to its essentials. The first aspect of the debate isn't quite as interesting to me - while it's certainly important, most scientists are able to communicate effectively enough to get work done. 

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