Scientific anti-realism and Objectivism

[Mushroom]

In a recent course on the metaphysics of science, I encountered the theories of realism vs anti-realism in regard to scientific theories. I've considered myself an Objectivist for a while, but I found myself agreeing with the anti-realists. Now, of course, "anti-realism" sounds very un-Objectivist, but I'm specifically referring to anti-realism concerning scientific theories (and more particularly, my interpretation of anti-realism regarding scientific theories.)

 

As I understand it, scientific anti-realism is the view that scientific theories should be viewed as 'models' of reality and not as representing 'actual' reality. An anti-realist would say that the questions of whether electrons exist or not is beside the point, but that by modeling atoms as though electrons exist, we are able to make accurate predictions. A realist would say that electrons 'actually' exist.

 

An anti-realist would say that modeling water as a fluid and applying fluid dynamics is no more or less 'truthful' (or closer to reality) as modeling water as a series of small H2O molecules, but it is more 'useful' when talking about fluids and less useful when discussing Brownian motion. A realist would say that water is 'really' bursts of quantum fluctuations (or energy vibrations), and so modeling it as small particles is a more accurate representation than fluid dynamics, but that the most truthful of all is thinking of water as quantum energy (i.e. it's closer to reality).

 

If, somehow, we developed an infallible model of physics (one that always gave accurate results) an anti-realist would claim it was a very good model, but that we couldn't really claim it was true or false, only that it gave very good predictions. A realist would say it was a true model.

 

Some of my reasons for believing in anti-realism come from my chemistry background. We model light as a particle in some situations and a wave in others. When, in reality, it seems light is something else, and it's really hard to comprehend exactly what. Quantum mechanics often comes up with theories that seem to predict reality better than we can measure it, but I've never heard a Quantum chemist say that what they're doing is actually meant to be reality, it just models it really well.

 

For the sake of intellectual honesty (of calling myself an Objectivist), I was wondering whether Objectivist views are compatible with (my understanding of and belief in) scientific anti-realism. 

 

P.S. I searched for this topic before starting a thread, but couldn't find it. "Anti-Realism" shows up a lot on the search engine. I apologize if this has been covered already. Sorry if I rambled too long.

Edited August 14, 2013 by Mushroom

[rowsdower]

Disclaimer: I haven't heard of anti-realism until just now.

 

Your three examples are each different. I would say that an electron does exist, simply because: something must exist (stop me if you disagree), and it has all the attributes regarded as fundamental to an electron.

 

If you encountered a locked box from which emanated the sound of a cricket you could not say for certain that there was a cricket in there. But there would have to be some (concrete) entity in there with some (concrete) nature, and no further knowledge can contradict that it chirps.

 

I agree about fluid dynamics; we already have more detailed models, but it makes computation easier; it's more of an engineer's cheat-sheet than an understanding of new facts of reality. However, it is not separate from or completely replaced by molecules. Our understanding of fluid molecules grows on the less detailed understanding, but does not contradict it. If the two theories contradicted, then one of them would have to be regarded as wrong, utility be damned (although I can't see how contradiction could be of any utility). I wouldn't regard molecules as being more true (you can't be truer than true), but it is a better understanding of reality. And as we learn more about something, our understanding of what is fundamental to its nature also changes; the wizard of Oz is really a man behind a curtain, and the floating head is only one result of the man's actions.

 

Light goes into a difficult territory because (AFAIK) particle physics takes things like force, light, gravity, etc. that one might think to be only interactions (behaviors) and makes them actually be particles (entities). If anything that would point you in a more realist direction. So I dunno.

 

The Logical Leap makes the point that good scientific theories are not only models of data, but are necessitated by the data. In other words, concepts should flow from perception rather than being arbitrarily thought up and then tested for conformity with perception. If you have an infallible but ridiculous model, one that could be replaced by any one of other infallible, ridiculous models, you wouldn't regard it as true. If the model isn't forced upon you by the data, don't believe it. (Some 'infallible' theories are also not falsifiable; non-falsifiability is the opposite of necessity.)

 

Realism and reification are far from Objectivism, but so is pragmatism. I don't know what you meant by 'useful' but if you haven't heard of Pragmatism (lexicon) you should be interested in it too.

[Nicky]

As I understand it, scientific anti-realism is the view that scientific theories should be viewed as 'models' of reality and not as representing 'actual' reality.

I don't understand the difference. A model IS a representation.

If, somehow, we developed an infallible model of physics (one that always gave accurate results) an anti-realist would claim it was a very good model.

Sounds like an anti-realist doesn't know how models that always give accurate results come to be. The extent of an anti-realist's curiosity about how all the realists developed Physics as it exists today seems to be limited to "somehow".

Ayn Rand on the other hand did know that, and she explains it here, and in detail in the published works being quoted: http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/truth.html

The short version is that knowledge is the result of people looking for the truth about various aspects of reality. Saying that there's no such thing as truth implies that you don't plan on looking for knowledge, and just hope it will fall into your lap by accident. It won't.

Edited August 14, 2013 by Nicky

[Spiral Architect]

I can't shake the perception that Schrödinger's Cat is responsible for this.

 

I will quickly admit I'm not up to date on all my scientific jargon or theories as it has been a while but I will say this sounds like diet-skepticism, at least as presented.  While a though exercise and testing it is certainly a valid method of experimentation it is not valid to claim everything is a thought exercise (or in this case a model) not connected to reality.  Then you cannot know anything for sure.  But water boiling at sea level at 212 degrees is not a model, but a fact.  The whole point of objectivity is to connect abstract ideas to direct perception, or ideas to reality.  The Spiral theory of knowledge (going back and forth from ideas to perception as you connect new ideas.  This theory appears to cut off perception and place all science as ideas floating around waiting to be tested as a version of an a priori.  Well, many a priori's since everyone can have many models to work from. 

 

Basically, you are making up ideas, then testing it, versus looking at the data then testing for the essential idea represented by the data.  In the long run, which is more effective?  Deducing from a thought exercise or integrating known facts? 

[Mushroom]

 

Disclaimer: I haven't heard of anti-realism until just now.

 

Your three examples are each different. I would say that an electron does exist, simply because: something must exist (stop me if you disagree), and it has all the attributes regarded as fundamental to an electron.

I agree that electrons exist. However, we attribute to them certain properties: They are indistinguishable from one another, they are synonyomous with beta radiation and electrical current, they have a wavenumber that is allows them to 'tunnel' occasionally.

 

But, to maybe explain, I have heard a theory that all electrons and positrons are the same particle. This particle is simply moving backwards and forwards in time, so that it interacts with itself. The interaction between a positron and an electron is identical if you say the particles were "annihilated" or if you say the single electron it reversed its direction through time and continued on in its same direction. This theory, that all electrons are really the same one, bases itself on the facts that they all look identical and that their behavior can be modeled perfectly by thinking of them as a single electron. A realist would regard this theory as either 'true' or 'false' where an anti-realist would say that, as it predicts reality in an identical way as thinking of electrons as multiple systems, that we can only say that it is identically useful as the current accepted model.

 

I should explain that a scientific anti-realist can believe (and I certianly do) in a completely objective reality, but he or she regards scientific theories about reality as models intended to correlate with data, and that these models cannot be said to be more or less true representations.

 

The short version is that knowledge is the result of people looking for the truth about various aspects of reality. Saying that there's no such thing as truth implies that you don't plan on looking for knowledge, and just hope it will fall into your lap by accident. It won't. 

 

I'm not saying that there's no such thing as truth, only that the purpose of scientific theories should be to correlate with data, and this correlation does not necessarily imply that something is an accurate representation of reality. For instance, a realist would say that the model of physics that Newton developed was less true than that of Einstein. An anti-realist would say that it is equally true, because it is equally good at predicting certain sets of data, but that it is less useful when discussing things like very large gravity or fast movement.

 

I can't shake the perception that Schrödinger's Cat is responsible for this.

 

It might be, although I came to it in discussing biological essentialism. 

While a though exercise and testing it is certainly a valid method of experimentation it is not valid to claim everything is a thought exercise (or in this case a model) not connected to reality.

 

I'm claiming that all scientific theories ARE connected to reality.

But water boiling at sea level at 212 degrees is not a model, but a fact.

 

Exactly. This is an observation. It's a fact that we must explain. It is true. In explaining it, we make a theory to account for it. One of these theories is that it is water's "essence" to boil at 212 F. Another theory is that it boils because water exceeds its own vapor pressure. Another theory might discuss the quantum substructure. An anti-realist would say that these are equally true models because they all explain the facts equally well, but that these models are more or less useful for certain things, and that the "essence" model is the least useful.

Basically, you are making up ideas, then testing it, versus looking at the data then testing for the essential idea represented by the data.  In the long run, which is more effective?  Deducing from a thought exercise or integrating known facts? 

 

I believe this is a bit beside the point. Making up ideas and then testing them is more useful for quantum physics, looking at data then testing for the essential idea (creating a theory) is more useful for most other kinds of science.

Realism and reification are far from Objectivism, but so is pragmatism. I don't know what you meant by 'useful' but if you haven't heard of Pragmatism (lexicon) you should be interested in it too.

 

In a way this is related to pragmatism, but it's not synonymous with it. I am not a pragmatist. I subscribe to the correspondence theory of truth. However, I think that scientific theories can be seen as pragmatic postulations, ones that don't give us truth or falsity.

Anti-realism is more a statement of how scientific theories about the world should be viewed, rather than a statement about how truth is gained. Pragmatism, as I understand it, would say that Spiral Architect's fact that water boils at 212 F sea level is true if it is useful and false if it is not. I disagree, and think that it is simply "true."

I monkeyed around wikipedia and found the "anti-realism" article to be awful. Looking up "instrumentalism" is a bit better, but the first paragraph is a bit misleading, in my opinion, as I understood instrumentalism to be a form of scientific anti-realism, rather than a way to avoid the topic (although I could easily be wrong).

 

Maybe a better example would be: there's a color blind man and a man with normal color perception. An anti-realist would say that when they both look at a blue block, they are seeing equally true representations of reality but that the man with color blindness has less information, so his perception is less useful in some cases (like in telling someone the color). That said, the color blind man's perception might be more useful (if, say, a camouflage were designed to make it difficult for people who can see true color to spot military personnel in camoflauge, but that color-blind folks can see right through the camouflage.)

 

A realist would say that neither man is seeing 'true' reality, as 'true' color is the wavelength of light (or bursts of quantum static or something else), but that the color-normal visioned man is seeing a more truthful reality than the other one.

 

 

Thanks so much for your replies. I understand that I might be going on too long and I really don't mean to be difficult. I'm a subscriber to anti-realist thought, but I wanted to know if that automatically excludes me from being an Objectivist.

[Spiral Architect]

 

I'm claiming that all scientific theories ARE connected to reality.

 

Then there is no reason to claim it is anti-realism, or whatever.  It simply is an observable truth.  It might sound like splitting hairs at this point but I suspect the destinction is leading to issues later. 

 

Exactly. This is an observation. It's a fact that we must explain. It is true. In explaining it, we make a theory to account for it. One of these theories is that it is water's "essence" to boil at 212 F. Another theory is that it boils because water exceeds its own vapor pressure. Another theory might discuss the quantum substructure. An anti-realist would say that these are equally true models because they all explain the facts equally well, but that these models are more or less useful for certain things, and that the "essence" model is the least useful.

 

And this may be the issue. 

 

The fact water boils at 212 degrees is a fact.  It is a trait of water.  Later we learn that water has other traits, like vapor pressure or how the distance from sea level affects the boiling point.  Each isn't a "different model", which seems to imply different facets of reality, but additional knowledge that applies to the same object.  They are all aspects of the same object (reality). 

 

I get why they may want to "compartmentalize" a subject to study it in isolation but there is no logical reason to disintegrate an object into many facets then add the caveat that they all apply.  The truth is in the whole. 

 

 

I believe this is a bit beside the point. Making up ideas and then testing them is more useful for quantum physics, looking at data then testing for the essential idea (creating a theory) is more useful for most other kinds of science.

 

Science is science.  You can only run through thought exercises to a certain extent before you have need to return to real integrative work of data to find actual truths.  Besides, proving a thought exercise doesn't tell you much since you have not connected it to a wider series of data.  You have to integrate it into everything you know and by that point you are back to actual scientific work. 

 

I hope QM is built upon a better method then just tossing ideas at the board and going with something that sticks a little. 

 

 

In a way this is related to pragmatism, but it's not synonymous with it. I am not a pragmatist. I subscribe to the correspondence theory of truth. However, I think that scientific theories can be seen as pragmatic postulations, ones that don't give us truth or falsity.

 

This the issue right here.  If you are not looking for the truth then there is no reason to do it.  Your just playing games with ideas, frankly.  Thought exercises are fun but it doesn't do anything outside of that entertainment.  Just ask a farmer how doing that would work for him to see how fast he would starve.  Obviously he isn't going to make an idea up on how to grow a crop better and not care if it is true or false. He is going to be certain that his idea is right based on evidence before he risks his family on the idea. 

 

 

 

Maybe a better example would be: there's a color blind man and a man with normal color perception. An anti-realist would say that when they both look at a blue block, they are seeing equally true representations of reality but that the man with color blindness has less information, so his perception is less useful in some cases (like in telling someone the color). That said, the color blind man's perception might be more useful (if, say, a camouflage were designed to make it difficult for people who can see true color to spot military personnel in camoflauge, but that color-blind folks can see right through the camouflage.)

 

A realist would say that neither man is seeing 'true' reality, as 'true' color is the wavelength of light (or bursts of quantum static or something else), but that the color-normal visioned man is seeing a more truthful reality than the other one.

 

 

I'd say both are debating for the fun of it.  I mean, it sounds like both are false alternatives.  The object is the object and how two men sense it doesn't really change anything.  They just have access to different input on it but in the log run they will ultimately learn the same thing about it.

 

I agree that electrons exist. However, we attribute to them certain properties: They are indistinguishable from one another, they are synonyomous with beta radiation and

Thanks so much for your replies. I understand that I might be going on too long and I really don't mean to be difficult. I'm a subscriber to anti-realist thought, but I wanted to know if that automatically excludes me from being an Objectivist.

 

Like I said, I'm not an expert on this so your getting my off the cuff thoughts.  Economics and ethics are stronger subjects for me.  Glad to help however

 

As for being an Objectivist, don't fall for the false alternative that you have to agree with every conclusion.  The core of Objectivism is defined as accepting (by choice) the key fundaments in each science: Reality in Metaphysics, Reason in Epistomology, Objectivity in Philosophy, Egoism in Ethics, and Capitalism in Politics.   That leaves a lot of room for how you interpret those ideas and the particulars they lead to. 

Edited August 14, 2013 by Spiral Architect

[rowsdower]

I agree that electrons exist. ...

 

But, to maybe explain, I have heard a theory that all electrons and positrons are the same particle. ...their behavior can be modeled perfectly by thinking of them as a single electron. A realist would regard this theory as either 'true' or 'false' where an anti-realist would say that, as it predicts reality in an identical way as thinking of electrons as multiple systems, that we can only say that it is identically useful as the current accepted model.

 

In regards to the unknown, it is wrong to say 'true' or 'false'; but it need not be wrong to say 'true or false'.

 

Is it significant that you seem to be focusing on current science? Consider the theory that this hard, rocky thing is a rock. Is it equally valid to say that it is a soft, squishy thing in a wacky mood? No, because only rejection of the former rejects the data you have. You seem to be more of a quantum anti-realist than a general anti-realist; this is a field in which we don't yet have the data to make accurate judgments.

 

The realist would be wrong to regard the theory as 'true' or 'false'. It is arbitrary. It is a good thing for scientists to come up with conjectures, and it is also good to keep them distinct from the knowledge that suggests them; that is, not all theories are arbitrary. In order for the theory to fit the data, you need knowledge about data. In order to judge utility, you need knowledge about its benefit to you.

 

What do you think about the statement "Science is a series of progressing lies-to-children"?

 

As stated above, as long as existence exists, you don't reject Objectivism, but attempt improve technical details.

[Plasmatic]

Mushroom said:

"For the sake of intellectual honesty (of calling myself an Objectivist), I was wondering whether Objectivist views are compatible with (my understanding of and belief in) scientific anti-realism.

P.S. I searched for this topic before starting a thread, but couldn't find it. "Anti-Realism" shows up a lot on the search engine. I apologize if this has been covered already. Sorry if I rambled too long."

Objectivism is a thoroughly realist philosophy. The special sciences are to indentify causal connections, not give descriptions of appearances or make arbitrary "conjectures".

[Mushroom]

Then there is no reason to claim it is anti-realism, or whatever.  It simply is an observable truth.  It might sound like splitting hairs at this point but I suspect the destinction is leading to issues later. 

 

I did a bit of looking around. The wikipedia article was atrocious, but the Stanford Encyclopedia was really good at explaining the distinction between realism and anti-realism. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/ . At the end of section 4.1 is where I fit in, I think. It says, 

 

Crucially, unlike traditional instrumentalism and logical empiricism, constructive empiricism interprets theories in precisely the same manner as realism. The antirealism of the position is due entirely to its epistemology—it recommends belief in our best theories only insofar as they describe observable phenomena, and an agnostic attitude with respect to anything unobservable. The constructive empiricist thus recognizes claims about unobservables as true or false, but does not go so far as to believe or disbelieve them. In advocating a restriction of belief to the domain of the observable, the position is similar to traditional instrumentalism, and is for this reason sometimes described as a form of instrumentalism.

 

The article explains that there are three positions where one can be scientifically anti-realist: metaphysics, semantics, and epistemology. I'm a metaphysical realist (I think that there is an objective external world and that we can understand it, although our understanding is not complete). I'm not 100% sure what a semantic anti-realist is, although it seems that they take scientific principles and concepts and interpret them as not literally trying to describe reality. Again, I think when we say 'electron' we're actually talking about things that we call electrons, and not the data points on the screen.

 

However, I do think I am an epistemological anti-realist (or, to be more precise, a believer in 'constructive empiricism'). So to return to my point about scientific theories connected to reality: I believe they are semantically linked, and there IS an external reality, but the theories themselves should not be taken as having truth functions.

 

*Sorry, I don't know how to use the quote tool with your name and date quoted.

 

I hope QM is built upon a better method then just tossing ideas at the board and going with something that sticks a little. 

 

It is. I think I may have misunderstood your point about quantum mechanics earlier. Unlike most other science, QM often theorizes a TON of stuff before the technology is built to test their theories. Most science is Data -> Theory to account for the data. QM is mostly Theory -> Wait 30 years for a gigantic machine to test the theory and give us possible data. That said, there's always back and forth. Theory to data to theory to data to theory etc.

 

In regards to the unknown, it is wrong to say 'true' or 'false'; but it need not be wrong to say 'true or false'.

 

 

I agree.

 

Is it significant that you seem to be focusing on current science? Consider the theory that this hard, rocky thing is a rock. Is it equally valid to say that it is a soft, squishy thing in a wacky mood? No, because only rejection of the former rejects the data you have. You seem to be more of a quantum anti-realist than a general anti-realist; this is a field in which we don't yet have the data to make accurate judgments.

 

 

Yes, or at least partially (to your first question about current science). My anti-realism draws a bit of a line between observable and unobservable (although that is a fuzzy line sometimes). It mostly applies to phenomena that are rather impossible to understand in terms of our vantage point. (i.e. quantum rules of physics are weird enough that we like to resort to thought experiments like Schrodinger's Cat.)

For example, one of the more contentious areas of science is about how our models of biological lineages (phylogenetics) relate to reality. Realism and anti-realism debate over what it means when we say we've discovered a new 'genus' or 'clade' of triceratops. Since we can't directly observe the triceratops (we can only observe the fossils and data left by it), an anti-realist would say, "all the data points to the fact that the triceratops fits into a new clade/branch of phylogeny, however we cannot regard this as true because it was not observed." All we can say is that the data agrees with the current model and that any future models should also account for the data. 

 

As for being an Objectivist, don't fall for the false alternative that you have to agree with every conclusion.  The core of Objectivism is defined as accepting (by choice) the key fundaments in each science: Reality in Metaphysics, Reason in Epistomology, Objectivity in Philosophy, Egoism in Ethics, and Capitalism in Politics.   That leaves a lot of room for how you interpret those ideas and the particulars they lead to. 

 

 

As stated above, as long as existence exists, you don't reject Objectivism, but attempt improve technical details.

 

 

I've studied Objectivism long enough to know that this isn't exactly true. I know I don't have to agree with every conclusion, but it's not enough to believe in reason, egoism, capitalism, objectivity, and reality. You need to integrate these beliefs, and you must do it in the Objectivist fashion. I don't want to start any kind of debate, but I believe that both David Kelly and Nathaniel Brandon have been advised not to call themselves Objectivists, although both of them (to my knowledge) continued to espoused the foundational principles. They differed on particulars.

 

For now it seems that I may believe in 'constructive empiricism' (my new name for scientific anti-realism) and still call myself an Objectivist. Thanks for your replies.

 

Edit:

 

What do you think about the statement "Science is a series of progressing lies-to-children"?

 

 

I'd say that it depends on the specifics of what's told. We teach children basic addition before multiplications, but that's obviously not a lie. If a teacher says "you can't subtract a bigger number from a smaller one." That's a lie meant to placate children. Ditto if a chemistry teacher explains about SN1 and SN2 reactions. In reality, there's no such thing as an SN1 or SN2 reaction. Chemical reactions proceed along a spectrum. The teacher knows this, has seen evidence of it, but has decided not to discuss electrostatics with his or her O-chem 1 class.

However, if a teacher says, "species are individuals," that's not a truth or a lie, it's a model of how we should interpret phylogeny data. There may be a fact of the matter, but we've tried to explain the data points as best we can by building that model.

Edited August 15, 2013 by Mushroom

[New Buddha]

One of these theories is that it is water's "essence" to boil at 212 F. Another theory is that it boils because water exceeds its own vapor pressure. Another theory might discuss the quantum substructure. An anti-realist would say that these are equally true models because they all explain the facts equally well, but that these models are more or less useful for certain things, and that the "essence" model is the least useful.the topic (although I could easily be wrong).

An Objectivist would say that they are all true statements, and that the "essence" of some thing is epistemological, and not metaphysical -- meaning, what we consider to be a things "essence" is only relevant in the context of a given propositional statement.  No thing has a "essence" in an Aristotelian sense, i.e. some universal, cosmological sense.   This is what fundamentally separates Objectivism from Aristotelian philosophy.

[New Buddha]

Consider the theory that this hard, rocky thing is a rock. Is it equally valid to say that it is a soft, squishy thing in a wacky mood? No, because only rejection of the former rejects the data you have

 

However, in one context (comparing a rock to a banana) the rock is hard.  But in another context (comparing limestone to steel) the limestone is indeed "soft".

 

A propositional statement is always made within a context.  When Objectivists state that a rock is "hard", we do so in a limited, contextual, epistemological sense - not a Universal, metaphysical Aristotelian sense.

[Mushroom]

An Objectivist would say that they are all true statements, and that the "essence" of some thing is epistemological, and not metaphysical -- meaning, what we consider to be a things "essence" is only relevant in the context of a given propositional statement.  No thing has a "essence" in an Aristotelian sense, i.e. some universal, cosmological sense. 

 

Yes, thank you. Objectivists (and myself) don't believe in metaphysical essences as essences are chosen contextually. I was simply using the 'essence' thing to denote a theory some hold. Although, I think that most Objectivists would regard the boiling point of water as a nonessential feature of water. (Actually, now that I'm thinking about it.. there probably isn't anyone who'd regard 212 F boiling point as the essence of water, since most metaphysical essentialists would regard its chemical formula/structure as its essence.)

 

This is what fundamentally separates Objectivism from Aristotelian philosophy.

 

This and our ability to count a woman's teeth.

[Spiral Architect]

 

I've studied Objectivism long enough to know that this isn't exactly true. I know I don't have to agree with every conclusion, but it's not enough to believe in reason, egoism, capitalism, objectivity, and reality. You need to integrate these beliefs, and you must do it in the Objectivist fashion. I don't want to start any kind of debate, but I believe that both David Kelly and Nathaniel Brandon have been advised not to call themselves Objectivists, although both of them (to my knowledge) continued to espoused the foundational principles. They differed on particulars.

 

I'm aware of the difference, and like you said I don't want to get into a debate on this now, but  I was just giving you my opinion since you asked. 

 

I agree that there has to be integration of the subject (thus my forum name).  It's just that some people get carried away with it.  To much emphasis is placed on particular concretes versus the core abstractions that have been completed IMO.  

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Everything you described about scientific antirealism seems kosher, to me.

 

I think the whole thing boils down to what it means for something to "exist" and, in that respect, antirealism sounds much more realistic to me.  Are abstract existents (such as an electron or a boiling point) real?

It sounds like scientific antirealism considers such concepts to be real, but only in connection with their observables (not self-sufficiently real, in their own right).

 

So, for instance, is matter composed of waves or particles?  If I understand you correctly:

A scientific realist would get hung up over the wave/particle duality, while an antirealist would reply that matter is matter and sometimes it acts like both.

 

It's very similar to the issue of omniscience and the contextuality of knowledge.  So, yeah; not only does that not prevent you from considering yourself an Objectivist, I think that's the generic Objectivist position.

---

 

Tangential:  It's especially understandable with regards to quantum mechanics.  The human mind can't even visualize more than three dimensions; why get worked up over one of several valid perspectives?

[rowsdower]

An Objectivist would say that they are all true statements, and that the "essence" of some thing is epistemological, and not metaphysical -- meaning, what we consider to be a things "essence" is only relevant in the context of a given propositional statement.  No thing has a "essence" in an Aristotelian sense, i.e. some universal, cosmological sense.   This is what fundamentally separates Objectivism from Aristotelian philosophy.

 

Except we often apply the same ideas to many propositional statements - eg "The water will boil on Arbor Day", "The water will boil with a fox in a box".

And of course no thing has a universal essense - it's a single thing, that's as far from universal as it gets!

 

 

 

However, in one context (comparing a rock to a banana) the rock is hard.  But in another context (comparing limestone to steel) the limestone is indeed "soft".

 

A propositional statement is always made within a context.  When Objectivists state that a rock is "hard", we do so in a limited, contextual, epistemological sense - not a Universal, metaphysical Aristotelian sense.

 

It doesn't seem any of the facts we used to learn about the rock (say, gripping it, or banging it on another rock) are taken out of context by learning that limestone exists. It's a language problem - if a non-relative measure of "hard" were used there would be no context problems, unless the rock was dipped in a softening acid or some such. But barring that, the rock will be hard upside-down, tomorrow, under a strobe light.

 

If contexts are too small, induction won't work beyond the range of the moment; once something's happened, it's "exact context" is gone.

 

 

 

 

I think the whole thing boils down to what it means for something to "exist" and, in that respect, antirealism sounds much more realistic to me.  Are abstract existents (such as an electron or a boiling point) real?

It sounds like scientific antirealism considers such concepts to be real, but only in connection with their observables (not self-sufficiently real, in their own right).

 

This sounds opposite to the first quote, which I take to mean that observation is epistemology, not metaphysics. If I observe a stain on the wall, it's my observation of color that distinguishes it from the wall around it; metaphysically it isn't changed by the distinctions I make; what's metaphysically real is mold and water damage, things I haven't observed yet; the color is real too but isn't the only thing. The stain is true knowledge about reality but it's not the whole story. So here we have an observable that isn't any more real than an electron; "stain" and "electron" are epistemological whereas stain and electron are metaphysical. One might consider the amount of evidence for each, but not the amount of reality. Otherwise a blind man may consider your observables as his "abstract existents". They're both self-sufficiently real whether you observe them or not.

 

You might say, "but I see the stain!" You see an image - if you twist your head, you see another. It is the job of epistemology to detect the single metaphysical entity from two different observations.

 

 

(Aside: "boiling point" is much like the "center" of a sheet of paper - it's objective, but still only a product of thought.)

 

 

 

It is possible I am becoming one of those realists. Does a bird flying high over a forest believe in the woods, but consider the trees "abstract" simply because it can't see them? How can this position be objective if a squirrel disagrees?

[New Buddha]

"stain" and "electron" are epistemological whereas stain and electron are metaphysical...  I don't understand the purpose of the " ".  Can you elaborate?

 

"Does a bird flying high over a forest believe in the woods, but consider the trees "abstract" simply because it can't see them? How can this position be objective if a squirrel disagrees?"

 

Because the bird and the squirrel (and you and I) are limited to a First Person Perspective.  Objectivity does not mean that something is "right" in an omniscient sense -- only that it contains no contradictions and no willful evasions.   The determination of the Objectivity of your knowledge is YOUR responsibility - it's not up for a vote.

Edited August 31, 2013 by New Buddha

[rowsdower]

"stain" and "electron" are epistemological whereas stain and electron are metaphysical...  I don't understand the purpose of the " ".  Can you elaborate?

 

The concept vs the referent.

 

"Does a bird flying high over a forest believe in the woods, but consider the trees "abstract" simply because it can't see them? How can this position be objective if a squirrel disagrees?"

 

Because the bird and the squirrel (and you and I) are limited to a First Person Perspective.  Objectivity does not mean that something is "right" in an omniscient sense -- only that it contains no contradictions and no willful evasions.   The determination of the Objectivity of your knowledge is YOUR responsibility - it's not up for a vote.

 

"Omniscient" means "having total knowledge". Right, objective knowledge does not require all knowledge, just some knowledge - but real knowledge. It is not sufficient for some idea to be non-contradictory, and saying that knowledge should have "no willful evasions" begs to be asked - willful evasions of what? Of other non-contradictory, non-evasive statements?

 

The fundament of objectivity is the object. Subjective observation must be observation of something. In the example I gave, the squirrel is right, but it can't just say, "My knowledge of trees neither contradicts nor evades my knowledge." That's rationalization, not induction. Objectivity isn't mere self-consistency.

 

Knowledge must refer to metaphysical things, and the bird and the squirrel refer to the same things. The thing is what it is, regardless of what they think. But the bird, not seeing the trees completely, says that they are in some lesser metaphysical realm of "abstract existents". The bird isn't just saying "I don't know concretely what it is," it's saying, "it isn't concrete at all." How could that possibly be objective, if it changes with observation - when you look at it it's concrete, when you don't it's abstract?

 

Aside: do you believe rational agents can disagree?

Edited August 31, 2013 by rowsdower

[New Buddha]

"The concept vs the referent."  Objectivism does not posit the existence of such a duality.

 

Regarding Objectivity.  In your thought experiment of the bird vs. the squirrel, you've also introduced a third-person-perspective into the mix  -  yourself as the arbiter - weighing what each purports to believe, and passing judgment on who is right or wrong.  But each player in the trio is an independent agent -- and it's not necessary that he reach a consensus with the other two before determining if his knowledge is objective or not.

 

"But the bird, not seeing the trees completely, says that they are in some lesser metaphysical realm of "abstract existents". The bird isn't just saying "I don't know concretely what it is," it's saying, "it isn't concrete at all." How could that possibly be objective, if it changes with observation - when you look at it it's concrete, when you don't it's abstract?"

 

Is it the bird making the statements in bold?  Or is it the third-person-perspective arbiter?

 

 

edit.  Thanks for the link to the article.

Edited August 31, 2013 by New Buddha

[rowsdower]

"The concept vs the referent."  Objectivism does not posit the existence of such a duality.

 

If you don't conceptualize things, they still exist. Zen question: What is a referent if it is not referred to? There must be a difference between concepts and referents, or forgetfulness causes bits of reality to disappear.

 

Regarding Objectivity.  In your thought experiment of the bird vs. the squirrel, you've also introduced a third-person-perspective into the mix  -  yourself as the arbiter - weighing what each purports to believe, and passing judgment on who is right or wrong.  But each player in the trio is an independent agent -- and it's not necessary that he reach a consensus with the other two before determining if his knowledge is objective or not.

 

"But the bird, not seeing the trees completely, says that they are in some lesser metaphysical realm of "abstract existents". The bird isn't just saying "I don't know concretely what it is," it's saying, "it isn't concrete at all." How could that possibly be objective, if it changes with observation - when you look at it it's concrete, when you don't it's abstract?"

 

Is it the bird making the statements in bold?  Or is it the third-person-perspective arbiter?

 

 

edit.  Thanks for the link to the article.

 

The bird is aware of it's perception and thoughts, which covers all bolded statements. Rewriting the story in first-person would change style, but not content.

 

Imagine this conversation between the two (via, say, cell phones):

Bird: "What's it like, living in such an abstract place?"

Squirrel: "What do you mean? Everything down here is concrete."

B: "Well, it's not concrete to me."

S: "I don't care what it is to you, I care what it is. Come down and see for yourself."

B: "If I came down there I would undoubtedly be convinced that the trees are concrete. But I won't, so I still say they're abstract."

S: 

 

Similarly (but more complex):

B: "I know you're rational and have knowledge that I don't have. But I will still disagree with you no matter what you say."

S: "What? How can you forsee to disagree?"

[Plasmatic]

"Rational agents can disagree"

Sorry for the aside but the comments on that article are hilarious! A clear display of the rationalistic, psychological determinism that is wide spread today. There is a unique type of disconnectedness in many math minded folks.

[New Buddha]

Rowsdower,

 

I've lost the thread of the discussion.  I'm not really even sure what point you are trying to make.  And again, the "concept vs. referent" argument has nothing to do with Ojectivst epistomology.

Edited August 31, 2013 by New Buddha

[rowsdower]

I'm trying to say that electrons exist as concretes, because existence is independent of observation. I deny the existence of abstract entities.

 

In analogy, a bird flying over woods might not observe individual trees, but can not rationally deny their existence as concretes.

It's lack of knowledge is no excuse, because it knows that if it did have knowledge about them, it could not regard them as abstract. It can't forsee to be wrong.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

The bird can't possibly accept something as concrete until it IS concrete to him and that's all im saying.

Electrons almost certainly exist but don't reify them; our knowledge of them is completely secondhanded and, if it were to change, so would they.

Nobody can think that they don't exist or that the concretes constantly around them don't exist, no matter what happens.

Electrons probably exist but could be refuted if the context changed.

Let's not reify any trees until we can actually see them for ourselves.

---

Rational agents can disagree but not for long.

[New Buddha]

I'm trying to say that electrons exist as concretes, because existence is independent of observation. I deny the existence of abstract entities.

 

In analogy, a bird flying over woods might not observe individual trees, but can not rationally deny their existence as concretes.

It's lack of knowledge is no excuse, because it knows that if it did have knowledge about them, it could not regard them as abstract. It can't forsee to be wrong.

 

Rowsdower,

 

All thought occurs at the abstract/conceptual level.  Everything you know is known as an abstraction.  A forest is an abstraction.  Oak trees are abstractions.  The specific oak tree that is right in front of you (and not the one to your left) is "known"  to you as an abstraction.  We don't think on the level of concretes.  Democracy and love are every bit as real as the rusty, yellow 1965 Ford Mustang parked on the street outside of my building.

 

There are floating abstractions that cannot be traced back to concretes - such as a unicorn - but even then, the abstraction "unicorn" does exist in that you and I both know what I'm talking about.

[New Buddha]

"..our knowledge of them is completely secondhanded...."

 

Our knowledge of everything can be said to be "secondhanded".  Objectivism's basic axiom is that to be consciousness is to be conscious of something other than the self.

 

The activity that we attribute to "electrons" is different than the activity that we attribute to photons, neutrons, muons, etc.  To paraphrase my post in another active discussion, it's not necessary that we have an omniscient and god-like, un-alterable definition of electron - it's enough, in certain contexts, to know that an electron is not a photon, is not a neuton, is not a baseball, etc.  Our definition of an electron will change, depending on the context in which we put it to use.