Errors of Analysis and Explanation

[dream_weaver]

It has to be asked: How does one go about comprending the incomprehensible? Can the mind grasp the ungraspable? Can one know the unknowable? Does the human mind, being capable of understanding anything in the universe, extend to explaining the inexplicable?

 

Rush put it well singing "If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice."

 

Randomness is simply observations the causal relationships of which have yet to be identified.

The seemingly abitrary acts echo the same sentiment.

[absols]

Absols: the fact that you cannot have your cake and eat it too doesn't negate your choice between the two.

I have no idea what the rest was about.

 

you mean subjective awareness being as if it is the choice, which is the total opposite

being aware or conscious is a fact that has nothing to do with doing anything

 

objectively our human condition is worse then animals one, we are forced to the absence of choice consciously

 

choice starts from possible freedom out of everything, while freedom is through the end of anything, when you cant have your cake then you are forced to watch others eating you without anyother possible choice to make

Edited November 11, 2013 by absols

[tadmjones]

HD

I am not well versed in formal logic or its notations, but it seems your last post was stating a proposition and showing a logical conclusion based on the veracity od the prop, or perhaps checking the veracity of the prop by the conclusion. Either way, identitylessness? What does this term refer to , it seems as if the argument as structured would rely on there being a referent to that term.

In keeping with the OP , it seems this an example of misidentifying or context dropping of concepts as regards metaphysic and epistemologic. 'Randomness' refers to an abstracted quality , not existential 'thing'.

[StrictlyLogical]

SL: Eliminative determinism (man as merely stimuli-response) is false because it contradicts the human mind.

If altered to specifically incorporate consciousness as self-determinism, on what grounds should it be rejected?

---

You had the choice, when reading my posts, to pay attention to them or not and to reply one way or another or not at all. You've made those choices.

Did you make them randomly, or on the basis of countless accumulative judgments you'd already made (ideas and values)?

Further: if your decisions are truly uncaused then eventually you'll accept my explanation anyway, statistically speaking. :-P

---

Honestly, why can't self-determinism be the whole truth?

 

"You had the choice... you've made those choices"

 

Q: Could I have chosen otherwise?

 

If so what would that mean for reality, the law of causality?  Showing or validating choice is one thing, explaining it in terms of other things which give rise to it, is another.  that's the point of my bringing up the fallacy (I think it is one of composition?)

 

We need to get down to specifics here.

 

My point is if we want to explain choice acting in a natural system we need to be prepared to explain it with configurations, arrangements of things and sub-processes,  which themselves do not possess or exhibit "choosiness".

Edited November 11, 2013 by StrictlyLogical

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Randomness is simply observations the causal relationships of which have yet to be identified.

Exactly my thought.

 

Absols:  You've lumped it all into either "I can choose anything I could ever imagine" which is essentially omnipotence, or "I have no choices at all".  Neither one is true, just as neither "all colors coincide with sounds" nor "color can never coincide with sound" is true.  If you approach the issue that way you're setting yourself up for an unsolvable contradiction.

The rest wasn't nearly coherent enough for me to understand.

 

I am not well versed in formal logic or its notations, but it seems your last post was stating a proposition and showing a logical conclusion based on the veracity od the prop, or perhaps checking the veracity of the prop by the conclusion. Either way, identitylessness? What does this term refer to , it seems as if the argument as structured would rely on there being a referent to that term.

By "randomness" I'm referring to acausality; any entity which, under a single set of circumstances, may act in multiple ways.  For example:

If one holds a plastic cube at eye-level and releases it, it will fall.  And barring strong winds, intervening objects or other exceptional circumstances, that is the only possible way for it to act.

Now, if this cube happens to be a die, it's common for us to refer to its motion as "random" between six possible outcomes.  However, given sufficient knowledge of the die's physical traits, the traits of whatever surface it lands on and the requisite grasp of physics, I think it safe to assume that the die's trajectory could be calculated and its outcome accurately identified in advance.

Which would be equivalent to "apparent randomness is causal relationships yet to be identified" or "probability is an expression of ignorance".  Now this concept of "randomness" as epistemological uncertainty is perfectly concievable and mundane.

 

The problem is in attributing "randomness" not to our own predictions, but to the predicted entities themselves (which brings us to QM).

Epistemological randomness means "it might do X or Y, and I'm not quite sure which."

Metaphysical randomness means "it might do X or Y, and nobody can ever be sure which because there isn't any causal link to find".

So by "randomness" I'm not referring to an entity, but an attribute of unspecified entities; specifically metaphysical randomness which, because it negates any relation between conditions and outcomes, is an explicit denial of that action's identity.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

'Randomness' refers to an abstracted quality , not existential 'thing'.

So "randomness" refers to the quality of metaphysical causelessness, such as the Copenhagen interpretation of QM.  I mention it because in Strictly Logical's post here:

 

Your conclusions about physics (not metaphysics) is that objective probability according QM is not possible. I dispute the logical necessity of arriving at such a conclusion from the law of causality according to Objectivism because (as pointed out by Plasmatic) it (may?) is not restricted to single valued causation, but in any case, the result is that any and all functional ingredients for choice are thus determined, so free will is not possible in a world of your strict determinism no manner how convoluted, complex, or circular looping the system.

He understood my point(s), correctly identified how it relates to several other concepts and then rejected it because his idea of "free will" involves nonidentity.

My response, in short, was to point out that anything which actually acts arbitrarily is by definition inexplicable and incomprehensible; to assert that something in reality does so, while claiming the Supremacy of Reason as simultaneously true, is identical to saying:

 

"The human mind is capable of understanding every thing in reality- except this one!" 

Edited November 12, 2013 by Harrison Danneskjold

[Harrison Danneskjold]

SL:  I think you should distinguish this "could have" into existencially possible (no physical or anatomical fact contradicts it) and normatively possible.

Otherwise you'll run into difficulty when I ask:  "is it possible for me to spontaneously chop off my left arm?"

Edited November 12, 2013 by Harrison Danneskjold

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Q: Could I have chosen otherwise?

 

If so what would that mean for reality, the law of causality?

Thought experiment.

Suppose "free will" means an exemption from causality and that, contrary to determinism, human actions are fundamentally uncaused.  If so then as in your symbol-selection experiment, anyone could choose X or Y with equal liberty, correct?

Now imagine the pilot of a jumbojet, with his hands on the throttle.  In accordance with the symbol experiment, he could choose to contract any of the muscles in his hands that he pleases, correct?

If so then as he controls the aircraft it has approximately (I'm not familiar with the precise internal arrangement of the hands) a very minute chance of suddenly rolling, turning, ascending or descending- all absolutely randomly.

If so then all things considered, the aircraft has about a 50% chance of entering a fatal nosedive and a 50% chance of stalling with its nose in the air, and a miniscule chance that anyone could possibly survive.

 

Now, if all of this is correct and if the original concept of volition stands, then we should go to an airport sometime so that I can put some cashy money on those odds.

 

My point is if we want to explain choice acting in a natural system we need to be prepared to explain it with configurations, arrangements of things and sub-processes,  which themselves do not possess or exhibit "choosiness".

I do not think that actual human beings exhibit this "choosiness".  When a certain practice should be a virtual death sentence in theory, but is almost completely safe in practice, your theory is wrong.

I'm all for the specifics and I think that knowledge, values and subjective experience (etc.) absolutely must be emergent properties; metaphysically deterministic properties.

[dream_weaver]

 

So by "randomness" I'm not referring to an entity, but an attribute of unspecified entities; specifically metaphysical randomness which, because it negates any relation between conditions and outcomes, is an explicit denial of that action's identity.

 Holding causality as the law of identity applied to action, an actions identity is dependent on the entity or entities that share that attribute. What is an unspecified entity if it is not an entity to which you refer?

[tadmjones]

Hd

I do not understand what you are trying teach me, nor do I think you understand what SLmeant in the quote. You did not explain what identylessness refers to. Added to my confusion is your use of the terms metaphysical and epistemological.As a rule of thumb if you can not gather something in bucket and carry it around it is most likely an epistemologic concept. Show me a bucket full of random andiI will agree that there is metaphysical randomness

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Hd

I do not understand what you are trying teach me, nor do I think you understand what SLmeant in the quote. You did not explain what identylessness refers to. Added to my confusion is your use of the terms metaphysical and epistemological.As a rule of thumb if you can not gather something in bucket and carry it around it is most likely an epistemologic concept. Show me a bucket full of random andiI will agree that there is metaphysical randomness

An identityless entity is anything which may supposedly act in multiple ways, given a single set of circumstances.  See Schrodinger's cat.

And I'm not defending such a concept; I'm emphatically trying to demonstrate its absurdity.

[StrictlyLogical]

Thought experiment.

Suppose "free will" means an exemption from causality

 

 

I don't claim this but for your exercise I will assume it. I assume free will is exemption from determinism.

 

 

and that, contrary to determinism, human actions are fundamentally uncaused.

 

 

again ... I disagree but will play along.  Determinism and causation are not the same thing.  Causation states there are causes and effects, determinism is a claim that limits the nature of causation, i.e. the kind or type which can occur, in a particular instance if we are talking about a deterministic process, and everywhere in the universe if we are talking about the philosophical notion of mechanistic determinism.

 

 

  If so then as in your symbol-selection experiment, anyone could choose X or Y with equal liberty, correct?

 

 

Applying your claim of causelessness I could agree X or Y outcome could be arbitrary... I do not see where "equal liberty" comes from.

 

 

Now imagine the pilot of a jumbojet, with his hands on the throttle.  In accordance with the symbol experiment, he could choose to contract any of the muscles in his hands that he pleases, correct?

 

 

By definition yes

 

 

If so then as he controls the aircraft it has approximately (I'm not familiar with the precise internal arrangement of the hands) a very minute chance of suddenly rolling, turning, ascending or descending- all absolutely randomly.

 

 

This assumes what he pleases is "all absolutely randomly", if you equate what he pleases with choice , with causelessness then this would be your conclusion yes

 

 

If so then all things considered, the aircraft has about a 50% chance of entering a fatal nosedive and a 50% chance of stalling with its nose in the air, and a miniscule chance that anyone could possibly survive.

 

 

If your stated premises this would seem to be a valid conclusion.

 

 

Now, if all of this is correct and if the original concept of volition stands, then we should go to an airport sometime so that I can put some cashy money on those odds.

 

 

According your premises you would bet with "equal liberty" and "randomly" which strategy would not likely yield a return.

 

...........................

 

I do not think that actual human beings exhibit this "choosiness".  When a certain practice should be a virtual death sentence in theory, but is almost completely safe in practice, your theory is wrong.

I'm all for the specifics and I think that knowledge, values and subjective experience (etc.) absolutely must be emergent properties; metaphysically deterministic properties.

 

I do not see the logical connection between a concept of "choosiness" which is here taken out of context, and the rest of this ...  it is a bald assertion and it restates the conclusions (I already know you have reached) founded on "I know not what"

[StrictlyLogical]

An identityless entity is anything which may supposedly act in multiple ways, given a single set of circumstances.  See Schrodinger's cat.

And I'm not defending such a concept; I'm emphatically trying to demonstrate its absurdity.

 

A human being, with volition and free will according to Objectivism qualifies as an "identityless entity" according to your definition.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

 Holding causality as the law of identity applied to action, an actions identity is dependent on the entity or entities that share that attribute. What is an unspecified entity if it is not an entity to which you refer?

Sorry; unspecified beyond having that attribute.

 

Determinism and causation are not the same thing.  Causation states there are causes and effects, determinism is a claim that limits the nature of causation, i.e. the kind or type which can occur, in a particular instance if we are talking about a deterministic process, and everywhere in the universe if we are talking about the philosophical notion of mechanistic determinism.

Which effects?

 

If so then all things considered, the aircraft has about a 50% chance of entering a fatal nosedive and a 50% chance of stalling with its nose in the air, and a miniscule chance that anyone could possibly survive.

 

 

If your stated premises this would seem to be a valid conclusion.

Thank you.

 

I do not see the logical connection between a concept of "choosiness" which is here taken out of context, and the rest of this ...  it is a bald assertion and it restates the conclusions (I already know you have reached) founded on "I know not what"

Choosiness as opposed to determinism; correct?  A multi-valued causality with a flexible identity.

Now the proposal does stretch that a bit far and I apologize for that; should've thought it out better.  But the logical connection is that pilots in empirical reality, making actual decisions every day, do not behave choosily; if they did then people would die.  Yes, some pilots have crashed before. . . accidentally (because they failed to predict the consequences of certain actions) and intentionally (because they wanted to do so).  My only point was that the example doesn't jive with a multi-valued causality.

I know I'm reiterating my conclusion; I keep thinking that if I find the right way to phrase it or explain it, you'll get it.  Honestly a good deal of the redundancy is just frustration and I'm sorry for that, as well.

 

I've told you what it's based on, though.  I have gone into great and explicit detail, so I'm not sorry for that one. 

[Harrison Danneskjold]

A human being, with volition and free will according to Objectivism qualifies as an "identityless entity" according to your definition.

That depends on which parts you're referring to. If you mean this:

 

Any natural phenomenon, i.e., any event which occurs without human participation, is the metaphysically given, and could not have occurred differently or failed to occur; any phenomenon involving human action is the man-made, and could have been different. . . Nothing made by man had to be: it was made by choice.

-Metaphysical vs. Manmade

Then yes, that constitutes an identityless entity and a blatant contradiction of self-determinism (among other things).

 

My evidence is purely introspective. Every decision I have ever made, from my earliest memories through typing this post at this moment, boils down to what I wanted most at the time and how I thought I could achieve it. I have invited you to examine your own choices, as well.

 

If your decisions do not reflect this then there is nothing more to say.

Edited November 14, 2013 by Harrison Danneskjold

[StrictlyLogical]

HD

 

 

Just to clarify:  you are a strict universal determinist correct?

 

i.e. the universe and everything in it is a clock work and will proceed inexorably along a single line of possibility determined from the very start.

 

i.e. you cannot influence the future away from its current "path", you and all your actions are already determined as part of that path

 

i.e. "possibility" and "if" even when used to refer to the future are words which are meaningful only in respect of ignorance or incomplete knowledge not in a metaphysical uncertainty of how the universe will evolve.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

i.e. the universe and everything in it is a clock work and will proceed inexorably along a single line of possibility determined from the very start.

Yes.

 

i.e. you cannot influence the future away from its current "path", you and all your actions are already determined as part of that path

Yes and no.

You cannot change the future, strictly speaking, into a different future; it must happen one way.  The specific path it will take is directly influenced by you (in one specific way, in accordance with your "nature").

 

i.e. "possibility" and "if" even when used to refer to the future are words which are meaningful only in respect of ignorance or incomplete knowledge not in a metaphysical uncertainty of how the universe will evolve.

Yes.

[StrictlyLogical]

How long have you been a strict determinist?

 

You do realize it is in contradiction with Objectivism's position on volition which is vehemently opposed to determinism?

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Objectivism's position is opposed to eliminative materialism; anything which denies the existence of consciousness.

 

Ayn Rand said that America was founded on the ideas of Aristotle, primarily, and is being destroyed by the conceptual gangrene Kant proliferated.  The method by which these ideas influence the world is through the actions of living human beings.  That can only be true if it's also true that people's actions are determined by their thoughts and values (parts of consciousness).

In the metaphysically given versus the manmade essay, she said that nothing volitionally and consciously done is metaphysically necessary.  This necessarily means it cannot be predicted (since it doesn't HAVE to happen) or explained (since it didn't have to happen, even once it has happened).  That's a contradiction, alright, and it didn't originate with me.

 

Either something is or is not necessary, given something else.  We may not know which one it is, given our limited information, but for two things to hold both relations would be a contradiction (which cannot exist).

 

Which means that either there is SOME causal connection between people's actions and SOMETHING else, or there is no such connection with anything else (which means the arbitrary).

 

Ergo, to reject "strict" determinism is to declare that volition has nothing to do with causality (which you refer to as "choosiness").

[Harrison Danneskjold]

And if you sincerely mean to say that the actions of your fellow human beings CANNOT BE predicted then I invite you to make no such assumptions, further no theories and become a hermit.

[whYNOT]

Has it come up here that Rand's words were: "Man is a being of volitional consciousness"?

Not - "Man is a volitional being". I think there's an important distinction; this second one, I call (very advisedly)'hard' volition.

In other words, one doesn't - per se - directly cause an outcome by volition. (You can't always get what you want...)

However, one activates one's cognition, by choice, and then focuses on one aspect of reality, by choice. (It might often be an entity of lesser importance according to one's value-hierarchy, at that moment in time.)

At the end of the line is a 'chosen' action - which you apply to a desired consequence - with no guarantee of success, until you try, try again. And with further minor changes via your self-directing, volitional consciousness, finally get somewhere.

Just some thoughts. [i realise this thread is not only about free will - the participants above got me thinking more about it is all.]

Edited December 8, 2013 by whYNOT

[dream_weaver]

Volition is not the cause of an outcome, per se.

Volition plays its part in the choice of the course of action.

Cauality is the result of the cause of action.

To the degree you understand the causal chain in regard to the choice of action is the degree to which the outcome is in alignment with the choice of action.

[whYNOT]

Damn straight!

The implications are enormous, to epistemology and ethics.

If individual man is not "Prime Mover" - as beginning and end of his causal chain - he is not much at all.