Please help...Explicit vs. Implicit Concepts — What is the differenc

[Questioner]

Hello all,

 

I am having a great deal of trouble understanding the relationships and differences between, as well as what exactly is being referred to, with the Objectivist use of the terms:

 

[CONCEPT,] [EXPLICIT CONCEPT], and [iMPLICIT CONCEPT];

 

as well as how those all relate to the more general, Objectivist or otherwise, term:

 

[CONCEPTUALITY].

 

I have read through all the major sections of the IOE and the Ayn Rand Lexicon that discuss these, but it all still seems a little muddy.

 

I was hoping that you all might be able to shed some light on what distinguishes the terms.

 

Specifically, for each one, I am looking for:

 

1. a (working) definition
2. what is categorically included
3. what is categorically excluded

I know that this is all pretty basic stuff, but it is confusing me and any help would very much be appreciated. THANKS!

 

[Grames]

The first thing to realize is that despite the misleading word formation the terms "explicit concept" and "implicit concept" are not subtypes of the category "concept".  An implicit concept is not a concept, it is only a potential concept.  In Ayn Rand's words "... if you substitute the definition "conceptualized or not" for "explicit and implicit," it will be perfectly clear." (ITOE pg 161).

 

A concept as defined by Rand is " a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by a specific definition."

 

An implicit concept is a concept which does not yet exist in the mind of a person because the mental integration has not yet been performed and no word has been assigned to it, but the mental integration could possibly be performed because the person has awareness of two or more particulars that have a similarity that could qualify as an essential similarity. 

 

The trivial response to your questions about what is categorically included and excluded is: what meets the definition is categorically included and what does not is categorically excluded.  

 

Implicit concepts are for example categorically excluded, they are not types of concepts.  

 

Emotions are not concepts.  The feeling and experience of anger is not a concept, the word anger which unites together and refers to all instances and degrees of anger is a concept.

 

Sensations are not concepts.  Single particular things, such as individual persons and their names, are not concepts.  

 

"Conceptuality" is not a term used by Rand in any of her published work.  Wiktionary sez:  NOUN 1. the state or quality of being conceptual

 

Since concept is a noun, and conceptual is an adjective, conceptuality is the noun form of an adjective form of a noun.  This is a pretty stupid and unnecessary word for any use, it is by its nature confusing and should be avoided.

[Leonid]

The difference between implicit and explicit concepts is that explicit concepts could be retained and communicated by means of words which designate them. The child who is learning to talk may notice and remember that certain objects like chairs have something in common. When he learns the word " chair" he will assign this word to this similarity simply by emulating others. However it is impossible to him to learn, retain and use the word which designates nothing for him. This is the task for a parrot. The cognitive development which allows concepts formation and learning of language is a simultanious process. Feral children which had been raised by animals never learn to speak or think, in spite that their brain is intact.

Edited January 25, 2014 by Leonid

[Questioner]

Thank you for your responses.

 

I am now wondering if we can agree that:

 

whatever is a concept is necessarily "a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by a specific definition" and its definiendum.

 

In addition to Rand's definition, the qualification that I am adding is that in order for something to be a concept, then there must necessarily be a specific, unique WORD which designates that something.

 

Next,

 

I am wondering what the relationship between [uNIT] and [CONCEPT] is.

 

[uNIT] is defined as:

 

"an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members."

 

Thus,

1. some units are not concepts
   • e.g. — a mental entity which is an awareness of an entity in the group of existents that have "a flat, level surface and support(s)."
2. some units are both units and concepts
   • e.g. — "table" is a unit in the group "Furniture" and "table" is a concept because it is a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by having "a flat, level surface and support(s)" and having the definiendum — "table."
3. some concepts are not units???
   • e.g. — ???
   • Can anyone identify something which is a [CONCEPT], but is not a [uNIT]?

______________

Something else,

 

 

What is the relationship between [PERCEPT] and [uNIT]?

1. Are they mutually inclusive?
2. OR, is it the case that all [PERCEPTS] are [uNITS], but not all [uNITS] are [PERCEPTS]?
3. OR, is it the case that all [uNITS] are [PERCEPTS], but not all [PERCEPTS] are [uNITS]?

 

What is the relationship between [THOUGHT] and [CONCEPT]?

1. Are they mutually inclusive?
2. OR, is it the case that all [THOUGHTS] are [CONCEPTS], but not all [CONCEPTS] are [THOUGHTS]?
3. OR, is it the case that all [CONCEPTS] are [THOUGHTS], but not all [THOUGHTS] are [CONCEPTS]?

What I am trying to get at is finding a GENERAL NAME for the faculty or active process of awareness from the [PERCEPT] level and above, as well as from the [uNIT] level and above. To my knowledge, Rand never explicitly gave a name to these faculties/processes. 

 

From the [PERCEPT] level and above, I propose [DISCRIMINATING CONSCIOUSNESS]. 

 

From the [uNIT] level and above, I propose [THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS].

 

I am neither attached to nor necessarily arguing for either of those proposed terms, I am just trying to find some terms to use to distinguish between these two levels of awareness. I should note that Rand does not seem to use "thought/thinking" in a consistent and uniform manner (see lexicon entry on "thought/thinking").

 

For me, I mean to use [THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] as a term that indicates the awareness's recognition of and thinking about units and their relationships to each other with and without the use of definienda.

 

For me, I mean to use [DISCRIMINATING CONSCIOUSNESS] as a term that indicates awareness's active processes of integration and differentiation.

 

Also, doesn't integration necessarily entail differentiation and vice versa, such that both faculties are simultaneously co-emergent. In other words, the integration of [A] entails its differentiation from [not-A] and the differentiation of [A] from [not-A] entails the integration of [A]. I cannot have one without the other - to integrate is also to differentiate.

[Plasmatic]

Questioner said:

whatever is a concept is necessarily "a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by a specific definition" and its definiendum.

In addition to Rand's definition, the qualification that I am adding is that in order for something to be a concept, then there must necessarily be a specific, unique WORD which designates that something.

Ms. Rand cleared that up in the appendix to ITOE. A word completes the integration.

I am wondering what the relationship between [uNIT] and [CONCEPT] is.

[uNIT] is defined as:

"an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members."

Thus,

some units are not concepts

e.g. — a mental entity which is an awareness of an entity in the group of existents that have "a flat, level surface and support(s)."

some units are both units and concepts

e.g. — "table" is a unit in the group "Furniture" and "table" is a concept because it is a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by having "a flat, level surface and support(s)" and having the definiendum — "table."

some concepts are not units???

e.g. — ???

Can anyone identify something which is a [CONCEPT], but is not a [uNIT]?

All concepts are units but sometimes proper names referring to particulars are referred to as "concepts". Technically they are not.

What I am trying to get at is finding a GENERAL NAME for the faculty or active process of awareness from the [PERCEPT] level and above, as well as from the [uNIT] level and above. To my knowledge, Rand never explicitly gave a name to these faculties/processes.

Whats wrong with perception vs conception?

Also, doesn't integration necessarily entail differentiation and vice versa, such that both faculties are simultaneously co-emergent. In other words, the integration of [A] entails its differentiation from [not-A] and the differentiation of [A] from [not-A] entails the integration of [A]. I cannot have one without the other - to integrate is also to differentiate.

Integration and differentiation are both involved.

Isolate, abstract, integrate -symbolize

Edited January 29, 2014 by Plasmatic

[Questioner]

Thanks Plasmatic.

 

All concepts are units but sometimes proper names referring to particulars are referred to as "concepts". Technically they are not.

If proper names are technically not concepts, then what are they. It seems strange that, for example, the proper name — [New York City], is not a concept. I can think "[New York City]" and I can think about "[New York City]." I don't know...just trying to figure out what a proper name is if it is not a concept.

 

 

Whats wrong with perception vs conception?

Nothing is wrong with them per se.

 

I was trying to come up with general terms for two different types of awarenesses and am here adding a third to maybe help clarify.

 

1. [DISCRIMINATING CONSCIOUSNESS] is meant to include "perception" and "conception," as well as something like [NON-CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] - my third term.
   • In other words, each and every case of a "perception" or a "conception" or a [NON-CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] or a [CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] or a [THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] is also a case of a [DISCRIMINATING CONSCIOUSNESS].
     • a "perception" is a [DISCRIMINATING CONSCIOUSNESS]
     • a "conception" is a [DISCRIMINATING CONSCIOUSNESS]
     • a [NON-CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] is a [DISCRIMINATING CONSCIOUSNESS]
     • a [CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] is a [DISCRIMINATING CONSCIOUSNESS]
     • a [THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] is a [DISCRIMINATING CONSCIOUSNESS]
   • The next obvious question is — what do I mean by [NON-CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS]?
     • Here, I am trying to come up with a term for a few interrelated, if not just marginally differently worded things:
       1. the third stage of the development of the (implicit) concept "existent" which "consists of grasping relationships among...entities by grasping the similarities and differences of their identities" (IOE pg. 6).
       2. grouping things using thought-images
       3. thinking in images
       4. memories of perceptions
       5. lucid dreaming (i.e. — dreaming while being aware that one is dreaming)
     • e.g. — a small child might be able to think about one out of two or more objects that have "a flat, level surface and support(s)" with just thought-images and without using any concepts OR they might remember a perception
2. [THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] is meant to include the aforementioned [NON-CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] and conception/[CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS].

• In other words, each and every case of either a [NON-CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] or a conception/[CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] is also a case of a [THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS].
  • a conception/[CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] is a [THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS].
  • a [NON-CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS] is a [THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS]

This is all a very long way to say that it seems to me — based on personal reflection, the technical fact that proper nouns are not concepts, and my reading of Rand's description of the three stages of development of the (implicit) concept "existent" (IOE pg. 6), that there are types of consciousness/awareness that are neither sensations, perceptions, nor conceptions.

 

I would also like add/emphasize that, according to Rand,  conception/[CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS]/[thinking with concepts], in short, necessarily means thinking with common noun words whose definitions you know.

 

Also, do you all consider [CONSCIOUSNESS] and [AWARENESS] to be  mutually inclusive or do they have a different type of relationship?

Edited January 30, 2014 by Questioner

[Questioner]

I will take the silence with regard to my last post as tacit approval of my proposed Objectivist division of consciousness. Barring the somewhat awkward phrasing, I propose...

 

First:

• [AWARENESS] and [CONSCIOUSNESS] are mutually inclusive (based on the lexicon entry on consciousness

And second:

• [MIND] may be divided as such
  • [MIND THAT TAKES NO OBJECT]
  • [MIND THAT TAKES OBJECT(S)]
    • [sUBCONSCIOUS]
    • [CONSCIOUSNESS]
      • [sENSE CONSCIOUSNESS]
        • [EYE CONSCIOUSNESS]
        • [EAR CONSCIOUSNESS]
        • [NOSE CONSCIOUSNESS]
        • [TONGUE CONSCIOUSNESS]
        • [bODY CONSCIOUSNESS]
      • [DISCRIMINATING CONSCIOUSNESS]
        • [PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS]
        • [THOUGHT/VOLITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS]
          • [NON-CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS]
          • [CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT CONSCIOUSNESS]

That is my understanding.

 

Also, with regard to the main topic of my post, I think that I understand it now. Thank you all for your help.

 

If anyone has managed to slog through my epically boring post, from an objectivist perspective, what is the name for what is happening to the mind when it has no object, such as in deep dreamless sleep, possibly some types of severe comas, etc.

 

Do Objectivists asserts that such states of mind exist or not? 

 

thanks.

[Questioner]

also, I think that it would be reasonable to divide consciousness in terms of [volitional consciousness] and [non-volitional consciousness], in which case [non-volitional consciousness] would include [sense consciousness] and the [discriminating consciousness] of [perceptual consciousness], while [volitional consciousness] would include the [discriminating consciousness] of [thought consciousness]. 

 

anyway...