Nitpick: Words are not concepts

[aleph_1]

Consider "A rock is heavy. It is mossy." We use 'it' to make sure that our two concepts heavy and mossy refer to the same entity. You couldn't use a concept like "rolling" there because "rolling is mossy" wouldn't clearly refer to the heavy rock. It's not even as simple as a substitute for a phrase, because "A rock is mossy" still wouldn't perform the task of referring to the same rock.

 

 

Pronouns, by their definitions, must refer to a collection of referents. A pronoun disconnected from referents is an error. The pronoun itself is not the collection of referents but stands in place of them as a convenience. In your example, we could replace the second sentence by "That same rock is mossy" and this would make sure that the two concepts apply to the same entity.

 

Pronouns, in this sense, represent referents and stand in their place. Disconnected from a collection of referents, they represent errors. Whether pronouns connected to a collection of referents represent concepts, I'll let "you" decide. All concepts are contextual. What is interesting about pronouns is that they may represent different concepts in different contexts.

[Eiuol]

So you're sure that the '(' in (B & C) doesn't denote the concept of "occasionally logicians want to apply operations in a different order"? You understand that we are simply doing it, not talking about it?

Simply doing what? '(' would be a concept of a method, so of course you are *doing* something. You seem to be equating concepts with definitions. If concepts were just a definition, you'd be right, since talking about X doesn't cover the performance of X. But Rand explained that her theory of concepts doesn't say concepts or even words are their definition and nothing more. In what way do you think Rand fails to take into account "doings"?

[rowsdower]

You've got two options.

 

1. The sentence is about at least one of A or B & C being true, and the order of operations is involved in expressing this but is not part of the meaning.

2. The sentence is about the order of its operations.

 

Pick 2, and '(' is used as a concept. But then you contradict the formal definition of the language. Pick 1 and '(' goes away during parsing; it only existed to structure the rest.

[Eiuol]

 

Pick 2, and '(' is used as a concept. But then you contradict the formal definition of the language. Pick 1 and '(' goes away during parsing; it only existed to structure the rest.

So what if its primary purpose is structure? That says nothing about if '(' is a concept or not. I didn't see any argument that concepts cannot refer to things that structure a sentence or a phrase. Or even the assertion!

[rowsdower]

So which one do you pick?

[Eiuol]

1 is fine. 2 is wrong for a number of reasons.

[rowsdower]

I have to be very careful with this. The goal of the logic language is to apply boolean operators to variables, aka concepts to referents. You recognize some distinction, in this simplified language, of the difference between a referent to which concepts are applied, the concepts themselves, and the syntax of expressing the application of concepts to referents. You recognize the meaning of the sentence to be something distinct from the list of symbols used to express it. You recognize that the idea conveyed is separate from your idea of the method of conveying it. Is this all correct?

Edited February 12, 2014 by rowsdower

[Eiuol]

 You recognize that the idea conveyed is separate from your idea of the method of conveying it. Is this all correct?

Yeah. "Idea conveyed" and "idea of the method of conveying it" can both be concepts. Or at least, you didn't say how the latter can't be a concept.

[Plasmatic]

Specifically, dower didn't convey how concepts of method aren't concepts....

Edited February 12, 2014 by Plasmatic

[rowsdower]

Ayn Rand made it clear that she doesn't literally consider the words concepts. They're symbols stand for concepts.

 

"Words are concepts" is a straw-man position. Rand also corrected herself about saying a concept is its referents. Try using more specific terms such as "represents" or "is described by".

[Eiuol]

"Words are concepts" is a straw-man position.

Right. You said that Rand said "every word we use is a concept". Grames pulled the real quote, which has "every word we use denotes a concept". So... yeah, the straw-man was there in the OP.

Edited February 12, 2014 by Eiuol

[Questioner]

Right. You said that Rand said "every word we use is a concept". Grames pulled the real quote, which has "every word we use denotes a concept". So... yeah, the straw-man was there in the OP.

 

I can understand leaning more towards the ITOE when it comes to discussing things like the relationships between words and concepts, but rowsdower definitely quoted Rand.

 

On page 17 of The Romantic Manifesto by Ayn Rand, in the section, "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art," she quite clearly says:

 

Man retains his concepts by means of language. With the exception of proper names, every word we use is a concept that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.

 

If you have any doubts, just look at the Ayn Rand Lexicon entry for Concepts. The quote comes from the second sentence of the third paragraph of the first entry.

 

It is definitely a notable contrast to what she says in the ITOE.

[Questioner]

All those quotes show how the word is a unifier. A word in this case works like a function. There is only redundancy if a word is a separate thing to be unified and not the thing [that] unifies. In a way, denoting a concept is just a matter of naming the unifier, the word. If a word is not doing the unifying, what do you suggest as an alternative?

 

"otherStuff" conveys the nonessentials of concept formation.

• "otherStuff"

First, the notion that "'otherStuff' conveys the nonessentials of concept formation" just seems superfluous to the conversation or else I just don't understand its relevance. 

 

For example, the fact of a tree existing in a certain place 5 blocks from my house is nonessential to my formation of the concept [CUP] because of not being essential to my mental integration of two or more [CUP] units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by a specific definition — [A SMALL, BOWL-SHAPED CONTAINER FOR DRINKING FROM, TYPICALLY HAVING A HANDLE AND USED WITH A MATCHING SAUCER FOR HOT DRINKS]. 

 

"Nonessentials," in and of itself, seems too broad to be included in what is relevant to that which constitutes concept formation; so broad, in fact, that it includes all existents and non-existents that are, for example, [NON-CUPS] and [NON-MY CONSCIOUSNESS].

________

 

Second,

 

It may be useful to try to refocus and I, for my own part, will try to reconsider my position.

 

1. Rand, as far as I can tell, says that a [CONCEPT] is constituted by 3 parts:
   1. a mental integration...
   2. a definiendum/word
   3. a definition (unnecessary for first level concepts)
2. These 3 parts of a [CONCEPT] may be then categorized in terms of [ESSENTIAL] and [NON-ESSENTIAL] parts as follows:
   1. essential
      • a mental integration...
      • a definiendum/word
   2. non-essential
      • a definition (unnecessary for first level concepts)
3. These 3 parts of a [CONCEPT] may also be categorized in terms of the parts that are [uNIFIED] and [uNIFIERS] as follows:
   1. the unified
      • a mental integration...
   2. the unifiers
      1. the primary unifier
         • a definiendum/word
           • unifies the mental integration...
           • unifies the definition with the mental integration...
      2. the secondary/non-essential unifier
         • a definition
           • unifies the mental integration...
           • unifies the definiendum/word with the mental integration...
4. The [CONCEPT], generally, is expressed in the form of its [PRIMARY UNIFIER], though it may also be expressed by its [sECONDARY/NON-ESSENTIAL UNIFIER].
5. Thus, when a word denotes a [CONCEPT], it is better understood as that concept's [PRIMARY UNIFIER] re-presenting itself in the position of the [CONCEPT]
6. To the extent that a [PRIMARY UNIFIER] occupies the position of the [CONCEPT] and that every [PRIMARY UNIFIER] is a [WORD], it can definitely be said that:
   • A WORD IS A CONCEPT

_________

 

"In a way, denoting a concept is just a matter of naming the unifier, the word."

 

The word, "CUP" — the name of the primary unifier and which may be either a perceptual concrete or a mental concrete, denotes the concept [CUP] which is partially constituted by the word/primary unifier "CUP" and is expressed by the word/primary unifier "CUP."

 

Thus, the word, "CUP," denotes "CUP." 

________

 

My point is that a word is always a constituent part of any concept and that the notion that a word denotes a concept really means that a word self-denotes itself as a concept for any consciousness apprehending (recognizing & understanding) that word.

 

A word is not something different from a concept. The presence of a word entails the presence of a concept and the presence of a concept entails the presence of a word. 

[rowsdower]

Knowing something about all concepts does not entail knowing something about all words. That all As are better off associated with a B does not mean that all Bs are As. For example, this is illogical: "Two people in love are unified by a ring" -> "This is the purpose performed by a ring" -> "A ring is a marriage".

[Eiuol]

 

On page 17 of The Romantic Manifesto by Ayn Rand, in the section, "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art," she quite clearly says:

 

Man retains his concepts by means of language. With the exception of proper names, every word we use is a concept that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.

Thanks for pointing that out. Would've helped in the OP to get the whole quote.

 

I don't read Rand as though later work supercedes prior work. Like any philosopher, I consider the point of their philosophy. Not that you said otherwise, I'm just clarifying. ITOE is usually a better source for Objectivist epistemology.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

All words are concepts.

Rand already touched on the vast majority of concepts.  However, proper nouns are also concepts; their referents are distinguished from all other existents and abstracted across multiple observations of such referents.  For example:

 

p:  Here is a rock at 5:00.

p:  Here is an identical rock, in the same place, at 6:00.

P:  These rocks I have observed seem to actually be the same rock; at this point one could name it (if there were some reason to)

 

Conjunctions such as 'and' or 'but' are also concepts, which serve the same purpose as 'addition' and 'subtraction'; they specify the relations between other concepts.

For example:  the term "for example" serves to indicate a consequent concretization of the antecedent abstraction, and to signify the relation between them.

The reason conjunctions are indispensable to thought (for instance: reason conjunction indispensable thought) is because of the objective relations between existents which must be preserved, for cognition to retain its adherence to reality.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

All words are concepts.

And in the above sentence, 'all' is a concept of measurement and 'are' is a concept of identity.

[rowsdower]

All words are concepts.

 

Okay, this is not a straw-man. But what do you think about the rest of this thread? I have addressed the argument from your having a concept of a word.

Edited February 15, 2014 by rowsdower

[Questioner]

Knowing something about all concepts does not entail knowing something about all words. That all As are better off associated with a B does not mean that all Bs are As. For example, this is illogical: "Two people in love are unified by a ring" -> "This is the purpose performed by a ring" -> "A ring is a marriage".

I. "Knowing something about all concepts does not entail knowing something about all words."

• While it is absurd that any one person could ever know either all concepts or all words, according to Objectivist epistemology, if there was such a person who did know all concepts — as opposed to the "something about" all concepts, it would necessarily entail that they knew all words.
  • Again, this position is entailed by the logic of Objectivist epistemology.
  • I would like to add that, personally, I do not accept  the notion that to know a concept is to also know the word that constitutes that concept or that all concepts are constituted, in part, by words.

II. "That all As are better off associated with a B does not mean that all Bs are As."

• This is not an accurate representation of Objectivist epistemology.
• Their position is more like this:

1. [A] exists if and only if both:
   1. & [C] (& [D]) exist and
   2. [A], , & [C] (& [D]) are mutually related with one another
2. [A] does not exist if both:
   1. & [C] (& [D]) do not exist and
   2. [A], , & [C] (& [D]) are not mutually related with one another
3. Because [A] has no actual name itself, [A] is only ever named and thereby assumes the position of [A]. This is true despite the fact that [A] can also be understood/explained via [D].
4. Thus, in an unique and peculiar way, is [A] and [A] is  

III. "For example, this is illogical: 'Two people in love are unified by a ring' -> 'This is the purpose performed by a ring' -> 'A ring is a marriage.'"

• I would agree that this is illogical, strictly speaking, as it does not utilize a syllogism correctly. 
• Additionally, it is not an accurate analogy.
  • a better, though far from perfect, non-syllogistic explanation/analogy would be:
    1. In order for a Marriage to exist, there must be a marriage.
    2. If there is no marriage, then no Marriage exists.
    3. The existence of a marriage together with the formal union of two people by which they become spouses is known as a Marriage.
    4. marriage is the unifier and the ceremony is known as Marriage.

IV. At this point, I am curious what your exact definitions [WORD] and  [CONCEPT] are and what the basis for those definitions are (e.g. — the dictionary would be a perfectly reasonable basis).

 

It is obvious that you don't think that [WORD] = [CONCEPT].

 

Maybe both are possible. Maybe sometimes [WORD] = [CONCEPT] and maybe sometimes [WORD] ≠ [CONCEPT].

Edited February 15, 2014 by Questioner

[rowsdower]

By letting [A] take the place of an arbitrary concept, and making claims about it, you do seem to be making claims about all concepts.

Now I'm going to ignore C and D and temporarily accept what I believe to be a simplified version of your claims: That for any arbitrary concept [A]:

1) There is definitely one word denoting [A].

2) [A] does not exist if does not exist, or if doesn't denote [A]. Since [A] exists, this is logically just a more complicated way of saying that exists and denotes [A], AKA 1).

3) [A] is called . This is a simpler way of saying 1).

 

So we really only have one statement: Every [A] has an associated . Or, there is a 1:1 mapping from [A] to . But we don't know if this mapping is onto.

 

 

Okay, now I have an arbitrary word [W]. Can I make any claims about it? Not on the basis of the above.

 

P.S.

Concept: A mental integration of existents.

Word: A lexeme; You may also consider putting punctuation marks in this category depending on whether you agree with previous posters.

[Eiuol]

Questioner (and the end is for rowsdower too):

 

Going off how Rand took it that there are nonessentials when forming a concept (for instance, having five fingers), I presume the same sort of idea for what she means by concept formation. I don't think she meant differentiation, integration, and words are exhaustive of what contributes to concepts. There are cognitive processes that aren't essential to our discussion. So by nonessential, I mean the things different from a philosophy discussion.

Why did you say that a definition is nonessential? Do you mean it's necessary, but not for first level concepts? If so, I'm fine with that characterization.

The only point I disagreed is the conclusion "A word is a concept". You said that the word re-presents itself in the position of the concept. I agree with with that by clarifying that by coming up with a word is this process. But that doesn't mean equality between word and concept! Words are pointers to concepts. Or stated differently, words stand for a concept and refer to a concept, but it's just a "container" for a concept. That's why there aren't 1:1 mappings between word and concept if we use Rand's theory: one word can be used for many concepts (e.g. investment =bank=, river =bank=), or one concept can be used for many words (e.g. cat, chat, neko, gato).
 

Edited February 15, 2014 by Eiuol

[Questioner]

By letting [A] take the place of an arbitrary concept, and making claims about it, you do seem to be making claims about all concepts.

Now I'm going to ignore C and D and temporarily accept what I believe to be a simplified version of your claims: That for any arbitrary concept [A]:

1) There is definitely one word denoting [A].

2) [A] does not exist if does not exist, or if doesn't denote [A]. Since [A] exists, this is logically just a more complicated way of saying that exists and denotes [A], AKA 1).

3) [A] is called . This is a simpler way of saying 1).

 

So we really only have one statement: Every [A] has an associated . Or, there is a 1:1 mapping from [A] to . But we don't know if this mapping is onto.

 

 

Okay, now I have an arbitrary word [W]. Can I make any claims about it? Not on the basis of the above.

 

P.S.

Concept: A mental integration of existents.

Word: A lexeme; You may also consider putting punctuation marks in this category depending on whether you agree with previous posters.

 

I. You summarized my claims when you said:

• 1. "There is definitely one word denoting [A]."
  • In a sense, denotes [A], but [A] also contains .
• 2. "[A] does not exist if does not exist, or if doesn't denote [A]. Since [A] exists, this is logically just a more complicated way of saying that exists and denotes [A], AKA 1)."
  • I said that — [A] does not exist if BOTH 1)  does not exist AND 2) is not mutually related with [A]
• 3. "[A] is called . This is a simpler way of saying 1)."
  • Fair enough.

II. "So we really only have one statement: Every [A] has an associated . Or, there is a 1:1 mapping from [A] to . But we don't know if this mapping is onto."

• I am not sure that I understand (literally, it is not clear to me) exactly how your 1:1 mapping from [A] to in the link that you posted correlates to our discussion of [WORD] & [CONCEPT]
  • Math is very far from my any sort of strong suit that I might have.
• However, if we consider this only from the perspective of Objectivist epistemology, let [A] = [WORD] & = [CONCEPT]
  • [A] is a set containing only itself, the element — [A], necessarily
  • is a set containing only the element(s) [A] ([C] & [D]), necessarily
  • ([A] of [A]) is the ([A] of )
  • ([A] of [A]) also maps onto itself as the ([A] of )
  • Because ([A] of [A]) is the ([A] of ) and the ([A] of [A]) also maps onto itself as the ([A] of ), [A] =
  • If the ([A] of [A]) is the ([A] of ), does this mean that the ([A] of ) also self-maps itself onto itself as the ([A] of )?
  • Though I can't say that I am mathematically inclined, this is how I understand the logic of the Objectivist position through the lens of 1:1 mapping.
  • This seems peculiar, especially that a set could contain nothing but the set of itself or that one set could contain the other set and yet remain distinct from that other set (though I really have no idea whether or not it could do any of that and its all sort of besides the point). 
• "Okay, now I have an arbitrary word [W]. Can I make any claims about it? Not on the basis of the above."
  • This statement is not entirely clear to me.
  • However, if /[CONCEPT] is a set that necessarily contains the set [A]/[WORD] and I know , then it follows that I know something about [A] because of knowing and can make a claim about it.

III. Concept: A mental integration of existents & Word: A lexeme.

• First, I will presume that you will accept the following three:
  • Definiendums and their definitions are mutually inclusive in the sense that whatever is one is necessarily the other and vice versa.
    • For example, [CUP] is a word and [CUP] is also a lexeme.
  • Any word may be either a physical existent (e.g. — a visible word, an audible word, a tangible word — as in Braille) or a mental existent; and that we are primarily talking about words as mental existents. 
  • It is your position that whatever is a concept is necessarily not a word and that whatever is a word is necessarily not a concept.
• Logical consequences follow from your definitional position:
  • The subject, the mental existent — the word: [CUP], is not a [CONCEPT] because of not being [A MENTAL INTEGRATION OF EXISTENTS].
    • You probably accept this.
  • Also, the subject, the mental existent — the word: [CUP], is not  [A MENTAL INTEGRATION OF EXISTENTS] because of not being a [CONCEPT].
    • You probably accept this as well.
  • If you accept the first two, then it follows that the subject, the mental existent — the word: [CUP], is not a [A MENTAL INTEGRATION OF EXISTENTS — THE LETTERS C, U, & P] because of not being a [CONCEPT].
    • I am not sure how you will respond to this, but this is a logical consequence of of your definitional position and contradicts your position that a word is not a concept and/or that whatever is a word is necessarily not a concept.
    • Why is this a logical contradiction?
      • It is because there is no pervasion — It is not the case that whatever is not a concept is necessarily not a mental integration of existents — the letters C, U, & P.
      • 1) The letters are existents and 2) [CUP] is the mental integration of the letters [C-U-P].

Edited February 15, 2014 by Questioner

[Questioner]

Questioner (and the end is for rowsdower too):

 

Going off how Rand took it that there are nonessentials when forming a concept (for instance, having five fingers), I presume the same sort of idea for what she means by concept formation. I don't think she meant differentiation, integration, and words are exhaustive of what contributes to concepts. There are cognitive processes that aren't essential to our discussion. So by nonessential, I mean the things different from a philosophy discussion.

Why did you say that a definition is nonessential? Do you mean it's necessary, but not for first level concepts? If so, I'm fine with that characterization.

The only point I disagreed is the conclusion "A word is a concept". You said that the word re-presents itself in the position of the concept. I agree with with that by clarifying that by coming up with a word is this process. But that doesn't mean equality between word and concept! Words are pointers to concepts. Or stated differently, words stand for a concept and refer to a concept, but it's just a "container" for a concept. That's why there aren't 1:1 mappings between word and concept if we use Rand's theory: one word can be used for many concepts (e.g. investment =bank=, river =bank=), or one concept can be used for many words (e.g. cat, chat, neko, gato).

 

If your first paragraph is referring to "otherStuff," it is just too broad for my taste, sorry.

 

Just as you said, definitions are nonessential for first level concepts. It is because some definitions are nonessential to some concepts that I said definitions are nonessential, generally, even though they are essential for non-first level concepts. I should have been clearer. That was my mistake.

 

I like your other comments. I will have to think about them more.

[Questioner]

One could also say that then it follows that the subject, [A MENTAL INTEGRATION OF EXISTENTS — THE LETTERS C, U, & P], is not a [CONCEPT] because of not being [A MENTAL INTEGRATION OF EXISTENTS].

 

But that is just contradictory nonsense as well.

 

I propose you offer another definition of concept.

[Questioner]

It cannot be the case that both predicates are true:

• [CUP] is NOT a [CONCEPT], and
• [CUP] IS [A MENTAL INTEGRATION OF EXISTENTS — THE LETTERS C, U, & P]

This is because [CONCEPT] and [A MENTAL INTEGRATION OF EXISTENTS] are mutually inclusive, in the sense that:

• whatever is a concept is necessarily a mental integration of existents
• whatever is a mental integration of existents is necessarily a concept 
• whatever is not a concept is necessarily not a mental integration of existents 
• whatever is not a mental integration of existents is necessarily not a concept 
• if a concept exists, then a mental integration of existents necessarily exists
• if a mental integration of existents exists, then a concept necessarily exists
• if a concept does not exist, then a mental integration of existents necessarily does not exist
• if a mental integration of existents does not exist, then a concept necessarily does not exist

 

Again:

• The letters [C], , & [P] are existents, and
• The word [CUP] is the mental integration of the existents — the letters [C], , & [P].