Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum

Why cannot the future be random? (or: invalidating axioms?)

Rate this topic


Recommended Posts

Louie said:

 

"Axioms are, metaphysically speaking, the basis to knowledge, but our recognition of axioms must be discovered." -me

Discovery =/= Proof.

 

 

Its hard to believe you drop context like this so often on accident. I have already made it perfectly clear that I am not challenging the need to validate-discover the axioms by abstracting these fundamental facts from all facts in #52

 

If my problem was with the fact made clear by Ms Rand that we discover the implicit fact of axioms from all facts, I would have asked you to quote her saying that. I asked you to defend the claim that anything in Oism supports the idea that axioms are to viewed as a type of conditional truth that by your account could have been otherwise-"just happen to be true".

 

.

 

And again in #55, the very post you are responding to:

 

 

In particular I made it clear that I was NOT debating the need to discover that axioms are implicit in all facts. I used the word conditional to describe your comments treating the axioms as "derived" or "discovered" from a specialized context as though a new context might invalidate them.

 

It's the "specialized" that is the relevant difference you are missing. This has been a consistent point in my posts.( "specialized vs general")

 

 

Louie said:

 

 

Your awareness of an axiom may be brought on by a specialized science,

 

So what? That doesn't make the axioms specialized knowledge or justify skepticism of the axioms...."Implicit in all facts" includes all facts.....

 

Louie said:

 

 

and if we EVER observe an inconsistency, as with Kepler, our philosophy may be wrong. Kepler probably had his mind totally blown that none of his observations worked with the universe of perfection created by god.

 

Again "our philosophy" in this context is referring to the axioms of Oism. Kepler's philosophy has nothing to do with those axioms.

 

louie said:

 

From that realization, provided by special science of astronomy, that brought on the EVENTUAL axioms Rand discovered.

 

Absolute, complete nonsense! You are actually claiming that Rand abstracted the axioms from some astronomical observation???

 

Louie said:

 

So, this is what I mean by confusing metaphysical facts, ontology if you will, from our conceptual development. I am only making an epistemological claim that by the very reason we discover axioms, we can be mistaken in what  we identify as an axiom. We could use poor methods.

 

 

Specifically you are claiming that the axioms of Objectivism could "possibly" be wrong and "just happen" to have been true in the past. Not some hypothetical axiom. This means could be disproven.

 

louie said:

 

This is rhetoric absent of facts to support it. It sounds pithy, but explain yourself more. Descartes basically treated "cogito ergo sum" as axiomatic. But it had issues despite how great it sounds. He wasn't 100% wrong, and it can't be proven wrong, but further philosophical and scientific developments allowed for the realization that simply thinking isn't the whole story to consciousness being conscious.
 

 

 

Ive already given facts but you ignore them. This whole Descartes nonsense is irrelevant, unfactual, and ignores the onus of proof principle (cant be disproven)

 

louie said:

 

 

 It is difficult to phrase it exactly right, so don't crucify me if I don't pass the linguistic analysis test.

 

Its clear you don't know what linguistic analysis is. My statement:

 

 

You and ludicious keep doing this. You make a ridiculous comment and then when your pressed you try to say something other than what you said before. But what you said before that was wrong is still present in what your saying now.(I'll address this in detail in a bit)

 

Is the very antithesis of what you want to accuse me of. You change your words but you keep saying -meaning the same mistakes is the opposite of linguistic analyst who play with symbols apart from meaning....

 

 

Louie said:

 

Yeah, axioms are themselves incontrovertible, but that doesn't mean 5,000 years in the future we won't find that Rand wasn't 100% right.

 

 

 

You cannot know what incontrovertible or axiom means and make this statement. Rand said the axioms are incontrovertible-they are axioms and she was 100% right. Is your future going to exist, be what it is and are any conscious being gonna be conscious?

 

 

louie said:

 

Possible is referring here to fallibility, where an individual could be wrong about what is true. I am not referring to the presence of counter-evidence. That's why I said "awareness of an axiom" rather than "evidence of an axiom". You can mistake a rhino for an elephant, even though there is no evidence that the rhino-mistake is an elephant because the trunk couldn't be seen. Similarly, you can mistake a provable fact for an axiom. This is fallibility.

 

 

There is no other meaning to "possible". Mistaking a rhino for an elephant is not an instance of a being validating axiomatic self evidencies. There is something and you are aware of it, it is something in particular. That it is impossible to be wrong about! That information given directly by the senses Is infallible! Categorization is fallible, not perception, and direct perception is the key to the validation of the axioms. And one who knows that Oist axioms are not provable cannot mistake them for a provable fact! You and Lud claim to be one of those people.

 

louie said:

 

 

I found it quite presumptuous of you, Marc, and Nicky to take it that the disagreement is rooted in denying axioms or thinking axioms can be proved. It is more productive to correct errors and point out better terms to use.

 

You and Lud have been quoted doing exactly that. That is not a presumption! Having contradiction pointed out is very productive for me..... 

What would be more productive is to admit you have contradicted your claims about axioms, figure out what axiom means so you can then recognize your own contradictions before you post them, and simply say what you mean.

 

 

Plasmatic, quotes are fine, but it is not an argument for anything you say. I can't put together your argument. Give me reasons and examples.

First part you bolded is the question. Rand doesn't comment on where Prof. E said "infallible data". The response is saying that the foundation that stands in for the senses at a conceptual level is what you conceptualize directly. Given the whole book, "conceptualize directly" is a first level concept.

The second quote is saying that subsequent knowledge does not itself "add to" an axiom. There is nothing more to say about existence. However, "grasped conceptually" is to learn by a conceptual method, that is, we are not given at birth knowledge at birth of axioms. To the extent of learning a concept, we all must volitionally consider information and only then can a concept be formed. Axiomatic concepts are no different. What you perceive is what it is, but what you say about what you perceive is fallible. I cannot say this any more clearly.
 

 

I've given you direct quotes of you saying two different things yet you somehow don't get that as argument...

 

Those quotes are directly related to the issue.

 

 

 what is the stand-in for the
evidence of the senses—the incontestable,
infallible data which are the foundation for
all subsequent inference?

 

Is actually hyphenated to link the "evidence of the senses" with "foundation". Ms. Rand then says "the foundation there is the same as in extrospective knowledge. In other words, the base is that which you can conceptualize directly and which corresponds to that same level of conceptual development in the extrospective world." "Base" and "level" are synonyms of foundation and directly  refers to "direct sense perception. The infallible data is sense perception.

 

The second quote is to show you that the axioms are 1. experienced directly (infallibly), 2. nothing one learns after the first sensation adds anything to our knowledge of the axioms, so no specialized context is going to change what is already there in and from the first sensation. Learning that this is true explicitly adds nothing to the direct experience of these primary facts.

 

 

louie said:

 

 

The second quote is saying that subsequent knowledge does not itself "add to" an axiom. There is nothing more to say about existence. However, "grasped conceptually" is to learn by a conceptual method, that is, we are not given at birth knowledge at birth of axioms. To the extent of learning a concept, we all must volitionally consider information and only then can a concept be formed. Axiomatic concepts are no different. What you perceive is what it is, but what you say about what you perceive is fallible. I cannot say this any more clearly.
 

 

It is impossible to be wrong that you exist or are conscious and have identity once you know what that means. Validating them is a process of becoming aware of your awareness of them and what it means to refer to them. Its impossible to be wrong that there is something, I am aware of it, it is something in particular.

 

For this reason I disagree about categorizing particulars as infallible. But one cannot be wrong that "it", "that", what ever one is perceiving, exists, has identity, and you are the one aware of it. ("without yet knowing what it is")....

 

I used to be a complete paradox embracing skeptic before discovering Oism. It was only when I realized that nothing in my experience of the world led to these beliefs that I realized I was taking the words of scientist (superpositions, duality, etc.) as reality and not my direct experience of the world.  Then Oism taught me how that foundation relates to meaning and this made me realize that I cannot even state the opposite meaningfully-without contradiction.

 

Once a skeptic similar to you and Don on this issue of fallibility, asked me to state what evidence I would accept as disproof of identity. I said to him "I can say the words "show me something that is not what it is", but these words are actually nonsense. I am just making sounds with my mouth".... "To be honest I'd have to say; "Nothing, what you just said is a contradiction and I wont accept it as meaningful!" 

 

 I used to say "we cant know anything for certain, but I know that is a claim to knowledge" I just didnt know a way out....... I wish someone could have said to me during those years of meaninglessness embracing paradoxes, "look out, can you see anything that is not what it is?"

Edited by Plasmatic
Link to comment
Share on other sites

 

Yeah, that validates A is A. I don't see where first-level concepts are infallible is demonstrated?

 

Interesting. I had not put that forth as an effort of validating A is A. The example I'm trying to paraphrase came from Peikoff's Intro to Logic, and boiled down to there are facts of which we know for certain, and facts which we can be mistaken about. I may have imported first-level concepts as facts about which we are certain.

 

These two examples may help address the question of how do we know we are fallible:

  • Prior to the practice of branding cows, we are certain that the cow we observe in the field is a cow, but is it farmer Joe's cow that wandered into farmer Pete's field, or farmer Pete's cow, is a fact not obvious via direct inspection. The distinction being of facts available and unmistakable to the evidence of sense, vs., facts which are possible to be mistaken about, that the immediate evidence of sense does not provide.
  • Consider the oft used stick appearing bent when partially submerged in water example. Note that the attack on the senses was not done via the stick, the water, or the partial submergence, rather it was done on the appearance of being bent. The stick, the water and the partial submergence are unmistakable facts, given by direct evidence of the sense, where the explanation of the bent appearance relies on subsequent observations integrated in accordance with the methods described in Newton's "Optiks",
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Categorization is fallible, not perception

I never was talking about perception. I've been emphasizing in different ways that I'm talking about one's understanding and categorization of axiomatic concepts.

As for the rest of your post, Don's post expresses what I'm thinking pretty well.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'll respond to the OP, for the sake of the original poster:

 

First, the idea that something "pops into" and "out of existence" are stolen concepts.  Mass and energy as well as a myriad of various other quantities, charge, momentum, lepton number etc. are conserved and/or in some cases converted one to another (e.g. mass <---> energy) but strictly speaking no physicist has actually observed anything actually going "out of existence" or "coming into existence".  Particles can annihilate top create energy and excess energy of particle interactions can lead to particle antiparticle pair production  but this is not "something from nothing" nor "something into nothing"... it is a change in the forms of existents - the sum total of the universe does not change: the universe cannot become "the universe minus one" or the "universe plus one" so to speak. 

 

As for randomness, nothing philosophically speaking can strictly and logically rule it out nor strictly and logically rule it in.  Causality, for subatomic particles and for conscious beings, as a corollary of the law of identity, requires only that a thing act in accordance with its nature, i.e. it cannot act not in accordance with its nature.  So for some things, being identically as they were, and in the exact same context, "could have done otherwise than they did".  This is what some people mean by the property of "free will" which is exhibited by complex existents like human beings.  This also is claimed to be exhibited by things such as electrons or photons changing states on interaction: the claim being they could have changed to another state (spin up instead of down or polarization orientation etc.) according to some probability (which we use to describe them).  In this way the possible outcomes and the probabilities are determined by their nature/identity but the particular outcome is not determined by their identity (determinism of course holds the opposite view).

 

Einstein would deny this "it could have done something different" as evidenced by his statement "God does not play dice..." to subatomic particles, and materialists who deny free (adhering to determinism) will deny the same "it could have done something different" as exhibited by more complex conscious systems: humans.

 

As long as the range of possibilities and probabilities are dictated by the nature of the electron, photon, or human, i.e. as long as the actions are in accordance with identity, then some randomness within those constraints is possible within the Objectivist philosophical framework.

 

In fact, Objectivism's validation of "free will" as a fact of reality strictly and logically speaking presupposes that a material (non supernatural) entity (which happens to be complex system) can act (all actions are caused, none are uncaused) in such a way that it "could have done otherwise".  As such the universe is not deterministic.

Edited by StrictlyLogical
Link to comment
Share on other sites

 

These two examples may help address the question of how do we know we are fallible:

  • Prior to the practice of branding cows, we are certain that the cow we observe in the field is a cow, but is it farmer Joe's cow that wandered into farmer Pete's field, or farmer Pete's cow, is a fact not obvious via direct inspection. The distinction being of facts available and unmistakable to the evidence of sense, vs., facts which are possible to be mistaken about, that the immediate evidence of sense does not provide.
  • Consider the oft used stick appearing bent when partially submerged in water example. Note that the attack on the senses was not done via the stick, the water, or the partial submergence, rather it was done on the appearance of being bent. The stick, the water and the partial submergence are unmistakable facts, given by direct evidence of the sense, where the explanation of the bent appearance relies on subsequent observations integrated in accordance with the methods described in Newton's "Optiks"

 

I'll talk more about it in another thread, but the point related to this thread is that it is important to distinguish between the language I use to talk about direct perception, and direct perception which is by definition concept-less and language-less. The language I use is fallible of course, even though direct perception can't be wrong or even right (it's how you know how to conceptualize right or wrong anyway). We can call the language used to talk about direct perception and our experience of it a "metaperception" in the sense it is *about* perception. Indeed, I can't be wrong about what I perceive with my senses, but I can be wrong with the very language I use to say all this and formulate my thinking.

 

Lest the whole discussion seem off topic, it is related to how the future can't be random because the question in the OP has to do with thinking on the level of axioms and existence itself.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

For now I'll simply ask Don, Lud and Louie:

If a scientist walked up to you and said, " I have incontrovertible evidence that I am not standing in front of you and that evidence isn't ever incontrovertible".. Do you say, " it's only reasonable to hear his argument and if it happens to turn out that he was wrong, then...." ?

Serious question. Please answer directly. Yes or no?

Edited by Plasmatic
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'd probably laugh while saying "show me" because it was probably a wacky experiment that doesn't show what the scientist claims, so no. I never was arguing that I'm uncertain, nor that all viewpoints are worth listening to. Axioms are defined ostensively, which means you can't define it with words. So, what you can be wrong about is the language you use to talk about it. Defined ostensively, yes, but as you know, concepts are fully formed once a concept is given a word. We then use more words to talk about that word. The result is that it is possible to be wrong with regard to what we *say* about an axiom. It is not possible to be wrong with regard to what we *perceive* about an axiom's referent. Rand does an incredible job at linking the two together, where in the past many have failed, ending up with total skepticism of one's own perception (Kant, but Hegel probably more so), or trusting only direct perception but not concepts (a logical positivist maybe?).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

For now I'll simply ask Don, Lud and Louie:

If a scientist walked up to you and said, " I have incontrovertible evidence that I am not standing in front of you and that evidence isn't ever incontrovertible".. Do you say, " it's only reasonable to hear his argument and if it happens to turn out that he was wrong, then...." ?

Serious question. Please answer directly. Yes or no?

I hate these kinds of "yes or no" questions, because sometimes such a simple answer will not serve to capture everything that I believe is important in my response. (There's a reason why it's so often a tactic of dirty lawyers on television, after all.)

But okay. We're talking reasonably, and you've asked, so:

No.

If I believe that I can fairly put some argument in the form of A = ~A, then I reject that argument, on that basis.

Yet here is my fuller answer:

In putting any argument in this form of A = ~A, I might be mistaken to do that very thing. The scientist himself, in trying to demonstrate his findings, might be mistaken to do so. Can I reject his literal claim/conclusion of "I have incontrovertible evidence that...evidence isn't ever incontrovertible"? Yes. (Though I should say that there are some senses in which "I am not standing in front of you" might well be true, as for instance if he has developed some sort of holographic technology or etc.)

But his research or experiments might well have valuable information (leading to such an insensible conclusion) that ought not be dismissed out of hand. His results might even be spot on, and they might point to something that would be unexpected or counter-intuitive or even freaking bizarre. Depending on the context (who is this guy, and etc.), it might be well worth hearing him out, even though I know that I will not, in the end, conclude that A = ~A. Yet I may well have to revise much of what I believe to be true about the universe on the basis of his findings.

Here is an even fuller answer:

The OP says this:

 

...what if all things can potentially "jump out of existence"? The things' future will then be "random".

What is the objectivist respons?

The first response says this:

 

Entities cannot existentially 'jump out of existence'. That is supernatural nonsense.

And later on that same poster referred to science being "corrupted by bad philosophy," which is really what sent us down this path in the first place.

Now I should state upfront that I am not a scientist and I have no particular specialized knowledge (despite having gone through school and read some popular science works on my own). But look, what if things could "potentially jump out of existence"?

I don't myself know how to respond to such a thing. Yet I'm not certain that the axioms, as such, deny the possibility of things (like subatomic "particles," or fields, or however we conceptualize them, though I will stick with "particle" for convenience's sake) behaving in such a way that we would sensibly describe them as "coming into existence" or "jumping out of existence"? Could there be something about the arrangement of other particles which brings about this behavior, like an emergent property? I've no idea what the possibilities might be to cause what we observe, but we must start with observation.

For after all, "I am aware of something which exists" does not tell me what exists or how it is meant to behave; that I learn through observation. That something behaves "according to its nature" does not tell me about its nature, which again must be learned. What is the nature of a subatomic particle? What is its behavior like? I've no idea. I would expect that a scientist who studies subatomic particles would know far better than I -- and probably far better than anyone on this board, or perhaps within the greater Objectivist community.

So when we begin to argue against "bad physics" on the basis of our "axiomatic knowledge," I think it is at least suspect, and it might well point to a need to reexamine how we are conceptualizing our axioms, or applying them, which is, again, not an infallible process.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Don, I know this is currently going to seem strange to you. But the problem here is that you don't know what it is to "mean" something explicitly and how that relates to communication.  In essence you don't realize that logic is the formalization and preservation of meaning. A contradiction is a failure to preserve meaning. Specifically you don't know what it means to validate the axioms and then communicate that validation in a way that conveys-preserves that meaning.

Don said:
 


I understand your experience of your own certainty; I believe that I experience my own certainty similarly, not only with respect to the axioms that Rand identified, but also most of what I understand of Objectivist Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics, and etc.

Yet there are many people who are equally certain about things which I know to be false. There are also Objectivists who come to particular conclusions, and are apparently quite certain of them (with all of the rhetorical vigor you might imagine), yet I am equally certain that they are wrong on those same points. And I have felt certain of things in the past, and have later found myself to have been mistaken.
My takeaway from all of this -- experience in itself, and sometimes dearly won -- has been that howsoever certain I may be of a thing, I must be willing to be overruled in my conclusions by my ongoing experiences. I must adapt my ideas and my concepts according to reality as I find it.

 

 

I am going to add that you are confused about fallibility because you don't know what certainty is and what the precondition of certainty is. That is why you are contradicting yourself without noticing it. You are not connecting the symbols your using to the experiences that give rise to them. Certainty is NOT a feeling! It is awareness of what you have been aware of. A concepts meaning is the things it refers to. That is always a content of awareness-perception stored in memory. That is what "knowing what you do know" means-refers to. Being aware of your own awareness is the key to validating axioms. The second part is knowing how awareness relates to meaning. Because without a symbol there is no concept, there are no non-linguistic concepts. learning how to use those symbols meaningfully is part of cognition. Dialogically (in discourse) preservation of meaning-logic is the ability to avoid contradiction by remembering what your referring to-the content of your perceptual awareness you are using those symbols to refer to.

You have used the symbol "certain" to refer to the "result" of your cognitive state evaluation, that is, you have taken feeling as a tool of cognition. What ever you feel when you decide you have justified your conclusion has nothing to do with the the veridity of your method and conclusion.

Don said:

 


When you say that it's not possible to be mistaken with regards to Existence, Identity, volition, or etc., I would say that it's possible to come to some mistaken understanding of those same ideas. If that takes us beyond the original topic of the thread, so be it. I also don't care what qualifies as "Objectivism" so much as what is true. Even if Ayn Rand was 100% right on those topics (and I believe that she was), any given individual might be mistaken in his own understanding or application of the same. I think it is a mistake for any man to take his own understanding as infallible, on any matter.

 

The problem is that you don't realize that by mixing these two contexts you are making equivocations that confuse you. "Understanding" that you exist, are conscious, and have identity is the precondition of your truly understanding what it means to understand and mean anything. "those same ideas" are either axioms or aren't.

The string of symbols, "Even if Ayn Rand was on those topics (and I believe that she was), any given individual might be mistaken in his own understanding or application of the same. I think it is a mistake for any man to take his own understanding as infallible, on any matter."

means-refers to one thing, you are contradicting yourself by using the same symbols to refer to two different things.("understand")The question you don't realize is at issue is,"do you mean what you say when you express "I believe that she was 100% right ".

 

Don said:

 

 

I think it is a mistake for any man to take his own understanding as infallible, on any matter.

Because that's really what we're talking about. Not whether AXIOMS, in themselves, can "be mistaken" -- they cannot -- but whether an individual may be mistaken, with respect to his understanding of axioms or Objectivism or any other aspect of reality. .
 

We are talking about the infallible foundation to knowledge (not ANY matter). However, nowhere have I said  " AXIOMS, in themselves, can "be mistaken", ( even though Louie claimed I did, "You are confusing axioms with knowledge of axioms.") which is a nonsensical dichotomy. I have only ever been referring to a person who knows that the axioms of Oism are inescapable. That person can never be wrong in that knowledge. You keep switching to a context of some other "axioms", or, application of that knowledge. I'm not talking about that.

 

One who knows what existence, identity, and consciousness means, can never be wrong in THAT knowledge. This enables them to speak meaningfully about the referents of the symbols used to designate those facts, because they know what they are referring to, the content of their direct experience. A contradiction is a failure to preserve meaning, to use symbols while forgetting what they are tied to in perception and, or, forgetting what you used them for from one statement to the next.

 

 

 

Don said:

 

The recognition of this possibility is not skepticism, I don't think. It is not a claim to have any evidence against any given position. It is not a call for doubt. It is not an impediment to action. But it is a recognition and retention of the context of all human knowledge, which is that it is acquired through a process of thought, which is sometimes susceptible to error

 

 

 

Of course it is skepticism. The idea "one could be wrong on any matter because they are fallible" is all about doubt.  

 

 

Don said:

 

But when we say "rationally doubt the axioms," what do we mean? An "axiom" is more than a word, isn't it? It's a concept. And a concept that exists beyond just the printed pages of ITOE or wherever, but a concept that a person must hold. In coming to form that concept a person might be right or wrong, make any manner of error; two people might read the same page of Rand's writings and walk away with completely different understandings of the same material (I'd say we can see evidence of that all over this board).

 

First, ITOE contains symbols, NOT concepts. I have repeatedly told you what I mean! I mean by "axiom" an incontrovertible fact that has to be reaffirmed in order to deny it. I've given you the particular ones I'm referring to as well. I specifically said that one cannot even state a doubt of an axiom without contradiction-meaningfully...That one can fail to grasp another's communication is very different from the awareness of the implicit content of ones own awareness, and the choice to designate that fact with a symbol.

 

Axiomatic concepts and conceptualized sensations are "peculiar" because of the presence of the units of the concept in all facts. This is different from other concepts of any kind. THAT difference is not something that can not be denied via thought, or stated in a communication meaningfully-without equivocation and contradiction. The directness of the relation between symbol and referent here is important to understanding the undeniability of the axioms.

 

 

Well, if two people read what Rand had to say about axioms, and both consider themselves to be "in agreement," yet they have two separate understandings of it (one of them perhaps smuggling in "effortlessness"), which man should feel entitled to now consider his views unchangeable and permanently validated? The one who's correct? But they both consider themselves to be correct, and there is no arbiter beyond their own judgement...
 

 

Here again, "which man should feel entitled to now consider his views unchangeable and permanently validated?"  Both will "feel" an emotion based on their belief that they are justified in their conclusions. This is irrelevant to the question "which man is justified in his belief?"....The man whos premises corresponf to reality will not have them contradict his certainty when he rejects meaningless contradictions. The man who's ideas don't will have reality slap him in the face eventually. Either way it is not the responsibility of a rationally selfish man to try to persuade others of what they know from direct experience.

 

 

Don said:

 

 

except to appeal again to one's experience in reality, but that's the very thing we're now calling unnecessary (or even wrongheaded)!

 

NO, NO, NO "we" are not calling the "appeal to one's experience in reality" "unnecessary" or "wrongheaded"!

The rejection of the claim that existence ,identity and, consciousness are not incontrovertible facts, is done by knowing what those symbols represent in "ones experience of reality". I am rejecting the possibility that one could have a direct experience of any other type on the grounds of that direct experience! There will never be an experience of "nothing-nonexistence" by an unconscious experiencer. I am certain that no one can claim this nonsense and be right. You do not realize that you are accepting this kind of claim by even stating the need to revalidate what could not be otherwise.

 

 

Don said:

 

 

 If I were mistaken, absent further reflection or experiment or what have you, I do not believe that I could simply tell. Thus I believe that my epistemological practices should be designed to put myself in the best possible position to catch my own errors, should they exist (unlikely though that may be).
 

 

Like it or not, you are arguing that you cannot tell that the statement, "one can experience a non existent nothing in particular with out consciousness", is a meaningless contradiction on the basis that you are incapable of knowing your own direct experience of the facts that this statement presupposes.....

 

 

Don said;

 

I think that to fairly investigate a claim requires one to temporarily set aside his own certainty.

 

 

I am certain that one cannot investigate anything without existing, having identity, and being conscious. Nothing can make me uncertain of that. If and when you realize what this means you will join me.

 

Don said:

 

For you see, suppose *I'm* the one who has smuggled something Rand never intended -- something false -- into my understanding of "free will"? I'd like to be able to find that out, if that's the case, and so my process is designed to help me to do that -- to discover where I'm mistaken. (I'd argue that there are additional benefits to this approach besides, perhaps beyond the scope of this discussion, but I'm happy to discuss them if you're interested.)
 

 

 

 

Lets be clear and specific. Do YOU think it is possible that the axioms of Objectivism are not axioms? That's what I am "really talking about" Every word you are using to express your "process" is an out of context absolute-stolen concept, if you don't.

 

Ill ask again:

 

If a scientist walked up to you and said, " I have incontrovertible evidence that I am not standing in front of you and that evidence isn't ever incontrovertible" do you take the time to listen to him on the basis that he may be right? Yes or no?

 

Edit: you answered while I was typing

Edited by Plasmatic
Link to comment
Share on other sites

louie said:

 

 

I'd probably laugh while saying "show me" because it was probably a wacky experiment that doesn't show what the scientist claims, so no.

 

This is astonishing to me. You really don't realize that you described the conditions that satisfy a yes answer and then said "no"? You just used the word "probably" which means you are not certain when someone is standing in front of you and that contradictions are impossible!

 

Louie said:

 

 

I never was arguing that I'm uncertain, nor that all viewpoints are worth listening to

 

You just said that it was only probable that you could determine if someone is standing in front of you! That means you are not certain! You have been arguing that one ought not dismiss the claim that the axioms are not axiomatic on the basis that you could be wrong and they might be right! You said you agree with Don didn't you? He is claiming that one ought to listen to any evidence on the basis that he could be wrong.

 

 

Louie said:

 

Axioms are defined ostensively, which means you can't define it with words. So, what you can be wrong about is the language you use to talk about it. Defined ostensively, yes, but as you know, concepts are fully formed once a concept is given a word. We then use more words to talk about that word. The result is that it is possible to be wrong with regard to what we *say* about an axiom. It is not possible to be wrong with regard to what we *perceive* about an axiom's referent. Rand does an incredible job at linking the two together, where in the past many have failed, ending up with total skepticism of one's own perception (Kant, but Hegel probably more so), or trusting only direct perception but not concepts (a logical positivist maybe?).

 

 

Uh, "defining with words" is not the same thing as symbolizing with words! We use words to symbolize axioms. " It is not possible to be wrong with regard to what we *perceive* about an axiom's referent." exactly describes the the Oist description of grasping the meaning of the symbol "axioms", reducing it to direct perception. "You do know what you do know". "Concepts are their referents!"  You now need to realize that this infallible perception that is the thing the symbol refers to, is the basis for rejecting the symbols one would use to attempt to refute your direct experience.. The words "existence, does not exist" is an attempt to refute that infallible knowledge.

Edited by Plasmatic
Link to comment
Share on other sites

AXIOMS, in themselves, can "be mistaken", ( even though Louie claimed I did, "You are confusing axioms with knowledge of axioms.") which is a nonsensical dichotomy.

No, that's not what I mean, it's backwards! Knowledge of what is an axiom is fallible. An axiom itself, when correctly identified as an axiom, cannot be mistaken, that's what makes it an axiom. "God exists" can easily be an axiom. But as it turns out, that contradicts more fundamental facts, so I'll proceed to say the person's understanding is mistaken. The whole topic by now is questioning my and Don's understanding of axioms! You're already saying we've mis-identified an axiom. That makes my point for me.

 

EDIT: Probably as in either that, or they're insane, or it was a dream, or it was only a schematic sketch. The "probably" is referring to how the scientist came to the conclusion. Usually, it's a wacky experiment. The "probably" was conveying a lack of certainty about why a scientist would say something so absurd...

Edited by Eiuol
Link to comment
Share on other sites

No, that's backwards! Knowledge of what is an axiom is fallible. An axiom itself, when correctly identified as an axiom, cannot be mistaken, that's what makes it an axiom. "God exists" can easily be an axiom. But as it turns out, that contradicts more fundamental facts, so I'll proceed to say the person's understanding is mistaken.

 

Axioms aren't mistaken about anything, people are!

 

How many times do I have to say that I am referring to the axioms of Objectivism? How many times are you gonna respond to something I am not talking about? The question is "Are the axioms of objectivism axioms?" If someone came to you and said "I have incontrovertible proof that you are a non existing-nothing in particular, that is not conscious", is it possible that person is correct???????

 

edit:

"God exists" can easily be an axiom"

 

Really? So "god exists "cannot be denied without reaffirming it? I think you mean "someone can mistakenly think that "god exists" is an axiom". Even if this is irrelevant.

 

 

 

The whole topic by now is questioning my and Don's understanding of axioms! You're already saying we've mis-identified an axiom. That makes my point for me.

 

Where have I said you mis identified an axiom? Quote me saying this. This thread is now largely consisting of trying to get you and Don to talk about the same thing I am!

Edited by Plasmatic
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Weaver I see the thread has been subtitled: "invalidating axioms" . I seems like that is what we are discussing. Its just that there is equivocation on that topic. I agree that a topic discussing "hypothetical axioms" would be a different topic. However, I wouldnt be involved in that thread.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The question you don't realize is at issue is,"do you mean what you say when you express "I believe that she was 100% right ".

I do mean what I say, but I do not agree with you that this question is at issue.

 

I have only ever been referring to a person who knows that the axioms of Oism are inescapable. That person can never be wrong in that knowledge. You keep switching to a context of some other "axioms", or, application of that knowledge. I'm not talking about that.

But what I am saying is that it is knowledge. And what is true of knowledge is true of one's knowledge of axioms as well (including his knowledge that the axioms Rand identified, according to his own understanding of them, are inescapable).

I don't believe that I am "switching context." Rather I think that the context I'm trying to provide is the only applicable context. As a conceptual understanding, an axiom doesn't exist except that some individual holds that concept in his own mind. He must have some particular and specific understanding of it, and he must apply it in some fashion. It doesn't just float there; it must be used.

In doing so (forming a concept or using it) a person may make some error -- even when it comes to conceptualizing axioms, or understanding Rand's writing on them, or applying them to contemporary controversies in science (which was the original context of this discussion).

 

One who knows what existence, identity, and consciousness means, can never be wrong in THAT knowledge.

But this is begging the question. I might as well say that "someone who is right about a given matter cannot be wrong about that matter," and sure. One who knows something correctly (or here "knows what existence, identity, and consciousness means") is correct in his knowledge.

That's not just true about "axioms," it's true about everything. The correct man is correct.

But we exist as individual people who need to come to knowledge about the world (axioms included) via some actual process. And as there is sometimes error in that process, when a person finds that there is some conflict between what he believes to be true and his further experience, a person must be willing to entertain the possibility that his held knowledge is wrong in some fashion. This extends to what he has held as "axiomatic."

I think Rand meant something similar with her aphorism, "check your premises." Well, a person who's arguing against modern physics may well hold his understanding of the Objectivist axioms as a premise, explicit or otherwise. I'd say that at some point he might be wise to check that premise, as his understanding might be faulty (or his application of that axiom).

Is this necessary for someone who holds the correct axioms, conceptualized correctly and applied correctly? No. But who's going to tell him that he's holding the correct axioms, conceptualized correctly and applied correctly? Me? You? God? No; it's his own understanding that's going to tell him whether he's right or not, in his understanding of the axioms or anything else -- but that's the very thing that needs to be checked! His own understanding! And what does he need to check his understanding against, and by what means?

 

Of course it is skepticism. The idea "one could be wrong on any matter because they are fallible" is all about doubt.

No, I think you're mistaken -- either in your understanding of "skepticism" or your understanding of my argument.

I'm not questioning whether a man can know something, or even be certain of a thing. I know and am certain of many things. Yet people are capable of making errors in concept formation, and etc. We are capable of believing something to be true and being mistaken. I don't believe that is an expression of skepticism, or if it is, then we should all be skeptics to that extent -- because it is true. People make mistakes and are sometimes wrong. I have made mistakes and have been wrong; I expect that you have had similar experiences; and I think that this is valuable knowledge to have, because it helps us to be willing to "check our premises" and root out errors from time to time.

This is not "all about doubt." I act with complete confidence in my beliefs. I do not doubt something if I have no specific call to doubt it. But when something does not happen according to my expectations, I do allow that I might have been mistaken, because I recognize this as a general possibility, and I investigate to try to determine whether that is the case, and whether I need to modify my own understanding.

 

Here again, "which man should feel entitled to now consider his views unchangeable and permanently validated?"  Both will "feel" an emotion based on their belief that they are justified in their conclusions. This is irrelevant to the question "which man is justified in his belief?"

Both men will consider themselves to be justified in their beliefs. Only one (at most) will be correct. But there is no arbiter to appeal to to decide that question, except...

 

....The man whos premises corresponf to reality will not have them contradict his certainty when he rejects meaningless contradictions. The man who's ideas don't will have reality slap him in the face eventually.

Indeed. But whether some apparent "contradiction" is truly meaningless, or is a "slap in the face" which should alert him to his own mistaken viewpoint, is itself an assessment that an individual must make. It is the willingness to engage in that assessment that allows a mistaken man to correct his mistakes.

As a man does not know ahead of time that he is mistaken (and that his confidence in his own conclusion, or "certainty," is unwarranted), it is wise for every man to be willing to reassess his own understanding and knowledge in the face of apparent contradiction.

 

Either way it is not the responsibility of a rationally selfish man to try to persuade others of what they know from direct experience.

I never said that it is, but I am arguing for the process by which all men ("rationally selfish" or otherwise) may come to divest themselves of false beliefs and gain knowledge.

Edited by DonAthos
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Keep in mind (a little off the current topic) that much of what scientists say is strictly not science.

 

1.  Some scientists actually hold the view that consciousness observation plays a causal role in QM wave function collapse... i.e. states are indeterminate until an observer (specifically possessing consciousness) observes the phenomenon after which the probabilities become certainty.

 

2.  Some "physicists" speculate that we live in just one of many universes.

 

3.  Others claim that there is a high probability that our universe is a simulation...

 

 

the list goes on...

 

This is not science.  It is rationalism (possibly influenced by mysticism) and pure fantasy/imagination.  The reason why supposed scientists indulge in this insanity is bad philosophy.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

2.  Some "physicists" speculate that we live in just one of many universes.

Just a comment on 2, that's usually a semantic argument. It's sensible to say we live in a universe comprised of multi-verses. Not a problem any more than saying there are many galaxies in the universe. Whatever you call it doesn't matter a lot metaphysically speaking, it doesn't succeed in being anything other than a reaffirmation that there is only one reality...

Link to comment
Share on other sites

From the online etymology dictionary:

 

universe (n.) 1580s, "the whole world, cosmos, the totality of existing things," from Old French univers (12c.), from Latin universum "all things, everybody, all people, the whole world," noun use of neuter of adjective universus "all together, all in one, whole, entire, relating to all," literally "turned into one," from unus "one" (see one) + versus, past participle of vertere "to turn" (see versus).
 
multiverse (n.) 1895, William James's coinage, an alternative to universe meant to convey absence of order and unity.
But those times are past; and we of the nineteenth century, with our evolutionary theories and our mechanical philosophies, already know nature too impartially and too well to worship unreservedly any god of whose character she can be an adequate expression. Truly all we know of good and beauty proceeds from nature, but none the less so all we know of evil. Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference, a moral multiverse, as one might call it, and not a moral universe. [William James, "Is Life Worth Living?" address to the Young Men's Christian Association of Harvard University, May 1895]

 

I didn't much like multiverse before, and this quick search has me liking it less. I, too, have also heard that multiverse ultimately boils down to one reality. It just seems to introduce unnecessary complexity. Isn't it also the term the mathematical 17+ dimensional stuff is packaged into as well? If multiverse is not an invalid concept, is there room for a category of bastardized concepts?

 

When I think of things comprised of multi-verses, stuff like the Koran, the Torah, etc., which come to mind much more readily.

 

My two-cents on multi-verse.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Weaver said:

 

I didn't much like multiverse before, and this quick search has me liking it less. I, too, have also heard that multiverse ultimately boils down to one reality. It just seems to introduce unnecessary complexity. Isn't it also the term the mathematical 17+ dimensional stuff is packaged into as well? If multiverse is not an invalid concept, is there room for a category of bastardized concepts?

 

When I think of things comprised of multi-verses, stuff like the Koran, the Torah, etc., which come to mind much more readily.

 

My two-cents on multi-verse.

 

 

 

Yeah, "concepts ought not be multiplied beyond necessity" (Rands Razor), is the category that comes to my mind.... Another example of using the requirements of context as a license to equivocate...

Edited by Plasmatic
Link to comment
Share on other sites

In response to Plasmatic-
 
Quote

"One who knows what existence, identity, and consciousness means, can never be wrong in THAT knowledge.






Donanthos said
 
Quote

"But this is begging the question. I might as well say that "someone who is right about a given matter cannot be wrong about that matter," and sure. One who knows something correctly (or here "knows what existence, identity, and consciousness means") is correct in his knowledge.


That's not just true about "axioms," it's true about everything. The correct man is correct."






Defending the axioms by showing that one must use them to deny them is not begging the question. The point is that there is no argument against the axioms. Unless you can come up with an argument that does not exist(axiom 1), has no identity(axiom 2) and of which you are not aware(axiom 3).



Begging the question is when YOU assume the point that YOU are trying to prove.

Any argument against the axioms is an example of YOUR OPPONENT assuming the point YOU are trying to prove. ( ex. I am saying existence exists is true. Unfortunately your argument against my axioms exists.)

And any argument against the axioms in the future by the most brilliant scientist rigorously adhering to the scientific method going totally by empirical evidence. Whatever he comes up with will exist.



Ayn Rand stated the above more eloquently:

"“‘We know that we know nothing,’ they chatter, blanking out the fact that they are claiming knowledge—‘There are no absolutes,’ they chatter, blanking out the fact that they are uttering an absolute—‘You cannot prove that you exist or that you’re conscious,’ they chatter, blanking out the fact that proof presupposes existence, consciousness and a complex chain of knowledge: the existence of something to know, of a consciousness able to know it, and of a knowledge that has learned to distinguish between such concepts as the proved and the unproved. “When a savage who has not learned to speak declares that existence must be proved, he is asking you to prove it by means of non-existence—when he declares that your consciousness must be proved, he is asking you to prove it by means of unconsciousness—he is asking you to step into a void outside of existence and consciousness to give him proof of both—he is asking you to become a zero gaining knowledge about a zero. “When he declares that an axiom is a matter of arbitrary choice and he doesn’t choose to accept the axiom that he exists, he blanks out the fact that he has accepted it by uttering that sentence, that the only way to reject it is to shut one’s mouth, expound no theories and die."



Rand, Ayn (1963-12-01). For the New Intellectual: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand
Edited by Tsook
Link to comment
Share on other sites

But what I am saying is that it is knowledge. And what is true of knowledge is true of one's knowledge of axioms as well (including his knowledge that the axioms Rand identified, according to his own understanding of them, are inescapable).

I don't believe that I am "switching context." Rather I think that the context I'm trying to provide is the only applicable context. As a conceptual understanding, an axiom doesn't exist except that some individual holds that concept in his own mind. He must have some particular and specific understanding of it, and he must apply it in some fashion. It doesn't just float there; it must be used.

In doing so (forming a concept or using it) a person may make some error -- even when it comes to conceptualizing axioms, or understanding Rand's writing on them, or applying them to contemporary controversies in science (which was the original context of this discussion).

 

I'm still having difficulties with the part I've highlighted in red.

 

Is this: (All S is P)

All 'forming a concept' is error prone.

All 'using a concept' is error prone.

 

or is it: (Some S is P)

Most 'forming a concept' is error prone.

Most 'using a concept' is error prone.

 

If error is not a derivative concept, then by what means is it discovered?

 

Or are you just referring to forming and using axioms/axiomatic concepts as being error prone, rather than knowledge more broadly?

I am arguing for the process by which all men ("rationally selfish" or otherwise) may come to divest themselves of false beliefs and gain knowledge.

Nicely put.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

If error is not a derivative concept, then by what means is it discovered?

 

Or are you just referring to forming and using axioms/axiomatic concepts as being error prone, rather than knowledge more broadly?

Hi dream_weaver,

I'm not completely comfortable trying to put my argument into the forms you've suggested. Let me try to dig into this concept of error, as I'm using it, and recapitulate my argument to see if I can help you understand my meaning. Maybe when I'm done you'll also have the answer to your initial question(s). (Or maybe, if you find some flaw here, you can bring it to my attention.)

I contend that in coming to knowledge, or in knowledge held, or applied, a man may be mistaken. Though I don't believe I've used this specific phrase, I think we may reasonably describe this as man being "error prone," and a counter position against any claim of "infallibility."

I make this argument, not as standing against "knowledge" or "certainty" in general (which would be skepticism), nor as an attack on any given position (that "man is error prone" does not mean that any given claim is wrong, or that a given man has made an error), but as the necessary context for understanding why, in the face of apparent contradiction (between a man's beliefs, or between his beliefs and his further experience in reality) a man may have to revise what he believes to be true (or in Rand's parlance, as I've made this connection previously, why a man may need to "check his premises")

To hopefully address one specific question to your satisfaction, error remains "derivative" in the sense that we may only understand "mistake" or "error" in comparison to correct, right, or true. Doubt likewise remains reserved for those situations where we have some actual cause for doubt (as opposed to a general approach).

And yet the question which I seek to answer is -- when we meet some apparent contradiction (meaning that which we judge to be contradictory, as between, say, the claims of a modern physicist and our own beliefs, which was the initial context of the thread), do we assume that the error must lie in the claims of the physicist -- because we are certain in our beliefs, and determine prior to any subsequent investigation that we cannot be mistaken? Or are we willing to check our premises in recognition that this is potentially where the observed error/discrepancy lies? I say that we should be willing to check our premises, our certainty notwithstanding, because being human it is possible that we have made some mistake (even in the evaluation that something is certain).

I believe that the contention has been made that when we discuss "axiomatic knowledge," which is sometimes held to be a special case -- when the premises in question are "axioms" -- there is no need to "check" them. But I disagree with this, because in coming to conceptualize or apply a given axiom (even one which, when properly understood, is true) to a specific situation, a person may yet make some error.

In order to demonstrate this, I've provided the example of a person who agrees that "free will" cannot ever be disproven, yet who conceives of free will incorrectly (and therefore comes to erroneous conclusions in application). This person must be willing to reexamine his concept of free will, despite holding it to be "axiomatic," despite his certainty, if he is to rid himself of his error. There is no other way to do it.

It has been contended (or at least implied) that this may be true or necessary for the man who has conceived of free will incorrectly, but it is not true or necessary for the man who has conceived of free will correctly. In itself, this is true enough. But the problem for the individual who wishes to apply these ideas in reality is that a man does not know whether he is mistaken prior to reexamination, and there is no external arbiter or authority to which he can appeal, except for reality via that process of reexamination. Both the correct man and the incorrect man will consider himself to be "the correct man." Thus, when one considers himself to be "the correct man" -- when one believes himself to have conceptualized free will correctly, and applied it correctly, it is still good policy to be willing to reexamine one's own beliefs on the matter in the face of apparent contradiction. It is still wise to be willing to check one's premises.

Edited by DonAthos
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Loading...
  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.

×
×
  • Create New...