Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum

The "What" of the Concept Consciousness

Rate this topic


Recommended Posts

Hello All

 

 

I have read something recently which leads me to believe that independent of the fact that we cannot fully describe consciousness, why it arises, specifically being able to predict with certainty what kinds of complex systems would have consciousness and which ones would not and why... that different people have a fundamental difference about WHAT they are referring to when they use the concept "consciousness".

 

It is only recently I have begun to think this. It's subtle but let me try to explain... first by way of analogy.

 

 

SIGHT.

 

I ask a first someone about what kinds of evidence in reality deals with sight.  He responds by saying things like: well if I ask my subject about an object they cannot touch and which is silent they report sensing it with their eyes, if I move an object they are able to align their arm with it, and I have determined that the light bouncing off of objects actually enters a persons eye and causes retina and optical nerve activity which are then passed to the brain.  This is evidence of sight.

 

If I ask a second someone, they talk about first person experiences, about what it like to perceive orange, what red is like, how they experience the world around them and they cite having touched what they see as verification of sight by the sense of touch.

 

 

I would say we here know that the first description of sight and evidence therefore as well as the second description of sight and the evidence therefor are really about the same thing.  However, we can also see that sight involves two slightly different aspects in reality.  1. there is a process, a function, which we can verify is going on in reality, and which could have been verified far before we understood it fully (observing other people seeing is sufficient), and 2. there is a first person experience which occurs, no less in reality, which we can verify is connected to the visual objects of reality.

 

As rational scientific people I would have thought "sight" did not mean one of these two to the exclusion of the other... i.e. it is the process occurring regardless of whether it is observed from a third person perspective or from a first person perspective, as a matter of fact all "person perspectives" inform the knowledge of reality, of the thing, which we identify as "sight".

 

 

 

Consciousness

 

I know that some people, when they hear the term "consciousness" they think of a process or function in reality which is exhibited by human brains and is evidenced by a multitude of things including the mere existence of buildings, airplanes, chess, puzzles, nuclear bombs, as well as psychological experiments, medical and neurological data, MRI imaging, as well as reports of people and of course first person experiences.

 

I have come to a sneaking suspicion that other people, when thinking of the term "consciousness" they specifically take it to mean the first person experience of being conscious.  That what people do, how people behave, how brains behave, how brains look in MRI scans... is only evidence of what a material brain does.  Third ?other? person observation is about things "out there" are not, strictly speaking, about consciousness.  The

concept "consciousness", these people would say, refers only to the first person experience which can never be deduced from or reduced to "other person" observation of any kind. It is true that there is a "first person - other person gap".  It is the same problem as that of the impossibility of knowing "what it is like to be a bat" or a worm or a thermostat for that matter, no matter how much we actually learn about how bats, worms, and thermostats work.  I question, however, whether WHAT these people limit the concept "consciousness" to is overly narrow.

 

 

Question:  Do some people define the WHAT to which the concept "consciousness" refers as ONLY the first person experience of being conscious

 

IF this is the case... I begin to see the reference to heretofore irrational and incomprehensible claims about consciousness as such as having some explanation/excuse.

 

 

 

Personally I have always taken consciousness (the concept) to refer to the thing in reality which functions to identify and which can be observed from an other person i.e. objective view, as well as definitely can be observed through direct first person experience of it. i.e. My concept of "Consciousness" is the thing independent of the "view" by which one happens to observe it.

 

 

Thoughts?

Edited by StrictlyLogical
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Consciousness can have multiple definitions - depending on the context of the discussion/proposition.  No one definition has anymore "metaphysical" value than any other, except in a given context.  A child can have an understanding of consciousness every bit as objective as a neurosurgeon or psychologist.  We can't have an all-encompassing omniscient understanding of consciousness (or anything for that matter).

 

I would say that you need to better define the context which you are working in.  Is this related to Artificial Intelligence?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Your first paragraph has me wondering if the passage you're referring to came from "How We Know".

 

While I only have direct knowledge of my consciousness, I do infer that others perceptually experience it a similar way, barring various anomalies, such as color-blindness, just to name one.

 

I would infer that the bats I see swooping in the sky at night demonstrate a form of consciousness, worms exhibit different enough behavior to question just how they might perceive reality. A thermostat? The physical design exploits properties of materials that bring about its functionality.

 

Your inclusion of buildings, airplanes, chess, etc., are applications arising from man's unique form of conceptual consciousness - adding a dimension to the question that appears to go beyond the sight analogy.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I think, if you are a proponent of Oist epistemology, it makes sense to begin with Rand's question, 'what fact or facts of reality give rise to the need for a concept consciousness?'. I would say that the major fact is our observations (including introspection) of entities which are aware of their surroundings. This faculty of awareness which is only present in certain entities requires a concept to denote it: consciousness.

 

That being said, you do not need to know everything about an existent to form a concept for it. Actually, I'm sure a large percentage of concepts are initially formed with an incomplete understanding of the existent to which it refers. A child does not need to understand everything about tables to form the concept 'table'. Similarly, the concept of consciousness has been around for a long time prior to our modern scientific understanding of consciousness.

 

 

My concept of "Consciousness" is the thing independent of the "view" by which one happens to observe it.

 

Is that your definition of the concept? If so, that seems to be a really confusing one. Is the genus 'thing'? And the differentia is 'independent of the view by which one observes it'? Remember that the point of a definition is to distinguish the concept from other concepts and also to establish where in the hierarchy of knowledge the concept lies. I think a better definition would be: Consciousness is the faculty of awareness. The genus is 'faculty' and the differentia is 'awareness'.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I don't follow what you're saying. Most philosophers are pretty clear that how consciousness works is different than what it is like to be conscious. But yeah, consciousness IS the first person experience. When I ask if you're conscious, I'm asking if you are aware of your experiences.

By the way, if consciousness is independent of any viewpoint of any observer is equivalent to asking for evidence of consciousness without using consciousness. A consciousness "outside" my consciousness such that I observe my consciousness is self-contradictory! This is one reason consciousness is axiomatic: it is senseless to talk about observing the very thing your observation depends on. We can analyze its identity and what gives rise to consciousness (the brain is part of it at least), though. The closest to "outside" I get is identifying someone else as conscious. Still, consciousness refers to my experience of the world.

Edited by Eiuol
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I don't follow what you're saying. Most philosophers are pretty clear that how consciousness works is different than what it is like to be conscious. But yeah, consciousness IS the first person experience. When I ask if you're conscious, I'm asking if you are aware of your experiences.

By the way, if consciousness is independent of any viewpoint of any observer is equivalent to asking for evidence of consciousness without using consciousness. A consciousness "outside" my consciousness such that I observe my consciousness is self-contradictory! This is one reason consciousness is axiomatic: it is senseless to talk about observing the very thing your observation depends on. We can analyze its identity and what gives rise to consciousness (the brain is part of it at least), though. The closest to "outside" I get is identifying someone else as conscious. Still, consciousness refers to my experience of the world.

 

"If consciousness is independent of any view point..."

 

Existence of consciousness in any particular thing, a person , a carrot, a rock. is independent of any viewpoint, of all thinkers WE KNOW this... either it exists in it or it does not.  Something is "happening" in the person and something is not "happening" in the carrot or rock whether I want it to or not, and independent of what "viewpoint" we are discussing.  It is not as if "from the carrots view" or "from the person's view" the actual status of the existence of consciousness changes in any of them... it is there or it is not.

 

Consciousness of the first person is validated by that first person's experience, and requires nothing more.  Consciousness occurring in reality (which it does) in places other than the first person is validated by other evidence (as well as perhaps the inference that other biological systems likely function similarly to the first person and hence likely also have consciousness).  It would be a gross misuse of logic to say it were "possible" everyone else, made of the same types of structures functioning in the same way do not exhibit consciousness .. only the appearance of consciousness.

 

 

Thank you for your answer to my question , you at least take "consciousness" to mean only the first person experience, not the property in reality exhibited by/in people.

Edited by StrictlyLogical
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I think, if you are a proponent of Oist epistemology, it makes sense to begin with Rand's question, 'what fact or facts of reality give rise to the need for a concept consciousness?'. I would say that the major fact is our observations (including introspection) of entities which are aware of their surroundings. This faculty of awareness which is only present in certain entities requires a concept to denote it: consciousness.

 

That being said, you do not need to know everything about an existent to form a concept for it. Actually, I'm sure a large percentage of concepts are initially formed with an incomplete understanding of the existent to which it refers. A child does not need to understand everything about tables to form the concept 'table'. Similarly, the concept of consciousness has been around for a long time prior to our modern scientific understanding of consciousness.

 

 

Is that your definition of the concept? If so, that seems to be a really confusing one. Is the genus 'thing'? And the differentia is 'independent of the view by which one observes it'? Remember that the point of a definition is to distinguish the concept from other concepts and also to establish where in the hierarchy of knowledge the concept lies. I think a better definition would be: Consciousness is the faculty of awareness. The genus is 'faculty' and the differentia is 'awareness'.

 

It is not my definition of the concept.  It is a clarification that I take consciousness to be a property or quantity in reality which is occurring at least (for example) in the crania of every awake and thinking human.  The clarification i.e. that it is independent of the view means I can speak of it as objectively existing in other people when I simply say "consciousness" I am not ONLY referring to my introspective experience of my own consciousness.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

To me it sounded like you were asking about being conscious OF your own consciousness. I'm still not sure if you are. If you mean noting other conscious entities, that's difference. Either way the property of consciousness is a first person experience which Rand called a faculty of awareness and many philosophers say similar things. I don't know what you want to say, you said your concept of consciousness is independent of the view you happen to observe it. That's asking about consciousness apart from being conscious. The philosophers who are functionalists and say consciousness is JUST particular activated neurons that correspond to mental states, they'd claim that the brain and neurons is the independent thing you want. The problem is, functionalism doesn't CARE about first person experience. Trying to ignore it or avoiding it is a fool's errand - the mechanics are not equal to the phenomena.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

If I recall correctly we both are of the view consciousness is a process or function of non-supernatural material existence.  It is true that the function/process is not the material, but the material is functioning, it is being conscious.

 

My point is that there may be different senses that the word "consciousness" is used.  It IS an experience but it is an experience THINGS (complex things like brains) have/do.  So arguable "consciousness" is a property that can be attributed to a thing doing it.  THAT man is conscious.  Brains have the property of "consciousness"... So in this sense the concept encompasses what it is and the experience we have of it.

 

The other possible sense is that "consciousness" only refers to the subjective first person experience of the processes. I WOULD say "what it is like to be conscious" but the last part "to BE conscious" would be a misnomer, things only experience consciousness. i.e. consciousness is ONLY an experience not a process not an attribute of reality, purely subjective.

Edited by StrictlyLogical
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I don't know whether this will speak to the questions being raised with precision, but when I speak of my consciousness, I mean my "first person experience."

I may and do infer that others have similar experiences. Others make the same sort of inference, though people can sometimes mistake in so doing. Early, people granted a consciousness to the moving planets and other natural phenomena, and in the future it's possible we will have advanced simulacra capable of "appearing conscious" to most observers. (I've heard that some program recently passed someone's administered "Turing test," but what I saw of that program was not impressive, imo.) As to whether -- and when -- such things are judged to actually *be* conscious...? I do not know. Usually when I think about this subject, I think about ST:TNG's Data. Was he a conscious entity (in the same way that I am, possessed of this kind of "first person experience")? I do not know.

Speaking of Star Trek, I also sometimes think about their teleporter technology and its implications for my concepts of self and personhood. While I don't see any real potential for "beaming" as such...

Given that my consciousness and all that it entails (i.e. "the first person experience") is certainly a product of the physical state of my body... I could imagine a technology eventually that could breakdown, analyze, store, and replicate "me" (meaning: replicate the physical state of my body which would then produce a consciousness like my own).

Yet any person so-created would have an experience completely separate from my own. And were I deconstructed in the manner of Star Trek's teleporter and later reconstructed (whether in the same place or elsewhere), it would appear to the rest of the world as though I had been recreated...

But I think that I would actually be dead (meaning that this "first person experience" typing this here and now would no longer exist), and that there would be another new person (who would, confusingly, believe himself to be me just as much as I do).

Oh Science Fiction! -- you are full of such entertaining and provoking vexations!

Edited by DonAthos
Link to comment
Share on other sites

If I recall correctly we both are of the view consciousness is a process or function of non-supernatural material existence.  It is true that the function/process is not the material, but the material is functioning, it is being conscious.

Not really. I say there are natural reasons for consciousness to exist and is essentially an abstraction to refer to our first person awareness, or subjective awareness. The mechanics and processes are not themselves consciousness, at least to the extent that each neuron is not conscious. But in total, as entities that are not merely composed of parts, we can label the total faculty that results in first person awareness as consciousness. Otherwise, it is no different than describing how a thermostat works where we know all its parts but it still isn't conscious in any sense. In fact, some philosophers go as far to say anything that processes information is to at least some degree conscious - even thermostats! While all consciousness will process information, the essential element I'm referring to is first person awareness.

Consciousness is only an experience. That doesn't deny consciousness as arising from a real process, nor does that deny that consciousness can be explained. Likewise, saying that sight is an experience and only an experience doesn't deny that it arises from visual processing  and eyeballs. But when I talk about sight, I mean the experience. If I say that the neurons firing ARE consciousness, then I'm already mixing up origin and result. To keep those distinct, I have to keep consciousness as a first person experience and what it *does*, and use a different concept to refer to what makes it possible. Often, this other concept is called "architecture" or "cognitive architecture". The actual mechanical makeup is not conscious, at least going on what I said so far. A functionalist would accept the term architecture, but will say mental state A is identical to neuronal activation X, and only differentiates based on one how one is concrete and the other more abstract. Sometimes, it is a form of dualism called "property dualism". This is how I understand functionalism, and it varies in the extreme people go to.

Anyway, yeah, first person experience is "subjective", except only in the sense there is no absolute state of consciousness -  that no one is conscious of your consciousness and able to experience it too. This is no issue, if you're concerned about objective knowledge. All you need to remember that objective knowledge is a matter of using the right methods to integrate the world around you. A total separation from the real world though is one error, but I don't think that issue comes from seeing consciousness as only an experience.

 

Ideas to read about:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism

Edited by Eiuol
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I think we are all in agreement as to what in reality is occurring.

 

And now I understand better some people's use of the term (and concept) "consciousness".

 

Of course I must be contextually aware of the speaker or presenter but I think I will have a better chance of understanding a statement surrounding consciousness by remembering that there are different ways to use the term, and I'll be better equipped to identify its particular use in the context. 

Edited by StrictlyLogical
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I think we are all in agreement as to what in reality is occurring.

I don't think so. You claimed that consciousness is something but as a something totally different than what I am claiming. We only agree that consciousness is real. Past that, I don't see a similarity.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

you at least take "consciousness" to mean only the first person experience, not the property in reality exhibited by/in people.

The formation of the concept of self as self-consciousness depends on observing a conscious relationship of at least two people. That is, self-consciousness is: 1) the word, 2) the definition, 3) observation of fact (two units of third-person consciousness to which you referred).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I don't think so. You claimed that consciousness is something but as a something totally different than what I am claiming. We only agree that consciousness is real. Past that, I don't see a similarity.

 

We agree on what is happening in reality... we are not in a disagreement over the existence, properties, manifestations, reality of brains, biology, physics what they do and that there are some of these systems which have subjective first person experiences.  I will of course recognize we do not agree with the limitations of scope/breadth of the concept/word "consciousness" as regards to which and how much of those things the concept covers.

 

Since you claim not to be a rationalist I assume you know the difference between reality, what is, what is happening and concepts, ideas, abstractions, words.. which refer to reality.  We agree on reality disagree on the scope of a concept i.e. what it refers to.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The formation of the concept of self as self-consciousness depends on observing a conscious relationship of at least two people. That is, self-consciousness is: 1) the word, 2) the definition, 3) observation of fact (two units of third-person consciousness to which you referred).

Oh I meant to say that in general, you sound relatively correct for once. =P

 

That is, to differentiate, we need to observe non-conscious things and other conscious things. When the concept is formed, the definition and word are necessarily part of the concept, with many other aspects that are non-essential. Indeed third-person consciousness, seeing others as conscious, doesn't conflict with first person consciousness. But we mustn't forget that cause is not equal to effect; the cause of consciousness is not the same as the effect, which is consciousness, the first-person point of view or faculty of awareness to use Rand's terminology. Perhaps it sounds minor, but I am absolutely saying consciousness is only a first-person experience. SL began with the opposite claim.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Question:  Do some people define the WHAT to which the concept "consciousness" refers as ONLY the first person experience of being conscious

Yes, I do.  Neurological evidence and such are clearly intimately related to it (and we can learn a lot about consciousness from such things) but yes; every time I refer to "consciousness" I mean the object of my own introspection, and anything else which is the same 'on the inside' (so far as I can infer).

 

I don't know whether this is valid or not; I haven't really questioned it, before.  I'll have to think about it.  :thumbsup:

 

Usually when I think about this subject, I think about ST:TNG's Data. Was he a conscious entity (in the same way that I am, possessed of this kind of "first person experience")? I do not know.

Here's the thing, though.  Suppose I were to build a robot, like Data, which was not conscious; every thing it said and did ultimately boiled down to smoke and mirrors; let's call it a "mechanical zombie" (since, just like a philosophical zombie, it would be identical to a real person in every way except actually being a real person).

Now, the Turing test hinges on a human being's judgment, which makes the judge the most important part of the whole arrangement.  And the vast majority of people in the world make judgments about other minds (which is how the test works), not according to any conscious deliberation, but according to implicit whims and impressions.

So in considering AI and mechanical zombies, I think there are two critical questions to ask:

  1. Do you think that a mechanical zombie could meaningfully discuss anything (not "how about that sports team" but a real conversation) without some connection between its words and their referents?  This isn't purely speculation because we can actually observe conscious beings in the real world who attempt to use words without referents; we can actually form some rational expectation of what that would look like.  And I think that modern chatbots talk just like anticonceptual mentalities do.  For example: http://nlp-addiction.com/eliza/
  2. More importantly, if I had a mechanical zombie which wasn't conscious, but which gave such a realistic appearance that you would never be able to tell the difference, then what would it mean for us to say that it still wasn't really "real"?  Is that an Objective distinction?

---

 

I'll respond to the OP in greater depth once I think about it some more.

Edited by Harrison Danneskjold
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Here's the thing, though.  Suppose I were to build a robot, like Data, which was not conscious; every thing it said and did ultimately boiled down to smoke and mirrors; let's call it a "mechanical zombie" (since, just like a philosophical zombie, it would be identical to a real person in every way except actually being a real person).

All right.

 

Now, the Turing test hinges on a human being's judgment, which makes the judge the most important part of the whole arrangement.

I agree that we're trying to determine how to judge whether something is conscious or not -- and by "conscious" I mean a creature experiencing something similar to myself. A "first person experience," as mentioned earlier in this thread.

To give us a baseline to work with, I would say that a calculator does not have this first person experience and is therefore not conscious. To the extent that it gives any appearance of intelligence at all (e.g. accurately completing mathematical operations or plotting graphs), it is functioning as your mechanical zombie.

Computers or other forms of artificial intelligence are initially, at least, as the calculator. We may envision programs of increasing complexity -- and indeed, we may look at the development of artificial intelligence programs, from Eliza forward. Someday, perhaps, Data.

Eliza was not conscious, I don't think. She was akin to the calculator: naught but pre-programmed responses. So the question, to my mind, is first of all how to cross that divide. How do we change from a calculator of increasing complexity, but the same essential structure, to something altogether different. And when we cross that threshold from not-conscious to conscious (if we do), how will we recognize it? How will we know that "we're not dealing with a calculator anymore"?

 

So in considering AI and mechanical zombies, I think there are two critical questions to ask:

1. Do you think that a mechanical zombie could meaningfully discuss anything (not "how about that sports team" but a real conversation) without some connection between its words and their referents?

Hmm... well...

If it *is* a "mechanical zombie," then it won't truly "mean" anything of what it says, though I may well find meaning there myself. For instance, the calculator doesn't care whether it says two and two are four or five; it's just outputting what its circuits demand. Yet there is meaning in its display to the programmer and to myself.

Could a mechanical zombie be programmed to give the appearance of meaningful discussion -- just as answering two and two with four, but with respect to sports, or the weather, or even philosophical topics? Could technology ever progress to such a degree?

I mean...

Isn't that, at least in part, what we're asking? Let's approach the topic from that oblique perspective for half a moment. Forget whether a computer could ever truly be conscious, as perhaps is Data, but suppose that it was a programmer's dream to make a mechanical zombie who could function like Data, but without actually being conscious.

Is that possible? Could a program have enough power, and be programmed sufficiently, such that it could not be conscious and yet pass the "Turing test" as administered by you or me? Could any programmer be so cunning? Or do you deem that impossible, because if some program passes the Turing test, then ipso facto it must be conscious, regardless of the programmer's methods or intentions?

 

This isn't purely speculation because we can actually observe conscious beings in the real world who attempt to use words without referents; we can actually form some rational expectation of what that would look like.  And I think that modern chatbots talk just like anticonceptual mentalities do.  For example: http://nlp-addiction.com/eliza/

You know, it's kind of funny-sad, but one of my thoughts on this topic has been that there have been some conversations here in which I've both participated and merely observed where, if it had been part of some official Turing test, I can't swear that I would have passed the other parties...

I give people the benefit of the doubt, because in understanding that another person is "like myself" in form and structure, I infer that their outward shows correlate to an internal experience like my own, whether I otherwise find them sensible or not.

Similarly, in knowing that an artificial intelligence comes from the same sort of programming that produces the outputs of calculators (no consciousness) and Eliza (no consciousness), I think I would have a bias against pronouncing any given artificial intelligence as truly being conscious, no matter how convincing the show.

It's confusing, too, because I'm convinced that it *should be possible* to create a truly conscious artificial intelligence. I just... don't know how it can be accomplished (which is, perhaps, no real wonder; I don't know the specifics of how human consciousness came to exist either), and I don't know how to assess whether it has been accomplished or not, and I guess I'm unconvinced that the Turing test gets to the root of the matter.

 

2. More importantly, if I had a mechanical zombie which wasn't conscious, but which gave such a realistic appearance that you would never be able to tell the difference, then what would it mean for us to say that it still wasn't really "real"?  Is that an Objective distinction?

Well, I wouldn't use "real" in that fashion. A realistic appearance is "real" -- it really is what it is, whatever that happens to be (and whether we get it right or not). In this case, it really is a "realistic appearance" of a conscious entity, yet an unconscious mechanical zombie for all of that. For knowing the origin of the mechanical zombie you propose, and knowing (in general terms) the means by which it was constructed, and knowing that the employment of such means does not serve to give consciousness to calculators... all of that is context that ought not be discarded in our ultimate assessment, I think. In this very case, as you are positing a "mechanical zombie which [isn't] conscious," maintaining that context may serve us well, as it is only this which will allow us to discern the truth of the matter.

Edited by DonAthos
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Loading...
  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.
×
×
  • Create New...