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andie holland

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Professor's McCaskey and Ducheyne said:

Although several opponents of Aristotelian logic had accused the syllogism of committing the logical fallacy of petitio principii, most of them were not crystal clear on what the fallacy actually involved.24 George Campbell seems to have been the first to clearly formulate the petitio principii charge.25 In his Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) he argued that the syllogism is epistemologically wanting because it assumes “in the proof the very opinion or principle proposed to be proved.”26 The petitio principii charge states, in other words, that the syllogism is fallacious because knowledge of the major “presupposes” that of the conclusion.27 According to proponents of the inductive philosophy, the syllogism begs the question because, in the order of knowing, the major is epistemologically posterior to its conclusion. In other words, their criticism of the syllogism was tied up with their view on how knowledge is acquired. In their view, knowledge is acquired from particular facts to general principles and not the other way round. A different charge that frequently accompanied the petitio principii charge complained that, since the syllogism only renders explicit what is contained in its general principle, it cannot lead to new knowledge. Although both charges are distinct, they were frequently confounded by defenders and opponents of the syllogism alike.

CHAPTER XX The Sources of Mill’s View of Ratiocination and Induction

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Prof. McCaskey has written specifically that it was the rejection of Socratic-Baconian induction that led to Mill and his acolytes creating the "hypothetical deductive method".

That is a link but not a quote of Prof. McCaskey.

Andie hilariously said:

"Yes, metaphysics is a working out of apparent contradictions. In this respect, I'd say that Objectivism has a serious problem to work out, metaphysically speaking. Again: Induction, by its procedure of the scientific method, denies Identity, which is the conceptual corner stone of its opposite, deduction."

That is the exact opposite of what historically led to the HDM you tout! Mill claimed that inductions were tautologies that did nothing ampliative.

Yes, you & McClasky are correct that  Mill gave a negative assessment of induction (LOL). 

And yes, Mill did not think that science worked by induction.

So yes, Hilariously, without some form of induction, the notion of Identity doesn't look worthless after all.

 

That's because, without induction,  you can always say that the scientific method of hypotheses-formation is really nothing but a sham: because we pretty much find what we're looking for, the identity of a given 'A' is always...A. Induction is really just nothing but running the deductive process in reverse.

 

What's hilarious is that it isn't. Of countless many hypotheses, only one survives as true. 

 

For example, a certain Astrophysicist 'reasoned' that since quasars are really stars, and since 'A-ish' starness = all stars, a discrepancy in red shifts would refute red shifting as evidence for an expanding universe. Ugh...what's hilarious is that A wasn't really so A-ish after all, as quasars are B-ish, as in 'galaxies'.

 

So okay--for Objectivism, 'induction' is an epistemological issue that may/may not explain how concepts are formesd. As such, to an Objectivist, induction  cannot explain how science works. So what does?

 

My point, again, is that the process of hypotheses justification denies the Law of Identity because we don't know what A is before we establish A-ness via the scientific method. Therefore, you must choose: post 1680 science or Leibnitzian Identity.

 

Hilariously enough, i do think that part of the decision is existential in terms of how one lives. Accepting the positive consequences of science without accepting its epistemological validity on its terms (ie not yours!) seems somewhat hypocritical. 

 

To a certain degree accepting practical results of sciences that you label 'fairytales' creates the genre of metaphysical contradictions that Rand was so encouraged to work out. What's really hilarious is that you refuse to do so.

 

AH

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andie, you really need to learn to chew faster, or take smaller bites.

 

Harriman's book The Logical Leap examined several areas where science works. In the Philosophical Corruption of Physics, Harriman examines several areas where science goes astray.

 

The fact that we do not know what A is (i.e.; identity) prior to establishing A-ness (i.e.; identity) merely demonstrates that omnipotence is not a prerequisite to knowledge in any field, including science. This is not a refutation or denial of the Law of Identity. Rather, it simple illustrates that the Law of Identity acts as a fundamental illuminating principle helping to guide the footsteps of reasoning along its arduous path.

 

The hypocritical position here is the one that thinks that science can continue to forward itself ad infinitum while at the same time pretending to ignore what made science possible in the first place.

 

If you want to dispel the "fairytale" under which you are operating, you will need to provide more Newtonian style evidence to substantiate your position in this court.

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andie, you really need to learn to chew faster, or take smaller bites.

 

Harriman's book The Logical Leap examined several areas where science works. In the Philosophical Corruption of Physics, Harriman examines several areas where science goes astray.

 

The fact that we do not know what A is (i.e.; identity) prior to establishing A-ness (i.e.; identity) merely demonstrates that omnipotence is not a prerequisite to knowledge in any field, including science. This is not a refutation or denial of the Law of Identity. Rather, it simple illustrates that the Law of Identity acts as a fundamental illuminating principle helping to guide the footsteps of reasoning along its arduous path.

 

The hypocritical position here is the one that thinks that science can continue to forward itself ad infinitum while at the same time pretending to ignore what made science possible in the first place.

 

If you want to dispel the "fairytale" under which you are operating, you will need to provide more Newtonian style evidence to substantiate your position in this court.

First of all, you're not running a court room. i'm trying to be constructive by offering you an argument which i can make on any site, anywhere. So it's best to think of me as an amius curaie.

 

No one is refuting the Law of Identity. My point is that for purposes of doing science, saying A=A presupposes what you're trying to find out. It's therefore a meaningless hindrance, not necessarily wrong within its own context for formal logic.

 

In this sense, Harriman is dead wrong in loading down his rhetoric with 'omnipotence'. Not knowing what A is means just that. Science is highly competitive and you have dozens of people competing to be right. What A turns out to be is not known until the debate is more or less closed.

 

But Harriman is supposed to know this because, as a grad student, he knew full well that he was responsible for understanding the merits of competing theories and explanations--or that A might be B,C,D,E....

 

Science existed for thousands of years before Aristotle. People also reasoned things out long before 'reason' was given formal properties and 'axiomitized'.

 

His effort was to try to bring the vast compendium of pre-existing scientific learning under a formalized blanket called "The four causes". One outcome was a deductive system based upon the assertion of 'essentuials':

 

If we understand what dog-ness is, for example, we can, by asserting A=dogness, thereby  deduct that all other animals that say 'bow-wow' and pee on streetlamps are 'dogs'.

 

Around 1600 or so, learned people discovered that this system really didn't work very well, and that some form of induction was needed to explain experiments and hypotheses. For example, Newton hypothesized that all elements can be transmuted in to gold, at some point or another. That this conjecture failed indicated that there was not one big 'A' that changed forms, but rather many other different elements: b,c,d,e,,,,,,not equivalent to 'a'. It's hardly approaching 'omnipotent' knowledge to be dead wrong.

 

Experimentally speaking, it's also been demonstrated that the Newtonian F=MA is wrong. Rather F=MAG, or that the Lorentz contractor is always a present co-efficient (Spec Rel). Again it's hardly 'omnipotent' to have  missed one-thirds of the true equation.

 

AH

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First of all, you're not running a court room. i'm trying to be constructive by offering you an argument which i can make on any site, anywhere. So it's best to think of me as an amius curaie.

I'm sure you meant amicus curaie. As to my court room, my mind serves as my judge. It is one of the tasks I consider it competent to perform.

No one is refuting the Law of Identity. My point is that for purposes of doing science, saying A=A presupposes what you're trying to find out. It's therefore a meaningless hindrance, not necessarily wrong within its own context for formal logic.

The Law of Identity is something which can be vocationally adhered to, or can serve as a hindrance if you choose not to adhere. (By the way, it's A is A, not A=A, if you're actually interested in such a nuance.)

In this sense, Harriman is dead wrong in loading down his rhetoric with 'omnipotence'. Not knowing what A is means just that. Science is highly competitive and you have dozens of people competing to be right. What A turns out to be is not known until the debate is more or less closed.

Harriman loaded down his rhetoric with 'omnipotence'? I must have missed that one.

Anyhow, there are lots of competing philosophies competing for your mind. I'd recommend selecting one that focuses on discovering how to know when you are right.

Edited by dream_weaver
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@Andie #79

 

"If we understand what dog-ness is, for example, we can, by asserting A=dog-ness thereby  deduct that all other animals that say 'bow-wow' and pee on streetlamps are 'dogs'."

 

No, we cannot, and you are wrong if you believe that this is what Objectivism is positing.

 

You are equating the Law of Identity with the (cognitive) Method of Identification.  It is wrong to equate them.  Identity does NOT equal Identification.  A single, human mind will never exhaustively understand what "dog-ness" is.  To a single, unique human mind, "dog-ness" will always remain open ended, and subject to revision/clarification/expansion.

 

However, this does not mean that what a single, human mind knows is not objective.  The knowledge can be said to be Objective to the degree that the individual has integrated, to the best of his ability and experience, what he knows to be true, while rejecting contradictions and evasive thinking.

 

A 2 year old child can objectively understand the concept "dog" every bit as "objectively" as a 45 year old Veterinarian.  Two 45 year old Veterinarian's will certainly not have the exact same knowledge of "dog-ness" in their brains, and they may also have fundamental - equally rational - disagreements on even some of the most basic tenants of "dog-ness".

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I just want to register that I think Buddha is misrepresenting Objectivism here, as in other places on this topic. It seems to be a sincere misunderstanding though.

Identification is a concept that represents the cognitive grasp of EDIT: an existents identity. This has nothing to do with omniscience or "understanding" being exhaustive of that being identified. It means that the range of measurements that a particular concept integrates is essential to differentiating that kind of existents from others. The objective determination of essential characteristics is a relation between observer and observed but that doesn't mean that two observers can be objective in the same context and disagree and both be right and objective. That is nonsense and it is not found anywhere in Oist literature.

This all bound up with a wrong understanding of the metaphysical basis of similarity.

Edited by Plasmatic
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I just want to register that I think Buddha is misrepresenting Objectivism here, as in other places on this topic. It seems to be a sincere misunderstanding though.

Identification is a concept that represents the cognitive grasp of identity. This has nothing to do with omniscience or "understanding" being exhaustive of that being identified. It means that the range of measurements that a particular concept integrates is essential to differentiating that kind of existents from others. The objective determination of essential characteristics is a relation between observer and observed but that doesn't mean that two observers can be objective in the same context and disagree and both be right and objective. That is nonsense and it is not found anywhere in Oist literature.

This all bound up with a wrong understanding of the metaphysical basis of similarity.

Thank your for your polite reply.  You and I have disagreed in the past on this issue, but I want you to know that there is no "hidden agenda" on my part, and that my stance is sincere.

 

I know from your previous posts that you appear to apply a significant emphasis on what you perceive to be the "metaphysical fundamentality" of Man's rational characteristic.  This is where I believe we disagree. My position is that any one of the numerous characteristics of Man are elevated to "essentiality" only in the context of a given proposition.  No one characteristic is epistemologically, metaphysically or ontological more "fundamental" than any other - except in a given context.

 

And yet you have stated (if I understand correctly) that the singular characteristic of rationality is "metaphysically fundamental" because it is the one that most differentiates Man from all other entities and therefore the one upon which all others must rest.

 

If this is a true understanding of your position (that a single characteristic MUST exist that is "metaphysically" more fundamental than all others for EVERY entity), then what is the characteristic that most differentiates an Oak Tree from all other entities?  I'm not trolling you with this, I really want to know.  Is it the shape of it's leaves? the type of seed it produces? the tensile strength of it's lumber?  It's branching pattern?

Edited by New Buddha
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Buddha, I'm glad we can discuss this without flames. That is a tribute to your sincerity.

In the appendix to ITOE, Prof. C asks Ms. Rand the question that I believe you are asking me. Essential to his confusion was the failure to understand the metaphysical fundamental from the essential. I explained in another thread that I, and Ms. Rand, explicitly do not mean that somethings exist more or less, which is nonsensical. Ive explained previously that metaphysical primacy has to do with causal order. That "by means of which" something comes to be, is its causal primary.

In relation to a child's early definition of man as "a thing which moves and makes sounds" Prof. C says:

I don't see how the fundamental there<--- [metaphysical] is also the essential

Ms Rand takes the time to make sure its clear that she is referring to causal fundamentality by metaphysical. There is a difference between identification qua referential economy and causal sequence. This is the basis for the difference between "philosophical" concepts and special science concepts.

I will say some more in a bit.

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@Andie #79

 

"If we understand what dog-ness is, for example, we can, by asserting A=dog-ness thereby  deduct that all other animals that say 'bow-wow' and pee on streetlamps are 'dogs'."

 

No, we cannot, and you are wrong if you believe that this is what Objectivism is positing.

 

You are equating the Law of Identity with the (cognitive) Method of Identification.  It is wrong to equate them.  Identity does NOT equal Identification.  A single, human mind will never exhaustively understand what "dog-ness" is.  To a single, unique human mind, "dog-ness" will always remain open ended, and subject to revision/clarification/expansion.

 

However, this does not mean that what a single, human mind knows is not objective.  The knowledge can be said to be Objective to the degree that the individual has integrated, to the best of his ability and experience, what he knows to be true, while rejecting contradictions and evasive thinking.

 

A 2 year old child can objectively understand the concept "dog" every bit as "objectively" as a 45 year old Veterinarian.  Two 45 year old Veterinarian's will certainly not have the exact same knowledge of "dog-ness" in their brains, and they may also have fundamental - equally rational - disagreements on even some of the most basic tenants of "dog-ness".

No, a 'method of identification' indicates  the procedure by which objects are identified. For example, the use of a telescope that Arp (inadequately) used to identify quasars.

 

As for The Law of Identity', my point is that, in order to be meaningful, it has to reveal something of intellectual value--which it does in terms of serving as a basis of Formal Logic. 

 

My second point is that Bacon's "New Method" emphasized that because Aristotelian procedure didn't work his 'identity' asserted things which must be proven.

 

Being 'objective' has many meanings. For example, 'suspension of value-judgment' or simply 'subject-independent'. Yours refers to a personal effort to avoid bias and logical error. In this sense, i suppose that always remembering the first rule if logic becomes paramount.

 

In a very real and good sense, then, Rand's message hearkens back to that of the Stoics: above all, order your own mental house.

 

It also must be noted that never being able to really get at the essential thing-ness of, say, dog-ness was Kant's critique of Aristotle. Against Aristotle's essence, Kant said science was about 'phenomena', snd therefore the neumenal thing-in-itself' was unknowable.

 

This, of course, serves as a severe restraint on the Aristotelian effort to offer logical elegance to science. A is at best a conditional 'A' with respect to our changing  understanding of said phenomena in question. For example, again with Arp, An identified and labeled  'quasar' qua star can become a non-A galaxy when re-measured.

 

AH

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I just want to register that I think Buddha is misrepresenting Objectivism here, as in other places on this topic. It seems to be a sincere misunderstanding though.

Identification is a concept that represents the cognitive grasp of EDIT: an existents identity. This has nothing to do with omniscience or "understanding" being exhaustive of that being identified. It means that the range of measurements that a particular concept integrates is essential to differentiating that kind of existents from others. The objective determination of essential characteristics is a relation between observer and observed but that doesn't mean that two observers can be objective in the same context and disagree and both be right and objective. That is nonsense and it is not found anywhere in Oist literature.

This all bound up with a wrong understanding of the metaphysical basis of similarity.

Yes, i agree that A=A means that a quasar cannot be both a star ad a galaxy, and that one claimant is wrong.

 

To this end, yes, we can all agree that saying a photon can be in two places at once contradicts said Law Of identity. So when the new quantum computers come out, I suppose that O-ists will boycott, yes?

 

More to the point, practicing QMers don't need to reference formal logic to refer to their own pursuit as 'not making sense'. Feynman already said that, and it's more or less accepted by everyone else.

 

For example, it was discovered in the 1950's that successively fired  photons, each going in the opposite direction, will have alternate spins. Einstein's answer to this mystery --the EPR-- was analogous to finding a matching glove, somewhere: for each 'right' a 'left'.

 

Now this hypotheses, of course, implicitly refutes the standard working model of Bohr as to how photons are created by electrons descending back into their own orbitals. In other words, what would make successive emissions of photons from electrons have alternate spins?

 

The Aspect experiments refuted EPR. Fire alternate photons from a 'gun' with each successive particle gong in the opposite direction. Then set a polarizing strobe that will direct the first photon after it's been emitted. The next photon will take on the opposite 'spin' (polarization) of the first!

 

In other words, prior to the 'command' by the strobe, direction is not determined, much as if we were in Denver, you heading towards LA, and me to NYC. En route, one of us would flip a coin to determine a right/left turn, ostensibly north or south. Then we'd phone instructions: it's 'indeterminate as to which one of us would wind up in Mexico. the other in Canada.

 

This is the 'spooky action a ta distance' which means that communication between photons is travelling far in excess of the speed that they themselves travel. 

 

Now in terms of 'making sense' as being internally consistent, Aspect experiment satisfies the challenge of 'Bell's Inequality'. In other words, this seems to be the state of A-ness in so far as we can observe photons to behave.

 

That each successive photon is virtually in two places at once is just how it is. The advantage to this is that it opens up the door for the creation of an extremely fast computer. Along with transistors and GMR that run off of QM, too, harnessing the non-A capacities of the photon define the contours of modern technology.

 

AH

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Andie the incomprehensible said:

 

 

When Arp measured red-shits of quasars, he took them to be renegade stars that were approximately the same distance from Earth as the nearest galaxy--ostensibly its 'home'. Hence the huge discrepancy in the measurements of the shift of the two infrared spectra. 

 

So although Arp's assumption that quasars were imploding stars met the standards of his day, deep space 'Hubbles' clearly indicate that they're really imploding galaxies far in the distance. Therefore, calculating the spectral shift (to red) with the correct. far-longer  distance does give the same consistency accepted  by mainstream astrophysics by way of Hawking.

[...]

For example, a certain Astrophysicist 'reasoned' that since quasars are really stars, and since 'A-ish' starness = all stars, a discrepancy in red shifts would refute red shifting as evidence for an expanding universe. Ugh...what's hilarious is that A wasn't really so A-ish after all, as quasars are B-ish, as in 'galaxies'

 

Substantiate this with references please. I'd like to see the evidence for this.

 

Edit:

 

 

Quasars in Back of Galaxies?

Mrk 205 figures in another long standing argument about distances of quasars. It was long ago argued that since low red shift absorption lines were often seen in the spectra of high redshift quasars that the quasars had to be at great distances in back of the galaxies which were causing the absorption. Some partisans aggressively searched for absorption lines from NGC 4319 in the spectrum of the bright Mrk 205. At first they did not find any but finally they found a weak line and announced that this proved that Mrk 205 was in back of the galaxy. But they barely mentioned that the line was about 10 times fainter than than expected. I.e. the quasar was indicated to be only 10% in back of the galaxy (Or one might say 90% in front.)

This illustrates of course that an object can be just in back, or even within the envelope of the low redshift absorber. The argument used to be that for quasars of different redshift closely along the same line of sight that the absorption lines were almost always from the lower redshift quasar, thus showing that the high redshift quasars were always in back of the low. But if the high redshift quasars were smaller than the low redshift ones, as indicated by local quasars, then the high redshift ones could be just in back of, or even within, the larger envelope of the low redshift quasar. Astronomers got quite carried away for a while measuring quasars with larger and larger separations along the line of sight and deriving larger and larger clouds around the quasars, or intervening in the line of sight. Amusingly they derived clouds so ridiculously large in linear dimension, if at redshift distances, that they research in this direction was dropped.

http://www.haltonarp.com/articles/rebuttals

 

Andie said:

 

**The real turn against Aristotelian identity began with Bacon’s New Method. This is because Aristotelian identity is based, again, on essences. If we know the essential it-ness of something (nominally expressed as telos) we can deduct to discover this particular thing-ness in other objects. Classically, if fire burns in Persia, it will burn in Athens, as well.

 

In a parallel sense, if we define horses with one horn as a species known as ‘unicorn’, then we might deduct that one-horned horses everywhere possess that essential unicorn-ness. Of course, this example comes from the written testimony of medieval students who were a bit fed up, and wanted to learn ‘the new method’!
 
Bacon’s method said that because we know of no essences prior to investigating, both deduction and identity is the goal, not the method. In other words, by using both induction and the prescribed scientific method, we can possibly arrive at rational deductive statements. 
 
This is tantamount to saying that what’s at stake is finding the A-ness in a propositional A. Therefore, declaring that A=A is therefore either confusing a hypotheses with a result, or simply expressing the tautological, ‘We’ve found what we’ve found’.
 
For example, essentially speaking, is Pluto a planet? All we know by which to make our assessment are the phenomena as inductively observed. What is essentially Pluto is beside the point. 
 
According to Bacon, then, all deductions are based upon the prior labor of induction. The is-ness of A is only what we find it to be.
[...]
Per #40, I also  explained that the first violation of identity came with the advent of induction, in Bacon's 'New Method'.
[...]
* First, Bacon's Induction demonstrates that A only equals A when A-ness is discovered by the scientific method. Otherwise, 'null hypotheses' is said to cancel out Aristotelian essences and telos.
[...]

** kant, following Hume, demonstrated that induction was insufficient; inherent mental frames of reference also play a part. Therefore, ab-duction.

 

*** Beginning with Nietzsche, A-ness becomes a matter of perspective and intent. How we want to look at nature will give our expected results, or define what A is, so to speak.

 

**** Godel's incompleteness theorems, while intended for arithmetic in a narrow sense, resonates through to math, then to logic. This is because the history of logic has always concerned itself with establishing a foundational base. Perhaps the best example of this is 'Logical Positivism'. 

 

So in the sense that Philosophy has developed since Bacon, the Law of Identity is shown to lack any foundation whatsoever. It is merely an article of faith.

 

Can you substantiate this view of Bacon on induction? A few quotes to demonstrate your claims?

 

Its clear you have no Idea what the Law of Identity means to Oist.

 

Are you claiming that what Bacon rejected was the acceptance of the premise that "whatever one "finds to be", will be what it is-something in particular"? That, the rejection of contradiction as meaningless, prior to "looking to see" if something has Identity, is not part of Bacon's "second method"?

 

Nowhere has Rand claimed that the LOI tells someone what something is in particular. Are you repudiating the principle that contradictions do not exist metaphysically?

 

How does induction refute identity? Be specific.

 

Oism doesn't view universals through the lens of Leibnitz's "strict identity" view of similarity.

 

If you want to actually have a discourse instead of being ignored then I suggest you work harder to respond less indirect-circumspectly.

 

You claim to accept that no one takes PoMo seriously yet your narration above is an instantiation of post modern historicism used to deflate foundationalism, identity, and objectivity.

 

I say your talking nonsense and what you claim is spurious BS. Prove me wrong.

Edited by Plasmatic
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No, a 'method of identification' indicates  the procedure by which objects are identified.

Andie,

Let me elaborate by way of example, on what specifically I objected to in your premise that "A=dog-ness".

 

In my profession, Architecture, I hire and give direction to interior designers, landscape architects, geotechnical, civil, traffic, structural, mechanical, electrical, plumbing, low-voltage controls, fire protection, acoustical engineers, etc. to create drawings, specifications and calculations for new buildings.  The collection of drawings, calculations and specifications, from which the building is built, are not EQUAL or INTERCHANGEABLE with the building that is finally built from them.  Using your terms, the final building is 'A' and the drawings, calcs and specs' are 'Dog-ness'.

 

There is an objective relationship between the two, but they are not interchangeable.

 

Edit 1:

This same relationship exists between Relativistic or QM models and "what" they are modeling.

 

Edit 2:

There will never be a "Theory of Everything".  To even attempt to do so is to fundamentally misunderstand what knowledge is.

 

Edit 3: When I make a recording of a symphony, the recording is not equal to, or interchangeable with, the live performance.  But the recording was made by a QUANTIFIALBE exchange of mechanical/electromagnetic energy ( minus entropy's share, of course).  This is also true for ideas.

Edited by New Buddha
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Buddha, simple question: Do you deny absolute correspondence?

Edit: that our measurements correspond exactly to the things measured?

While being conscious of not trying to spike a flame war between us, and to keep this exchange civil....

 

Yes, I do reject that our "measurements correspond exactly to the things measured."  But I do hold that our measurements are objective relative to a pre-established acceptable level of tolerance/precision.

 

Just as the thing being measured exists, a measurement exists in it's own right.

 

When you place something on a scale, and look to see where the pointer falls relative to the marks scribed in the plastic, do you not understand that the spring of the scale is subject to fatigue?  Do you not understand that the marks are subject to the imperfections of the machine that made them?  Do you not understand that parallax can distort your perception of where the pointer falls relative to the marks?  Do you not understand that the thing being measured is subject to oxidation, and therefore it's weight changes with time?

 

There is no such thing as absolute precision or absolute correspondence.  There is only acceptable levels of precision and tolerance relative to an end goal.  Measurements exist to sever a purpose.  They are means to an end, not an end within themselves.

 

Entropy is a bitch, ain't it.

Edited by New Buddha
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I want to respond in detail later.

For now: Is 1+1 exactly= to 2?

If you believe that mathematics is a disembodied, phenomenological, socially driven, consensus-is-truth exercise, then, yes, 1 + 1 EXACTLY = 2.

 

But if you are an engineer, making professional liability insurance payments, do you believe that every No. 2 kiln dried Douglas Fir 2x8 is ABSOLUTELY equal to every other No. 2 kiln dried Douglas Fir 2x8?  No.  You incorporate a safety factor into your calculations.

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Buddha said:

If you believe that mathematics is a disembodied, phenomenological, socially driven, consensus-is-truth exercise, then, yes, 1 + 1 EXACTLY = 2.

I don't understand why you said this or what you mean specifically. I think its because you don't understand what I'm asking. If I take one apple with my left hand from a tree and then take one with my right hand from that tree and the only apples I have are the ones just mentioned, do I have exactly 2 apples? Is it absolutely true that I have only two apples? Does the statement about this scenario "plasmatic has only two apple from said tree" 100 percent exact and therefore does absolutely correspond to such a situation?

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The statement: 1+1=2  (per Post #91)  is completely different from the statement: 1 apple + 1 apple = 2 apples (per post #93).  You incorrectly believe that they are interchangeable.

 

You do understand that the apple in your left hand and the apple in your right hand are existentially two different apples - and that their degree of similarity is relative to a pre-established, epistemic standard, right?  And that the apple in your left hand + the apple in your right hand does not equal 2 absolutely, existentially similar apples.  it equals two epistemically similar apples.

 

I'm objecting to your use of the words "exactly" and "absolutely" in what I perceive to be a disembodied, non-contextual sense.

 

Edit:

When a structural engineer looks at the table that lists the properties of empirically tested, No. 2 kiln-dried Douglas Fir 2x8's, he does not fool himself into believing that all the 2x8's delivered to the job site will meet the industry standard.  If for no other reason, the moisture content can vary seasonally (in rainy Oregon, moisture content of lumber is a major issue).   He knows that when mass producing materials, there will always be differences in the individual products.  No manufacturer tests each and every 2x8 that they produce.  They do have a statistical based, quality control program in place, but this in no way guarantees that every 2x8 will be to the standard.

Edited by New Buddha
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There is a difference between the counting numbers, and number as it applies to continuous quantity. The counting number is precise and exact Every instance of the count  "3" is exactly the same. When applying number to continuous quantity, measurement is subject to the level of precision required. It relates the counting number to the attribute being measured via means of a standard.

 

Edit: Added

Edited by dream_weaver
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The statement: 1+1=2  (per Post #91)  is completely different from the statement: 1 apple + 1 apple = 2 apples (per post #93).  You incorrectly believe that they are interchangeable.

 

You do understand that the apple in your left hand and the apple in your right hand are existentially two different apples - and that their degree of similarity is relative to a pre-established, epistemic standard, right?  And that the apple in your left hand + the apple in your right hand does not equal 2 absolutely, existentially similar apples.  it equals two epistemically similar apples.

 

I'm objecting to your use of the words "exactly" and "absolutely" in what I perceive to be a disembodied, non-contextual sense.

While I understand and agree that no two apples are exactly alike, when I say something like "1 apple + 1 apple = 2 apples," aren't I speaking to the "pre-established, epistemic standard" you mention?

So as long as I keep that context in mind, isn't it correct to say that 1 apple + 1 apple = 2 apples?

Anyone who somehow takes that statement to mean that any given apple is absolutely interchangeable with any other given apple, for any and all purposes (i.e. in any context) is mistaken, but it doesn't take away from the value or meaning of the original statement.

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Man, I am dying to respond but I have to wait till after work. It relates to something Weaver and I have discussed several times privately.

Weaver, I'm glad you brought that up because now I see what you have told me in the past that Corvini claims is the case. I have a response to this claim.

Don you are homing in on the problem...Are you familiar with how it relates to Leibinitz?

Buddha, I asked these questions to get at an equivocation I see in your thinking and will explain tonight.

Edited by Plasmatic
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Don you are homing in on the problem...Are you familiar with how it relates to Leibinitz?

No, I'm sorry, my familiarity with Leibnitz is limited to understanding that he was mocked in Candide ("best of all possible worlds") and that he and Newton had a rivalry of some sort over the development of calculus...

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Andie,

Let me elaborate by way of example, on what specifically I objected to in your premise that "A=dog-ness".

 

In my profession, Architecture, I hire and give direction to interior designers, landscape architects, geotechnical, civil, traffic, structural, mechanical, electrical, plumbing, low-voltage controls, fire protection, acoustical engineers, etc. to create drawings, specifications and calculations for new buildings.  The collection of drawings, calculations and specifications, from which the building is built, are not EQUAL or INTERCHANGEABLE with the building that is finally built from them.  Using your terms, the final building is 'A' and the drawings, calcs and specs' are 'Dog-ness'.

 

There is an objective relationship between the two, but they are not interchangeable.

 

Edit 1:

This same relationship exists between Relativistic or QM models and "what" they are modeling.

 

Edit 2:

There will never be a "Theory of Everything".  To even attempt to do so is to fundamentally misunderstand what knowledge is.

 

Edit 3: When I make a recording of a symphony, the recording is not equal to, or interchangeable with, the live performance.  But the recording was made by a QUANTIFIALBE exchange of mechanical/electromagnetic energy ( minus entropy's share, of course).  This is also true for ideas.

NB,

 

The premise that A (must necessarily) equal dog-ness is Aristotle's not mine. Anything-ness is ultimately defined by its telos, or final cause.

 

For example, finding 'dog-ness is what makes it possible for us to deduct that any particular  animal observed, smelled, or heard can be labeled a 'dog'. This is because all dogs share an essential dog-ness, which according to Aistotle is their 'purpose', or again, 'final cause.

 

Please remember here that Greek 'logos' means 'speech'. To this end, Aristotle said to speak correctly --'logic'-- first means non-contradictory identification, which means nothing more than holding oneself to one's defined criterion...of essential 'dog-ness'. So all he's simply saying is that we don't change rules, definitions,and standards post facto. Otherwise, it would shoot the deductive system straight to hell.

 

Briefly, Bacon wrote that the process of science is to call said dog-ness into question by the use of the scientific method. Therefore what A is remains to be determined.

 

Your description of Architecture is excellent. Thanks! if i understand you, if A on the left side represents inputs and A on the right equals final product, the A's are incommensurate. For one, i suppose (?), a final building is more than the sum of its parts...exception Bauhaus !

 

Edit 2: I agree. A-ness is incomplete; telos is conjectural, at best.

 

Edit 3: well, i would say that the electromagnetic energy is the same in both cases, live and recorded because the entropy is insignificant to human ears. Does dog-ness means that they would hear a difference? Sameness being the case, would source really matter?

 

Edit 1...Or how the laws of Physics lie?!n 6-D 'Phase Space', what we observe is the electron of hydrogen popping up to six different configurations when excited. The figures are charming--see for yourself!

 

Now QMers have always dealt with the electron's excitations in terms if the math measured as some sort of thermal gradient: Cauchy escape levels, spectral lines as Riemannian z-functions, whatever...

But Nancy Cartwright sez that because we can now observe the real configurations, the question needs to be demanded as to how and why those phase jumps occur.

 

In other words, to her, we really don't know what we're measuring. The telos of photons, so to speak, 

is twofold: why such clearly-defined 'leaps' and what causes them to form six configurations? Hence, to her, the math alone cannot define your 'what'.

 

It's all about 'capacities' that modern QM cannot answer. This makes the science 'incomplete', but not a fairytale.

 

AH

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No, I'm sorry, my familiarity with Leibnitz is limited to understanding that he was mocked in Candide ("best of all possible worlds") and that he and Newton had a rivalry of some sort over the development of calculus...

The calculus we use today is that of Leibniz. That of Newton was incomprehensible.

 

AH

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