Determination

[Harrison Danneskjold]

I've realized, in discussing free will, that I hold a certain concept of 'causality' to be true:

1: The actions of any entity are "determined" or caused by some context IF it must always act that way within that context and cannot do so beyond it.

2: A causal relationship is implied, for any body of knowledge, when it contains observations of an entity behaving a certain way under a certain set of circumstances, but none of that entity doing so outside of that set of circumstances.

3: A previously-discovered causal link allows one to make valid temporal inferences; to predict the consequent from the antecedent, as venture capitalists do, and vice versa, as archeologists do.

4: If some abstract, omniscient being were to infer a causal relationship, in perfect accordance with #2 (since it has an infinite attention span), any subsequent inference from that knowledge would ALWAYS yield correct predictions.

Does this contradict Objectivist epistemology?

Edited February 16, 2015 by Harrison Danneskjold

[dream_weaver]

I'm a bit puzzled. What would be left to an omniscient being to infer?

[William O]

I've realized, in discussing free will, that I hold a certain concept of 'causality' to be true:

1: The actions of any entity are "determined" or caused by some context IF it must always act that way within that context and cannot do so beyond it.

2: A causal relationship is implied, for any body of knowledge, when it contains observations of an entity behaving a certain way under a certain set of circumstances, but none of that entity doing so outside of that set of circumstances.

3: A previously-discovered causal link allows one to make valid temporal inferences; to predict the consequent from the antecedent, as venture capitalists do, and vice versa, as archeologists do.

4: If some abstract, omniscient being were to infer a causal relationship, in perfect accordance with #2 (since it has an infinite attention span), any subsequent inference from that knowledge would ALWAYS yield correct predictions.

Does this contradict Objectivist epistemology?

I'll use your numbering.

 

1. Right, this is a pretty standard definition of determinism. The past, together with the laws of nature, necessitates the future under determinism.

 

2. This is basically a loose statement of Mill's method of difference, so it's solid.

 

3. This follows from the definition of a causal link. You probably don't even need to list this as an assumption.

 

4. This seems true, bracketing the problems omniscience involves.

 

Frankly, I don't see any part of your post that a reasonable person could argue with.

[StrictlyLogical]

You are attempting to smuggle into the concept "causation" a specific theorized manner by which it occurs .. specifically determinism.

 

Your bald assertion is that causality leads to single valued outcome.  By bald assertion I mean that you simply state it as though it were an incontrovertible fact.  Insofar as you have NO evidence whatever for it... your choice of it over any other is the definition of "arbitrary" according to Objectivist philosophy.  Inasmuch as Einstein did not want it to be... photons themselves, on balance of evidence, show, as opposed to single valued causation having to be the case, that multivalued causation occurs.

 

Objectivism (at least what Rand said if not LP) never restricted the number of outcomes of causality to a single one outcome... as you know Rand was a staunch supporter of free will and volition and clearly would have seen (as a great logician) that defining causality as being restricted to single outcomes would have destroyed her conception of free will, since a man and his consciousness have identity as every other natural thing.

 

 

"Because man has free will, no human choice—and no phenomenon which is a product of human choice—is metaphysically necessary. In regard to any man-made fact, it is valid to claim that man has chosen thus, but it was not inherent in the nature of existence for him to have done so: he could have chosen otherwise.

 

Choice, however, is not chance. Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation." 

 

Rand in Philosophy: Who Needs It,

“The Metaphysical and the Man-Made,”
, 31

 

 

"Choice" ("he could have chosen otherwise" - > multivalued) "is a type of causation"  THIS is consistent with Objectivism.  What you state is NOT.

Edited February 16, 2015 by StrictlyLogical

[William O]

I didn't read the OP as identifying causality with determinism initially, but now that StrictlyLogical points it out, it is a plausible interpretation of what was written in the OP. If the OP is advocating universal determinism as opposed to claiming that some specific events happen deterministically, then I retract my claim that there is nothing in the OP that a reasonable person could argue with.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

I'm a bit puzzled. What would be left to an omniscient being to infer?

Nothing. There really couldn't be any reason for such a being to conceptualize much of anything. The point isn't why it would do so, though; only whether it would work the way it's been outlined, if this completely impossible scenario were to take place.

I only use point #4 to make explicit certain things implied by (or perhaps assumed by) the other three.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

You are attempting to smuggle into the concept "causation" a specific theorized manner by which it occurs .. specifically determinism.

I'm not attempting to smuggle anything anywhere. I was as open and clear as possible about what the first three points meant, and then threw the fourth in just to be extra explicit. And nowhere did I specify what any particular entity's behavior is determined by, nor even whether that term applies to any concrete thing at all.

If the OP does present some package-deal, it was not an intentional one.

Your bald assertion is that causality leads to single valued outcome. By bald assertion I mean that you simply state it as though it were an incontrovertible fact.

Yes; that's the way it seems to me, inside of my own head. Obvious.

Now you know that it's possible that the behavior of photons could be dictated by hidden variables and I know that any semblance of determinism, in any area, could be caused by a series of lucky observations (in which the underlying subject is actually multi-valued).

So just as you claim that there is no evidence for a single-valued causality, I could just as easily state that EVERYTHING is evidence for it, and neither of those claims would be on empirically better or worse ground.

I don't make that claim because of that even footing. I feel that there must be something deeper which neither of us has grasped yet (or at least that neither of us has told me about).

[Harrison Danneskjold]

If the OP is advocating universal determinism as opposed to claiming that some specific events happen deterministically, then I retract my claim that there is nothing in the OP that a reasonable person could argue with.

Why?

[StrictlyLogical]

I'm not attempting to smuggle anything anywhere. I was as open and clear as possible about what the first three points meant, and then threw the fourth in just to be extra explicit. And nowhere did I specify what any particular entity's behavior is determined by, nor even whether that term applies to any concrete thing at all.

If the OP does present some package-deal, it was not an intentional one.

Yes; that's the way it seems to me, inside of my own head. Obvious.

Now you know that it's possible that the behavior of photons could be dictated by hidden variables and I know that any semblance of determinism, in any area, could be caused by a series of lucky observations (in which the underlying subject is actually multi-valued).

So just as you claim that there is no evidence for a single-valued causality, I could just as easily state that EVERYTHING is evidence for it, and neither of those claims would be on empirically better or worse ground.

I don't make that claim because of that even footing. I feel that there must be something deeper which neither of us has grasped yet (or at least that neither of us has told me about).

 

Current experimental evidence shows that the very small (of which the macroscopically large "things" we observe on the human scale are comprised) behave in delimited and predictably probabilistic ways in almost all contexts other than those set to measure the eigenstate of a prepared system.  So based on direct evidence the "hidden variables" of macroscopic determinism turns out to be microscopic probability.  You (and others) invoke the stolen concept (hierarchically speaking) of purported "hidden (deterministic) variables" to "explain" the observed non-determinism of the constituents of what we are used to in our everyday experience.  The hierarchy of reality as measured is that probabilistic (multivalued) causation leads to deterministic results at the macroscopic scale.... to try to explain the probabilistic causation with what that causation makes possible is to try to support the foundation with the roof... it's irrational and nonsensical to even attempt such a thing. 

 

 

Although some incorrect interpretations says that QM probabilities implies sheer non-identity, it is actually only "indeterminancy" of outcome from a delimited number of outcomes, and the fact that there are a predictable number of outcomes with particular probabilities is the very consequence of that identity.

 

Far from EVERYTHING pointing to determinism, when you are looking at the experiments of the fundamental existents which make up those things you see behaving quite deterministically ... they do not themselves behave so... and I do not rely upon bad interpretations... or rely on any mystical collapse of the wavefunctions due to consciousness observing the system...  I am referring to the sheer statistical behavior of the very small. 

 

You might as well doubt man ever set foot on the moon.    

[dream_weaver]

The point isn't why it would do so, though; only whether it would work the way it's been outlined, if this completely impossible scenario were to take place.

I could be missing something here, but I would have to assume it is the other way around . . . if the impossible were to occur, — how could it be reckoned as impossible?

[Harrison Danneskjold]

I could be missing something here, but I would have to assume it is the other way around . . . if the impossible were to occur, — how could it be reckoned as impossible?

It couldn't occur; it's a counterfactual scenario. For example, what if England had won the American Revolution? That's impossible; the fact of the matter is that it didn't. However, I think it stands to reason that IF England had won, we wouldn't call it the "American Revolution".

A counterfactual scenario can be useful, despite the fact that it explicitly runs counter to the known facts, to the extent that it helps us to reason about what is actually real.

In this case, since we're trying to reason meaningfully about causality itself (which is involved in every single thing that we'll ever experience) it seemed necessary to refer to total knowledge and infinite attention spans, just for the sake of clarity. If memory serves, that was also a large part of Rand's explanation of the axioms, in Galt's speech.

Edited February 17, 2015 by Harrison Danneskjold

[Harrison Danneskjold]

You (and others) invoke the stolen concept (hierarchically speaking) of purported "hidden (deterministic) variables" to "explain" the observed non-determinism of the constituents of what we are used to in our everyday experience.

OK; how?

I don't see what concept that would be stealing, nor how. If you would be so kind as to explain it in greater detail, I would greatly appreciate it.

Edited February 17, 2015 by Harrison Danneskjold

[Eiuol]

I didn't read the OP as identifying causality with determinism initially, but now that StrictlyLogical points it out, it is a plausible interpretation of what was written in the OP.

The argument/points as written are neutral on that. It is all true and valid. A plausible way to go with an argument doesn't mean it's the only way. You can't just backpedal when you know a person's view on something else.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

If there are entities (like photons) whose behavior isn't determined by anything in particular, then according to point #2:

A causal relationship is implied, for any body of knowledge, when it contains observations of an entity behaving a certain way under a certain set of circumstances, but none of that entity doing so outside of that set of circumstances.

So if we have no conditions which could ever account for that then there wouldn't be any implication of causality, would there?

Edited February 17, 2015 by Harrison Danneskjold

[William O]

Why?

My reasons are the reasons Objectivists typically give. Introspection provides some support for the existence of libertarian free will, determinism implies skepticism, and determinists usually want to use terms like "rational" that are hard to account for satisfactorily on determinism.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

My reasons are the reasons Objectivists typically give. Introspection provides some support for the existence of libertarian free will, determinism implies skepticism, and determinists usually want to use terms like "rational" that are hard to account for satisfactorily on determinism.

Hard to account for???

Edited February 17, 2015 by Harrison Danneskjold

[Eiuol]

My reasons are the reasons Objectivists typically give. Introspection provides some support for the existence of libertarian free will, determinism implies skepticism, and determinists usually want to use terms like "rational" that are hard to account for satisfactorily on determinism.

Objectivism doesn't argue for the libertarian free will position. I'm not sure why people insist on it, it's not the only free will position.

[StrictlyLogical]

If there are entities (like photons) whose behavior isn't determined by anything in particular, then according to point #2:

So if we have no conditions which could ever account for that then there wouldn't be any implication of causality, would there?

 

No one ever said a photon's behavior was not "determined by ANYTHING in particular".  Are doing this on purpose?

 

A photon is affected by what it interacts with, the direction of polarization of the film it encounters, the number of slits it passes through... a great many things determine its behavior.  The point is that its behavior is delimited and probabilistic.  NOT undetermined and arbitrary, NOR completely deterministic (single possible outcome).

[StrictlyLogical]

OK; how?

I don't see what concept that would be stealing, nor how. If you would be so kind as to explain it in greater detail, I would greatly appreciate it.

 

Determinism (single outcomes) for macroscopic objects is what you are familiar with on a common sense human interactive level.  Metaphysically, macroscopic objects behave as they do due to their constituents, their microscopic atoms, electrons, nuclei etc.  Hierarchically the behaviour of the microscopic constituents give rise to the macroscopic properties.  Better still the resulting behavior of the object is a result of the behaviors of what it is made of and no outside supernatural ingredient.

 

 

We learn that a large number of finite separate atoms gives rise to substance which seems (to our eyes) infinitely continuous.

 

We also learn that electromagnetic forces and point like particles which can pass arbitrarily close to each other, when assembled in an atomic structure comprising overwhelmingly "unoccupied" space, can give rise to our eyes what is space filling stuff which cannot pass through each other.

 

When we learn of the metaphysical (and therefore the proper epistemological) foundation for things at a macroscopic scale behaves a certain way, we do not try to invert the hierarchy by imputing the property "continuity" to atoms or the property "space filling" to electrons...  Why? Because it is irrational to try to describe the cause (the microscopic behaviours which make the macroscopic behavior possible. and cause them to be as they are) as a consequence of the effect (the thing it gives rise to).

 

 

It would be the same as trying to say there is a little "light" in the photon making it "shiny".

 

 

The determinism you see every day, (single valued outcomes) is a result of the behavior of more fundamental constituents, i.e. lower in the hierarchy.  The multivalued probability of outcomes of interactions of electrons and other subatomic particles is as observable as the deterministic (single valued) outcomes of macroscopic objects.  It is what gives rise to them.  YOU attempt to describe the cause in term of the effects.

 

 

Trying to put a hidden variable "inside" the photon  is like trying to put a little light in there to explain how it is shiny.

[William O]

Objectivism doesn't argue for the libertarian free will position. I'm not sure why people insist on it, it's not the only free will position.

I think you're mistaken in your interpretation of Rand. Rand said "Reason does not work automatically; thinking is not a mechanical process; the connections of logic are not made by instinct. The function of your stomach, lungs or heart is automatic; the function of your mind is not." This is more consistent with libertarian free will than with determinism, because there would be no fundamental difference between the operation of the mind and the stomach on determinism. She also said "thinking is not an automatic function," which has similar implications.

 

http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/free_will.html

[Eiuol]

I think you're mistaken in your interpretation of Rand. Rand said "Reason does not work automatically; thinking is not a mechanical process; the connections of logic are not made by instinct. The function of your stomach, lungs or heart is automatic; the function of your mind is not."

False dichotomy. Your quote doesn't address anything about what exactly it is that differs between a mechanical process and a non-mechanical. I'll have to get back to you in a more substantive way to say that Rand advocates a form of compatibilism where reason operates under the same basic causal laws of everything else in reality and free will is a meaningful concept. In any case, by your own words, there's nothing problematic about the first post. You're right about what determinism requires though, or hard determinism at least.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

No one ever said a photon's behavior was not "determined by ANYTHING in particular". Are doing this on purpose?

Doing what? I would have no issue with saying that whether a probability wave collapses here or there isn't determined by the hairs on its chin; nor with saying that it isn't determined by the position of Pluto relative to Aquarius. What you're saying is that its behavior, in that instance and others, isn't determined by any thing in the entire universe.

If it quacks then I call it a duck.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

The multivalued probability of outcomes of interactions of electrons and other subatomic particles is as observable as the deterministic (single valued) outcomes of macroscopic objects.

OK.

So subatomic particles can spontaneously zap from matter to energy and back, whenever, but macroscopic objects could only do that once in a blue moon because of the sheer quantity of such actions.

But if macroscopic matter could spontaneously pop itself into energy, at any random moment (no matter how infrequent), then in what sense was Hume wrong when he said that there is NO POSSIBLE WAY TO KNOW whether food will nourish us tomorrow?

[William O]

False dichotomy. Your quote doesn't address anything about what exactly it is that differs between a mechanical process and a non-mechanical. I'll have to get back to you in a more substantive way to say that Rand advocates a form of compatibilism where reason operates under the same basic causal laws of everything else in reality and free will is a meaningful concept. In any case, by your own words, there's nothing problematic about the first post. You're right about what determinism requires though, or hard determinism at least.

I look forward to your more substantive discussion of Rand's position on free will.

[StrictlyLogical]

Doing what? I would have no issue with saying that whether a probability wave collapses here or there isn't determined by the hairs on its chin; nor with saying that it isn't determined by the position of Pluto relative to Aquarius. What you're saying is that its behavior, in that instance and others, isn't determined by any thing in the entire universe.

If it quacks then I call it a duck.

 

Your grasp of either logic or language is eluding you.  To say the behaviour of A is not determined by anything is to say that nothing can affect it .. and/or equally to say what it does is completely arbitrary. 

 

No one other than you is making such a ridiculous claim.  AS I SAID... photons and other microscopic fundamental particles behave in delimited probabilistic manner which depends on their identity and the identity of the context in which they are found.  It turns out there are multiple outcomes, not a single one.  you cant ague with something a person is saying when they have not said it .. so if you want to argue please stick to what I am saying not something you are imagining.